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ABSTRACT 
 
Armies, Navies and Economies in the Greek World  
in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.E. 
 
James Stephen O’Connor 
 
 
My study examines a category of data—the logistics of classical Greek warfare—that has 
not been used before for ancient Greek economic history.  This examination provides 
much new evidence for Greek economies in the fifth and fourth centuries.  Close readings 
of contemporary literary evidence—especially Thucydides—shows that classical Greek 
amphibious and naval expeditions military forces always acquired their food from 
markets provided to them by cities and traders.  A systematic comparative analysis 
confirms this conclusion by demonstrating that the economic and politico-social 
structures of classical Greek states meant that the market was the only institutional 
mechanism available to them to feed their navies and amphibious forces—in contrast to 
other European and near Eastern pre-industrial states which could use mechanisms such 
as requisitioning and taxation-in-kind to acquire provisions to supply their military 
forces.  I then produce estimates of the amounts of food purchased by classical Greek 
military forces in the markets provided to them by cities and traders by combining data 
on standard daily rations (from contemporary literary and epigraphical sources) and 
caloric requirements (established from an analysis of classical Greek skeletal material and 
WHO/FAO research data) with the relatively precise figures we have in contemporary 
historians for army and navy sizes and lengths of campaigns.  These calculations provide 
many more figures for trade in grain and other foods in the classical period than we 
currently possess, and figures that are mostly much greater in scale.  The analysis of the 
 provisioning of Greek overseas warfare provides, then—for the first time—evidence for a 
regular and large-scale seaborne trade of grain in the classical Greek Mediterranean; it 
shows a world where the development of marketing structures and networks of merchants 
was sufficiently strong to permit tens of thousands of men to get their food through 
markets for years at a time. Demonstrating the existence of a regular and substantial 
overseas trade in grain in the fifth and fourth centuries is crucially important for a wider 
understanding of classical Greek economies because the existence of such a trade made 
possible increased urbanization and specialization of labor, and itself could only have 
been made possible by sizeable reductions in transactions costs for maritime commerce:  






Armies, Navies and Economies in the Greek World 
in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.E. 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction............................................................................................................................ 1 
Chapter 1:  The Provisioning of the Sicilian Expedition ..................................................... 15 
Chapter 2:  The Provisioning of Classical Greek Overseas Campaigns............................ 119 
Chapter 3:  The Provisioning of Classical Greek Overland Campaigns............................ 192 
Chapter 4:  Military Markets:  Previous Approaches (I) ................................................... 256 
Chapter 5:  Military Markets:  Previous Approaches (II) .................................................. 291 
Chapter 6:  The Disbursement of State Pay to Classical Greek Sailors and Soldiers........ 349 
Chapter 7:  The Administration and Functioning of Markets used by Classical Greek 
Military Forces................................................................................................................... 437 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 507 
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 513 
Appendix 1:  Thucydides’ Speeches as Historical Evidence............................................. 561 
Appendix 2:  The Number of Men on the Athenian Campaign in Sicily in 415-413........ 574 
Appendix 3:  The Daily Grain Requirements of Classical Greek Sailors and Soldiers..... 589 
Appendix 4:  The Provisioning of the Ten Thousand on the March to Cunaxa ................ 622 
Appendix 5:  Some Notes on Hellenistic Military Pay and Provisioning.......................... 655 
Appendix 6:  Thucydides 8.58.5-6 and Rates of Pay for Peloponnesian Sailors in the First 
Years of the Ionian War..................................................................................................... 674 
Appendix 7:  Figures for the Proceeds from the Sale of Plunder in the Fifth and Fourth 
Centuries B.C.E ................................................................................................................. 699 
 ii 
Acknowledgements 
At Columbia, I am grateful to my advisor, Richard Billows, for his support, 
guidance and encouragement throughout the planning and writing of this dissertation.  I 
thank William Harris, too, for his support, and also for the opportunities he provided me 
during my time in New York, and for the typically provocative and intellectually 
stimulating contribution he made as chair of my dissertation defense.  I am also thankful 
to Marco Maiuro and Gary Reger both for their careful reading of my dissertation and for 
their comments at my defense, and to Clemente Marconi and Suzanne Saïd for their 
participation in the defense of my dissertation proposal.  I am particularly grateful to 
Adam Kosto for his incisive comments on the dissertation in both draft and finished 
form, his intellectual and professional advice at all stages of the dissertation process, and 
for his alerting me to the possibilities of the comparative evidence.  I would also like to 
thank my fellow graduate students, Todd Davis and Lisa Mignone, for their friendship 
and support before and during the writing of the dissertation. 
In Ireland, Maura Halpenny was a wonderful source of support, encouragement, 
and advice during the last year of writing; I will never forget this.  Finally, I will always 
be grateful to my parents, Maurice and Maura, and to my sisters, Caroline, Aisling, and 
Niamh, for their support (moral and material) during my time at Columbia, and for never 






















 i. Research  questions  
In 1962, Moses Finley, in a typically trenchant and brilliant article, exposed the 
theoretical poverty of (then) current approaches to classical Greek economic history and 
suggested several “lines of investigation” that could wrench the subject out of the 
conceptual crisis it was undergoing.
1
  The fifth line of investigation suggested by Finley 
reads as follows: 
The army and war deserve a full study in themselves, as feeders into the 
trade network by seizing mines, by providing slaves and other booty, and as 




No one has yet taken up this research project recommended by Finley.  If it has often 
been acknowledged that classical Greek land and sea warfare, like the warfare of any age, 
cannot be fully understood unless examined within its social, cultural, political, and 
economic framework,
3
 no study has ever situated the activities of classical Greek military 
                                                 
1
 Finley (1965) (publication of a paper given in 1962). 
 
2
 (Ibid.) 34.  Cf. also Finley’s sixth suggested research topic ((ibid.) 34-35:  “[s]trangely enough, there is no 
complete collection of the evidence on market regulations and procedures.  Past experience suggests the 
necessity for a careful preliminary definition, which would distinguish the kind of market with which the 
agoranomoi were concerned from the behaviour of pirates on the sea or from wartime blockade measures; 
or between the agora in its commercial sense, an emporion as a “port of trade” to use a phrase (and a 
concept) recently placed on the agenda by Karl Polanyi, and the temporary “markets” that Xenophon and 
others are always mentioning in connection with campaigning armies.  Whether these are meaningful 
distinctions or not remains to be seen; the usual approach to market regulations begins by ignoring them 
and therefore makes a test impossible.”  See now chapter 7 section ii below:  there is, in fact, no meaningful 
distinction between ‘commercial’ polis agorai and those agorai provided to classical Greek military forces.  
 
3
 See Perjés (1970) 23:  “[t]he warfare of any age is basically determined by economic and social 
circumstances...”; Braudel (1972) 891:  “[e]very age constructs its own war, its own types of war”; Howard 
(1976) ix-x; and esp. Erdkamp (1998) 1:  “[t]he way Roman wars were fought was determined by the 
geography and climate of the Mediterranean peninsulas, by the ecological restraints on agriculture and 
transport, and by the economic and social structures of the society of which the armies were a significant 
part.”  For the idea in a specifically classical Greek context, see , e.g., Cartledge (1997) 682; van Wees 
(2004) 1.  Cf. also (J. H.) Finley (1942) 5 on Thucydides’ Archaeology:  “he allows the first three sentences 
to suffice as an introduction, and plunges at once into the argument, demanded alike by these sentences and 
  
2 
forces within the structures and institutions of the economies in which they operated 
4
—
or used an analysis of their activities to ask questions about the nature and scale of 
economies in the classical Greek world.  This dissertation will address itself to the last of 
the research topics suggested by Finley above (although I will have often things to say 
below, too, on the sale of booty by classical Greek military forces).  That is to say, I will 
be primarily concerned in this work with addressing the following three questions: 
1. To what extent did markets provision Greek armies, navies, and amphibious 
forces in the fifth (especially) and fourth centuries B.C.E.?
5
 
2. How did the markets provided by poleis and traders to classical Greek military 
forces behave?  That is, how efficient were these markets in meeting the 




                                                                                                                                     




 Although there has been much work recently on the financing of military and naval operations by 
classical Greek states:  see, e.g., Garlan (1989); Kallet-Marx (1993); Millett (1993); Brun (1999); Andreau, 
Briant and Descat (edd.) (2000). 
 
5
 For a definition of ‘market,’ see, fundamentally, Samuelson and Nordhaus (1998) 27:  “[a] market is a 
mechanism by which buyers and sellers interact to determine the price and quantity of a good or service.”  
See, too, Erdkamp (2005) 1 on the word ‘market’ meaning three things:  “first, the place at which the 
commercial exchange of goods takes place; secondly, the forces of supply and demand that govern the 
commercial distribution of goods.  ‘Market’ in the second sense gives rise to another meaning of the word:  
the geographical area in which the commercial exchange of certain goods operates.”  I will use ‘market’ in 
all three of these senses in this dissertation; in each case, the context will make it clear in which particular 
sense I am employing the word.  See also chapter 2 section v for definition of what constitutes a market 




 The focus throughout the dissertation will be on the grain supply of classical Greek armies, navies, and 
amphibious forces (and not on the supply of any other food).  This is so for two important reasons:  firstly, 
there is not sufficient information to calculate the daily consumption of wine and olive oil by classical 
Greek sailors and soldiers:  see Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 69-70 (not possible to estimate oil consumption 
in antiquity); cf. Morley (2007b) 603 (orthodox figure of twenty liters a year for ancient oil consumption 
having no real basis); see also Harris (2005) 22 (the contribution of olive oil and wine to the caloric needs 
of ancient Mediterranean populations still unclear).  There is, however, sufficient information to calculate 
the daily grain requirements of classical Greek sailors and soldiers:  see appendix 3 below.  Secondly, 
  
3 
3. Finally, what do the scale and functioning of markets organized for military 
forces tell us about the structure and performance of the economy/economies 
of the classical Greek Mediterranean? 
 
ii. Previous work on the provisioning of classical Greek armies, navies, and 
amphibious forces 
Answering these questions necessitates a thorough re-examination of how 
classical Greek armies, navies and amphibious forces acquired their provisions.  There 
has not been much work done previously on the provisioning of classical Greek military 
forces,
7
 and the work that has been done has been marked by basic methodological errors.  
I will deal in detail in the chapters and appendices which follow with specific problems in 
earlier treatments of classical Greek military provisioning, and limit myself here to 
outlining the four main problems marring previous work on this subject.
8
  Firstly, almost 
all previous work on the food supply of classical Greek armies and navies has taken an 
antiquarian approach, simply listing the various means of acquisition of provisions 
                                                                                                                                     
demand for oil and wine, unlike grain, was elastic:  see Erdkamp (2005) 167-170.  Classical Greek sailors 
and soldiers could live without their oil and wine (cf. chapter 3 section iva, chapter 7 section iv below), but 




 See, e.g., Harthen (2001) 1-2 for a brief survey. 
 
8
 Pritchett’s (1971) work on the pay and provisioning of classical Greek military forces is marred by all the 
methodological errors I am about to describe and by numerous errors of fact, misreadings, and unwarranted 
assumptions.  There will be a lot of correction and criticism of Pritchett throughout this dissertation (see 
already Wheeler’s criticisms ([1992-93 410-414) of Pritchett’s thesis-less ‘tell all you know’ approach in 
his review of Pritchett [1991]); this will be done in the belief that productive academic work is generated 
through (reasoned) controversy and debate, and not out of any wish to be ungenerous.  It will be especially 
necessary to carefully correct and criticize Pritchett’s work on provisioning (and pay) since it is constantly 
cited as the authoritative treatment of these subjects:  see, e.g., Andrewes, HCT v.346; Hornblower, CT 
i.105, i.249; Kallet-Marx (1993), e.g., 10 n.29, 45 n.20, 75 n.17; Lazenby (1994) 3 n.1, 10 and n.78; 
Raaflaub (2007) 120 n.9; Hornblower, CT iii.310, 322.  See also Hanson (2007) 8:  Pritchett “in many ways 




available to Greek military forces in the fifth and fourth centuries without attempting to 
quantify their relative importance (to each other);
9
 but the role of any one method of 
provisioning in the food supply of military forces can only be understood when its 
relationship to (available) alternative methods of provisioning is ascertained.
10
  Secondly, 
the mechanisms available to classical Greek states to feed their armies, navies, and 
amphibious forces depended not just on the economic structures of those states, but also 
on their institutional, political, and social structures, a fact rarely noted by previous 
classical historians.
11
  Thirdly, previous authors on this topic have taken no or insufficient 
account of the fact that “[m]ilitary strategy combines tactics and logistics to shape the 
conduct of operations.”
12
  The “dialectical” nature of the relationship between strategy 
and supply meant that classical Greek generals were sometimes compelled to adopt 
certain means of acquisition of provisions for their forces in order to achieve their 
                                                 
9




 See esp. Erdkamp (1998) 17-18:  “[s]ince none of the[..] mechanisms [of provisioning] could apply to all 
circumstances, various alternatives were always used during the same war.  The difficulties inherent in 
feeding armies compelled governments and commanders to use most of the methods available 




 See the exceptions of Cruickshank (1954) 58-85; van Wees (2004) 105-108, 113.  Those scholars citing 
Engels’ work on the provisioning of Alexander’s army in the east (e.g. Ober [1991] 174, Hanson [1998] 
33-34 n.24, Rawlings [2007] 74) miss the point that Alexander was campaigning with resources 
unavailable to classical Greek poleis (and the fact that Alexander was operating in completely different 
conditions to those found in ‘old’ Greece).  See also p.248 n.134, p.607 n.67, and p.195 n.6 below:  several 
methodological errors in Engels’ groundbreaking work render his conclusions unsafe. 
 
12






  Fourthly, and related to the previous two points, previous treatments of 
the provisioning of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces have failed to 
adopt a specific comparative framework in order to establish a model of the “limits of the 
possible”
14
 means of acquisition (of supplies) available to classical Greek states and their 
military forces, into which one can fit the limited information we possess on Greek 
provisioning.
15
  This was an understandable failure for those historians writing on the 
food supply of classical Greek military forces before the nineteen eighties, at which point 
very little work had been done on the provisioning of other pre-industrial land and sea 
forces; but the outpouring of work on pre-industrial (European) military provisioning 
since that date makes the failure by Greek historians working on this subject to use 
comparative evidence less understandable now.
16
  In this dissertation, I will employ the 
models and frameworks developed by Erdkamp
17
 (especially) and Harari
18
 in order to 
                                                 
13
 See Harari (2000) esp. 297, 329-333.  See also Erdkamp (1998) 11-12, and, e.g., chapter 2 section iiic 
below for illustration of this point.  The failure of previous historians to take account of the role of the 
actual conditions of fighting in determining the means of provisioning used by classical Greek military 
forces can be seen in, e.g., the (incorrectly) indiscriminate treatment of supply lines to classical Greek land 




 See Braudel (1981) 27-29. 
 
15
 See, e.g., Hopkins (2002) 191-192 on the utility of models:  “[f]irst, models allow us to perceive the 
structures or repeated patterns which lie behind the superficial flow of individual actors and events, which 
fill the pages of traditional Roman narrative histories.  Secondly, models allow us to construct whole 
pictures, into which the surviving fragments of ancient source material can be plausibly fitted.  The model 
is a sort of master picture, as on the front of a jigsaw puzzle box; the fragments of surviving ancient sources 
provide only a few of the jigsaw pieces.” 
 
16
 van Creveld (1977) stimulated interest in logistics in pre-industrial European military history (see 
Chambers [1991] 401).  For important work on the provisioning of pre-industrial European armies (later 
than classical Greece) after van Creveld, see (in addition to the works cited in the next two notes) esp. Lynn 
(ed.) (1993), Roth (1999), Haldon (ed.) (2006), Pryor (ed.) (2006).  
 
17
 (1998) esp. 12-18. 
  
6 
ascertain the provisioning possibilities open to classical Greek states, and to get beyond a 




iii. Previous and current conceptual approaches to classical Greek economies 
Dominated by the work of Moses Finley, the historiography of the ancient Greek 
economy in the second half of the twentieth century emphasized what that economy was 
not:  e.g., it was not an economy characterized by large-scale industrial enterprises, 
economic rationality, integrated self-regulating markets, sophisticated credit instruments, 
and so on.  This approach originated as a necessary and laudable reaction against 
seventy-five years of theoretically unsophisticated and modernizing scholarship, but it 
erred in letting a valid ‘substantivist’ critique of the anachronistic assumptions of earlier 
historians slide into a characterization of economies in the ancient world as static, 
minimally sized entities;
20
 and in the last fifteen years, new work, which focuses not on 
the failure of the classical Greek economy to develop, but rather on its particular structure 
and performance, has emerged to replace the Finleyian orthodoxy (which “relentlessly 
emphasized structure over performance”).
21
  The recent work of Bresson
22
 and 
                                                                                                                                     
 
18
 (2000) esp. 300-301. 
 
19
 I do not agree with Hanson ([1999] 413) that the adoption of a common sense approach is the way 
forward for ancient military history. 
 
20
 I am very summary here since the ‘substantivist-formalist’ and ‘primitivist-modernist’ debates have been 
well summarized and treated so many times:  for sane and balanced discussions of those debates, see, e.g., 
Andreau (2002); Cartledge (2002); Amemiya (2004) 57-58. 
 
21
 See Morris, Saller and Scheidel (2007) 3.  See also Morris and Manning (2005) 14:  for Finley, following 





 (and his various collaborators) has been instrumental in this 
regard,
24
 especially through its emphasis on (respectively) the place of markets and the 
potential for growth in the ancient Greek economy. 
Within the broader debates on the nature and scale of ancient Greek economies, 
the question of the nature and scale of the trade in grain in the classical Greek world has 
focused (almost) solely on Athens, and especially on the question of when in the fifth 
century imports of grain became structurally important to the subsistence of that polis.
25
  
There has been almost no work done specifically on the grain trade of poleis other than 
Athens in the fifth century,
26
 and hardly any for this trade in the fourth century, mostly 
                                                                                                                                     
transformation; concentrating on this question, “what mattered was the social structure of the economies 
under study.” See Morris, Saller and Scheidel (2007) 5-6 for Roman historians attempting to investigate the 
structure and performance of the economies they study earlier and more often than Hellenists. 
 
22
 (2000), (2008a), and (2008b). 
 
23
 See the works cited in n.21, and also Morris (1994a), (2004), and (2006). 
 
24
 The fact that specialists working on the “advanced organic economies” found throughout the world 
before the nineteenth century (see Morris and Manning [2005] 14) have recently shown that there was 
nothing intrinsically special about European economies of the eighteenth century that led to the take-off of 
those economies into industrial capitalism, but rather that this take-off was dependent on contingent factors 
such as (especially) the availability of coal and (markets in) colonies to those economies (see especially 
Pomeranz [2000]), has also motivated scholars to develop a new framework of analysis for ancient Greek 
and Roman economies, and to consider the possibility of “major gains in performance” in those economies 
(see esp. Morris, Saller and Scheidel [2007] 6-7, 11). 
 
25
 For the debate, see Garnsey (1988), Whitby (1998), Moreno (2007). 
 
26
 Moreno ([2007] 314-315) has recently argued that five to ten per cent of other poleis in the Greek world 
besides Athens in the fifth century probably imported grain regularly because of their population sizes 
(around ten thousand male citizens).  Moreno relies on Hansen (2006) for these population figures; but this 
work is full of assumptions with greater or lesser margins of error (Robinson [2007] 1244) that render its 




because the evidential landscape for this question is so bleak outside of Athens:
27
 “the 
regular movement of grain [in the Greek world] is not specifically attested in the sources 
of the fifth century B.C.”
28
  This dissertation will argue that the provisioning of Greek 
amphibious forces and navies does give us evidence of regular large-scale trade in grain 
in the Greek world in the fifth century B.C.E.  I will focus mostly on the fifth century 
since the narrative of Thucydides together with the other literary and epigraphical sources 
of that century allow for a continuous and integrated analysis of the provisioning of 
Greek navies and amphibious forces; and also because the idea that there was a regular 
trade in grain in poleis outside Athens in the fourth century is less controversial.
29
  (I will 
also focus on the fifth century because there is, in fact, very little work on the nature and 




iv. Some preliminary remarks on the use of sources in this dissertation 
The evidence to answer the question of how important markets were in satisfying 
the provisioning requirements of Greek, and especially Athenian, overseas expeditionary 
forces and navies in the fifth and early fourth centuries comes from many and various 
sources.  I will address the particular challenges of interpretation each of these sources 
                                                 
27
 See Bresson (2000) 278-279, Reed (2003) 16 n.6 for the few references we do have. 
 
28
 Horden and Purcell (2000) 120.  This is not absolutely right—see SIG
3
 337-338 and Jameson (1983) 12 
for a regular trade in grain attested at Teos in 470/69—but it has been true for regular large-scale 
movements in grain.  
 
29
 Assumed for example at Burford (1992) 676; cf. Austin (1992) 558-559. 
 
30




poses as and when I employ them in the chapters and appendices below.  But the 
importance of one work—Thucydides’ Histories—for the reconstruction of the 
provisioning of overseas expeditions in the Aegean in the period after the Persian Wars 
and up until 411 is so great that some preliminary points, basic but crucial, need to be 
made about the use of Thucydides as a source before any analysis of this provisioning 
can begin.
31
  Firstly, in constructing his narrative, Thucydides could presume in his 
contemporary audience “a large contextual competence we fatally lack;”
32
 he could 
therefore take for granted and omit the details of the basic structures of the states and 
societies he was describing.
33
  Secondly, Thucydides’ work is not a primary source for 
the conditions of classical Greek warfare.
34
  Thucydides wrote a highly rhetorical 
narrative containing novel and controversial interpretations of political and military 
developments:  even if we are forced to treat his work as if it were a primary source 
because of our lack of primary documentation, it must always be remembered that it is 
not.
35
  This means that before we can use any statement in Thucydides’ text concerning 
                                                 
31




 Luraghi (2000) 227. 
 
33
 See Gomme, HCT i.1-25 on “What Thucydides took for granted;” cf., e.g., Raaflaub (2007) 98. 
 
34
 Luraghi (2000) 228. 
 
35
 I.e., one always has to keep in mind the (obvious but important) point that Thucydides was not writing to 
become a repository of data on, e.g., the mundane details of the supply and financing of classical Greek 




the provisioning of military forces, we must examine and take into consideration its 
context in order to grasp its true meaning and significance.
36
 
But how to get from these methodological points to a (as near as one can) 
comprehensive examination of the provisioning of fifth-century Greek amphibious and 
naval operations?  The answer lies in developing these two points.  By actively 
interpreting Thucydides’ text,
37
 i.e. by studying it closely in order to “rediscover and 
appreciate more fully the care and categories which Thucydides applied in selecting and 
presenting events,”
38
 we can reconstruct what Thucydides usually took for granted and 
therefore omitted.  It is a brute fact that the men taking part in the overseas expeditions 
and naval operations that Thucydides described needed to eat and drink in order to live:  
but, in general, details of provisioning appear only rarely in his accounts of military 
campaigns, and then almost always in exceptional circumstances; it is therefore certain 
that Thucydides thought that the details of military food supply were utterly familiar to 
                                                 
36
 Cf. Kallet (2001) 7 on the topics of money and finance in Thucydides:  “[Thucydides’] aims, and the 
often highly rhetorical ways in which he embeds the subject of money and financing in the narrative, 
necessitate an examination of passages concerned with financial information in their narrative context, 
instead of regarding them as factual nuggets that can be plucked out of context and used as if they came 
from a list or as if Thucydides were writing a history of Athenian war finance.”  Cf. also Kallet-Marx 
(1993) 98 on Thucy. 2.13.3-5.  And see again Luraghi (2000) 228:  since Thucydides is not a primary 
source, we cannot “transform[...] every statement by him into a fact” and we must always remember “the 
role played by any statement in Thucydides’ rhetorical strategy.”  Cf. Flower and Marincola (2002) 22 on 
using Herodotus as a historical source:  “the Histories are a literary creation, and this has important 
implications for how we understand the text.  H. did not haphazardly set down what he knew, but rather 
constructed his narrative with great care.  As a result, it is not legitimate to pick and choose what one wants 
to believe while ignoring the context of the surrounding narrative.” 
 
37
 See Hopkins (1978a) 183:  “[t]he historian should interpret his sources actively, by trying, for example, 
to examine what the ancient sources took for granted and so systematically underreported.”  See also 
Cipolla (1991) 54:  primary sources are “a screen between the historian and the past.  The distorting effect 
of this screen varies, and the historian’s first task is to check its existence and assess its strength.” 
 
38
 Stahl (2003) 174; or, as Luraghi puts it ([2000] 228), to overcome the problems noted above, “it is 




his audience, and thus normally did not feel the need to describe them.
39
  In general, 
Thucydides (in common with other ancient Greek (and Roman) historians) only mentions 
provisioning when it forms a part of the tactical or strategic considerations of a military 
force, when he has to in order to clarify his narrative of military operations, or when 
something extraordinary occurs in connection with it.
40
  Keeping in mind the fact that 
Thucydides usually systematically underreported military provisioning, one can then use 
those discrete pieces of evidence on provisioning he does include (with due attention to 
their context), together with evidence from other (literary and epigraphical) sources 
external to his text, as well as comparative evidence, in order to begin “to develop an 
entirely different framework of analysis”
41
 to his.  But the basis of any attempt to fully 
develop a framework of analysis for the provisioning of classical Greek overseas military 
campaigns has to be a detailed examination of the means of supply of the one expedition 




                                                 
39
 See Gomme, HCT i.14 on the question of supplies as part of “What Thucydides took for granted” (there 
are, however, serious mistakes in Gomme’s treatment in this section of the provisioning of Greek military 
campaigns (see p.46 n.84 and p.126 n.18 below)); cf. Davies (1993) 118.  Cf. also Rood (1998) 135:  “... 
food was for [Thucydides] only selectively important;” and (ibid.) 135 n.9 for a summary of those rare 
occasions when Thucydides does mention food in his narrative.  Cf. esp. Kallet (2001) 7 [a continuation of 
the passage quoted above at p.8 n.36 on the topics of money and financing in Thucydides]:  “[i]n order to 
understand the nature and meaning of such items of [financial] information, we must begin by 
understanding his purpose in including them.  This helps in understanding the reasons for the absence of 




 See Erdkamp (1998) 4-5; cf. Luttwak (1993) 3-4. 
 
41
 Davies (1993) 118; my discussion of the issues surrounding the use of Thucydides as a historical source 
owes much to his short discussion of this problem (at [1993] 117-118).  
 
42
 For the question of why Thucydides described the provisioning of the Sicilian expedition at length, see 
appendix 1 section iii.  For the use of Thucydidean speeches as historical evidence, see appendix 1.  For use 
  
12 
v. Structure of the dissertation 
 This dissertation can be understood as comprising three parts.  In the first part 
(chapters 1-3), I demonstrate that both the amphibious forces sent out by Athens to 
reduce Syracuse by blockade in 415-413, and those sent out before that campaign to 
besiege coastal and island poleis in the Aegean rebelling from or refusing to join the 
Athenian empire, depended for their provisions during their siege operations on markets 
supplied by private traders (bringing their own stocks of grain to sell).  In sailing to the 
poleis they wished to reduce by circumvallation sieges, Athenian amphibious forces 
relied for their supplies on markets provided by friendly (or neutral) poleis they sailed by.  
Foraging played no important role in the provisioning of these amphibious forces.  
Traders were the most important single source of grain for the provisioning of Athenian 
periploi around the Peloponnese in the first and second Peloponnesian Wars, too, though, 
for these operations, foraging did play a greater role in the provisioning of sailors and 
soldiers (than it did in the provisioning of sailors and soldiers engaged in the blockades of 
enemy poleis).  The huge Athenian and Peloponnesian navies fighting each other in the 
Ionian War also relied for their food on seaborne supply lines provisioned by traders.  In 
contrast, classical Greek armies relied almost solely on foraging for their provisions in 
hostile territory; private traders played only a supplementary role in the provisioning of 
land campaigns.  In friendly territory, however, classical Greek armies on the march to 
war zones depended for their provisions on markets organized by friendly poleis, too. 
                                                                                                                                     
of ‘real’ Athenian forensic and bouleutic speeches as historical evidence, see Millett (2000) 25, Nevett 
(2000) 340:  representations of institutions and ‘daily life’ had to be at least plausible in these speeches in 
order to seem realistic to juries chosen by lot, numbering in the hundreds, and broadly representative of the 
Athenian citizen body as a whole. 
  
13 
 In the second part of the dissertation (chapters 4-6), I discuss previous treatments 
of the pay and provisioning of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces.  I 
demonstrate, firstly, that the entrenched scholarly consensus that classical Greek sailors 
and soldiers were regularly the victims of opportunistic behavior by traders in the agorai 
organized for them has no basis in the literary texts usually cited to support that 
consensus.  I then show that the idea held by previous scholars that classical Greek 
military pay rates reflected prices in the markets prepared for Greek military forces also 
has no foundation in any ancient evidence.  Finally, I show that the old (and firmly held) 
idea that Athenian (and other) military forces in the fifth and fourth centuries received 
their pay in two installments (one on campaign, and one when those forces returned from 
a voyage or campaign) was based on a misreading of passages in Thucydides and the 
Demosthenic corpus; in reality, classical Greek military forces could expect (till the mid 
fourth century) always to receive their pay in monthly installments (before each of month 
of service) while on campaign. 
 In the third part of the dissertation (chapter 7), I demonstrate that the legal and 
institutional framework of the markets organized for classical Greek military forces, and 
the conditions of production and distribution in the Greek world of the fifth and fourth 
centuries, enabled those markets to satisfy the grain requirements of classical Greek 
overseas forces.  On land campaigns, too, classical Greek soldiers could acquire 
sufficient amounts of grain from the markets prepared for them by friendly poleis. 
 Finally, after concluding briefly with a consideration of what the provisioning of 
classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces can tell us about the structure and 
performance of Greek economies in the fifth (especially) and fourth centuries, I discuss, 
  
14 
in seven appendices, the use of Thucydides’ speeches as historical evidence; the numbers 
of men on the Sicilian expedition; the daily grain requirements of classical Greek sailors 
and soldiers; the provisioning of the Ten Thousand on their march to Cunaxa; some 
features of Hellenistic pay and provisioning; the rates of pay of Peloponnesian sailors in 
the first years of the Ionian War; and figures for proceeds from the sale of plunder in the 
Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries. 
 But, before all of that, I will begin the dissertation proper with a discussion of the 
provisioning of the Sicilian expedition, and what it can tell us about the scale of markets 





Chapter 1:  The Provisioning of the Sicilian Expedition 
i.  Nicias’ second speech to the assembly concerning the παρασκευ of the 
expedition (6.20-22) 
In the summer of 415, the Athenian assembly voted to send sixty ships to go to 
war in Sicily, on the pretext of supporting the Egestans and the Leontines (against the 
Selinuntines and the Syracusans, respectively) (6.8.2);
1
 although the Athenians’ real aim 
in voting for the expedition, according to Thucydides, was to conquer the whole of Sicily 
(6.6.1; cf. 6.8.4).  On the fifth day after the decision to send the sixty ships, a second 
assembly was held, “καθ’ ὅτι χρὴ τὴν παρασκευὴν ταῖς ναυσὶ τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι, καὶ 
τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, εἴ του προσδέοιντο, ψηφισθῆναι ἐς τὸν ἔκπλουν,” “to consider how the 
παρασκευή for the ships might be prepared as quickly as possible,
2
 and to vote whatever 
else might be required by the generals for the expedition” (6.8.3).
3
  Nicias, who had been 
chosen against his will to be one of the three generals to sail to Sicily, thought that the 
Athenians were being badly advised regarding the decision to send an expedition in the 
first place; accordingly, he came forward to address the assembly in an attempt to divert 
it from the undertaking (6.8.4).  Instead, then, of speaking about the logistical 
                                                 
1
 All text references in this chapter will be to Thucydides’ Histories, unless otherwise indicated. 
 
2
 My translation of this clause, based on Dover (1965a) 14 and Hornblower, CT iii.319. 
 
3
 “τὴν παρασκευὴν” in this sentence should be taken to mean “all those things that make up an overseas 
expedition other than the triremes”; i.e., all the heavy and light infantry, cavalry and provisions (in the 
broad sense of this word, i.e., meaning supplies of food, drink, and equipment) brought for an expedition.  
This is not the usual meaning of παρασκευή, nor is this an orthodox translation of the term as it used at 






requirements of a force of sixty ships about to embark for Sicily,
4
 he attempted to 
dissuade the Athenians from the expedition by arguing that their strategic position in the 
Aegean would be endangered by mounting a campaign in such a distant theater of 
operations.   
 Nicias did succeed in persuading some of those present to abandon the idea of the 
expedition (6.15.1).  But, even after his speech, most of the Athenians in the assembly 
were still in favor of sailing to Sicily (6.15.1); and when Alcibiades, one of the other two 
generals chosen to command the sixty ships, spoke after Nicias and made a persuasive 
case against him and for war in Sicily in a brilliant speech full of specious arguments and 
misrepresentations,
5
 the assembly was even more eager for the expedition than before 
(6.19.1).  Nicias, in response, perceiving that it would now be useless to attempt to deter 
those assembled from the war by the arguments he had used in his first speech, now 
adopted a new rhetorical strategy:  he would attempt to discourage the Athenians from 
sending the expedition by demanding, as general, a massive amount of παρασκευή
6
 for it 
(“παρασκευῆς δὲ πλήθει, εἰ πολλὴν ἐπιτάξειε, τάχ’ ἂν µεταστήσειεν αὐτούς”) (6.19.2).
7
 
                                                 
4
 Although Nicias did acknowledge the official agenda of the assembly in his first words to those gathered 




 See appendix 1 section iii for discussion of this speech. 
 
6
 παρασκευή here should be taken to mean “all those things that make up an overseas expedition”; see 
below p.27 n.37 and p.29 n.42 for this interpretation. 
 
7
 As Connor points out ([1984] 166 and n.21, citing the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1421b 24f.), Nicias was 
adopting here a rhetorical strategy common in classical Greek oratory:  if one could not prevent a course of 
action by arguing that it was the wrong one to take or that it was infeasible, one could attempt to stop it by 






In order to justify the dispatch of exceptionally large numbers of land forces and 
amounts of supplies and equipment to accompany the triremes sailing to Sicily, Nicias 
had to make a compelling argument to the assembly for why the expedition to Sicily 
would need an extraordinarily great παρασκευή.  He began by describing the character 
and number of the cities in Sicily; they were many, great, and subject to no one (6.20.2).  
But it was an emphasis on the impressive military resources available to the Sicilian 
poleis, and especially those available to the poleis that the Athenians would be sailing 
against, Selinus and Syracuse, that formed the first truly important part of his argument 
for a massive παρασκευή for the expedition (6.20.3-4).
8
  Nicias isolated and emphasized 
five crucial factors that would make the Sicilian poleis unusually formidable enemies for 
an expeditionary force sailing from Athens (6.20.4):
9
 
1. They had many hoplites and archers and slingers; 
2. They had many triremes (an exaggeration at least as far as Selinus was 
concerned),
10
 and the populations to man them; 
3. Selinus and Syracuse had plentiful supplies of money, both private and public. 
But the chief advantages which these cities would have over any potential force 
sailing from Athens were that: 
4. They possessed many horses; 
5. They relied on homegrown grain, rather than importing it.
11
 
                                                 
8
 Kohl (1977) 145.  See appendix 1 for my approach and methodology in using this and other Thucydidean 
speeches as historical evidence. 
 
9
 These factors should be understood as applying to all the Sicilian cities that would be fighting against 
Athens, but particularly Syracuse:  cf. Smith (1913) 47 ad loc. with 7.58.4, 7.55.2. 
 
10






Having described the military assets available to Selinus and Syracuse, Nicias 
then logically and methodically laid out the παρασκευή that would need to be brought 
with the expedition to Sicily in order to ensure a successful outcome in a war against 
cities with such (by the standards of ‘mainland’ Greece and the Aegean) extraordinary 
resources
12
—and especially the παρασκευή that would be needed in order to counteract 
these cities’ natural advantages in cavalry and grain (over any force sailing against them 
from a long distance away).  Firstly, against such enemies, the force sent from Athens 
would have to consist not just of triremes and an inadequate force (of infantry is implied), 
but would have to include a sizeable infantry, too (6.21.1:  “Πρὸς οὖν τοιαύτην δύναµιν οὐ 
ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς µόνον δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πεζὸν πολὺν ξυµπλεῖν...”),
13
 in order 
                                                                                                                                                 
11
 Nicias says “ᾧ δὲ µάλιστα ἡµῶν προύχουσιν, [i.e., cavalry and grain].”  Who are the “ἡµῶν” here?  It 
seems that Nicias at 6.20.4 was eliding the Athenians in the assembly and those about to embark on the 
expedition in order to make his presentation of the potential problems of the expedition more vivid to his 
audience (‘these are the problems you face’).  Athens was strong in cavalry (see 1.80.3, 1.80.6), and the 
Selinuntines and Syracusans could not be said to be especially superior to the Athenians in the numbers of 
horse available to them:  at the start of the war, Athens had 1,200 cavalry (2.13.8), exactly the amount 
available to their Sicilian enemies in 415 (see 6.67.2).  Even allowing for exaggeration on Nicias’ part, he 
must be alluding here to the cavalry that would be available to an expedition making the long journey from 
Athens to Sicily, and not to the total numbers of cavalry currently available to the Athenian state.  As for 
Nicias’ statement on the grain resources of Selinus and Syracuse, Dover (HCT iv.257 ad loc.) states that 
“the contrast with Athens is pointed, but the special relevance of the remark is that states which do not rely 
on imported corn are less vulnerable to naval blockade.”  But a contrast with the resources in grain 
available to the city of Athens would have no relevance or point here:  Nicias is here, in fact, making a 
contrast with the grain supply of the expedition, since any force sent to Sicily would necessarily have to 
rely on imported grain in order to survive in Sicily, unlike the cities it would be sent to fight against:  see 
pp.29-33 below on 6.22. 
 
12
 Note that Nicias had told his audience that (in implicit contrast to ‘mainland’ Greece and the Aegean) in 
Sicily the Athenians would be fighting against Greek cities “armed in every way just like our own power” 
(“παρεσκευασµέναι τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁµοιοτρόπως µάλιστα τῇ ἡµετέρᾳ δυνάµει”); and that this was especially 
true of Selinus and Syracuse (6.20.3).  This would make these cities especially and unusually difficult for 
the Athenians to war against (the point is endorsed by Thucydides (see again 7.55.2, 7.58.4, and also esp. 
8.96.5); cf. Liebeschutz (1968) 294 and n.42. 
 
13
 See Kohl (1977) 150:  as can be seen from the adverb “οὖν,” 6.21.1 represents the start of the conclusions 
to be drawn from the analysis at 6.20.3-4.  My paraphrase of the Greek is based on Dover (1965a) 32-33; 





to achieve something worthy of its intentions and not be shut off from the land by the 
numerous cavalry of the Sicilian cities.
14
  A sizeable infantry would be especially 
necessary “if the cities should take alarm and combine, and we should be left without 
friends (except the Egestans) to furnish us with cavalry with which to defend 
ourselves.”
15
  Nicias then once more emphasized the importance of an initial dispatch of 
a large land force in order to counteract the Sicilian horse:  it would be shameful, not 
having deliberated properly and therefore failing to send out a substantial infantry force 
to deal with the cavalry of the Sicilian cities, to be forced to depart (due to failure to ward 




                                                                                                                                                 
 
14
 6.21.1:  “εἴπερ βουλόµεθα ἄξιον τῆς διανοίας δρᾶν καὶ µὴ ὑπὸ ἱππέων πολλῶν εἴργεσθαι τῆς γῆς...” 
 
15
 6.21.1:  “ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ ξυστῶσιν αἱ πόλεις φοβηθεῖσαι καὶ µὴ ἀντιπαράσχωσιν ἡµῖν φίλοι τινὲς 
γενόµενοι ἄλλοι ἢ Ἐγεσταῖοι ᾧ ἀµυνούµεθα ἱππικόν...”  As Kohl points out ([1977] 151), the “ἄλλως τε 
καὶ” here picks up the “εἴπερ” of the previous clause:  Nicias is gradually but constantly preparing his 
audience for the detailed demands for infantry to come. 
 
16
 6.21.2:  “(αἰσχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν ἢ ὕστερον ἐπιµεταπέµπεσθαι, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως 
βουλευσαµένους)...”  Kagan ([1981] 187) and Ober ([1998] 113) take “ἐπιµεταπέµπεσθαι” at 6.21.2 as 
referring to the possibility of the Athenians having to send home for “supplies.”  But this section of Nicias’ 
speech is concerned only with the issue of the size of the infantry force needed by the expedition to 
counteract the large numbers of cavalry possessed by the Sicilian cities; it is only in the next, separate and 
discrete, section of the speech that Nicias first mentions and discusses the question of supplies for the 
expeditionary force.  As I will demonstrate below (see pp.24-26, pp.32-33), Nicias never considered the 
possibility that the Athenians in Sicily might be able to send home for provisions.  Crawley’s translation of 
“ἐπιµεταπέµπεσθαι,” “to send back for reinforcements,” is therefore correct. 
The argument that it would be shameful to send back for reinforcements was by far the weakest used by 
Nicias to support his case that a large land force should form part of the expedition:  shame would not 
prevent the Athenians in the summer of 413 from sending a second expeditionary force to Sicily which 
would include roughly the same amount of infantry as the first sent to the island (see 7.42.1).  But with this 
argument, Nicias had at least anticipated the potential objection to his plan, that more infantry forces could 
always be sent out later, if the initial expeditionary force struggled against the Sicilian cavalry; this 
objection had to be addressed somehow, and in the lack of a compelling strategic argument against it, an 





It was, then, essential for the success of the expedition that it set out from Athens 
with a considerable παρασκευή—but not just to be able to match the Sicilian infantry and 
cavalry in any fighting, but also in order to be able to counter the advantage in grain 
resources that Selinus and Syracuse possessed (6.21.2):   
αὐτόθεν δὲ παρασκευῇ ἀξιόχρεῳ ἐπιέναι, γνόντας ὅτι πολύ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἡµετέρας 
αὐτῶν µέλλοµεν πλεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὁµοίῳ στρατευσόµενοι καὶ ὅτε ἐν τοῖς τῇδε 
ὑπηκόοις ξύµµαχοι ἤλθετε ἐπί τινα, ὅθεν ῥᾴδιαι αἱ κοµιδαὶ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας ὧν 
προσέδει, ἀλλ’ ἐς ἀλλοτρίαν πᾶσαν ἀπαρτήσοντες, ἐξ ἧς µηνῶν οὐδὲ τεσσάρων 
τῶν χειµερινῶν ἄγγελον ῥᾴδιον ἐλθεῖν. 
 
We must therefore start from here (i.e. Athens) with a considerable παρασκευή,
17
 
seeing that we are going to sail far from our country, with the prospect of a 
campaign on quite different conditions from those in which you took the field 
against some other state as an ally of your subjects in this part of the world, 
where the supply of your additional requirements from friendly territory was 
easy; but (on this campaign) we are cutting ourselves off, and going to a land 
entirely hostile, from which it is not easy for a messenger to come (sc. to Athens) 




These words mark an important stage in the development of Nicias’ rhetorical 
strategy.  At the start of 6.21.1, the argument that the force sent out from Athens would 
have to include not just triremes but a sizeable land force in addition had contained an 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
17
 Two notes on the translation of this first clause.  Firstly, as Jordan points out ([2000] 67 n.10 (cf. 72), 
referencing 6.25.2, 6.26.2, 6.22 and the scholiast (Hude) on 6.21.2), “αὐτόθεν” at 6.21.2 means ‘from 
Athens itself’ (as opposed to ‘from the allies’ or elsewhere; or, as Kohl [1977] 155 has it, “= griech. 
Mutterland”).  See also Classen/Steup, vi.54 ad loc., and p.32 n.49 below on 6.22. 
Secondly, Jordan, criticizing Classen/Steup’s translation of “ἀξιόχρέων διάνοιαν” at 6.31.1 as “ein 
gewaltiges Unternehmen,” states ([2000] 67 n.11) that “ἀξιόχρεως [at 6.31.1] basically means 
‘counterbalancing a need’; here it echoes Nicias’ word [at 6.21.2] and has its regular meaning ‘adequate’.”  
But at 6.21.2, at any rate, there is no real contradiction between translating “ἀξιοχρέῳ” as “counterbalancing 
a need” and “considerable” or “large”:  the παρασκευή at 6.21.2 is to be sent out to counterbalance the very 
substantial military resources of Selinus and Syracuse, and therefore is meant to be very substantial itself.  
Here, then, “adequate,” while a literally correct translation of “ἀξιοχρέῳ,” does not satisfactorily convey the 
size of the παρασκευή Nicias is arguing for. 
 
18
 For the translation:  for “with the prospect of... from friendly territory was easy...” and “from which it is 
not easy... during the winter,” see Dover, HCT iv.257-258.  Otherwise, Crawley’s translation is used, apart 
from “hostile” for “ἀλλοτρίαν,” for which see Kohl (1977) 153 n.1:  “ἀλλοτρίαν” is to be contrasted with 





implicit contrast between the requirements of the planned expedition to Sicily and those 
of normal Athenian operations:  that is, in pointing out the need for a large infantry force 
to accompany the expedition to Sicily, Nicias had implied that, in their normal overseas 
campaigns in the Aegean and ‘mainland’ Greece (against ‘normal’ enemies which did not 
possess the unusually large infantry and (especially) cavalry resources of Selinus and 
Syracuse), the Athenians usually sent out only relatively small land forces to accompany 
the fleets of triremes sent on these campaigns.
19
  Here, at 6.21.2, Nicias stressed the 
potentially very great difficulties of provisioning for an expeditionary force from Athens 
operating in and around Sicily by explicitly contrasting the relative advantages of the 
methods of supply of normal Athenian overseas campaigns in their usual theater of 
operations, the Aegean.
20
  Nicias’ use of the aorist ἤλθετε (“καὶ ὅτε ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὑπηκόοις 
ξύµµαχοι ἤλθετε ἐπί τινα”), representing “the imagined point of view of the troops who 
will be in Sicily,”
21
 emphasized that the Athenians in the assembly had past experience 
(and knowledge) of these campaigns in the Aegean, the conditions of which he was now 
inviting them to contrast with the conditions of war they would find in Sicily.
22
  
                                                 
19
 The infantry forces on Athenian amphibious operations during the Peloponnesian war were sometimes 




 As Kohl points out:  “[e]s geht in diesem Satz um den Vergleich zwischen sizilischem und heimatlichen 
Kriegsschauplatz, genauer:  um die Darlegung der Nachteile einer Kriegsführung auf Sizilien im Vergleich 
zu den Vorteilen eines Kriegsschauplatzes im Mutterland” ([1977] 152).  And see also Kohl’s analysis of 
the whole of this section of Nicias’ speech ([1977] 152-153).  See also Classen-Steup’s (vi.54) gloss of 
6.21.2, “καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὁµοίῳ στρατευσόµενοι”:  “‘in der Erkenntnis, daß wir in Begriff stehen, weit hinaus 
von der Heimat auszuziehen und nicht mit der Aussicht, in derselben Weise den Krieg zu führen.’” 
 
21
 Dover, HCT iv.258. 
 
22
 On the ‘as all you know’ type of argument Nicias was employing here, see Ober (1989) 149-150, and 
appendix 1 section ii.  Also, by the change here from the first to second person, Nicias encouraged his 




In sailing to Sicily, then, Nicias told the Athenians that they were about to sail far 
away from home on a campaign which would not be like those that they had undertaken 
before amongst their subject states (“ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὑπηκόοις”).
23
  On these overseas 
campaigns in the Aegean,
24
 and in contrast to any campaign in Sicily, supplies of what 
the Athenians needed in addition (“προσέδει”) could easily be obtained from friendly 
territory.  This begs the question (for us):  in addition to what?  The answer must be:  the 
supplies that the Athenians had initially taken with them on campaign.
25
  Nicias was 
therefore taking it as understood among his audience in the assembly (whom he presented 
as experienced in and knowledgeable of the provisioning practices of normal Athenian 
campaigns) that typical Athenian overseas expeditions in the Aegean departed from 
Athens with initial stocks of provisions that could be added to, if necessary, by provisions 
coming from friendly(/subject) states.
26
 
                                                                                                                                                 
evoked more vividly for his audience the problems the expedition to Sicily would face (Kohl [1977] 153-
154; Hornblower, CT iii.358). 
 
23
 See chapter 2 section i:  these campaigns normally involved the subjection of rebellious poleis after more 
or less lengthy sieges.  “Taking the field against some other state as an ally of your subjects in this part of 
the world” should be taken as Nicias’ euphemism for this process. 
 
24




 See Dover’s gloss at HCT iv.258:  “‘where the supply of your additional requirements’ (i.e. requirements 
in addition to what you took with you)...”  For κοµιδαὶ = supplies, Classen/Steup (vi.54) compare 4.27.1. 
 
26
 These initial stocks of provisions needed to be brought to the war zone in order to ensure logistical 
security during the journey to the war zone and, more particularly, to provide a safe margin of supplies 
until shipments of provisions from nearby subjects/allies and Athens would begin to arrive at the newly 





Why, in contrast to any expedition to Sicily, could the additional requirements of 
Athenian overseas expeditions in the Aegean be supplied easily by friendly (i.e., subject) 
states?  The answers come out in the contrast that Nicias made between conditions on 
normal campaigns and those that he described as facing the planned Athenian expedition 
to Sicily.  Firstly, Nicias stressed that, unlike in the Aegean where they operated 
surrounded by friendly/subject states, the Athenians would be going to a completely 
strange and hostile land in Sicily.  The point was exaggerated, but did contain some 
substance.  With the exception of Egesta, the Athenians would not be able to count on the 
full co-operation of any Sicilian city or people prior to setting out on the expedition:  they 
did have an alliance with Rhegium in Italy (IG I
3
 54) and could expect to appeal to shared 
Chalcidian kinship to ask for aid from it and Naxos and Catana in their efforts on behalf 
of the Leontines;
27
 but, in contrast to coastal Aegean cities, neither Rhegium nor any of 
the Sicilian cities were subject to Athens and thus they could refuse to take the 
Athenians’ side in any fighting.
28
  There was also the danger that the Sicilian cities might 
unite in fear against the invading Athenian force.
29
  In contrast to the Aegean, then, where 
the co-operation of the friendly/subject states of the Athenians’ empire, including the 
                                                 
27
 For Rhegium and Chalcidian kinship to the Leontines, see 6.44.3, 6.46.2, and pp.67-68 below; for Naxos 
and Catana, see 6.20.3 with p.72 n.139 and p.68 n.129 below. 
 
28
 Kohl (1977) 153 n.1.  See also Bauslaugh (1991) 165:  “[i]n 415... Athens was confronted by a situation 
in which the West Greek states, because they were too powerful to coerce openly, had to be accepted on 
their own terms.”  Cf. 6.11.1, 6.86.3 for Nicias and Euphemus (an Athenian emissary to Camarina) stating 
that Sicilian poleis were too powerful and too distant from Athens for the Athenians to be able to rule them 
as subjects (although it should be noted that these statements were, in the first case, part of a larger 
argument against Athenian intervention in the west (Nicias) and, in the second, part of a disingenuous 









provision of supplies by these states, could be taken for granted by expeditionary forces 
on their departure from Athens, no such assumption could be made by the force leaving 
for Sicily:  the diplomatic situation in the far west was much more fluid, and both 
military success and diplomatic efforts would be needed to bring Sicilian (and Italian) 
states to the side of the Athenians, and to keep them there, so that they (as states friendly 
to the expedition) would supply the expedition with provisions.
30
 
Secondly, Nicias emphasized to his audience how far away Sicily was:  the 
Athenians were about to sail far away and cut themselves off from home, by voyaging to 
a country from which it was not easy even for a messenger to come to Athens during the 
four winter months.  In contrast to overseas expeditions in the Aegean, undertaken 
against enemies which were near to Athens or its allies/subjects,
31
 the expedition, in 
sailing to Sicily, would become detached from Athens and the Aegean, and it would be 
impossibly difficult to feed the tens of thousands of men campaigning in Sicily through 
seaborne supply lines carrying provisions over the long distance from Athens and/or its 
allied poleis in the Aegean:  this would be especially true during the winter.
32
  There 
                                                 
30
 See 6.23.2, 6.49.4, 6.68.3, 6.71.2, 6.103.2, 7.14.3 for the necessity of Athenian military success for 
gaining (and keeping) support from states in Sicily and Italy.  For the expedition’s diplomatic efforts to win 
over states in the far west to the Athenian cause, see 6.44.3, 6.50-52, 6.71.2, 6.88.3, and esp. 6.75.3-4 with 
6.81-88.2.  Cf. 7.7.2, 7.12.1, 7.25.9, 7.46.1 for the Syracusans sending envoys asking for military aid from 
the poleis in Sicily after and because they had experienced military success against the Athenians, and see 
7.21.1, 7.32.1, 7.50.1 for these envoys’ missions meeting with success; note esp. in this regard Dover, HCT 
iv.413 on 7.33.1:  the news of the Syracusan success in capturing Plemmyrion, which led to Camarina 
sending military aid to Syracuse, “achieved what persuasive arguments could not.” 
   
31
 The nearness of enemies in the Aegean is to be understood from the description of Sicily as far away, 
since Nicias here was explicitly contrasting conditions in the Aegean with those in the west.  Cf. the 
scholia’s gloss of the first clause of 6.21.2 (Σ
Mvc2 
[Hude (1927) 339]):  “οὐχ ὁµοίως µέλλετε στρατεύεσθαι 
ἐπὶ Σικελίαν, ᾗπερ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς ὑπηκόοις συµµαχοῦντες στρατεύεσθε ἐπί τινας οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχοντες, ὥστε 
ῥᾳδίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων παρακοµιδὴν ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας γῆς.” 
 
32
 Cf. Smith’s gloss of “ἐξ ἧς µηνῶν οὐδὲ τεσσάρων τῶν χειµερινῶν ἄγγελον ῥᾴδιον ἐλθεῖν” ([1913] 49):  




were, in the course of the Sicilian campaign, instances of triremes sailing between Sicily 
and cities in ‘mainland’ Greece during the winter months;
33
 but the length of the journey 
to Sicily and the dangers of sailing during the winter meant that Nicias’ argument here 
was generally valid.
34
  In the Aegean, Athenian overseas expeditions (prior to embarking) 
could count on logistical support from Athens and/or from allies/subjects close to the 
targets of their operations; i.e., once they had established a base of operations for a 
campaign, they could depend on the easy supply of any additional requirements they 
might have from Athens or nearby friendly territory (even during winter, as the contrast 
Nicias draws with the difficulties of sailing to Sicily during this season implies).
35
  But 
the expedition to Sicily would face a different set of circumstances:  because of the great 
distance to Sicily, any expedition sent there would not be able to reprovision itself from 
                                                                                                                                                 
much less then could these be sent thither in that time.”(Note also that the adjective “ῥᾴδιον” in the last 
clause of 6.21.2 picks up and is thus to be implicitly compared with “ῥᾴδιαι αἱ κοµιδαὶ” mentioned as 
available to expeditions in the Aegean from friendly territory.) 
 
33
 See Dover, HCT iv.258 ad loc. 
 
34
 See ibid.  Cf. Pryor (1988) 89: in the medieval Mediterranean, it was common for single galleys (and, 
one might add, small fleets of galleys) on important diplomatic and military missions to take to the sea 
during the winter, but very rare for large expeditions to do so.  Cf. Roth (1999) 191 (with Erdkamp [1998] 
54):  shipments by sea of supplies to Roman forces overseas were undertaken in winter only in cases of 
extreme need or in order to gain advantage over the enemy by surprise (and note that the instances cited by 
these authors are for shipments over distances much shorter than that from Athens to Sicily).  In the 
sixteenth century (C.E.), Mediterranean galley fleets operating in theaters of war far from home (and/or 
allied territory) returned home before the winter, because of the difficulties of provisioning by sea during 
wintertime:  see Guilmartin (1974) 104.  Cf., too, Erdkamp (2005) 187:  Polybius stating that the coast of 
the Gulf of Tarentum only has harbors suitable for summer sailing. 
 
35
 Cf. also, e.g., Erdkamp (1998) 53-55 on the difficulty of keeping open lengthy supply lines by sea during 
the winter for Republican Roman expeditions operating overseas, and esp. 55:  “... overseas shipments were 
vulnerable to adverse winds and... during wintertime, apart from short coastal trips, they usually had to 
stop.” 




Athens and its allies/subjects in the Aegean; the expedition therefore would require other, 




At 6.21.2, then, Nicias brought out the special problems that the Athenians would 
have to confront in provisioning an expedition to Sicily by explicitly contrasting the 
relative ease of supply of their ‘normal’ overseas campaigns in the Aegean.  This was a 
development of his rhetorical strategy of 6.21.1, where he had also invited his audience to 
note the differences between the unusual requirements of the campaign in Sicily and 
those of a typical expedition in the Aegean, although at 6.21.1 he had done this 
implicitly.  Thus, building on his presentation at 6.20.3-4 of the exceptional military 
assets possessed by the Sicilian poleis the Athenians would be campaigning against, 
Nicias had made the case at 6.21 for the need for an extraordinarily large force of infantry 
for the expedition in order to counteract the Sicilian strength in infantry and (especially) 
cavalry, and also for the need for extraordinary arrangements in order both to counteract 
the Sicilian poleis’ resources in grain and to overcome the logistical difficulties of 
operating in an unfriendly and distant theater of operations.  At 6.21, in other words, 
Nicias had made his case for an unusually large amount of παρασκευή for the expedition 
to Sicily.  Having done this, Nicias next listed the specifics of the massive παρασκευή 
necessary to meet the extraordinary operational challenges facing any expedition to the 
                                                 
36
 Kohl glosses the last clause of 6.21.2 as follows ([1977] 153 n.1):  “[u]nd der Nachschub kam dort nicht 
ἐκ τῆς φιλίας aus der Nähe, sondern mußte aus dem fernen Athen herangeschafft werden, wohin ein Bote 
nicht einmal in vier Monaten, Winter monaten, leicht gelangt!”  But there is nothing in Nicias’ description 
of conditions in the Aegean and Sicily that implies that, because supply from nearby friendly territory could 
not be depended upon in Sicily, the expedition would have to be supplied from Athens.  Indeed, the 
description of the difficulties of sailing to Sicily during the winter stressed the infeasibility of supplying the 
expedition in Sicily from Athens.  Kohl’s misunderstanding here is based on a misunderstanding of Nicias’ 







  The motivation behind this next part of Nicias’ speech, i.e. the fact that he 
was deliberately demanding at 6.22 unusual types and amounts of παρασκευή (which he 
hoped would persuade the Athenians not to embark on the expedition to Sicily), means 
that a simple but crucial procedural point needs to be kept in mind when discussing this 
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 Cf. Kohl (1977) 155.  And see the first clause of 6.22:  “ὁπλίτας τε οὖν πολλούς µοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡµᾶς 
ἄγειν καὶ ἡµῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυµµάχων, τῶν τε ὑπηκόων καὶ ἤν τινα ἐκ Πελοποννήσου δυνώµεθα ἢ 
πεῖσαι ἢ µισθῷ προσαγαγέσθαι...”:  as can be seen from the adverb “οὖν,” 6.22 represents the conclusions 
to be drawn from the analysis at 6.21 (cf. p.18 n.13 above on 6.21.1).  This brings up an important point on 
the meaning of παρασκευή in the early part of book 6.  παρασκευή is most frequently used by Thucydides to 
mean ‘a (military) force (in its entirety)’ (see, e.g., 6.1.1 (with Dover [1965a] 1 ad loc.), 6.6.2).  But 
παρασκευή can also shift in meaning in Thucydides to convey other objects, and processes, since it belongs 
to a class of nouns that exhibit “process-product ambiguity” (see Allison [1989] 7-8, and esp. 30-44; see 
also Allison [1981] 118 for a definition of process-product ambiguity:  “that is some nouns do not mark a 
distinction between whether they convey an action or the result of an action.”).  While Thucydides mostly 
uses παρασκευή to refer to products, i.e. military forces, he sometimes uses it to refer to a process; this is 
his usage at, e.g., 6.26.2 “καὶ µετὰ ταῦτα ἡ παρασκευή ἐγίγνετο,” “[a]fter this the preparation was begun.”  
Allison ([1989] 81 table 7) states that “παρασκευῇ ἀξιόχρεῳ” at 6.21.2 is ambiguous, i.e. that the term 
παρασκευή here could be taken as referring to a product or a process.  But consideration of the phrase 
“παρασκευῇ ἀξιόχρεῳ” within the context of 6.21-22 as a whole demonstrates that it is not ambiguous, but 
refers to concrete objects (products).  Firstly, a translation of παρασκευή here as “preparation” would make 
very little or no sense (note that, in her detailed treatment of 6.21.2, Allison leaves “παρασκευῇ” 
untranslated ([1989] 84)).  Secondly, and much more importantly, when Nicias presents in detail in 6.22 
what the “παρασκευῇ ἀξιόχρεῳ” argued for as necessary at 6.21.2 should comprise, it is made up of 
concrete objects (and persons):  “ὁπλίτας... τοξότας... σφενδονήτας... ναυσί... σῖτον... σιτοποιοὺς...” (thus 
Allison [1989] 83 is incorrect to state that “[t]he εἰ πολλὴν ἐπιτάξειε clause suggests product while the 
content of the following speech indicates not merely ‘things-prepared,’ but also ‘manner of preparing,’ both 
of the things, as well as a ‘preparing’ of the right attitude for the huge expedition.”  There is no indication 
in Nicias’ speech that supports the latter two meanings suggested here for παρασκευή by Allison.)  See also 
pp.53-54 n.95 on 6.25.1 on this point.  And since the people and objects listed at 6.22 constitute the 
“παρασκευῆς δὲ πλήθει” by which Nicias planned to discourage the Athenians from the expedition, then 
παρασκευή at 6.19.2 should be taken, too, as referring to concrete objects, and not to any process(es) 
(contra Allison [1989] 81 table 7, 83; it should be noted here also that the “εἰ πολλὴν ἐπιτάξειε” clause at 
6.19.2 strongly suggests a product sense for παρασκευή at 6.19.2, in any case (cf. Allison [1989] 83)).  And, 
again, since Nicias’ second speech outlining what he thought necessary for the παρασκευή of the expedition 
was part of the debate before the assembly concerning, as indicated at 6.8.3, the παρασκευή for the ships of 
the expedition, then, just as at 6.19.2, παρασκευή at 6.8.3—and at 6.9.1—should be taken as referring to 
concrete objects (contra Allison [1989] 81 table 7, 81-83 who states that Thucydides was using the term at 
6.8.3 and 6.9.1 in its process sense, i.e. that it should be translated as “preparations”).  Thus, to be more 
precise, at 6.8.3, παρασκευή should be taken to mean “all those things that make up an overseas expedition 
apart from the triremes,” i.e. all the heavy and light infantry, cavalry, and provisions brought for an 
expedition (Kohl [1977] 4 (“die... Ausrüstung der Flotte”) and Ober [1998] 107 (“the material necessities 
for [the] expedition”) are, then, better glosses of 6.8.3 than Allison’s, if still not quite precise enough); 
since at 6.8.3 the παρασκευή is for the triremes of the expedition, it obviously cannot include triremes.  One 
might also add, contra Allison, that at 6.8.3 it is “τὴν παρασκευὴν” and not “τὰς παρασκευὰς,” so that 
translating the term here as “preparations” is strictly incorrect (cf. 6.34.9, where “τὰς παρασκευὰς” is used 
to mean “preparations”).  In addition, the παρασκευή at 6.8.3 is to be made ready for the ships; this suggests 
that παρασκευή here is referring to something concrete.  For the exact meaning of παρασκευή at 6.9.1 and 





section of Nicias’ speech:  since Nicias meant that all of the forces and materiel he asked 
for at 6.22 were to be understood by his audience as exceptional demands to meet 
exceptional circumstances, none of the detailed demands for παρασκευή made in this part 
of his speech should be taken as representative of usual Athenian practice.  But also, 
conversely, the fact that Nicias meant these plans to be understood by his audience as 
unusual means that, by examining and establishing what was exceptional about the 
measures proposed by Nicias at 6.22, one can infer and reconstruct the kinds and amounts 




At 6.22, as at 6.20.4 and 6.21, Nicias dealt first with the question of infantry, 
before moving on to the question of provisions.  Thus, his first recommendation for the 
παρασκευή of the expedition was for many hoplites—Athenian, allied, and mercenary
39
—
and for many archers and slingers to withstand the Sicilian cavalry (whose potential 
threat to the success of the expedition he had outlined at 6.21.1).
40
  Very large forces of 
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 It should be remembered here that Nicias was assuming that his audience in the assembly was thoroughly 
familiar with typical Athenian overseas expeditions in the Aegean (see again p.21 above on the 
implications of Nicias’ use of ἤλθετε at 6.21.2, and appendix 1 section ii on Nicias’ use there of the ‘as you 
all know’ type of argument), and thus that it could recognize that the measures which he was proposing at 
6.22 were unusual.  Cf. Kallet (2001) 44 n.81:  “[t]hat Nikias expected his audience to be persuaded by 
exaggeration says much about their relative knowledge in these areas [i.e., their knowledge of the 
παρασκευή that usually accompanied overseas expeditions]:  they collectively knew enough to be expected 
to be impressed; that they were impressed to the extent that they reached a conclusion that was the opposite 
of what Nikias expected does not weaken the point.” 
 
39
 6.22:  “ὁπλίτας τε οὖν πολλούς µοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡµᾶς ἄγειν καὶ ἡµῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυµµάχων, τῶν τε 
ὑπηκόων καὶ ἤν τινα ἐκ Πελοποννήσου δυνώµεθα ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ µισθῷ προσαγαγέσθαι...” 
 
40
 6.22:  “... καὶ τοξότας πολλοὺς καὶ σφενδονήτας, ὅπως πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνων ἱππικὸν ἀντέχωσι...”  One should 
also remember here the Sicilian strength in archers and javelineers noted by Nicias at 6.20.4.  Slingers were 
not usually part of Athenian expeditions:  no slingers are mentioned as part of an Athenian force by 
Thucydides before the Sicilian expedition.  Slinging was not a usual Athenian practice:  the seven hundred 
slingers who left Athens for Sicily were all Rhodian (6.43) (for slinging as a particularly Rhodian practice, 




hoplites, archers, and slingers were not typical of Athenian expeditionary forces in the 
eastern Mediterranean;
41
 this is an important point because it serves as a confirmation 
that the measures proposed by Nicias at 6.22 were to be understood as unusual, and not as 
characteristic of the kinds and amounts of παρασκευή that usually accompanied Athenian 
overseas expeditions. 
After the detailed demands for land forces, Nicias moved from the expedition’s 
need for infantry to resist the Sicilian cavalry on to the specific measures for provisioning 
required to meet the special logistical challenges (as he had outlined them at 6.21.2) of 
campaigning in and around Sicily.  Nicias first recommended that the Athenians sail to 
Sicily with an overwhelming superiority in triremes in order that the expedition might be 
able to bring in its provisions (the more) easily.
42
  The recommendation for great 
numbers of triremes “ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ῥᾳον ἐσκοµιζώµεθα” picked up and addressed, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
41
 See pp.55-56 n.98 for the numbers and types of infantry forces accompanying Athenian amphibious 
operations in the Peloponnesian war before the Sicilian expedition. 
 
42
 6.22:  “... ναυσί τε καὶ πολὺ περιεῖναι, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ῥᾳον ἐσκοµιζώµεθα...”  It should be noted 
here that, with the inclusion of triremes among Nicias’ demands for the παρασκευή to be sent to Sicily, 
Nicias had exploited the ambiguity of this word to suit his rhetorical strategy.  At 6.8.3, παρασκευή had 
meant “all those things that make up an overseas expedition other than the triremes” (see p.27 n.37 above); 
now, at 6.22, when Nicias was setting out the details of the “παρασκευῇ ἀξιόχρεῳ” he had earlier presented 
as necessary for the expedition (6.21.2), he ordered a military force in its entirety—the primary meaning of 
παρασκευή in Thucydides (that is, at 6.22 Nicias had broadened the meaning of the term so that he could 
include here as many different things as possible under the heading παρασκευή in order to dissuade the 
Athenians from making the expedition to Sicily).  See pp.53-54 n.95 on 6.25.1 for confirmation of this 
point.  And since, as noted above (p.27 n.37), the people and objects listed at 6.22 constitute the 
“παρασκευῆς δὲ πλήθει” by which Nicias intended to deter the Athenians from the expedition, then 
παρασκευή at 6.19.2 should be taken as meaning ‘a military force in its entirety,’ too.  But since Nicias only 
adopted the plan to discourage the Athenians from making the expedition to Sicily by demanding a massive 
amount of παρασκευή for it after the reaction to his first speech to the assembly, and at 6.9.1 had 
acknowledged the assembly’s official agenda in the first words of his first speech to it (“Ἡ µὲν ἐκκλησία 
περὶ παρασκευῆς τῆς ἡµετέρας ἥδε ξυνελέγη, καθ’ ὅτι χρὴ ἐς Σικελίαν ἐκπλεῖν...”), then παρασκευή at 
6.9.1 should be understood as taking the same meaning as it does at 6.8.3, “all those things that make up an 
overseas expedition other than the triremes,” i.e. all the heavy and light infantry, cavalry, and provisions 





following logically from the presentation at 6.21.2 of the potential problems confronting 
the provisioning of the expedition to Sicily, the first concern raised by Nicias at 6.21.2:  
that, unlike in the Aegean, it could not be presumed prior to the departure of the 
expedition that “ῥᾴδιαι αἱ κοµιδαὶ” would be available to it in Sicily from friendly states 
in or near to the theater of operations to add to any provisions brought from Athens.  The 
fact that Nicias stressed the need for a great number of triremes—i.e., the fact that the 
recommendation that the Athenians should have an overwhelmingly greater number of 
triremes (than the Sicilian poleis is implied) in order to ensure the safety of the transport 
of provisions to their forces in Sicily was included as part of a series of exceptional 
measures—points up, by the implied contrast with usual Athenian practice, another 
important aspect of the provisioning of normal Athenian operations in the Aegean.  As 
opposed to the Aegean and ‘mainland’ Greece, where, in the period between the Persian 
Wars and the Sicilian expedition, the Athenian navy had (more or less) complete control 
of the sea,
43
 and operated surrounded by subject poleis,
44
 Nicias had argued, at 6.20.4, 
that an Athenian expeditionary force operating in Sicily would have to confront cities 
whose naval resources were similar to Athens in terms of ships, crews, and money;
45
 it 
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 I argue fully for this point in chapter 2 section iic but, for now, see 3.32.3 for a strikingly vivid example 
of Athenian control of the Aegean in the period before the Sicilian expedition, and 7.57.5 for Athenian 
control of the seas off western ‘mainland’ Greece. 
 
44
 See again 6.21.2:  in the Aegean, the Athenians operate “ἐν τοῖς... ὑπηκόοις...” 
 
45
 And see again p.18 n.12:  Nicias had told his audience (at 6.20.3) that in Sicily (in implicit contrast to 
‘mainland’ Greece and the Aegean) the Athenians would be fighting against Greek cities “armed in every 
way just like our own power.”  (Even if Nicias exaggerated the naval strength of Selinus at 6.20.4, this does 
not weaken the point I am making here because, firstly, I am interested here in the preconceptions about the 
provisioning of Athenian campaigns in the Aegean that Nicias’ demands revealed as shared by him and his 
audience; and, secondly, the subsequent narrative demonstrates that Thucydides considered that Nicias’ 
concerns about the security of the provisioning of the Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily were, in fact, 




would have to campaign against cities, therefore, that could compete with it for control of 
the sea.  Nicias had also argued at 6.21.2 that a force from Athens could not count on the 
friendliness of states in or near to the theater of operations in Sicily.  Thus, again, 
contrary to their experiences in the Aegean, where, because of their overwhelming naval 
superiority, and because of the fact that they were normally surrounded on all sides by 
friendly/subject states, the Athenians had never had to deal with the problem of enemy 
triremes challenging the transport of logistical support to their fleets and amphibious 
forces, and thus could count on the easy supply of their additional requirements from 
nearby friendly territory, such a superiority could not be taken for granted when operating 
in and around Sicily, because of the presence of enemy poleis (especially Syracuse) with 
substantial fleets of triremes.  Hence the recommendation that, as part of the παρασκευή 
of the expedition, an exceptional number of triremes sail with the expedition in order to 
ensure the safety of its seaborne food supply once it had reached Sicily; the point was 
that, unlike in the Aegean and the seas around ‘mainland’ Greece, the security of 
seaborne logistical support coming from nearby friendly states could not be assumed for 
Athenian forces operating in Sicily.
46
   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
46
 I will come back to this crucial point of difference with Athenian operations in the Aegean before 412 in 
chapter 2 section iic.  Note here that there is a slight contradiction between the presumed reliance at 6.22 on 
nearby states (nearby, that is, to any operations in Sicily) for the provisioning of the expedition, and Nicias’ 
statement at 6.21.2 that the Athenians would be sailing to a land “ἀλλοτρίαν πᾶσαν” (6.21.2).  But, as noted 
above (at pp.23-24), the description of the Sicilian theater of operations at 6.21.2 exaggerated the extent of 
the hostile, or rather unfriendly, reception which the Athenians might expect to receive in the far west:  the 
crucial difference between operating in and around Sicily and the Aegean was that the Athenians could not 
depend on the friendship of, and therefore resupply from, states in the west before embarkation, unlike in 
the Aegean (where they campaigned in the midst of subject states); thus, military success and diplomatic 
efforts would be required before the Athenians could gain the friendship of, and therefore the capacity to 
resupply from, states near to or in the Sicilian theatre of operations.  In sum, Nicias’ description at 6.21.2 of 
the ease of resupply of Athenian operations in the Aegean (“ῥᾴδιαι αἱ κοµιδαὶ”), which was meant to be 
contrasted with conditions in the west, implied not that resupply from friendly states in the west would be 




Nicias, then, intended for the requested superiority in triremes to provide security 
for shipments of provisions from states in or near Sicily to the Athenian expeditionary 
force once it had established itself in the far west (and not, as has been usually thought,
47
 
to provide security for shipments of supplies from Athens and the Aegean to the force in 
Sicily).
48
  This is confirmed by Nicias’ next specific instruction for the expedition’s 
provisioning, which consisted of a detailed list of arrangements for the transportation and 
preparation of grain to be brought with it from Athens: 
... τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν σῖτον ἐν ὁλκάσι, πυροὺς καὶ πεφρυγµένας κριθάς, 
ἄγειν, καὶ σιτοποιοὺς ἐκ τῶν µυλώνων πρὸς µέρος ἠναγκασµένους ἐµµίσθους, ἵνα, 
ἤν που ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας ἀπολαµβανώµεθα, ἔχῃ ἡ στρατιὰ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια (πολλὴ γὰρ 
οὖσα οὐ πάσης ἔσται πόλεως ὑποδέξασθαι)... 
 
... and we must take grain from here (i.e. Athens) in merchant vessels, 
that is to say, wheat and roasted barley, and bakers from the mills compelled to 
serve for pay in the proper proportion; so that, if we should be detained by bad 
weather,
49
 the expedition will have provisions, for it is not every city that will be 
able to receive a force as large as ours. 
 
As Dover commented, καὶ with αὐτόθεν is climactic here, giving the sense of 
‘actually from Athens itself’;
50
 the emphasis on “αὐτόθεν” was meant, then, to indicate a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
47
 See pp.33-34 n.52 and p.46 n.84 below. 
 
48
 Note again here 6.21.2, with the discussion at pp.24-26:  Nicias noting that the extraordinary distance 
from Athens to Sicily would preclude the sending of provisions from home to the expedition once it had 
commenced operations in Sicily. 
 
49
 Hornblower’s (CT iii.358) translation of “ἤν που ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας ἀπολαµβανώµεθα...”  For the translation of 
“αὐτόθεν” as “from here (i.e., Athens),” see p.20 n.17 above on 6.21.2 and see main text just below.  The 
rest of the translation is taken, with some slight modifications, from Crawley. 
 
50
 HCT iv.259:  “although Nikias has emphasized in 21 the importance of taking enough men and 
equipment from their own resources at the start, the first part of 22 speaks of raising troops also from allies; 
hence καὶ with αὐτόθεν is climactic, ‘actually from Athens itself.’”  This is not quite right:  καὶ with 
αὐτόθεν is climactic, and αὐτόθεν here is meant to contrast the grain from home with an earlier item 
demanded/recommended by Nicias from abroad (see also Dover [1965a] 33), but this item is not the allied 




very strong contrast with an item or items not from Athens.  Since the demand for 
“αὐτόθεν σῖτον” formed part of a discrete section of Nicias’ speech dealing specifically 
with the question of provisions, the climactic contrast conveyed by the demand for grain 
from here should therefore be understood as being with provisions from some place other 
than Athens.
51
  The contrast, that is, came with the provisions mentioned by Nicias in the 
previous clause, “... ναυσί τε καὶ πολὺ περιεῖναι, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ῥᾳον 
ἐσκοµιζώµεθα”:  i.e., “τὰ ἐπιτήδεια” from states in or near to Sicily which the 
overwhelming number of Athenian triremes would help to ensure reached the Athenian 
forces operating in Sicily.
52
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 In this second part of 6.22, Nicias had moved on from the expedition’s specific needs in infantry to the 
question of its provisioning requirements.  Just as the first part of 6.22 had dealt with the strategic concerns 
raised at 6.21.1 (i.e., the potential problems on land that would confront any Athenian force sailing to 
Sicily), the second part of 6.22, following the logical organization of the speech, dealt with the strategic 
concern raised at 6.21.2:  i.e. the difficulties in provisioning a force sailing to and operating in Sicily would 
have to face.  This is a decisive objection against Dover’s view that “τὸν... αὐτόθεν σῖτον” was meant to be 
contrasted with the infantry forces demanded in the first part of 6.22.  We might also note against Dover 
here that the first part of 6.22 speaks of raising hoplites from Athens, and also of raising archers; since the 
archers who accompanied Athenian overseas expeditions were usually solely from Athens (when archers 
are mentioned as part of Thucydides’ enumerations of Athenian overseas expeditions during the 
Peloponnesian War before 415, they are always Athenian:  see 2.23.2 [431]; 3.107.1 [winter 426/5]; 
4.129.2 [423]; 5.84.1 [416]), those listening to Nicias’ speech would have presumed that the archers on the 
proposed expedition to Sicily would have been (at least predominantly) Athenian (this is true even if 
Nicias, when pressed after his speech for precise arrangements for the expedition, stated that the force 
should include archers from Athens and Crete (6.25.2), and the 480 archers who eventually left from 
Athens did include 80 Cretans (6.43)).  It hardly seems possible that “αὐτόθεν” was meant (or could be 
understood by Nicias’ audience) to mark a climactic contrast with demands for a force of heavy and light 
infantry, at least half of which were to come from Athens.  (This makes sense in general terms, anyway:  
why should grain from Athens be contrasted with infantry (from wherever)?) 
 
52
 See already Jowett ad loc.:  “[t]he supplies taken out from Athens are contrasted by δὲ with the supplies 
which would have to be procured by plunder or otherwise in Sicily itself” (note, however, that neither 
plunder nor foraging plays any role in Nicias’ plans for the provisioning of the expedition or in its actual 
provisioning (see section ivb below).  See also appendix 1 section iii:  the description of the erga of the 
campaign in the narrative subsequent to Nicias’ speech, and esp. the connection made by Thucydides there 
between the struggle at sea and the provisioning of the expedition from states in Sicily and Italy (along with 
the lack of any mention of provisioning from Athens), confirms the analysis here that Nicias was asking for 
a superiority in triremes to protect shipments of provisions to the expedition from states in the far west.  As 
indicated above, this is not the usual modern interpretation of the clauses “... ναυσί τε καὶ πολὺ περιεῖναι, 




Grain was to be brought from home, then, with the expedition (but not to feed the 
men of the expedition once a base of operations had been established in Sicily; the grain 
at that point would come from nearby friendly states).  It was, however, usual practice for 
overseas expeditions leaving Athens in this period to bring (at least) some provisions 
from Athens;
53
 thus there was nothing unusual per se in Nicias’ demand that the 
expedition to Sicily be accompanied by grain from Athens.  But the measures that Nicias 
proposed at 6.22 were meant to deliberately extraordinary; the whole point of his 
rhetorical strategy in this section of his speech was, as I have shown, to make detailed 
demands for παρασκευή carefully constructed so as to be radically different from the 
requirements of normal overseas expeditions in the Aegean.  What, then, was 
extraordinary about Nicias’ demand that the Athenians bring grain from Athens with their 
expedition to Sicily?  The answer is (at least) threefold:  the form in which the grain was 
to be transported; the arrangements for its preparation for consumption; and the reason 
                                                                                                                                                 
generally very good and nuanced discussion of Nicias’ speech ([1977] 156), took the clause “τὸν δὲ καὶ 
αὐτόθεν σῖτον ἐν ὁλκασι... ἄγειν” to be in apposition to, and an amplification of, “ναυσί τε καὶ πολὺ 
περιεῖναι, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ῥᾳον ἐσκοµιζώµεθα” and therefore this latter clause also to be referring to 
the transport of provisions from Athens.  As I have just demonstrated, however, the demand for “τὸν δὲ καὶ 
αὐτόθεν σῖτον...” necessarily conveys a contrast with provisions from elsewhere, i.e. those mentioned in the 
previous clause as needing the presence of an overwhelming superiority of triremes so that they may be 
brought in (from nearby states).  The two requests (superiority in ships to ensure the transport of provisions, 
grain from here) refer to different methods and sources of provisioning, and are not in apposition.  (That 
Kohl’s understanding of the relationship between the two clauses is incorrect is confirmed by his 
misinterpretation of certain details:  thus, e.g., the demand for “ὁλκάσι” is not an explanatory specification 
of “ναυσί,” as Kohl has it ([1977] 156 n.1); “ναυσί” here means “triremes,” a type of ship completely 
different from (and not convertible to) a merchant-ship.)  Other scholars have not treated the relationship 
between the clauses in detail, but have simply assumed that the superiority in triremes was to secure the 
transport of provisions from Athens:  see p.46 n.84 below. 
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Nicias gave for the transportation of grain from Athens with the expedition and the 
special measures to be taken concerning its transportation and preparation.
54
   
   
When specifying what grain should be brought in the merchant-ships 
accompanying the expedition to Sicily, Nicias stated that it should be “πυροὺς καὶ 
πεφρυγµένας κριθάς,” “wheat and roasted barley.”
55
  In the fifth and early fourth 
centuries, however, although wheat was the preferred and higher-status grain, ἄλφιτα, 
barley-flour (or barley-meal), and its products
56
 was the most commonly consumed form 
of grain in the Greek world.
57
  It was also the form of grain most commonly consumed by 
                                                 
54




 Hornblower (CT iii.358) cites Pritchett (1971) 43 and n.69, and Dalby (1992) 25 n.66 ad loc.  But 
Pritchett simply notes that “[t]he words for wheat and barley are appositional to sitos [sic], a general word 
for grain,” while the passage of Dalby cited is a totally incorrect note on the workings of markets provided 
to classical Greek military forces (see chapter 4 section ii).  Other scholars who have previously treated this 
passage have not dealt with the question of why Nicias should have included precise details on the form of 
grain that was to be brought with the expedition:  so, e.g., Green (1970) 110, Kagan (1981) 187.  See, too, 
in this respect, Kohl ([1977] 156) and Kallet ([2001] 42-44), both of whom see the inclusion of the 
recommendation for grain from Athens simply as part of Nicias’ strategy to deter the Athenians from going 
to Sicily by emphasizing the exceptional troublesomeness of the necessary preparations for such an 
expedition, without asking the question why Nicias made the specific recommendations for the type of 
grain he did. 
 
56
 See Dalby (2003) 46-47 (with ancient and modern references) for a list of the foods that could be made 
from ἄλφιτα:  µᾶζα, a kneaded, uncooked, barley-cake was the form in which ἄλφιτα was most commonly 
consumed; barley-flour was also eaten in the form of gruel or porridge, or as flat, unleavened bread (but 
barley-bread was given to slaves only (see von Reden [2007] 390)). 
 
57
 See esp. Gallo (1983) 454-456, 458-460 (for Athens), Amouretti (1986) 125-126.  For ἄλφιτα meaning 
in effect ‘daily bread’ at Athens in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, see, e.g., Aristoph., Knights 
1000ff., 1359; Clouds 106, 648; Peace 636; Wealth 219.  Barley-flour was the grain normally contributed 
to and eaten in classical Spartan syssitia:  see, e.g., Figueira (1984) 88-89; Hodkinson (2000) 191-192; Hdt. 
6.57.2-3 with appendix 3 section i; Xen., Lac. Pol. 5.3.  Note also that the grain-containers produced by the 
authorities at Olympia, for a century or so beginning in the third quarter of the fifth century, for regulating 
consumption of grain (in a way unclear to us) at the Olympic Games were all for the measuring out and 






classical Greek military and naval forces on campaign:  on the few occasions that 
Thucydides and other authors of the fifth and fourth centuries specified the form of grain 
that classical Greek soldiers and sailors were eating, buying, or being given (when 
engaged in operations in the Greek world), it was always ἄλφιτα.
58
  The only instances of 
a grain-product other than ἄλφιτα being bought by or distributed to classical Greek 
soldiers occurred in extraordinary circumstances and outside the Greek world: when the 
grain of the Greek mercenaries in Cyrus’ army gave out as they were marching through 
the desert between Corsote and Pylae, their only recourse was to what Xenophon called 
the Lydian market (i.e., it was a market run by Lydians) in the non-Greek part of the 
army, where the prices charged for ἄλευρα (wheat-flour) and ἄλφιτα were astronomically 
high (Xen., Anab. 1.5.6); the wheat-flour and wine which were loaded on 400 wagons 
assembled by Cyrus before the battle of Cunaxa, and which were to be distributed to the 
Greeks in the case of famine in the army, were instead pillaged by the Persians in the 
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 3.49.3 [427]:  Mytilenian envoys prepare ἄλφιτα for the trireme sailing from Athens to Mytilene to 
inform Paches that the decision by the Athenian assembly to kill all the Mytilenians had been reversed (the 
sailors on board the trireme eat the ἄλφιτα kneaded with wine and oil as they row); 4.16.2 [425]: the 
Spartiates blockaded on Sphacteria were each to receive two choinikes of ἄλφιτα per day, already kneaded; 
8.100.2 [411]:  Thrasyllus orders stores of ἄλφιτα to be prepared at Methymna for the Athenian fleet 
(Hornblower incorrectly translates ἄλφιτα in this passage as “barley” (CT iii.1041)).  The xenia provided to 
the Ten Thousand by Trapezus (Xen., Anab. 4.8.23), Sinope (Xen., Anab. 6.1.15), and Heraclea (Xen., 
Anab. 6.2.3) in 400 all included ἄλφιτα as their grain component.  A merchant ship arriving at Calpe from 
Heraclea carried, amongst other things to sell to the Cyreans, ἄλφιτα, but no other form of grain (Xen., 
Anab. 6.5.1).  Coeratadas’ pathetic attempt at Byzantium to feed the Cyreans included twenty men 
accompanying him carrying ἄλφιτα (Xen., Anab. 7.1.37).  At Aristoph., Peace 368 (performed in 421), 
Trygaios pretends to take Hermes’ threats about his imminent destruction to mean that he has been called 
up for military service, at which news he feigns concern that he has not bought barley-meal or cheese in 
order to meet his death:  “ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἠµπόληκά πω, / οὔτε ἄλφιτα οὔτε τυρόν, ὡς ἀπολούµενος.”  At Peace 
475-477, the Argives are said to be happy with the Peloponnesian War since, by hiring themselves out to 
the warring parties, they can gain pay to buy ἄλφιτα (see esp. 477:  “καὶ ταῦτα διχόθεν µισθοφοροῦντες 
ἄλφιτα”).  The magistrates at Lampsacus, at some unknown point in the fifth or fourth century (see chapter 
4 section iii), ordered the price of ἄλφιτα in the city to be raised by fifty per cent when they heard that a 





aftermath of the battle (Xen., Anab. 1.10.18); and when the Cyreans bought bread 
(“ἄρτους”) from the city of Caenae on the Tigris (Xen., Anab. 2.4.27).
59
 
This evidence and the fact that the demand for unmilled grain constituted one of 
Nicias’ extraordinary demands for the παρασκευή of the expedition show that it was 
clearly unusual for a classical Greek military force to bring with it grain, and especially 
barley, in unhulled and unground form.  What reasoning, then, underlay Nicias’ demand 
that grain be brought from Athens in the form of “πυροὺς καὶ πεφρυγµένας κριθάς” rather 
than alphita (and aleura)?  His demand can be explained by the fact that wheat and 
barley in their grain, or “kernel,” form are much more biologically stable than wheat- or 
barley-flour.  The seed coating of dry cereal kernels makes them almost impermeable and 
therefore naturally biologically stable.
60
  The grinding and milling of grain kernels, 
however, removes the protective layers of the seed coat and thereby endangers the grain’s 
biological stability;
61
 processed cereals are therefore much more susceptible than cereal 
grains to biological and chemical deterioration, and to insect attack.
62
  Because of this 
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 At those points on their march when the Ten Thousand subsisted through foraging and plundering 
indigenous settlements in non-Greek lands, they often subsisted on grain (products) other than barley:  see 
3.4.25-30, 4.5.5-6, 4.5.25-26, 5.4.27-29, 7.1.13. 
 
60
 Thurmond (2006) 10. 
 
61
 Also, milled grain is more susceptible to degradation since activities such as milling permit interaction 
between enzymes in the germ and the bran and fats, as well as microorganisms from the surface of the 
grain, with other grain constituents:  see Campbell, Hauser, and Hill (1991), United Nations World Food 
Programme, Food Quality Control (2009). 
 
62
 See the last note for references for wheat-flour being more susceptible than wheat grains to deterioration; 
for barley-flour being much less biologically stable and therefore more susceptible to deterioration than 
barley grain, see Thurmond (2006) 34-35, and the comments of Dr. K. J. Mueller, of the 
Getreideforschungsanstalt Darzau, ap. Beckmann (2007).  (I am grateful to John (Mac) Marston for 
forwarding my question on the weight and density of barley as compared to barley-flour to the 





greater susceptibility to deterioration, milled cereals have a shorter ‘shelf life’ than whole 
grains:  although barley-flour, with optimal storage management and special processing, 
can last for anywhere between six to twenty-four months, in less than optimal conditions 
(i.e., in a warm but dry environment), it can suffer a clear deterioration already after only 
two to four weeks;
63
 modern standards for wheat-flour storage set limits of fifteen to sixty 
days, although rancidity has been detected after only two to fourteen days.
64
  In contrast, 
properly stored whole grains can last up to four years.
65
   
This greater biological instability of milled grains means that they require more 
careful handling than whole grain, and a far higher standard of storage management when 
being transported:  as cargo, milled barley and wheat are far more liable than barley and 
wheat grain to deterioration because of wetting, humidity, changes in temperature, light 
exposure, and attacks from vermin.
66
  Since transport by water increases the chances of 
deterioration of milled grains by all of these factors (and, by its very nature, especially 
wetness and humidity, the greatest threats to the biological stability of grain),
67
 it also 
increases the likelihood of decrease in their shelf life, much more so than it does for grain 
being transported in kernel form; thus, for example, in the grain trade of Paris in the early 
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 See again the comments of Mueller ap. Beckmann (2007). 
 
64
 Campbell, Hauser, and Hill (1991). 
 
65
 Thurmond (2006) 25. 
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 Erdkamp (1998) 57.  Cf. also Levinson and Levinson (1998) 140-141 on the paramount importance of 





eighteenth century, “[f]lour formed a large part of the overland trade as water transport 
increased the likelihood of spoilage, while grain continued to be transported principally 
by water.”
68
  Although there is only one extant certain piece of evidence for the means by 
which grain was stored when transported by sea in classical Greece—a man in the debate 
in the Athenian assembly after the battle of Arginusae told those assembled that he had 
saved himself after the battle by clinging on to a barrel of alphita (“ἐπὶ τεύχους 
ἀλφίτων”) (Xen., Hell. 1.7.11)—and it is therefore impossible to state with certainty 
whether grain in the classical Greek world was normally transported by sea in barrels, 
sacks, or (loaded straight into) the holds of ships,
69
 it is still certain that (without the 
technological improvements in cargo containing and shipping of the last two centuries) in 
classical Greece too, barley and wheat in the form of flour would have been much 
quicker to deteriorate biologically and chemically when being transported by water (i.e., 
by sea) than barley and wheat in whole grain form.
70
  Nicias’ instruction to transport the 
grain needed for the expedition in the form of whole grain rather than flour, then, was a 
rational response to the long journey required by an expedition from Athens to Sicily.  In 
other words, just as his request for a superiority in triremes for the expedition addressed 
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 Pelizzon (2000) 173. 
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 From the price that three thousand ‘Pheidonian’ medimnoi of barley transported in the form of grain from 
Apollonia (on the Adriatic) to Delphi raised when sold at Delphi in 361/0 (SIG
3
 239 B (also FD III 5, 3), 
Col. II, ll.1-22), Bousquet ([1985] 234) calculated that 4.33% of the barley-grain had been lost in transit.  
This figure has no validity, however, as Bousquet’s calculation relies on a “taux normal” of 2 drachmas per 
medimnos for the κριθαί transported to and sold at Delphi:  although 2 drachmas per medimnos was a 
common price for alphita in the late fifth and fourth centuries (see Heichelheim [1935] 887; cf. Diog. 





the first point he had made at 6.21.2 regarding the special difficulties the provisioning of 
a force sent to Sicily (that the Athenians could not assume the safe transport of provisions 
to their eventual base of operations in Sicily from friendly states), the exceptional request 
for “πυροὺς καὶ πεφρυγµένας κριθάς”—i.e. for grain instead of the flour transported with 
normal expeditions embarking on much shorter journeys within the Aegean and the seas 
around ‘mainland’ Greece—should be understood as a measure designed to address the 
second special difficulty which Nicias had pointed out at 6.21.2 as facing the supply of a 
force sent to the far west—the extraordinary length of the journey from Athens to Sicily.   
 
Nicias asked for roasted barley grain (“πεφρυγµένας κριθάς”) rather than just 
barley grain because the barley grown in classical Greece was hulled.
71
  In hulled (or 
‘husked’) grains, two modified floret leaves, the lemma and palea, are fused with the 
outermost covering of the kernel and therefore cannot be removed by normal threshing.  
In order, then, to make the husks brittle and thereby easily removable from the barley 
kernels, i.e. in order to prepare barley for milling, barley grains had to be roasted before 
being pounded and then milled.  Thus, by specifying “πεφρυγµένας κριθάς,” Nicias was 
indicating to his audience that he was asking for barley that had been prepared and was 
ready for milling.
72
  And this exceptional measure of bringing unhulled grain with the 
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 See Megaloudi (2006) Table 5.14, 79, 81.  See Thurmond (2006) 18-20 for what follows; cf. Amouretti 
(1986) 123-126 for the practice of roasting barley in order to mill it. 
 
72
 It is important to note that Nicias did not demand for the expedition simply “κριθὰς.”  In contrast to 
alphita, barley grain in unmilled form (“κριθαί”) had negative connotations in the classical Greek world:    
“κριθαί” was distributed to slaves and animals, and not to free-born citizens.  See Gallo (1983) 455-456, 
and Starkie (1968) 267 ad Aristoph., Wasps 718, ‘κριθῶν’:  “the food of the destitute (Pax 449 ληφθεὶς ὑπὸ 
λῃστῶν ἐσθίοι κριθὰς µόνον) or of slaves (Hipponax 35 καὶ κρίθινον κόλλικα, δούλιον χόρτον).”  Cf. 





expedition entailed another exceptional measure:  the expedition would also have to bring 
“σιτοποιοὺς ἐκ τῶν µυλώνων πρὸς µέρος ἠναγκασµένους ἐµµίσθους,” “bakers from the 
mills compelled to serve for pay in the proper proportion,” in order to mill the wheat and 
roasted barley.
73
   The exceptional nature of this demand can be seen by the fact that there 
is no other reference to a classical Greek state preparing food for consumption by its 
military forces.
74
  Although the argument from silence is very often an invalid procedure 
in analysing the practices of classical Greek provisioning, the fact that we nowhere else 
hear of state-organized preparation of grain (and the requisitioning of labor to do so) in 
the classical Greek world, together with the fact that Nicias included it in his 
extraordinary demands for the παρασκευή of the Sicilian expedition, means that we can 
be certain that the centralized preparation of food for consumption by military forces was 
not practised by classical Greek states.
75
  The unexampled request for the compulsion of 
bakers to serve the expedition, therefore, built on the exceptional demand for unhulled 
grain, and thus again picked up and addressed the the problem raised at 6.21.2 of the 
difficulty the unusually long distance of the journey to Sicily would cause for the 
provisioning of the expedition (as well as reinforcing the point that meeting this problem 
would necessitate an unusual and considerable παρασκευή).   
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 On the status of these bakers, see p.62 below. 
 
74
 As Pritchett remarked ([1971] 43 n.68); it should be noted here, however, that this remark is in conflict 
with Pritchett’s statements elsewhere in the same chapter of GSW I that classical Greek states often 
supplied provisions directly to their military forces:  see (ibid.) 34-35, 48. 
 
75
 The most important reason for this was that classical Greek states did not exact direct taxation in kind on 
their citizen’s crops:  see below chapter 2 section iic and chapter 3 section ivb for further discussion of the 
implications of the absence of taxation in kind in classical Greece for the organization of the provisioning 





Nicias also asked that the “πυροὺς καὶ πεφρυγµένας κριθάς” be brought from 
Athens “ἐν ὁλκάσι.”  The recommendation that the grain from Athens be brought in 
ὁλκάδες, “merchant-ships,” may also have been made on account of the exceptional 
length of the voyage to Sicily.  Any grain carried by the triremes recommended by Nicias 
for the expedition would have almost certainly been consumed in its first few days’ or 
week’s sailing; triremes were specialized rowing vessels, built for speed, and thus had 
very limited stowage space, which meant that they were not able to carry any substantial 
amounts of provisions.
76
  All this would have been known to Nicias’ audience; it would 
have been clear to them, then, that some form of transporters would be necessary to carry 
the grain requested by Nicias for the expedition.  Since Nicias did not have to mention 
that the grain he had recommended would have to be carried in vessels other than 
triremes—since that would have been obvious to his audience—why did he include the 
detail that it be carried “ἐν ὁλκάσι”?  And, more precisely, why did he demand ὁλκάδες 
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 For the small amounts of provisions normally taken on-board triremes, see esp. Morrison et al. (2000) 
95-96, 64 n.3 and 67; cf. Gomme (1933) 17-19; Casson (1995) 261; van Wees (2004) 218 and n.11.  See 
also Casson (1995) 261:  “[t]here was hardly any space... for storage [on triremes], and most of it must have 
been taken up by spare oars, spare tackle, and similar vital items” (cf. Pryor [1988] 79 (writing of medieval 
galleys but raising a factor that would have reduced the already very limited storage space for provisions 
on-board classical Greek triremes, too):  “[galleys] also needed to occupy stowage space with war materials 
and to keep their decks clear for combat”).  The fact that triremes going into battle (see 6.34.5 with 
Morrison et al. [2000] 102) carried minimal amounts of provisions implies that triremes normally carried 
more than a bare minimum of supplies (contra Gomme [1933] 18).  But Gomme was right to emphasize 
that the limited storage capacity of triremes meant that they had always to operate within a few days’ radius 
of either their home city, or a friendly city, or supply ships:  see (1933) 19.  The four or five days’ 
provisions probably taken by the main fleet of triremes leaving the Piraeus to join up with the rest of the 
Sicilian expedition at Corcyra (see Morrison et al. [2000] 99) probably represent a near maximal amount of 
provisions carried on-board a trireme—or at least more than usual, since the triremes could not count on 
provisioning from a friendly polis before Corcyra, or on reprovisioning from supply ships (since these were 
already at Corcyra), and could travel quite heavily since they knew they would not have to engage in any 
fighting on their way to Corcyra.  Jordan ([1975] 107-109) argued that triremes could carry large amounts 
of supplies so as to enable them to operate at sea for long periods at sea without the necessity of 





rather than simply πλοῖα?
77
  The answer may lie in the fact that a ὁλκάς probably denoted 
a vessel of a larger capacity than a πλοίον.
78
  The specific request for ὁλκάδες, then, may 
have signalled a demand for bigger supply ships than usually accompanied Athenian 
overseas expeditions in the Aegean.
79
  This would have conveyed the fact that more 
provisions (than for a conventional operation in the Aegean) would be needed to 
accompany the expedition to Sicily; that, unlike overseas expeditions in the Aegean, 
                                                 
77 Cf. 6.65.2:  the Athenians, after their ruse to draw the Syracusans to Catana succeeds, took all their own 
army and such of the Sikels or others as had joined them, and embarking on their ships and boats (“καὶ 
ἐπιβιβάσαντες ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ πλοῖα”) sailed under cover of night against Syracuse:  Dover (HCT 
iv.343) comments on ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ πλοῖα:  “ὁλκάδες, distinguished from πλοῖα in 30.1 and 44.1, must 
here be subsumed under πλοῖα.”  Thus, although ὁλκάδες and πλοῖα are often distinguished in Thucydides 
(see the next note and, e.g., 7.7.3, 7.23.2), the former could be subsumed under the latter; therefore Nicias 
(Thucydides) was making an informed choice when he specified the detail that the grain for the expedition 
ought to be brought in ὁλκάδες. 
 
78 
See Dover (1965a) 53 (ad 6.44.1—both here and at 6.30.1 Thucydides differentiates in his description of 
the support ships of the expedition between “ὁλκάδες σιταγωγοί” and “πλοῖα”):  “Thucydides commonly 
distinguishes between ὁλκάς and πλοῖον, but the grounds of the distinction are never clear; probably πλοῖον 
is the less specific word and ὁλκάς is a ship of more than a certain size.  Neither word means ‘barge’ or 
‘lighter’.”  See also Vélissaropoulos (1980) 59:  “[l]es navires de gros transport par excellence [in Greece] 
sont les holkades.” 
 
79
 Note that πλοῖα were present as supply ships at the siege of Mytilene in the summer of 428 (3.6.2).  Also, 
(λεπτὰ) πλοῖα accompanied as supply ships the (mainly Corinthian) Peloponnesian fleet at the first battle 
of Naupactus in the summer of 429 (2.83.5, 2.84.2, 2.84.3 with the translation of Morrison et al. [2000] 71).  
In contrast, Thucydides earlier mentions that, at some point in the first two years of the war, the Spartans 
had killed any Athenian or allied traders whom they had caught sailing around the Peloponnese “ἐν ὁλκάσι” 
(2.67.4:  “οἱ Λακεδαιµόνιοι... τοὺς ἐµπόρους οὓς ἔλαβον Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυµµάχων ἐν ὁλκάσι περὶ 
Πελοπόννησον πλέοντας ἀποκτείναντες”).  These traders were almost certainly bringing supplies to an 
Athenian fleet engaged in a ‘periplous’ of the Peloponnese (see chapter 2 section iii).  Such an operation 
was different strategically and logistically from a normal overseas expedition or dispatch of a trireme fleet 
(through friendly waters and to friendly territory), i.e. from those described at 3.6.2 and 2.83-84.  Whereas, 
in the latter situation, supply boats accompanied amphibious forces or fleets as a supplement both to the 
initial provisions brought by the crews of the triremes and to the provisions men could buy in markets 
provided by friendly poleis on their way to theaters of operations, at 2.67.4 the supply boats were sailing to 
an exceptionally large force operating in hostile territory:  thus, the ὁλκάδες mentioned here may have been 
part of exceptional measures to provision an unusually large amphibious force operating in hostile or 
uninhabited territory (I argue fully for this view at chapter 2 section iii).  But the mention of ὁλκάδες at 
2.67.4 does mean that the mentions of πλοῖα at Mytilene and in the first battle of Naupactus can only 
remain suggestive for our ideas of what types of vessels usually accompanied overseas expeditions in and 





which sailed over (relatively) short distances (among friendly poleis) to their theaters of 
operations, and therefore did not need many supplies to accompany them (and thus could 
be accompanied by smaller supply ships; i.e., πλοῖα), the expedition to Sicily would be 
sailing over a much longer distance to reach its theater of operations, and therefore would 
need much more provisions than a normal (and normally-sized) expedition would.  Thus, 
Nicias’ recommendation that “τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν σῖτον” be brought “ἐν ὁλκάσι” may 
have been another extraordinary measure complementing the other arrangements he 
recommended for the transportation (and preparation) of grain from Athens to meet the 
problem of the exceptionally great length of the journey to Sicily. 
 
Nicias justified his request that grain be brought with the expedition (and the 
specific instructions for its transportation and preparation) with the reasoning “ἵνα, ἤν 
που ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας ἀπολαµβανώµεθα, ἔχῃ ἡ στρατιὰ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια (πολλὴ γὰρ οὖσα οὐ 
πάσης ἔσται πόλεως ὑποδέξασθαι),” “that, if we should be detained by bad weather, the 
expedition will have provisions, for it is not every city that will be able to receive a force 
as large as ours.”  That is, the expedition would need to bring roasted barley and wheat, 
and bakers to mill this grain, from Athens in order that it would not be lacking for 
provisions if it were forced to remain, because of bad weather, at a polis which was 
unable to receive it:  in using the term “ὑποδέξασθαι,” Nicias was (primarily) referring to 
the universally accepted convention in the Greek world of the fifth and fourth centuries 
that, if traveling to, from or around a theater of operations, military and naval forces, 




to purchase food in the marketplaces of cities or in temporary markets provided by cities 
outside their walls.
80
   
It is again Nicias’ consideration of the exceptional length of the voyage from 
Athens to Sicily which we need to keep in mind when trying to explicate his rationale for 
requesting grain to be brought from Athens.  Because of the unusually great length of the 
voyage from Athens to Sicily, and because of the great size of the expedition, there 
would be a much greater danger (than for a ‘normal’ expedition in the Aegean making a 
much shorter journey from Athens to a theater of operations) that the exceptionally large 
expedition to Sicily would encounter weather enforced sailing delays.
81
  The grain from 
Athens was to be brought as a precaution against the eventuality of such delays, in order 
that the (exceptionally large) expedition might not run out of provisions if, during its 
journey to (and around the) theater of operations in Sicily, it should be forced to remain, 
because of unfavorable sailing conditions, at a polis unable to receive it on account of its 
unusually huge size.
82
  In other words, Nicias was requesting the grain as a safeguard 
against any problems with the expedition’s provisioning on its journey to (and around)
83
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 I will have much more to say on this convention, and on the fact that it was universally accepted 
throughout the Greek world:  see section iiia below; chapter 3 section iii; and chapter 7 sections iia, iii. 
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 See section ii below for detailed discussion of this point. 
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 On the link between ἀπλοία and lack of provisions, cf. Fraenkel (1950) 115 ad Aeschy., Agamemnon 188 
(ad “ἀπλοίαι κεναγγεῖ”):  “[e]very Athenian of any military experience was familiar with these [hunger-
causing (“κεναγγεῖ”)] results of ἄπλοια, and with the menace they represent...”  (Fraenkel, in the same note 
([1950] 115-116), was incorrect, however, to link Nicias’ request for a surplus of ships with the clauses 
“ἵνα, ἤν που ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας ἀπολαµβανώµεθα, ἔχῃ ἡ στρατιὰ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια”; as I have shown, the superiority 










Sicily, that is, while it was on the move to the war zone (and around it during the initial 
stages of the campaign).
84
 
The justification Nicias gave for his request for the grain from Athens and the 
arrangements concerning it was extraordinary, then, in that his request for grain was 
motivated by an extraordinary problem confronting the expedition:  the exceptional 
length of the journey to Sicily.  The rationale given for this request also allowed him to 
introduce to his audience another potential problem for an expedition from Athens to 
Sicily (as his earlier demand for the overwhelming superiority in triremes had done, too), 
and thus another potential deterrent from the expedition.  Nicias’ statement that not every 
polis could receive a force as exceptionally large as the one which he was proposing for 
the expedition to Sicily implied a contrast with the functioning of overseas expeditions of 
usual size on usual campaigns, a contrast from which one can draw several interesting 
inferences.
85
  The statement that not every polis on the way to and around Sicily could 
receive the exceptionally large force which Nicias was proposing implied that every polis 
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 The crucial point to note here is that Nicias had already made provision for the food supply of the 
expedition once it had established itself in Sicily (through the requested superiority in triremes):  he was not 
demanding grain from Athens to provision the expedition after it had established a base for operations in 
Sicily and/or when it was involved in lengthy operations in or around the island—which is the usual 
interpretation of this clause.  See Kohl (1977) 156 (cf. pp.33-34 n.52 above):  Nicias at 6.22 
“vervollständigen das Bild eines autarkoperierenden athenischen Heeres auf Sizilien” and left no room in 
his detailing of the expedition’s provisioning requirements for help from allies in Sicily ([1977] 156).  
Green ([1970] 110) and Kagan ([1981] 187) also interpret Nicias’ request for grain to be brought from 
Athens with the expedition to mean that he was aiming at a force that depended entirely on provisions from 
Athens, and that he left no room in his demands for the παρασκευή of the expedition for the possibility of 
provisioning from allies in the west (or, as they have it, Sicily).  See also Gomme ([1933] 18 (cf. HCT 
i.114)), also incorrect on this point:  “even when, as on the Syracusan expedition, special ships with a corn-
supply and bakers accompanied the fleet (Thuc. 6.44.1), a landing would be necessary for the baking if the 




 A contrast again, that was based, as his whole argument at 6.21-22 was, on the presumption (made 
explicit at 6.21.2) that his audience was thoroughly familiar with the functioning of normal Athenian 





would be able to receive—i.e., provide a market for—‘normal’ expeditions of ‘normal 
size’ in the Aegean.  But it also implied that Nicias assumed as taken for granted by his 
audience that every polis (on the way to and around Sicily) could receive a normally 
sized expedition, and that most of those poleis could receive even the unusually large 
force which he was demanding.  That is, Nicias, and by extension, his audience, thought 
that every Greek city in the eastern Mediterranean and in the west could provide for sale 
at least one to three days’ worth of provisions (the usual amount of provisions bought by 
passing forces) to expeditions of anywhere from 10,000 to 20,000 men, and that most 
cities in the far west could receive forces even larger than these figures.
86
   
In this way, then, Nicias’ explanation for the measures to be taken for the grain 
supply of the expedition on its way to Sicily was a rational response to the extraordinarily 
long journey required to get there; but his explanation also formed an integral part of his 
rhetorical strategy at 6.21-22 of using demands for specific types of παρασκευή at 6.22 to 
bring out and emphasize the extraordinary conditions and challenges he had described at 
6.21 as facing the expedition to Sicily.   
 
Nicias’ attempt to discourage the Athenians from sending an expedition to Sicily 
by demanding, as general, a massive amount of παρασκευή for it resulted in a rhetorically 
skilled, precisely reasoned, and carefully integrated speech.  Having demonstrated the 
especially great resources of the Sicilian cities, and especially Syracuse and Selinus, he 
then argued the case for an extraordinary amount of παρασκευή to be brought with the 
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expedition from Athens to Sicily in order to ensure a successful campaign against cities 
with such exceptional resources, and especially the παρασκευή that would be needed in 
order both to counteract these cities’ natural advantages in cavalry and grain, and to 
overcome the special logistical difficulties of operating in such a strange and distant 
theater of operations.  Having done this, Nicias then specified the extraordinary forces 
and materiel the massive παρασκευή would have to comprise to meet these extraordinary 
operational challenges (6.22).  The rational organization of Nicias’ speech from 6.20-
6.22, and the tight logical connections between its constituent parts, can be seen most 
clearly when broken down into tabular form:
87
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 This table is based on Kohl (1977) 158.  Kallet ([2001] 42) has spoken of the “deliberate messiness” of 
Nicias’ speech (cited approvingly by Hornblower, CT iii.354 (although Hornblower [CT iii.357] also 
comments on 6.20-21 that “Nikias elaborates on his points in the logical, not the usual natural idiomatic 
way, cavalry then grain at the end of 20, and again cavalry then grain in 21.”)  Kallet also comments 
([2001] 43) that “[t]he speech stands out because of the sheer jumble and quantity of items listed by 
Nikias...” and ([2001] 42) that Nicias’ speech “presents a confusing jumble of information that is as 
conspicuous for its ultimate vagueness as for its detail.”  To rebut these points, in order:  firstly, the view 
that Nicias’ presentation of the need for a massive παρασκευή for the expedition, and his subsequent 
detailed listing of what that massive παρασκευή should consist of, represents a ‘jumble’ comes from a 
failure to grasp the logically integrated nature of Nicias’ speech at 6.20-22 (cf. Stahl [1993] 191 on Nicias’ 
speech being a rational analysis)—although this is not to deny that Nicias’ speech is marked by 
considerable amounts of circumlocution and complexity:  see Tompkins (1972) esp. 187, 191-193.  
Secondly, as we have seen, there is no vagueness in Nicias’ demands for the παρασκευή of the expedition:  
each was designed to respond to a specific problem raised by operating in the unusual theater of operations 
that Sicily would be.  See also p.130 n.27:  Kallet’s treatment of Nicias’ speech does not sufficiently grasp 






Military resources of Sicilian poleis Παρασκευή recommended for the 
expedition 
6.20.4:  ἵππους πολλοὺς 6.21.1:  Large infantry force, needed 
especially to counter the cavalry of the 
Sicilians. 
6.22 (specifics):  Many hoplites, and 
especially many archers and slingers, to 
counter the Sicilian cavalry 
6.20.4:  σίτῳ οἰκείῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐπακτῷ 6.21.1:  A considerable παρασκευή from 
Athens, needed because Sicily is far away 
and unfriendly, and supplies of additional 
requirements will not be able to be brought 
in easily there 
6.22 (specifics):  An overwhelming 
superiority in triremes in order to ensure 
the bringing in of provisions; grain (and 
bakers) as a precaution against the 
eventuality of weather enforced delays on 
the long voyage to Sicily 












(See also 6.20.4:  πολλαὶ δὲ τριήρεις καὶ 
ὄχλος ὁ πληρώσων αὐτὰς) 
(6.21.1:  Large land force, needed if the 
Athenians want to do anything worthy of 
their ambition 
6.22 (specifics):  ὁπλίτας πολλοὺς, 
Athenian, allied, and mercenary) 
 
(6.21.1:  Large land force, needed if the 
Athenians want to do anything worthy of 
their ambition 
6.22 (specifics):  τοξοτὰς πολλοὺς καὶ 
σφενδονήτας)  
 









Several crucial points about the provisioning of normal Athenian overseas 
expeditions in the Aegean in the fifth century emerge from an analysis of Nicias’ speech: 
1. Normal Athenian overseas expeditions in the Aegean departed from 
Athens with (at least) some provisions; 
2. On campaigns in the Aegean, the Athenians operated surrounded by 
subject/allied states, whose co-operation could be assumed because of 
their existing relationship with Athens.  Because of this, Athenian 
expeditionary forces could count on logistical support from 
subjects/allies near or in theaters of operations in the Aegean; thus, on 
normal campaigns, Athenian forces could depend on the easy supply of 
provisions from nearby friendly territory to supplement the provisions 
they had brought from Athens; 
3. Because there were no serious competitors to Athenian naval power in 
the Aegean from 480 to 412, and because the Athenians operated there 
surrounded by the subject/allied states of their empire, security of 
seaborne logistical support to Athenian overseas expeditionary forces 
could be taken for granted in this period;  
4. It could be assumed that every polis in the Aegean could receive, i.e. 
could provide for sale at least one to three days’ worth of provisions to, 
normally sized Athenian expeditions (this could be assumed for poleis 
in Italy and Sicily, too; moreover, it could also be taken for granted that 
most poleis in the west could receive forces larger than normally sized 
Athenian expeditions); 
5. Barley-flour (ἄλφιτα) formed the main, grain-based component of the 
diets of the soldiers and sailors of Athenian military forces on overseas 
campaigns; 
6. Neither the Athenian nor any other classical Greek state centrally 
organized the processing of grain so as to prepare it for consumption by 




7. The amount of provisions that Athenian expeditionary forces operating 
in the Aegean usually left Athens with may have been relatively small, 
and transported in relatively small vessels. 
 
Two other points about Nicias’ recommendations for the Sicilian expedition 
should be noted before continuing.  Firstly, after listing demands for the παρασκευή of the 
expedition, Nicias also recommended that “we must also provide ourselves with 
everything else as far as we can, so as not to be dependent upon others; and above all we 
must take with us from home as much money as possible...”
88
 (6.22).  Although this 
remark on money was included at least partly as an opportunity to attack the bona fides of 
the Egestans’ promise to fund the Athenians’ operations in Sicily,
89
 the recommendation 
also underlines how crucially important Nicias (and Thucydides) judged (sufficient 
amounts of) money to be for the success of any expedition to Sicily.
90
 
  Secondly, and crucially, at no point in his (admittedly very brief) description of 
the provisioning of usual Athenian expeditions in the Aegean at 6.21.2, nor in his detailed 
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 Crawley’s translation of “τά τε ἄλλα ὅσον δυνατὸν ἑτοιµάσασθαι, καὶ µὴ ἐπὶ ἑτέροις γίγνεσθαι, µάλιστα 
δὲ χρήµατα αὐτόθεν ὡς πλεῖστα ἔχειν.” 
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 As the next sentence in his speech shows:  “[t]he sums talked about by the Egestans as ready there are 
readier, you may be sure, in talk than in any other way” (6.22) (an adapted version of Crawley’s translation 
of “τὰ [χρήµατα] δὲ παρ’ Ἐγεσταίων, ἃ λέγεται ἐκεῖ ἑτοῖµα, νοµίσατε καὶ λόγῳ ἂν µάλιστα ἑτοῖµα 
εἶναι”).  The Egestans had promised money for the expedition on its arrival in Sicily (6.6.2, 6.8.1-2), but 
Nicias had already voiced his suspicions about their ability to provide this money in his first speech to the 
assembly (6.12.1).  These suspicions are borne out at 6.46 (see section ivb below).  The request for much 
money to be brought with the expedition was also a response to the need to match the abundant monetary 
reserves held by both Syracuse and Selinus (see 6.20.4 and p.17 above). 
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 See section ivb below, appendix 1 section iii for the importance of money in Thucydides’ description of 
the operations of the Sicilian expedition.  As I demonstrate in chapter iv section iv, Nicias’ 
recommendation that the Athenians bring as much money as possible for the expedition to Sicily is not 
evidence that he expected that the members of the expedition would find inflated prices in the markets 





plans for the provisioning of the potential expedition to Sicily, did Nicias make any 
mention of foraging as a means of acquiring provisions for overseas expeditions.  This is 
a vital point that will need to be borne in mind when analysing the actual provisioning 
practices of the Athenians during the campaign in Sicily. 
 
 ii. The requisitioning of grain transports and other ships for the expedition  
The expedition that eventually sailed to Sicily in the mid to late summer of 415
91
 
consisted of 134 triremes (beside two Rhodian pentekonters) of which 100 were Athenian 
vessels (60 fast triremes (i.e. triremes fitted out for battle) and 40 troop transports 
(“στρατιώτιδες”))
92
 and the remainder from Chios and the other allies; 5,100 hoplites, of 
which 2,200 were Athenian, and the rest allied troops, some of them Athenian subjects, 
and besides these 500 Argives and 250 Mantinean and other mercenaries; 480 archers, 80 
of whom were Cretans; 700 slingers from Rhodes; 120 light-armed exiles from Megara; 
and one horse-transport carrying 30 horses (6.43).  The provisions for this force were 
carried by 30 grain-transporters (“ὁλκάδες... σιταγωγοί”) (which also conveyed the 
bakers, stonemasons and carpenters for the expedition, and the tools for raising 
fortifications)
93
 accompanied by 100 ploia which, like the grain-carrying holkades, had 
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 Precision as to the date of the embarkation of the expedition is impossible; it appears, however, to have 
set sail at some point in July 415.  See p.110 n.241 below for discussion and references. 
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 See appendix 2 for discussion of the carrying capacity of these troop transports. 
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 The inclusion of these men and objects on the expedition show that the circumvallation of Syracuse was 
always the main aim of the Sicilian expedition and had been planned from the beginning (Stahl [2003] 208; 
Hornblower, CT iii.419).  Nicias, in the generals’ conference at Rhegium, suggested that the expedition 
ought to sail against Selinus and then sail home, but “Nikias [was] simply dishonest in pretending that 
Selinus [was] the main objective; he could fall back on the actual words of the Athenian decision (8.2), but 
Thucydides represents him as recognizing, in the letter which he wrote to the Assembly at the end of 414, 




been requisitioned; many other ploia and holkades also followed the armament 
voluntarily for purposes of trade.
94
 
The actual expedition to Sicily therefore followed Nicias’ detailed 
recommendations at 6.22 very closely.
95
  This has a crucial implication for the use of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
triremes reconnoiter Syracuse and its harbors, and the features of the country [around Syracuse] which they 
would have to make their base of operations for the war (“κατεσκέψαντο τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς λιµένας καὶ 
τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν ἐξ ἧς αὐτοῖς ὁρµωµένοις πολεµητέα ἦν...”).  Liebeschutz’s argument ([1968] esp. 290-
294) that the reduction of Syracuse by siege was not initially the main goal of the Sicilian expedition is 
unsuccessful because of his failure to take the implications of 6.44.1, 6.50.5, and 7.11.2 into account 
(among other reasons). 
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 6.44.1:  “τούτοις δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἄγουσαι ὁλκάδες µὲν τριάκοντα σιταγωγοί, καὶ τοὺς σιτοποιοὺς ἔχουσαι 
καὶ λιθολόγους καὶ τέκτονας καὶ ὅσα ἐς τειχισµὸν ἐργαλεῖα, πλοῖα δὲ ἑκατόν, ἃ ἐξ ἀνάγκης µετὰ τῶν 




 The surprisingly favorable reaction to Nicias’ second speech in the assembly led to this tight connection 
between Nicias’ requests for the παρασκευή of the expedition at 6.22 and the actual παρασκευή of the 
expedition.  In the immediate aftermath of his speech, the Athenians in the assembly, far from being 
discouraged by “τὸ ὀχλώδης τῆς παρασκευῆς” demanded by Nicias (6.24.2), became more eager for the 
expedition than ever before (6.24.2-3).  One of those present in the assembly came forward and asked 
Nicias to outline immediately specifically what sort of expeditionary force (“ἥντινα... παρασκευὴν”) the 
Athenians should vote him (6.25.1).  Nicias, presumably surprised that his demands for a massive 
παρασκευή had not resulted in a reversal of the decision to mount the expedition and that he was now being 
put on the spot by the demand for details, unwillingly gave a provisional listing of the expedition’s 
requirements in παρασκευή:  at least 100 triremes; hoplite transports (both from Athens and the allies), and 
not less than 5,000 hoplites (again both Athenian and allied), and more, if possible; and “τὴν δὲ ἄλλην 
παρασκευὴν ὡς κατὰ λόγον, καὶ τοξοτῶν τῶν αὐτόθεν καὶ ἐκ Κρήτης καὶ σφενδονητῶν, καὶ ἤν τι ἄλλο 
πρέπον δοκῇ εἶναι, ἑτοιµασάµενοι ἄξειν,” “and the rest of the παρασκευή in proportion; archers from home 
and from Crete, and slingers, and whatever else might seem proper, being made ready by the generals and 
taken with them” (6.25.2).   
Nicias, in answering the demand for more precise information on the παρασκευή he thought needed for the 
expedition, was a hostage to the requests for παρασκευή he had just made in his second speech to the 
assembly:  to deviate in his answer now from the types and amounts of παρασκευή he had just requested in 
that speech would have been to expose its true motives and duplicitous nature.  His reply to the question of 
exactly what sort of expeditionary force (“ἥντινα... παρασκευὴν”) he wanted therefore had to duplicate the 
παρασκευή he had just outlined in his speech at 6.22 (with the addition now, naturally, of more detail, as 
the new context demanded).  Thus, at 6.25.2 there was the same request as at 6.22 for many triremes and 
many hoplites.  As for the rest of the expeditionary force, at 6.25.2, Nicias also made the same request for 
many (note “κατὰ λόγον”) archers and slingers as he had done at 6.22.  The phrase “τὴν δὲ ἄλλην 
παρασκευὴν” at 6.25.2 also included, in addition to the archers and slingers, “καὶ ἤν τι ἄλλο πρέπον δοκῇ 
εἶναι.”  Since Nicias at 6.25.2 was in the position of being forced to repeat and elaborate upon the requests 
he had made at 6.22, it is possible to construe safely what he meant by “καὶ ἤν τι ἄλλο πρέπον δοκῇ εἶναι” 
here—he was referring here to the other kinds of παρασκευή mentioned at 6.22:  grain, boats to transport it, 
and bakers to mill and prepare it for consumption (and note again “κατὰ λόγον”—there were to be large 
amounts of all of these).  Since Nicias was one of the three generals to whom (having heard his more 




arrangements made for the expedition as evidence for the provisioning of Athenian 
overseas expeditions:  since the force that sailed to Sicily was a direct result of Nicias’ 
instructions for the παρασκευή of the expedition at 6.22, this means (remembering the 
motivation for those instructions)
96
 that we should consider the scale and kinds of forces 
and materiel recruited and organized for the campaign in Sicily to have been deliberately 
extraordinary, prepared on the understanding that they were needed to meet the 
extraordinary military and logistical demands of sailing to and fighting in Sicily.  This 
means, in turn, that none of the individual details of the organization of the Sicilian 
expedition should be taken as typical of the organization of usual Athenian amphibious 
expeditions.  Taking this further, this then means—focusing on the measures taken for 
the provisioning of the expedition—that the fact that the grain transports and (smaller) 
boats (ploia) carrying the provisions for the expedition to Sicily were accompanying it 
“ἐξ ἀνάγκης,” i.e. that the boats carrying the provisions for the expedition had been 
                                                                                                                                                 
the size of the army and the organization of the expedition generally, it was to be expected that the figures 
for the ships and men and materiel which actually sailed to Sicily corresponded almost exactly with his 
detailed recommendations at 6.25.2 (see, e.g., again at 6.43 that the expedition did, in fact, comprise 100 
Athenian triremes (cf. 6.31.3); and also that the total number of hoplites on the expedition amounted to 
5,100)—which were, again, merely a more detailed version for his recommendations for the παρασκευή of 
the expedition at 6.22. 
Three points on the meaning of παρασκευή here.  Firstly, παρασκευή is ambiguous at 6.24.2:  it could be 
referring to the concrete παρασκευή listed by Nicias at 6.22, as well as to the process of preparing that 
παρασκευή (it should not be understood as just referring to a ‘process,’ contra Allison [1989] 81 table 7).  
Secondly, when Nicias responded to the request from his anonymous fellow citizens for specific details on 
the παρασκευή he wanted for the expedition, Nicias responded with a detailed list of objects (products) (cf. 
Allison [1989] 81).  Nicias’ answer—simply a more detailed version of his recommendations of 6.22—
shows, then, that the anonymous citizen had been asking for more specific details on Nicias’ demands at 
6.22 for military forces and materiel; i.e. that the anonymous citizen had understood the requests for 
παρασκευή at 6.22 as requests for concrete objects, thus confirming my earlier interpretation of παρασκευή 
at 6.21.2 (and thus at 6.8.3, 6.9.1, and 6.19.2) (see p.27 n.37 and p.29 n.42 above).  Thirdly, the analysis 
above shows that “τὴν δὲ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν”at 6.25.2 clearly refers to concrete objects (and people), and 
not to any process, contra Allison (1989) 81 table 7. 
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The Athenians took the extraordinary decision to requisition boats to carry 
provisions for the Sicilian expedition for two reasons:  the exceptional size of the 
expedition and the exceptionally great distance it would have to sail to Sicily.  The 
extraordinarily large size of the expedition would lead to an extraordinarily large demand 
for provisions during its voyage to Sicily.  The expedition sailing to Sicily contained 
many thousands more men than sailed on normal Athenian expeditions sent overseas for 
operations within the Aegean (or to western ‘mainland’ Greece).
98
  As Thucydides notes, 
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 Since the term “requisitioning” has sometimes been used by ancient Greek military historians in a rather 
loose manner (cf. Erdkamp [1998] 11 on Roman military historians’ confused and indiscriminate use of 
terminology relating to military food supply), I define it here (or, rather, provide the Concise Oxford 
Dictionary definition):  requisitioning means “the [state] appropriation of goods for military or public use.”  
More specifically, in a military context, requisitioning “involves obtaining supplies from at least ostensibly 
friendly authorities or individuals” and “generally involved either an involuntary seizure... or forced 
purchase...” (Roth [1999] 117, 141). 
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 30,000-50,000 men sailed to Sicily (see appendix 2), as compared to the 10,000-20,000 men (the 5,000 
or so men who sailed to Amphilochia formed an unusually small force) who sailed on the amphibious 
expeditions sent out by Athens just before and during the Peloponnesian War to reduce rebellious poleis or 
on other operations expected to be some length (i.e., not including periploi (on which see chapter 2 section 
iii)): 
1.57.1 (433/2):  30 triremes and 1,000 hoplites sent against Potidaea and other cities in the Chalcidice. 
1.61.1 (432):  40 triremes and 2,000 hoplites sent against Potidaea and the other cities in revolt in the 
Chalcidice (reinforced in the same year by 1,600 hoplites (1.64.2)). 
2.58.3 (with 2.56.2) (430):  150 triremes, 4,000 hoplites, and 300 cavalry sent against Potidaea (see also 
6.31.2 where Thucydides includes the detail that these forces were accompanied by many other allies 
besides). 
3.3.2 (428):  40 triremes sent against Mytilene (reinforced later in the same summer by 1,000 hoplites 
(3.18.2)). 
3.91.1 (426):  60 triremes and 2,000 hoplites sent against Melos. 
3.107.1 (winter 426/5):  20 triremes, 200 hoplites, and 60 archers sent to campaign in Amphilochia. 
4.42.1 (425):  80 triremes, 2,000 hoplites, and 200 cavalry, accompanied by Milesians, Andrians, and 
Carystians from the allies, sent against the territory of Corinth. 
4.53.1 (424):  60 triremes, 2,000 hoplites, a few cavalry, and some allied troops from Miletus and other 
parts sent against Cythera. 
4.129.2 (423):  50 triremes, 1,000 hoplites, 600 archers, one hundred Thracian mercenaries and some 
peltasts drawn from Athenian allies in the neighborhood, sent against Mende and Scione. 
5.2.1 (422):  1,200 hoplites, and 300 cavalry from Athens, a larger force of the allies, and 30 triremes sent 




there was just one expeditionary force sent from Athens during the Peloponnesian War 
that matched the Sicilian expedition in numbers of triremes and men:  the expedition sent 
out against Potidaea in 430, which originally had been prepared for a periplous with 
Epidauros as its main target (6.31.2 with 2.56.2, 2.58.3). 
But, as Thucydides also notes, the expeditions to Epidauros and Potidaea had set 
out on short voyages (“ἀλλὰ ἐπί τε βραχεῖ πλῷ ὡρµήθησαν”) to their respective theaters 
of operations (6.31.3).
99
  In contrast, as Nicias had pointed out, the expedition to Sicily 
would be embarking on a much longer voyage than those usually undertaken by overseas 
expeditions mounted by the Athenian state (6.21.2)—a point explicitly endorsed by 
Thucydides in an editorial comment on the launch of the expedition:  the voyage to Sicily 
was “µέγιστος ἤδη διάπλους ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας,” “the longest passage from home hitherto 
                                                                                                                                                 
5.84.1 (416):  38 triremes, 1,600 hoplites, 300 archers, and 20 mounted archers, and about 1,500 hoplites 
from the allies and the islanders, sent against Melos. 
(I use the round number of 10,000-20,000 men to take account of the unknowable numbers of slave-




 As did other periploi sent out from Athens to and around the Peloponnese, which could sometimes 
consist of large numbers of ships and men (see, e.g., 2.23.2 (431):  100 triremes, 1,000 hoplites, and 400 
archers; 3.16.1 (428):  100 triremes) (see chapter 2 section iii below for discussion of the provisioning of 
Athenian periploi).  Thucydides also states at 6.31.3 that, unlike the Sicilian expedition, the expeditions to 
Epidauros and Potidaea had set out with a “παρασκευῇ φαύλῃ,” since they were going on short voyages, 
and not on a long journey and on a campaign that needed both strong naval and land forces, as the Sicilian 
expedition did (6.31.3).  Dover comments (HCT iv.293) that παρασκευῇ φαύλῃ “refers to the structure and 
equipment of the force, not to the force itself...”; cf. Dover (1965a) 41:  “here [παρασκευή] must mean 
‘equipment’, covering both supplies and supporting arms.”  Two points refute Dover’s interpretation of 
παρασκευῇ φαύλῃ.  Firstly, Thucydides’ explanation (6.31.3-4) of his statement that the Sicilian expedition 
was not setting out with a παρασκευῇ φαύλῃ focuses on the unusually expensive preparation of the force 
and on the unusually careful recruitment of the men for the force, i.e. on the (military and naval) force 
itself.  Secondly, Thucydides at 6.31.2-3 is describing the strictly military and naval part (i.e. the ships and 
the men) of the Sicilian expedition still present at Athens; the “supplies and supporting arms” had already 
departed for Corcyra (cf. Morrison et al. [2000] 99).  In short, παρασκευή at 6.31.3 refers to the (military 
and naval) force embarking on the Sicilian expedition, not to its supplies, and therefore does not provide 





attempted” by a Greek state (6.31.6).
100
  Because of the much longer distance of its 
voyage to its theater of operations in the far west, the Sicilian expedition would be much 
more likely (than usual Athenian overseas expeditions making much shorter journeys to 
campaign theaters (relatively) near to Athens, e.g. those to Epidauros and Potidaea) to 
experience the weather enforced delays that could afflict all voyages in the pre-industrial 
Mediterranean;
101
 in particular, the prevailing northerly winds that marked part of the 
coasting voyage along the coast of Italy (even in summer) had the potential to slow the 
expedition’s progress significantly.
102
  There was a much greater chance, then, as Nicias 
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 Thucydides considered the exceptionally great distance to Sicily a key strategic factor in the planning 
and eventual outcome of the expedition, as can be seen from this authorial intervention and from the 
repeated and consistent mentions in speeches of the effect that the great distance to Sicily would have on 
the likely success both of the expedition and of any continued Athenian intervention in the far west:  see 
6.33.5 (Hermocrates, commenting on the probable outcome of the Athenian expedition, stating that few 
great armaments “πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀπάραντες” (“sent far from their own land”) have succeeded); 
6.37.1 (Athenagoras stating that any expedition from Athens to Syracuse would have to make “τοσοῦτον 
πλοῦν δεῦρο” (“such a great voyage here”)); 6.11.1 (Nicias, in his first speech to the assembly, telling the 
Athenians that, even if they managed to conquer the Sicilians, they would rule them with difficulty “διὰ 
πολλοῦ” (“on account of the great distance” to Sicily) (amongst other things)); 6.86.3 (Euphemus making 
the same point to the Camarinaeans, that the Athenians could not keep the Sicilian cities as subjects “διὰ 
µῆκός τε πλοῦ” (“on account of the length of the voyage” to Sicily) (amongst other things)).  Note that even 
the first stage of the expedition’s voyage, the crossing of the Ionian Sea, could be described by 
Hermocrates as one that was particularly long and difficult to make for a large trireme-based expedition:  
See 6.34.4:  “τὸ δὲ πέλαγος αὐτοῖς πολὺ περαιοῦσθαι µετὰ πάσης τῆς παρασκευῆς, χαλεπὸν δὲ διὰ πλοῦ 
µῆκος ἐν τάξει µεῖναι,” “the open sea [of the Ionian] is a wide one to cross with all of their παρασκευή, and 
it is difficult on account of the length of the trip to keep in formation.”  See also Dover (1965a) 40, who 
notes, comparing 6.13.1, that the Ionian sea “was the natural boundary between the Aegean world and the 
Western Greeks” (though Dover (ibid.) was wrong to state that the crossing from Corcyra to Iapygia “was 
the only stage of the journey which would be out of sight of land”—see Horden and Purcell [2000] 127, 
Map 9:  land would have been visible at all stages of the crossing). 
 
101
 See Erdkamp (1998) 56 (cf. Pryor [1988] 74-75) for voyages over longer distances being more prone to 
delays.  See also Braudel (1972) 360-363 on ‘average’ travel times in the sixteenth century (C.E.) 
Mediterranean, and esp. 360:  “[t]he essential point to note here is this very variety, the wide range of times 
taken to travel the same journey: it is a structural feature of the century...  In the sixteenth century all 
timetables were completely dependent on the weather.  Irregularity was the rule.”  Voyages over very long 
distances were more prone to these variations in travel times ([1972] 361-362). 
 
102
 See 6.104.2:  Gylippus’ squadron of four triremes, sailing along on the coast of Italy after leaving 
Thurii, was driven out to the open sea by northerly winds characteristic of the area and only made it back to 
land (at Tarentum) with difficulty and having suffered significant damage (which took some time to repair:  




had seen, that the expedition would be delayed for some time, because of unfavorable 
sailing conditions, in a polis that could not provide sufficient food for sale to it on 
account of its exceptional size.
103
  This exceptional combination of factors—i.e. the fact 
that the expedition’s extraordinarily large demand for provisions (because of its 
exceptional size) on its journey could not be assured of being met because of the greater 
risk of disruption to the voyage caused by the exceptionally long distance of the journey 
to (and around) Sicily
104
—compelled the dispatch of large reserves of grain with the 
expedition, in order to ensure its logistical (and therefore military) security during its 
voyage to the war zone in the far west.
105
  In addition, the fact that, during parts of its 
journey, there would be no secure (and predictable) means for the enormous expedition 
of acquiring sufficient supplies to reprovision itself—because, at several points during the 
(unusually) long coasting voyage to (and around) Sicily, the expedition would be sailing 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Syracuse, having treacherously allied with the Carthaginians, tried to discourage the Corinthians from 
the “trouble and expense of a voyage to Sicily with all its perils” (“ὡς οὐδὲν δέον πράγµατα καὶ δαπάνας 
ἔχειν αὐτοὺς πλέοντας εἰς Σικελίαν καὶ κινδυνεύοντας”).  Fleets entering the Ionian Sea were “exposed to 
prevailing northerlies as well as to the changeable and often inclement weather characteristic of it” even 
during summer:  Gertwagen (2006) 104 (contra Simonsen [2003] 263).  (The very long delay that some 
holkades carrying hoplites from the Peloponnese to Sicily experienced in the spring and summer of 413 
(they were blown off course to Libya:  see 7.50.1-2 with 7.19.3-4) is not relevant here, since these vessels 
had attempted to make the crossing across the open sea from Taenarum to Sicily.) 
 
103
 See again 6.22:  “(πολλὴ γὰρ οὖσα οὐ πάσης ἔσται πόλεως ὑποδέξασθαι).” 
 
104
 Note again that, unlike typical major expeditions in the Aegean which were sent out against one specific 
target (or limited area of operations, such as the Chalcidice), fulfilling the terms of the Sicilian expedition’s 
mandate would necessitate relatively long voyages from one theater of operations to another (see 6.8.3:  the 
expedition was to help the Egestans against the Selinuntines, to restore the Leontine exiles, and to order all 
other matters in Sicily as deemed best for the Athenians). 
 
105





through (potentially) hostile or uninhabited territory
106
—meant that the expedition’s 
demand for reserves of provisions was increased (exceptionally) still more.
107
   
This extraordinarily high demand for reserves of grain required in turn an 
extraordinarily high capacity of sea transport; in other words, the expedition required an 
extraordinarily high number of vessels to transport its provisions.
108
  The expedition also 
needed the transport of its grain, and therefore the sailing of the grain-transports, to be 
guaranteed, in order to ensure its logistical security, due to its unusually limited and 
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 See section iii below. 
 
107
 Cf. Erdkamp (1998) 61.  These conditions would also have faced the two fleets sent from Athens to 
Sicily during its first intervention in the west from 427 to 424.  But these fleets had much fewer men (20 
triremes sent at the end of the summer of 427 (3.86.1); 40 triremes sent in the summer of 425 (4.2.1, 
4.48.5)) than the Sicilian expedition of 415 and thus would have had a much smaller demand for provisions 
on their journey; their provisioning during the voyage to Sicily would therefore have been much less 
precarious.  In addition, the duration of the voyage to Sicily for the two fleets sent out in 427 and 425 
would have been shorter than that of the expedition in 415.  “Fleets, their speed governed by their slowest 
ships, moved far more slowly and far more predictably [than individual triremes and small squadrons of 
triremes]” (Guilmartin [1974] 96).  The fleets sent out in 427 and 425 consisted solely of fast triremes and 
would have been to make quicker progress than the expedition in 415 which also included, in addition to its 
fast triremes, troop transports and other vessels to transport men and materiel for conducting a siege 
(6.44.1) (note, in this regard, that, although “[t]he distance from Corcyra to the heel of Italy is about 155km 
or 84 sea miles, not much more than half the distance which could be covered by a trieres comfortably 
under oar ‘in a long day’” (Morrison et al. [2000] 101), Hermocrates expected the very large expedition 
from Athens to cross it “slowly and in small groups” (“βραδεῖά τε καὶ κατ’ ὀλίγον προσπίπτουσα”) (6.34.4) 
(see also p.57 n.100 above: the Ionian sea was thought to be particularly long and difficult crossing for a 
large expedition)).  In addition, the larger the expedition, the more time it took to complete the process of 
reprovisioning and watering at each stop it made (see again Guilmartin [1974] 96; cf. Simonsen [2003] 
260) (this remains true despite the fact that, in the event, the generals of the expedition in 415, before they 
set sail from Corcyra, split the expedition into three and allotted one to each of their number so as to make 
the expedition easier to control and to make its provisioning and watering less troublesome; each of these 
three parts would have taken longer to provision and water than the fleets sent out in 427 and 425).  The 
(probable) shorter duration of the 427 and 425 fleets’ voyages would have meant that they could have been 
expected to face a lesser risk of unfavorable sailing conditions.  Again, it was primarily the combination of 
the exceptionally large size of the expedition in 415 and the exceptionally long duration of its voyage to 
Sicily that would have necessitated the dispatch of large amounts of grain with it. 
 
108
 Contrast the needs of normal Athenian amphibious expeditions operating in the Aegean (or against 
targets on the eastern coast of the Peloponnese):  because of the short (or relatively short) distances to their 
targets, because of their (relatively) moderate size, and because they sailed within friendly territory, normal 
Athenian expeditions needed only to be accompanied by small amounts of provisions, and therefore small 





unpredictable access to means of resupply on its voyage to Sicily; i.e., due to the 
unusually precarious nature of its provisioning on the voyage to Sicily, the expedition 
could not depend on traders accompanying it voluntarily for the purposes of trade (even if 
these did provide a welcome supplementary source of provisions for the expedition).
109
  
In these circumstances, since the Athenian state did not possess any holkades,
110
 the sole 
means for Athens to meet the exceptionally high demand for vessels to transport grain for 
the Sicilian expedition was to requisition them, i.e. to make (some) owners of holkades at 
Athens to provide their vessels for the expedition “ἐξ ἀνάγκης.”
111
   
The requisitioning of 30 holkades to transport grain for the Sicilian expedition 
(and of 100 ploia to transport its other supplies) was, then, an extraordinary measure 
designed to meet extraordinary circumstances.
112
  The exceptional nature of the 
                                                 
109
 Cf. Erdkamp (1998) 61. 
 
110
 See Vélissaropoulos (1980) 59-60 citing Xen., Poroi 3.14 (a statement that applies, strictly speaking, to 
the middle of the fourth century, but which can be extended safely to cover the entire classical period). 
 
111 The requisitioning of merchant ships was a measure commonly taken by other states mounting 
unusually large expeditions over unusually long distances in later periods in the pre-industrial 
Mediterranean.  See especially Erdkamp (1998) 56-62, 82-83 for the requisitioning of ships for major 
Roman Republican expeditions:  this discussion informs much of the analysis here.  See also Madden 
(2006) 213-214 on preparations for the Fourth Crusade (of around 65,000 men) in 1201 requiring Venice to 
suspend overseas commerce for a year and to press all merchant vessels into service as troop and materiel 
transports.  See also Guilmartin (1974) 109:  the major Mediterranean states of the sixteenth century (C.E.) 
basing “their capability to launch a major expedition” in part on their capability to “commandeer[..] 
merchant ships, [in order] to provide logistical support and to serve as troop transports.”  (Cf. Braudel 
(1972) 307, 309 for further examples of requisitioning of ships for major overseas expeditions in the 
sixteenth century (C.E.).)  Note that smaller Spanish galley squadrons in the sixteenth century were able to 
satisfy their provisioning requirements during their operations from local town markets and royal 
magazines, and did not have to depend on requisitioned logistical support:  see Guilmartin (1993) 122, 127-
128.  (I should note here that the greater number of merchant ships requisitioned in these comparative 
examples can be explained by the fact that these vessels were also needed to carry supplies for the 
provisioning of expeditions in the theaters of operations (and, in the case of the sixteenth century 
expeditions, to transport artillery, too).) 
 
112
 This means, then, that one cannot use the arrangements made for the provisioning of the voyage of the 




Athenians’ decision to requisition vessels to transport the supplies of the expedition can 
be seen from the fact that there is no other reference to a classical Greek state 
requisitioning vessels for the transport of supplies for an expeditionary force operating 
overseas.
113
  Although the argument from silence is almost always an invalid procedure 
in analysing the practices of classical Greek provisioning,
114
 the fact that we nowhere else 
hear of the requisitioning of vessels to transport grain and other provisions in the classical 
Greek world, together with the fact that the requisitioning of ships was part of a set of 
atypical measures taken to man and equip the Sicilian expedition, means that we can be 
sure that the pressing of merchant ships into service to transport supplies for overseas 
expeditions was not (commonly) practised by classical Greek states.
115
 
                                                                                                                                                 
major Athenian overseas expeditions, contra Tänzer (1912) 28-29; Gomme, HCT i.16; Anderson (1970) 45; 
Pritchett (1971) 43; Jordan (1975) 110; Gabrielsen (1994) 119; Rawlings (2007) 118; Krentz (2007) 154 
(who takes the arrangements made for the provisioning of the expedition during its voyage to the far west 
as illustrative of the usual means used by classical Greek state to provision overseas expeditions to hostile 
territory).  van Wees ([2004] 219 and n.12) does note that the “extensive logistical support” for the Sicilian 
expedition was “rare,” but fails to note the exceptionality of the institutional arrangements made for the 
transport of grain and other supplies for the expedition. 
 
113
 Though see chapter 3 section v:  the Corinthians pressing wagons/mules into service to transport 
provisions overland to Phlius in 367. 
 
114
 As noted above regarding Nicias’ demand for the requisitioning of labor to mill the grain brought along 
with the expedition. 
 
115
 But note that the Athenian expeditions to Egypt and Cyprus in the late 460s and 450s (1.) matched or 
surpassed the Sicilian expedition in terms of men (see 1.104.2 (first expedition to (Cyprus) and Egypt 
consisting of 200 triremes (infantry numbers not mentioned by Thucydides); 1.112.2 (second expedition to 
Cyprus in 451 (?) consisting of 200 triremes (again, infantry numbers not mentioned by Thucydides)); (2.) 
also had to make unusually long voyages to their theaters of operations; and (3.) could not be assured of 
friendly reception at all points on those voyages (it is very improbable that the Athenian expeditions to 
Egypt used the facilities which Phoenician fleets had been using for centuries, contra Davies [2007a] 90 
n.80; a mistaken insistence on the (sole) importance of ‘secure naval bases’ for the provisioning of trireme 
fleets informs Davies’ mistaken belief here).  These expeditions were faced therefore with the same 
potential provisioning problems on their voyages to their theaters of operations as the Sicilian expedition 
(in addition, it is unlikely that either expedition to Egypt/Cyprus could count on continuous provisioning 
from nearby friendly territory).  It seems likely, then, for all the same considerations raised in the analysis 
of the Sicilian expedition’s unusual demand for grain, that the expeditions to Egypt and Cyprus were also 




As for the administrative mechanisms used to requisition the holkades and ploia 
for the expedition, as Dover notes, “of the machinery of [the] operation [of the 
requisitioning] and its legal and constitutional basis we know nothing.”
 116
  We can say 
that the σιτοποιοί pressed into service for the expedition were probably not slaves, but 
free men, ‘master-bakers’ accompanied by a number of their own slaves.
117
  After that, it 
is impossible to state with certainty (or probability) whether the grain in the “ὁλκάδες 
σιταγωγοί” was purchased by the state; requisitioned (either by forced purchase or 
involuntary seizure); or, indeed, whether it was, in fact, always owned by the state (as 
some form of tax-in-kind).
118
  We know nothing, too, of the means of allocation of this 
grain to the sailors and soldiers on the expedition:  if it was to be purchased at market 
price, at a fixed (and reduced) price, or distributed for free.  We do know, however, 
because the expedition was not provided with any markets on its way to Sicily (6.44.2), 
that (at least some of) the large reserves of grain brought in the requisitioned holkades as 
an emergency supply for the expedition’s voyage were consumed. 
                                                                                                                                                 
description of the extraordinary nature of the Sicilian expedition at 6.31.2-3, seems, in comparing it to other 
expeditions, to limit himself to those sent out during the Peloponnesian War; we might therefore be meant 
to understand the arrangements for the expedition as exceptional within the context of the period 
Thucydides treats in detail (i.e. the Peloponnesian War and the four years preceding it). 
 
116
 HCT iv.259. 
 
117
 See ibid. (see also Dover [1965a] 33-34):  σιτοποιοί normally referring to (female) slaves, but here 
almost certainly ‘master-bakers.’  Furthermore, regarding Nicias’ demand that the σιτοποιοί be pressed into 
service “ἐκ τῶν µυλώνων πρὸς µέρος,” it is, as Dover notes (HCT iv.259), unclear to us “whether Nikias 
wishes the σιτοποιοί to be assigned proportionately to the various units of the force or to be so conscripted 
that the burden is to distributed over the mills.” 
 
118
 Though this latter mechanism is most unlikely:  classical Greek states did not exact direct taxation in 
kind on their citizens’ crops (see below chapter 2 section iic and chapter 3 section ivb for discussion of the 





iii. The provisioning of the expedition ‘on the move’ 
a. Markets provided by poleis   
Nicias at 6.22 had argued that grain needed to be brought with the expedition 
from Athens because not every city could receive the force, as large as it was, if it was 
delayed by bad weather:  it can be inferred from his argument, then, that reception by a 
polis of a military force included some method of provisioning the received force.  What 
the institutional means were by which cities provisioned the military forces they received, 
and what, generally, the reception of a military force by a polis comprised, can be seen 
from 6.44.2, where Thucydides describes the treatment that the Athenian expedition 
received from the Greek cities in southern Italy on its way to Sicily:  “τῶν µὲν πόλεων οὐ 
δεχοµένων αὐτοὺς ἀγορᾷ οὐδὲ ἄστει, ὕδατι δὲ καὶ ὅρµῳ, Τάραντος δὲ καὶ Λοκρῶν οὐδὲ 
τούτοις,”
119
 “the cities not receiving them with a market nor into the town, though 
furnishing them with water and anchorage, and Tarentum and Locri not even with these” 
(6.44.2).
120
  Thucydides only outlined here what a passing expeditionary force expected 
                                                 
119
 Although ὑποδέξεσθαι is used in Nicias’ speech at 6.22, δέχοµαι is the verb usually used for ‘to receive,’ 
‘to admit as friendly’; but see also 6.34.4, 5 (and 3.111.4) for ὑποδέχοµαι used to denote the reception of 
military forces by (friendly) states. 
 
120
 The translation is taken from the Loeb.  Diodorus (13.3.4) narrates that the expedition got every kind of 
courtesy when it put in at Thurii (a colony of Athens), and that it was provided with a market by the 
inhabitants of Croton (“καὶ λαβόντες ἀγορὰν παρὰ τῶν Κροτωνιατῶν”).  But see Lazenby (2004) 137:  
“although it is possible that the Thourians remembered that the original colonization of their city had been 
sponsored by Athens, Thucydides implies that an anti-Athenian faction was now [i.e. in the summer of 415] 
in power (7.33.5-6).”  In addition, although “Kroton’s founder supposedly came from Patrai (Strabo 8.7.5) 
and might have been friendly because of Alkibiades’ help to its mother-city (5.52.2)” (Lazenby [2004] 
137), the Crotoniates refused permission to the Athenians to pass through their territory in the summer of 
413 (7.35.2).  Although this refusal could have been consistent with a position of neutrality (Bauslaugh 
[1991] 148), it suggests that Thucydides may have been right to have included the Crotoniates among those 
states signaling a non-committal attitude to the Athenians in 415.  Hornblower states (CT iii.419, 608-609) 
that we might also have expected Metapontum to have received the expedition in 415, since the force sent 
from Athens to Sicily two years later, led by Demosthenes and Eurymedon, was received by the 
Metapontines, who also added three hundred javelin men and two triremes to the Athenian force “κατὰ τὸ 
ξυµµαχικὸν” (7.33.4-5).  Hornblower, however, fails to note that the pro-Athenian attitude in Metapontum 




to be provided for it when being received by a polis—i.e., water, anchorage, 
reception/admittance into the city proper, and the provision of a market in which 
members of the force could buy supplies—because he wanted in this passage to 
distinguish between the different receptions the expedition experienced at the hands of 
the Italian cities.  The facts that at 6.44.2 Thucydides could mention incidentally the 
various arrangements for passing armies and navies denoted by the term δέχοµαι, and that 
he felt no need earlier in his work to describe what those arrangements were,
121
 
demonstrate that there was an assumed and shared understanding between him and his 
audience of the arrangements constituting the convention of reception by a polis of a 
passing expeditionary force
122
—and that Thucydides and his audience assumed the 
provision of a market as an integral part of that convention.  
 
Despite Nicias’ arguments at 6.22 and the fact that, after the entire Sicilian 
expedition had assembled at Corcyra (6.42.1 with 6.30.1), its three generals divided it 
into three parts, allotting one to each of their number, because of the possible difficulty 
that the entire force, sailing together, might have in obtaining provisions (amongst other 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hornblower) where both the Thurians and Metapontines are listed as siding with the Athenians because of 
conflicts within their cities.  See also Diod. 13.3.4, also unnoted by Hornblower:  Diodorus explicitly 
stating that the expedition in 415 sailed past the Metapontines (although Diodorus may have been incorrect 
in this as he may have been with the Athenians’ reception at Thurii and Croton).  There is, then, an 
adequate defense against Hornblower’s charge (CT iii.419) that “[i]n general, Thucydides may for literary 
purposes have exaggerated the poor reception given to the Athenians in S. Italy.” 
 
121
 δέχοµαι is used earlier in the work to indicate reception by a polis of a military force:  see, e.g., 4.71.2, 
4.73.5, 4.84.2, and esp. 6.42.2. 
 
122
 We may say the same of Nicias’ use of ὑποδέξασθαι without any explanation (at 6.22):  i.e., that Nicias’ 
audience in the assembly assumed (just as Thucydides’ audience did) the provision of a market by a 





things) from the cities on the way to the theater of operations in Sicily,
123
 one can state 
with certainty that the capacity of poleis to provide sufficient amounts of food for sale to 
passing expeditions was not usually the determining factor in their decisions whether or 
not to receive (provide markets to) expeditions or not.  It is, in fact, only at 6.22 and 
6.42.1 in the whole of Thucydides that a polis’ reception of a passing military or naval 
force is ever presented as being determined by its (potential) capability to do so, i.e. by 
the (potential) capability of its inhabitants to provide for sale sufficient food to provision 
the force received.  That considerations of the capacity of poleis to provision a passing 
expeditionary force are mentioned in Thucydides only in Nicias’ speech and in the 
context of the Athenian generals’ planning for the voyage to Sicily makes sense if we 
remember that the expedition was purposely designed by Nicias to be extraordinarily 
large as part of his attempt to discourage the Athenians from sailing to Sicily, and that the 
actual expedition which traveled to Sicily reflected Nicias’ recommendations very 
                                                 
123 6.42.1:  the generals divided the expedition into three parts “ἵνα µήτε ἅµα πλέοντες ἀπορῶσιν ὕδατος 
καὶ λιµένων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐν ταῖς καταγωγαῖς,” “in order that they might not, by sailing together, be 
at a loss for water and harbors and provisions when they put into shore” (and so that the expedition might 
be, in general, more orderly and easy to control, having been assigned in divisions to separate 
commanders). “ταῖς καταγωγαῖς” here is slightly vague:  “the places they put into shore”; Crawley 
translates “at the stations where they might land.”  Does Thucydides refer here primarily to stops at poleis 
or merely to any location along the Italian coast suitable for the anchorage and encampment of a large 
expedition (cf. Gertwagen [2006] 105:  “[t]he Gulf of Taranto... provided shelter and numerous small rivers 
along the east coast of Calabria provided water and moorings at their mouths.”).  Two considerations 
indicate that Thucydides meant the former.  The emphasis at 6.42.1 is on the objects and facilities that the 
stopping points would provide:  i.e., the καταγωγαῖ were expected to be the source of (at least some) water, 
harbors, and provisions for the expedition.  Since uninhabited (and therefore uncultivated) areas would be 
incapable of providing any supplies for the passing expedition, whereas poleis would be able to provide (at 
least some) food, one should take it that “ταῖς καταγωγαῖς” refers to poleis which the expedition would be 
halting at.  That this is the right interpretation of “ταῖς καταγωγαῖς” is confirmed by 6.44.2:  sailing along 
the southern shores of Italy, the reception of the expedition is characterized by its access to water, harbors 
(anchorages), and provisions (market and access to towns), exactly those things expected of the stopping-







  The decision to divide the expedition into three parts so as to ensure that the 
poleis receiving the expedition on its way to the Sicilian theater would be able to 
provision it was an extraordinary measure, then—as was the proposal at 6.22 to bring 
wheat and roasted barley in holkades in case some cities would not be able to receive the 
force on account of its great size—intended to deal with the potential problems that might 
confront a truly extraordinarily sized expeditionary force.  In other words, 6.42.1 does not 
show (as 6.22 does not show) that Athenian generals had commonly to consider, in their 
planning and organization of campaigns, whether the poleis on the way to campaign 
theaters could provide markets on a sufficient scale for their forces (in other words, 
6.42.1 does not show that poleis’ capacity to provide markets to passing expeditions was 
the factor that usually determined whether they received (provided markets to) 
expeditions or not).  Rather, these two passages imply the opposite:  that considerations 
of the capacity of poleis to provision forces rarely, if ever, had to enter into the planning 
of ‘normal’ expeditions on ‘normal’ campaigns—and thus that poleis’ reception or 
refusal of passing expeditions was rarely, if ever, decided by their capability to provide 
markets to those expeditions.
125
   
 
And, in fact, we never hear in Thucydides’ subsequent narrative of the Sicilian 
expedition of a polis unable to receive (i.e., unable to provide sufficient amounts of 
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 See again section ii. 
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 6.42.1, then, taken together with 6.22 (see also pp.46-47 above), also implies that it could be taken for 
granted that poleis in the Athenians’ normal sphere of operations (the Aegean and ‘mainland’ Greece) 





supplies for sale to) the expedition
126
—and this is true even after the entire expedition, 
having sailed along the southern coast of Italy in divisions, had assembled together 
(“ἡθροίζοντο”) again at Rhegium (6.44.2-3).  Instead, Thucydides’ account of the initial 
operations of the expedition, as it sailed around Sicily to assess the strategic situation and 
to ascertain the attitudes of the poleis towards it, makes it clear that classical Greek 
poleis’ decisions whether or not to provide a market to a passing expeditionary force 
were always based on (what we might call) political considerations and not on their 
respective capacities to provide markets for any force arriving at their city. 
The Italian and Sicilian Greek cities’ decisions to receive (and therefore provide a 
market for) the Athenian expedition were always determined by and indicated their 
attitudes towards it (and so the cities’ reception or refusal of the Athenians also indicated 
the stance they would be taking for the upcoming war).  In some cases, the decision to 
provide a market or not to the expedition indicated neither friendliness nor hostility 
towards it, but was used by some Italian and Sicilian poleis to signal their neutrality.  So 
when the entire expedition had arrived at Rhegium (6.44.2-3), the Rhegines did not admit 
the Athenians and their allies within their walls (“ὡς αὐτοὺς ἔσω οὐκ ἐδέχοντο”), but 
provided a market for the expedition in the sanctuary of Artemis outside the city (“οὗ 
αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀγορὰν παρεῖχον”), where the expedition had pitched camp (6.44.3).  In so 
doing, the Rhegines were demonstrating to the Athenians that they were remaining 
neutral for the time being, as becomes clear from 6.44.3:  in response to the Athenians’ 
request for military help on arrival at their city, on the basis of their shared kinship with 
the Leontines (cf. 6.46.2), the Rhegines had replied that “οἱ δὲ οὐδὲ µεθ’ ἑτέρων ἔφασαν 
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ἔσεσθαι,” “that they would not side with either party.”
127
  The Rhegines, then, did not 
receive the expedition within the walls of the city (and so did not offer the full set of 
facilities understood throughout the Greek world as making up the conventional reception 
of a military force) and refused to provide military help to the Athenians in order to 
demonstrate that they were not friends and allies of the Athenians; but they did provide a 
market to the expedition to show that they were not hostile to the Athenians, either.
128
 
But a polis could also demonstrate its neutrality by refusing to receive (and thus 
refusing to provide a market to) the expedition.  Thucydides tells us that the polis of 
Catana—a polis that, like Rhegium, could have been expected to be friendly to the 
Athenians on account of its shared kinship with the Leontines (see 6.20.3) and its 
previous friendly relations with Athens
129
—initially refused to receive the Athenians in 
415 because of opposition from a pro-Syracusan party in the city (6.50.3, 6.51.1).  The 
presence of this faction stopped the Catanians from taking the Athenian side in the 
conflict and therefore being friendly to the expedition (and receiving it); once the pro-
Syracusans had fled the city, however, the Catanians made an alliance with the Athenians 
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 For “οὐδὲ µεθ’ ἑτέρων” meaning the assumption of a position of neutrality, cf. 2.67.4, and esp. 2.72.1:  
Archidamus (in the summer of 429) offers the option to the Plataeans that they could remain neutral, “καὶ 
ἔστε µηδὲ µεθ’ ἑτέρων,” and join neither the Athenians nor the Peloponnesians but receive both as friends 
and neither as allies for the war (i.e., they were not to provide military help to either side) (“δέχεσθε δὲ 





 291—a list of monetary contributions to an Athenian campaign in the far west from Sicels, Sicilian 
poleis, and Rhegium—has been associated with the Sicilian expedition of 415 and thereby taken as 
evidence that monetary contributions to belligerents could be consonant with a position of neutrality in 
classical Greece (see now Hornblower, CT iii.458-461 for a summary of arguments in support of this 
position).  This is incorrect, however, as the inscription should be dated to 427-424 and the first Athenian 
intervention in the far west:  see Ampolo (1987) and esp. Bauslaugh (1991) 148-150 (whose arguments are 
not satisfactorily refuted by Hornblower). 
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 Catana was one of the Chalcidian cities that fought alongside the Athenians in the war between Leontini 





and their city served as a base for the expedition.
130
  A polis could also indicate that it 
wished to remain neutral by refusing to receive the entire expedition.  After the 
Athenians had gained the Catanians as allies and had begun to establish a base there, 
word reached them from Camarina that, if they went to that city, it would go over to them 
(6.52.1).  When the Athenians with all their ships reached Camarina and sent a herald 
ashore, however, its inhabitants did not receive them, but said that the terms of their oaths 
were to receive the Athenians only if they put in with a single ship, unless they 
themselves sent for more (“οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἐδέχοντο, λέγοντες σφίσι τὰ ὅρκια εἶναι µιᾷ νηὶ 
καταπλεόντων Ἀθηναίων δέχεσθαι, ἢν µὴ αὐτοὶ πλείους µεταπέµπωσιν”) (ibid.).
131
  
Informing a belligerent party that it would be received only if it came to a polis in a 
single ship was, in fact, a measure commonly used in the Greek world by poleis to denote 
their neutrality.
132
  In this case, then, the Camarinaeans’ decision not to provide a market 
to the entire expedition indicated their continuing neutral status.
133
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 The Catanians made the alliance with the Athenians in the summer of 415 when the pro-Syracusan party 
within the city fled after the men of the expedition had broken into the city and began shopping in the 
agora while the Athenian generals were making a second attempt to bring the assembled Catanians over to 
their side (6.51.1-2).  Catana serving as a base for the expedition:  in the summer of 415 (6.51.2-3, 6.52.1, 
6.62.3); for most of the winter of 415/414 (6.72.1, 6.74.1, 6.88.5, 6.94.1); and for part of the summer of 414 
(6.94).  The Catanians continued to be friendly to the Athenians throughout the war, providing cavalry for 
the Athenians in the summer of 414 (6.98.1), being listed by Nicias as allies in the winter of 414/3 (7.14.2), 
sending supplies to the expedition in the summer of 413 (at least) (7.60.2), and fighting alongside it in the 
final battle in the harbor of Syracuse in 413 (7.57.11).  Catana also served as a refuge for the Athenians and 
allies who managed to evade capture after the final defeat of the expedition:  see 7.85.4 with Dover, HCT 
iv.460 (citing Lys. 20.24, Paus. 7.16.4ff.). 
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 The oaths mentioned were probably sworn by opposing pro-Athenian and pro-Syracusan factions within 
Camarina “to maintain neutrality unless after proper deliberation the majority resolved to bring in one side 




 See Gomme, HCT ii.7, Fantasia (2003) 241 ad “δεχοµένους µιᾷ νηὶ” at 2.7.2.  See also 3.71.1:  during 
the stasis at Corcyra in 427, the conspirators, having killed most of the pro-Athenian party in the city, 




In all of these cases, therefore, Thucydides indicates explicitly that the decision 
whether or not to provide a market to the expedition was based on the attitudes of the 
citizens of these poleis to the Athenians (and on the stance they wished to take for the 
approaching hostilities).  But even for those poleis whose reasons to receive or to refuse 
reception to the expedition are not stated explicitly by Thucydides, it can be inferred with 
certainty from the preceding and surrounding narrative that these decisions were made 
solely on the basis of political considerations.  Thus, when the Messanians, the second 
polis in the Sicilian theater approached by the Athenians in the summer of 415, refused 
Alcibiades’ offer of alliance, answering that they would not receive him inside the city, 
but would furnish a market outside (“ἀπεκρίναντο πόλει µὲν ἂν οὐ δέξασθαι, ἀγορὰν δ’ 
ἔξω παρέξειν”) (6.50.1), they were indicating to the Athenians that they wished to remain 
neutral.  This can be seen to be true from analogy with the earlier actions of the 
Rhegines,
134
 and from the fact that the Messanians remained neutral throughout the rest 
of the war.  The Messanians did not aid either the Athenians or the Syracusans during the 
war.
135
  A pro-Athenian faction within the polis did attempt to betray it to the Athenians 
                                                                                                                                                 
party if they came with more than one ship, regarding any larger number as hostile,” “τό τε λοιπὸν 
µηδετέρους δέχεσθαι ἀλλ’ ἢ µιᾷ νηὶ ἡσυχάζοντας, τὸ δὲ πλέον πολέµιον ἡγεῖσθαι.” 
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 Cf. 6.88.2:  in the winter of 415/4, the Camarinaeans, in response to entreaties from both the Athenians 
and the Syracusans, still “thought it most consistent with their oaths, at present, to side with neither,” “... 
εὔορκον δοκεῖν εἶναι σφίσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι µηδετέροις ἀµύνειν.” 
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 See above on 6.44.3; cf. Bauslaugh (1991) 152. 
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 The Messanians are not listed at 7.57 as among the allies of Athens or at 7.58 as among the allies of 
Syracuse before the final battle in 413.  Thucydides does generalize at one point that all Sicily except 
Akragas (which remained neutral) actively joined the Syracusans against the Athenians in 413 (7.33.2).  
But this “cannot be used as evidence of anything, since Naxos and Catana, both allies of Athens, are also 
not excepted” (Bauslaugh [1991] 153; cf. Dover, HCT iv.413); and Thucydides’ “claim is restricted to 




in the winter of 415/414, but the friends of Syracuse there, having been informed by 
Alcibiades that there was a plot to betray the city, succeeded in crushing the conspiracy 
and, together with other inhabitants of the city opposed to receiving the Athenians, 
prevented it from receiving them (“ἐπεκράτουν µὴ δέχεσθαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους”) and thus 
kept it in its neutral status (6.74.1).
136
   
In other cases where Thucydides does not state the reasons for poleis’ refusal or 
reception of the expedition, since the decisions of these poleis in this regard always 
correlate precisely with our knowledge of their relations with the Athenians prior to the 
expedition, and with their later actions during the war, these decisions can also be 
considered to have been determined by the friendliness or hostility of the polis in 
question to the Athenians, or by the wish of a polis to adopt a neutral stance towards the 
Athenians.  Thus, those cities that had been hostile to the Athenians before the war, and 
especially during the first Athenian intervention in the west in 427-424, and also took 
part in operations against the Athenians or provided help to anti-Athenian forces during 
the war in 415-413—i.e., Tarentum and Locri—did not receive the expedition as it sailed 
to the theater of operations in Sicily.
137
  Himera, another polis that could have been 
                                                                                                                                                 
([2003] 213) takes the fact that Gylippus and his triremes from the Peloponnese touched at Messena (and 
Rhegium) (“σχόντες Ῥηγίῳ καὶ Μεσσήνῃ”) (7.1.2) to indicate that Messana (and Rhegium) were friendly 
to him.  But fleets could ‘touch’ (put into land) at neutral or non-committed cities, too:  see 6.62.2 
(Athenian fleet touching at Himera (“ἔσχον ἐς Ἱµέραν”); and 7.35.2 (Athenian fleet under Demosthenes and 




 See Dover, HCT iv.349 ad loc. 
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 Tarentum and Locri not receiving the expedition:  6.44.2.  Enmity towards Athens before the war:  
Tarentum was a Spartan colony, and a Syracusan speaker assumed before the beginning of the war that it 
would receive the Syracusans but not the Athenians in any war between the two (see 6.34.4 and section iiib 
below).  Locri had been particularly hostile to the Athenians during their first operations in the far west in 




expected to be hostile to the expedition on the basis of its experiences of the Athenians 
during their first intervention in the west, also did not receive the expedition.
138
  Naxos, 
on the other hand, which had been consistently friendly to the Athenians before the war 
and was a strong ally to them during it, was the first polis to receive the expedition in 415 
(6.50.3:  “Ναξίων δὲ δέξαµένων τῇ πόλει”).
139
  In all of these cases, Thucydides did not 
                                                                                                                                                 
Syracusans and the Leontines (which had brought about the first Athenian intervention in the west), Locri 
had been the only polis that did not make peace with the Athenians (5.5.2):  see 3.86.2 for the Locrians 
taking the side of the Syracusans against the Leontines in 427; see also 3.103.3, 3.115.6 for Athenian 
invasions of Locrian territory during this conflict.  Although the Locrians had agreed a treaty with the 
Athenians in 422, they had only done so because they were being pressed at that moment by a war on their 
border (5.5.3), and it is not surprising, therefore, that their actions during the second Athenian intervention 
in the west proved them again to be hostile to the Athenians.  Actions against the Athenians during the 
campaign in 415-413: in the winter of 415/4, the Tarantines (6.104.1) and the Locrians (7.1.1-2) received 
the Spartan Gylippus and the ships he had brought from the Peloponnese to stir up resistance to the 
Athenians in Sicily (the Tarentines also provided facilities to Gylippus to let him refit some ships of his 
which had been damaged by storms:  6.104.2, 7.1.1); the second Athenian expeditionary force, sent out in 
413 under the leadership of Demosthenes and Eurymedon, did not even attempt to land at Tarentum or 
Locri (7.33.3-4, 7.35.2).  In 413, a Syracusan squadron anchored at Locri, where they took on-board some 
Thespian hoplites who had arrived on a holkas from the Peloponnese (7.25.3-4).  The weight of this 
accumulated evidence is against Bauslaugh’s inclusion ([1991] 147-148, 150-151) of Locri and Tarentum 
as among those Italian states that stayed neutral in the war (even if Locri and Tarentum did not send any 
forces to the final battle in the harbor of Syracuse in 413 (7.58.3)).  Note, too, 8.91.2:  Locrian and 
Tarentine triremes, in the summer of 411, operating in the Aegean under the command of a Spartiate. 
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 Himera’s refusal:  6.62.2.  The territory of Himera had been attacked by the Athenians (in concert with 
the Sicels) in the winter of 426/5 (3.115.1).  Bauslaugh ([1991] 154) notes that the Athenian approach 
shows that they did not consider Himera immediately hostile, and that, the following summer, the 
Himeraeans had to be persuaded by Gylippus to join the Syracusans; he thus concludes that they were 
initially neutral in the war.  But the Athenians, since they had to pass by Himera in any case on their way to 
Egesta and Selinus, may simply have chanced their arm with the Himeraeans; and, crucially, note that 
Gylippus presumed, before his arrival at their city, that the Himeraeans would provide troops for the war 
against Athens (7.1.1).  The Himeraeans did, in fact, at Gylippus’ request, provide troops for the war for the 
effort against the expedition (7.1.3-5) and later fought alongside the Syracusans in the final battle of the 
war (7.58.2).  It would thus be more accurate to state that Himera, rather than being neutral at the start of 




 The Naxians had taken the side of the Leontines, together with the Athenians, in the fighting in 427-424 
(3.86.2, 4.25.7-10).  Nicias, in his second speech to the assembly before the expedition, thought that Naxos 
could be expected to join the Athenians in 415 on account of its Chalcidian kinship with Leontini (6.20.3 
with 6.3.1).  During the war, Naxos served as a base for the expedition during part of the winter of 415/4 
(6.72.1, 6.74.2, 6.88.3); the Naxians provide cavalry for the Athenians in the summer of 414 (6.98.1); they 
were listed by Nicias as allies of the Athenians in the winter of 414/3 (7.14.2); and they took the Athenian 





include the reason for these states’ differing treatments of the Athenian expedition, since 
the fact that their reception or non-admittance of the expedition was motivated by either 
their friendliness or enmity (or neutrality) towards the Athenians was either immediately 




   
A final confirmation that it was political considerations that determined poleis’ 
decisions whether to receive passing expeditionary forces or not, and not their capability 
to provide sufficient provisions for sale to those forces, comes from the second measure 
taken by the Athenian generals at Corcyra before the expedition’s voyage.  Having made 
the arrangements as to the order in which the expedition would sail, anchor, and encamp, 
the generals sent ahead three triremes to Italy and Sicily “εἰσοµένας αἵτινες σφᾶς τῶν 
πόλεων δέξονται,” “to ascertain which of the cities would receive them” (6.42.2).  The 
generals were not asking whether the cities in Italy and Sicily could receive them, but if 
they would receive them.  They expected, then, that the poleis’ decisions whether to 
receive the Athenians or not would be made on the basis of other criteria than their 
capacity to do so.  Here, as at all points on the subsequent voyage of the Athenians to and 
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 Thucydides only includes the reason for poleis’ refusal of the expedition when it confounds the 
expedition’s expectations (in the cases of Rhegium and Catana, on account of their kinship with Leontini 
and their previous friendly relationships with Athens; in the cases of Camarina and Messena (at 6.74.1), 
because the Athenians had received intelligence that they would be received in these cities) and is therefore 
surprising (to Thucydides’ audience).  Note that, generally, poleis’ decisions to receive military forces or 
not are only reported by Thucydides in exceptional circumstances, viz. when a polis is, by admitting a 
force, confirming its (previously uncertain) allegiance or signaling a change in such (4.73.5, 4.84.2; cf. 
3.71.1).  The reception of Athenian amphibious and naval forces is assumed in his narrative until the defeat 
of the Sicilian expedition.  The (relatively) great frequency with which Thucydides reports the Sicilian (and 
Italian) poleis’ decisions to receive the Athenian expedition or not is deliberate; it shows that, unlike in the 
Aegean, the Athenians could not depend on the friendliness of poleis in Sicily and Italy (and thus confirms 





around Sicily, the capability of poleis in the far west to provide sufficient supplies for 
sale to the passing expedition was taken for granted.
141
  Nicias had assumed that every 
polis on the way to and around Sicily could receive a ‘normal’ expedition, and that most 
of these poleis could receive even the unusually large force which he was demanding.  
The later planning and actual operations of the expedition demonstrated that all of the 
poleis in the Sicilian theater of operations could be assumed to be able to provide markets 
to the expedition as it passed by their territories
142
—and that their decisions to provide 
markets or not to the Athenians were made on the basis of whether they were friendly, 
hostile, or neutral towards the expedition from the east. 
 
b. Supply ships 
 Before the expedition’s triremes, troop transports, and one cavalry transport 
reached Corcyra, Thucydides describes a debate in the Syracusan assembly, called to 
discuss the many reports reaching the city that an Athenian expedition was coming to 
attack it (6.32.3), in which Hermocrates proposed a plan to deter the Athenians from 
crossing over to Sicilian waters, or at least to prevent their doing so until the following 
spring.  He suggested that all existing Sicilian naval resources (or, at least, those available 
at Syracuse plus all those available to the cities willing to join the Syracusans) be 
launched and dispatched with two months’ supplies (“µετὰ δυοῖν µηνοῖν τροφῆς”) to meet 
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 Although note that the expedition had been divided into three parts for the voyage to Sicily before the 
three triremes had been sent ahead to Italy and Sicily (6.42.1). 
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 It should be noted that it was not the whole expedition but only 60 triremes that were first received at 
Naxos and Catana (after having been refused at the latter polis initially) (although later the whole 
expedition was received by and encamped at these poleis); and that, before the voyage to Selinus and 





the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory (6.34.4).
143
  This would cause 
the Athenians to realize that they would have to fight to cross the Ionian Sea—i.e., that 
they would have to fight a battle before they would be able to fight (around and) for 
Sicily (ibid.).  This would shock the Athenians and force them to reflect   
ὅτι ὁρµώµεθα µὲν ἐκ φιλίας χώρας φύλακες (ὑποδέχεται γὰρ ἡµᾶς 
Τάρας), τὸ δὲ πέλαγος αὐτοῖς πολὺ περαιοῦσθαι µετὰ πάσης τῆς παρασκευῆς, 
χαλεπὸν δὲ διὰ πλοῦ µῆκος ἐν τάξει µεῖναι, καὶ ἡµῖν ἂν εὐεπίθετος εἴη, βραδεῖά 
τε καὶ κατ’ ὀλίγον προσπίπτουσα. [5] εἰ δ’ αὖ τῷ ταχυναυτοῦντι ἁθροωτέρῳ 
κουφίσαντες προσβάλοιεν, εἰ µὲν κώπαις χρήσαιντο, ἐπιθοίµεθ’ ἂν κεκµνκόσιν, εἰ 
δὲ µὴ δοκοίη, ἔστι καὶ ὑποχωρῆσαι ἡµῖν ἐς Τάραντα· οἱ δὲ µετ’ ὀλίγων ἐφοδίων 
ὡς ἐπὶ ναυµαχίᾳ περαιθέντες ἀποροῖεν ἂν κατὰ χωρία ἐρῆµα, καὶ ἢ µένοντες 
πολιορκοῖντο ἂν ἢ πειρώµενοι παραπλεῖν τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἀπολείποιεν 
ἂν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων οὐκ ἂν βέβαια ἔχοντες, εἰ ὑποδέξοιντο, ἀθυµοῖεν. 
 
 that we have as our base a friendly territory from which to keep watch—
for Tarentum is ready to receive us—whereas for them the open sea is a wide one 
to cross with all of their παρασκευή, and it is difficult on account of the length of 
the trip to keep in formation; consequently, coming up slowly and in small 
groups, they would be easy to attack. [5] If, on the other hand, they 
disembarrassed themselves (of the non-trireme part of the expedition) and 
attacked with their fast ships concentrated,
144
 then, if they used their oars, we 
could fall upon them when they were tired with rowing.  Alternatively, if they 
took the decision not to cross under oar but under sail, we could withdraw to 
Tarentum; and they, after making the crossing with a small amount of victuals as 
men going into a naval battle, would be a loss (for food) in uninhabited regions.  
Either they would remain and be blockaded, or attempting to sail along the coast 
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 The fact that Hermocrates specifies the amount of provisions here implies that it was an unusual (almost 
certainly an unusually large) amount—Thucydides rarely mentions specific amounts of provisions brought 
by a military or naval force, and then only to clarify exceptional strategic circumstances (cf. introduction 
section iv).  Since triremes did not have the capacity to carry any substantial amounts of provisions (see 
p.42 n.76), the τροφή proposed by Hermocrates for the Sicilian fleet was to be carried by supply ships (cf. 
Morrison et al. [2000] 100).  Jordan ([1975] 107-108) believed that Hermocrates’ proposal that the Sicilian 
fleet bring two months’ τροφή provided evidence that classical Greek triremes could carry substantial 
amounts of supplies “[s]ince Hermocrates obviously expected the Syracusan ships to stay at sea continually 
until they met the Athenian fleet, the sailors could not go ashore for food and had to draw their rations from 
the stores on board the ships.”  But Hermocrates’ emphasis at 6.34.4-5 on the advantage that having a base 
at Tarentum would be for the Sicilians shows that he did not expect the Sicilian triremes to stay at sea 
continually until the Athenians came.  In addition, the fact that Hermocrates thought that the Sicilians 
would have an advantage in that they could attack, while still fresh, the Athenian triremes tired out from 
rowing across the Ionian sea (6.34.5) shows that he did not envisage the Sicilian fleet being continually at 
sea.  The rest of the examples Jordan cites (at [1975] 108) to support his point that triremes could carry 
substantial amounts of supplies in fact undermine it. 
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they would leave behind the rest of their παρασκευή, and uncertain as to the 




Hermocrates was convinced that, discouraged by the presence of the Sicilian fleet at 
Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory, the Athenians would either remain at Corcyra, or 
retire to winter-quarters after reconnoitering the Sicilian position, or simply abandon the 
expedition altogether (6.34.6).  Reports and rumors exaggerating the strength of the 
Sicilian fleet would aid in deterring the Athenians from attempting the crossing to Italy 
(6.34.7), and the very fact that the Sicilian Greeks were mounting any resistance at all 
would shock and possibly discourage the Athenians from the expedition (6.34.8). 
Hermocrates’ proposals were grounded on an excellent strategic analysis of the 
exceptional problems that would confront an Athenian expedition attempting to sail from 
Corcyra to Italy in the face of opposition from a Sicilian fleet;
146
 in outlining these 
problems, however, Hermocrates’ speech, and especially the assumptions underlying it, 
also provides us with valuable evidence on the normal workings of the provisioning of 
classical Greek overseas expeditions.
147
  Firstly, the speech shares the assumptions of the 
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 6.34.4-5 (with the exception of the clause noted, the translation is based on the Loeb translation and also 
on the translation of part of this passage at Morrison et al. [2000] 101). 
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 Although previous scholarship had derided the feasibility of Hermocrates’ plan, believing that its 
deployment would have resulted in the complete destruction of the Sicilian fleet, Stahl, in a brilliant 
analysis ([2003] 194-198), demonstrated that the plan was a “prophylactic enterprise, which, moreover, 
[was] designed not to result in military action or even confrontation” ([2003] 196).  Hermocrates’ plan 
never envisaged a major battle with the Athenian fleet; rather, “[t]he plan’s reliance on rumor and 
exaggeration (i.e. on misinformation) renders it clear beyond doubt that Hermocrates never intended his 
collection of available ships, assembled at shortest notice, to engage the supreme Athenian fleet in actual 
battle.  He only wanted at least to buy time for his city until next spring and, if possible, even to scare off 
and prevent the enemy from coming at all... The idea ‘to challenge the Athenian fleet’ does not even occur 









surrounding narrative that it will be a polis’ attitude towards a passing force that will 
determine whether the polis receives it or not (Hermocrates assumes, in other words, that 
all poleis will have the capability to receive passing trireme fleets):  Tarentum will 
receive the Sicilian ships because it is friendly to them; the Athenian triremes, once they 
have crossed the Ionian Sea, would be uncertain of the attitude of the poleis on the 




 Secondly, Hermocrates’ plan also takes for granted the existence of “τήν τε 
ἄλλην παρασκευὴν” accompanying an Athenian expedition to Sicily (6.34.5).  At 6.34.4, 
when the whole expedition, including the fast triremes, is envisioned as crossing the 
Ionian sea, it is referred to as “πάσης τῆς παρασκευῆς” by Hermocrates; at 6.34.5, “τήν 
τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν” will be what remains of the imagined expedition once the triremes 
have crossed to Italy and left behind (at Corcyra) the rest of the expedition.
149
  The term 
“τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν” should be taken here as referring to supply ships 
accompanying the imagined expedition, as can be seen from the rest of Hermocrates’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
148
 In an earlier part of his speech, in which he proposed a series of measures for the medium term to 
prepare the polis for the eventuality of an Athenian invading force arriving in Sicilian waters, Hermocrates 
advised the Syracusans to send envoys to the rest of the Greek cities in Sicily, and Italy, too, in order to 
make them allies, or else prevent their receiving the Athenians (“ὅπως... µὴ δέχωνται Ἀθηναίους”) (6.34.1).  
Note here again that it is assumed that a polis’ attitude towards the Athenians determines whether it will 
receive them or not (the (Sicilian and Italian) poleis’ capability to do so is taken for granted); and that a 
position of neutrality—or more precisely, a non-committed position—can be considered to be consistent 
with the refusal of a passing expeditionary force. 
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 Cf. 6.44.2, when the expedition, understood as comprising both the land and naval part of the force and 







 the Athenian trireme crews, having crossed over with few provisions in the 
expectation of a naval battle, would be at a loss for food in deserted regions;
151
 and, if 
they sailed on from these regions, they would leave behind the rest of the expedition 
(“τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν”) and coast along by poleis where they could not be sure that 
they would be received (and therefore could not be sure whether these cities would 
provide markets for them), and therefore would be discouraged:  i.e., they would be 
discouraged because they would not be able to obtain provisions from ἡ ἄλλη παρασκευή 
of the expedition if they were not received by the poleis on the coast.  Hermocrates’ plan, 
in other words, assumed that an expedition sailing from ‘mainland Greece’ to a distant 
theater of operations would bring with it provisions in supply ships.
152
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 Cf. Dover, HCT iv.299; Morrison et al. (2000) 101.  This is the common meaning of “τὴν δὲ ἄλλην 
παρασκευὴν” in book 6 of Thucydides.  See esp. 6.30.1:  most of the allies, together with the grain 
transports and the smaller boats and as much else of ἡ ἄλλη παρασκευή as there was (“καὶ ταῖς σιταγωγοῖς 
ὁλκάσι καὶ τοῖς πλοίοις καὶ ὅση ἄλλη παρασκευή...”), had been ordered to assemble at Corcyra, and to 
cross the Ionian sea from there in a body to the Iapygian promontory (6.30.1):  Thucydides includes here 
the grain transports and smaller boats as the main part of ἡ ἄλλη παρασκευή embarking for Sicily.  See also 
pp.53-54 n.95 above on 6.25.2:  the phrase “τὴν δὲ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν” there should be taken to include in 
addition to archers and slingers, grain, boats to transport it, and bakers to mill and prepare it for 
consumption.  See also n.152 below on 6.37.1.  (One more point:  to repeat, at 6.34.5, once the triremes 
have left behind the rest of the expedition, the latter is referred to as “τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν.”  At 
6.34.4, however, when the whole expedition, including the triremes, is pictured as crossing the Ionian Sea, 
it is referred to as “πάσης τῆς παρασκευῆς.”  This latter phrase, then, comprises both the triremes of the 
expedition and the expedition’s supply (and other) boats.  I reiterate this point to demonstrate that the 
following inference of Allison’s is incorrect ([1989] 92):  “At 34.4, Hermocrates, suggesting a Syracusan 
defense, says that the Athenians would have to consider that they must cross the sea with “the whole 
παρασκευή”—thus he indicates the difficulty of passage because of the size of the paraskeue.”  No:  
Hermocrates at 6.34.4 is emphasizing that the presence of supply and other boats (accompanying the 
triremes and constituting with them the whole παρασκευή) would cause a slow and difficult crossing; the 
size of the παρασκευή is, at most, a minor consideration here.) 
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 Cf. Robinson (1999) 140 on “... καὶ ἢ µένοντες πολιορκοῖντο ἂν” at 6.34.5:  “[t]he vulnerability to 
πολιορκία is thus explicitly connected to the issue of provision, and no other causal factor is mentioned...” 
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 See also 6.37.1:  Hermocrates’ opponent in the debate in the Syracusan assembly, Athenagoras, 
employing explicitly rational and probabilistic arguments based on the tactical and logistical difficulties 
facing an Athenian expedition to Sicily (see Mader [1993] esp. 439-440), argued that one of the difficulties 
that would face an Athenian force attacking Syracuse, and which would discourage it from doing so (see 





 Classical Athenian amphibious forces on the move to theaters of operations 
acquired their provisions from two sources, then:  markets provided by coastal poleis; and 
the supply ships which accompanied them.  These are the only two means of acquisition 
of provisions considered in Hermocrates’ speech in Syracuse:
153
  and they are the only 
two mentioned in Nicias’ second speech to the assembly at Athens, too.  We need to 
distinguish, however, between the relative importance of polis-provided markets and 
supply ships in the provisioning of amphibious expeditions (and trireme fleets) on the 
move.  Normal Athenian amphibious expeditions departed from Athens with (at least) 
some provisions in supply ships;
154
 but, because they moved within and along 
friendly/subject territory at all times during their voyages to their theaters of operations in 
the Aegean, they could count on reception by poleis on their way to these theaters, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
πορισθῆναι, οὐκ ὀλίγην οὖσαν,” “the rest of the παρασκευή which must be provided against so large a city as 
ours is not small.”  (This remark comes within the context of a discussion of the military strength of any 
expedition coming from Athens to attack Sicily as compared to the strength of the polis of Syracuse:  
Athenagoras refers to “τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν” here because he had already spoken of the main 
components of a hypothetical Athenian παρασκευή attacking Sicily:  horses, hoplites, triremes.)  Thus, 
Athenagoras also assumed, just as Hermocrates had done in his speech to the assembly, that an expedition 
sailing from Athens against Syracuse would bring with it provisions in supply ships. 
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 Thus, the imagined Athenian triremes pressing on from the deserted regions would be at a loss for food 
because they would be separated from their supply ships and because they could not be sure whether they 
would be received by the coastal poleis on their paraplous.  Hermocrates’ assumption that markets 
provided by poleis and supply ships would be the only means of acquisition of supplies available to the 
envisioned expedition from Athens also explains why, in his plan, having taken on-board a minimal amount 
of provisions in the expectation of a battle, the Athenian triremes would be at a loss for food in the 
uninhabited region of Italy at which they would first touch (and thus would have to move on from this 
region):  since there would be no poleis, there would be no markets at which to reprovision; and since the 









therefore markets and opportunities for resupply.
155
  Normal Athenian amphibious 
expeditions brought provisions with them therefore only as an emergency supply for their 
(relatively) short voyages to war zones (in case they did not have access to a market 
provided by a polis because of bad weather or some other unforeseeable circumstance), 
and to provide a safe margin of supplies until shipments of provisions from nearby 
subjects/allies and Athens began to arrive at the base of operations.
156
  Even the supply 
ships requested by Nicias for the extraordinary expedition to Sicily were to function in 
the first place as an emergency reserve:  they were to accompany the expedition to enable 
it to reprovision in case the enormous force from Athens found itself weather-bound at a 
polis unable to provide sufficient supplies for sale.
157
  Markets provided by friendly (or 
neutral) poleis were, then, the primary means of acquiring supplies for normal Athenian 
amphibious expeditions on the move to theaters of operations; the supply ships that 
accompanied these expeditions never played more than a secondary role in their 
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 Note again that it is assumed in Nicias’ speech that poleis in the Athenians’ normal sphere of operations 
would be able to provide markets on the necessary scale for normal Athenian expeditions.  Note also that, 
traveling at all times through friendly territory, Athenian forces in the Aegean would be unable to acquire 
provisions through foraging:  see pp.179-180 n.192 below.  (The same went for the Sicilian expedition 
traveling through mostly uninhabited or neutral (non-committal) territory.) 
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 See again Erdkamp (1998) 56, and chapter 2 section iib.  And see again section ii above:  Athenian 
amphibious forces (and trireme fleets) sent on operations in the Aegean (or around the Peloponnese) 




 The ensuing narrative of the voyage of the expedition also presents markets provided by cities as the 
expected (if not, in the end, actual) method of provisioning for the expedition on the move:  the Athenian 
generals’ attempts to ascertain whether the cities in Italy and Sicily would receive (provide a market for) 
them implied that they were counting on polis-provided markets to be the primary source of provisioning 
for the expedition in its voyage to Sicily.  The fact that Thucydides includes the detail at 6.44.2 that the 
expedition was not provided with any markets also implies that it was expected that the expedition would 
receive markets from (at least some of) the poleis on the way to Sicily.  In the end, the grain-transports and 
other boats carrying provisions for the Sicilian expedition did function as an emergency reserve, but not for 
the reason envisioned by Nicias:  it was because the coastal poleis on the way to Sicily did not provide the 





provisioning; to be more precise, they functioned as emergency reserves when, for 
whatever reason, an amphibious expedition on the move did not have access to a market 




iv. The provisioning of the expedition during the operations in Sicily 
a. The importance of seaborne imports for the grain supply of the expedition 
To recap, the expedition received markets from some friendly or neutral Sicilian 
poleis as it moved around from polis to polis in the opening phase of the campaign, 
making brief stops at each as its generals attempted to ascertain the attitudes of the poleis 
in Sicily towards it.  After this initial phase, however, once the expedition had established 
a base of operations for the campaign, and especially when it had established itself before 
Syracuse in order to besiege that city, it (obviously) could not depend on its reception by 
various cities to reprovision.  At least for the roughly eighteen months from the beginning 
of its siege of Syracuse in the early summer of 414 (6.97ff.) until its eventual destruction 
in the late fall of 413,
159
 then, it had to acquire its provisions by a different means.    
The expedition acquired its provisions during the siege (solely) through seaborne 
imports (secured by the expedition’s naval superiority) from nearby friendly states.  This 
can be shown to be true from the several references in Thucydides’ narrative to the 
expedition’s food supply during the operations around Syracuse.  In the summer of 414, 
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 Thus, Casson ([1995] 262-263, 268-269) was incorrect to state that triremes on the move depended 
solely on agorai (provided by poleis) for their supplies; similarly mistaken:  Gomme (1933) 18-19; Hanson 
(2005) 258-260.  Pritchett ([1971] 42-45), Jordan ([1975] 109-111), Morrison et al. ([2000] 102), van Wees 
([2004] 218-219) and Rawlings ([2007] 118) fail to distinguish between the relative importance of agorai 
provided by poleis and supply ships for the provisioning of amphibious and naval expeditions on the move. 
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Nicias decided to fortify Plemmyrion, a headland overlooking the Great Harbor of 
Syracuse, since “if this were fortified, it seemed to him that the bringing in of supplies 
would be an easier matter,” “ῥᾴων αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο ἡ ἐσκοµιδὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔσεσθαι,” 
since basing the Athenian triremes there, instead of the inner bay of in the Great Harbor 
where they had been previously based, would make it easier to operate against the 
Syracusan fleet:  the expedition’s triremes would now be able to keep closer watch on the 
harbor of the Syracusans and not have to put out against the Syracusans if they showed 
any activity with their fleet (7.4.4).  Before this decision of Nicias’, provisions had been 
imported by sea to the Athenians’ naval base in the Great Harbor,
160
 and it appears, at the 
beginning of the siege, to the Athenians’ first naval base at Thapsus.
161
 
The absolute necessity of these seaborne imports (and thus of the fortification of 
Plemmyrion) for the expedition’s provisioning becomes apparent from a letter sent by 
Nicias to Athens at the end of the summer of 414 (7.8) concerning the strategic situation 
facing the expedition as winter approached.  Nicias wrote that the expedition was now 
struggling with the Syracusans for control of the sea (7.12.2-7.13.1).  The Athenians no 
longer had a great superiority in the number of their triremes (“πολλῆς... περιουσίας 
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 This follows from the fact that the Athenians’ naval base was in the Great Harbor when Nicias made his 
decision to make the import of supplies to the expedition easier. See also 6.103.2 with p.84 n.163 for the 
bringing in of provisions to the Athenian naval base while it was based in the Great Harbor. 
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 See 6.99.4:  “αἱ δὲ νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὔπω ἐκ τῆς Θάψου περιεπεπλεύκεσαν ἐς τὸν µέγαν λιµένα, ἀλλ’ 
ἔτι οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐκράτουν τῶν περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, κατὰ γῆν δ’ ἐκ τῆς Θάψου οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τὰ ἐπίτήδεια 
ἐπήγοντο”; “as the Athenian fleet had not yet sailed round into the Great Harbor, the Syracusans still 
commanded the sea coast, and the Athenians brought their provisions by land from Thapsus” (Crawley’s 
translation).  See 6.97.1-2 for the establishment of the base for the expedition’s triremes at Thapsus.  
Although, strictly speaking, 6.99.4 does not provide evidence for seaborne imports to the expedition’s 
naval base at Thapsus, this would appear to be the most likely source of the supplies brought overland from 
there to the Athenians’ soldiers engaged in the siege works (given that it was halfway between the deserted 





νεῶν”), and were forced to use all of them for guarding their food supply:  they were 
compelled to use all of them for this task since, if they were to relax their guard even a 
little, they would not have provisions, which were even then being brought with difficulty 
brought past Syracuse and into their camp:  “τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐχ ἕξοµεν, παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων 
πόλιν χαλεπῶς καὶ νῦν ἐσκοµιζόµενοι” (7.13.1).  There is a crucial implication from this 
statement:  if the expedition could not provide security for its seaborne food supply, it 
would not have provisions; in other words, the expedition was depending for its 
provisions solely on imports of grain.  This point is reinforced later in the same letter to 
Athens, when Nicias noted that 
εἰ δὲ προσγενήσεται ἓν ἔτι τοῖς πολεµίοις, ὥστε τὰ τρέφοντα ἡµᾶς χωρία 
τῆς Ἰταλίας, ὁρῶντα ἐν ᾧ τε ἐσµὲν καὶ ὑµῶν µὴ ἐπιβοηθούντων, πρὸς ἐκείνους 
χωρῆσαι, διαπεπολεµήσεται αὐτοῖς ἀµαχεῖ ἐκπολιορκηθέντων ἡµῶν ὁ πόλεµος. 
 
If but one advantage more shall be gained by the enemy—that the 
regions of Italy which supply us with food, seeing in what plight we are and that 
you are not sending reinforcements, should go over to the enemy—the war will 
be over for them without a battle, for we shall be besieged into surrender. 
(7.14.3) 
 
Nicias told the Athenians, in other words, that if those regions of Italy that were currently 
supplying the Athenians with food were to cease doing so, the Athenians would have to 
surrender without a battle since, without the food from Italy, they would be, in effect, in 
the position of a besieged and blockaded city, having to rely solely on whatever stores of 
grain and other food they might happen to possess at the point when the Italians ceased to 
supply them;
162
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 Cf. the translations of “ἐκπολιορκηθέντων ἡµῶν” of Crawley:  “famine would compel us to evacuate”; 
Jowett:  “we shall be starved out, and they will have made an end of the war without striking a blow”; 
Warner:  “hunger will force us to submit, and Syracuse will win the war without having to strike a blow.”  
Nicias had already written in the same letter that the expedition, which was meant to be besieging Syracuse, 




The critical (and continuing) importance of seaborne supply for the provisioning 
of the expedition can be seen from some events of the early summer of 414/3.  As a result 
of a battle on land and sea with the Syracusans, the Athenian forts at Plemmyrion were 
taken by the Syracusan army (7.23-7.24.1).  This was a serious blow to the Athenians 
because, with the Syracusan capture of the forts, they had lost many men and a great deal 
of property (7.24.2).
164
  Thucydides considered the capture of Plemmyrion the first and 
foremost cause of the ultimate ruin of the expedition not for these reasons, however, but 
because, having lost Plemmyrion, 
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι οὐδ’ οἱ ἔσπλοι ἀσφαλεῖς ἦσαν τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς τῶν ἐπιτηδείων 
(οἱ γὰρ Συρακόσιοι ναυσὶν αὐτόθι ἐφορµοῦντες ἐκώλυον καὶ διὰ µάχης ἤδη 
ἐγίγνοντο αἱ ἐσκοµιδαί), ἔς τε τὰ ἄλλα κατάπληξιν παρέσχε καὶ ἀθυµίαν τῷ 
στρατεύµατι.   
 
the work of bringing in provisions through the entrance to the harbor 
could no longer be carried on with safety (since the Syracusans lying in wait 
there with triremes hindered this, and from now on the convoys could only make 
their entrance by fighting), and in general this event brought dismay and 
discouragement to the army. (7.24.3) 
                                                                                                                                                 
because of the Syracusan cavalry:  “ξυµβέβηκέ τε πολιορκεῖν δοκοῦντας ἡµᾶς ἄλλους αὐτοὺς µᾶλλον, ὅσα 
γε κατὰ γῆν, τοῦτο πάσχειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς χώρας ἐπὶ πολὺ διὰ τοὺς ἱππέας ἐξερχόµεθα” (7.11.4).  The 
cessation of seaborne food supplies would therefore complete the blockade (cf. Robinson [1999] 143 n.26).  
See also 7.75.5 (with Connor [1984] 188-189 n.7):  the remnants of the expedition, after the destruction of 
the Athenian fleet in the final battle in the Great Harbor, fleeing the camp and holding very few or no 
provisions, “looked like nothing else than a city in secret flight after a siege, and that no small city,” “οὐδὲν 
γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεπολιορκηµένῃ ἐῴκεσαν ὑποφευγούσῃ, καὶ ταύτῃ οὐ σµικρᾷ...”  Hornblower (CT 
iii.561) compares 4.29.2:  the Athenians at Pylos, engaged in the blockade of the Spartans on Sphacteria (a 
very laborious one on account of the lack of food and drink to be had at Pylos:  4.26.2), “were suffering 
hardship from the shortages of the place and were being blockaded rather than blockading,”  “οἱ γὰρ 
στρατιῶται κακοπαθοῦντες τοῦ χωρίου τῇ ἀπορίᾳ καὶ µᾶλλον πολιορκούµενοι ἢ πολιορκοῦντες...” 
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 Shipments of provisions from Italy had, in fact, been reaching the expedition at Syracuse since at least 
the early part of the summer (and siege) in 414:  Thucydides mentions, in his description of the 
consequences of the initial Athenian successes in the effort to besiege Syracuse, that “provisions were 
coming in for the force from all parts of Italy,” “τὰ δ’ ἐπιτήδεια τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας πανταχόθεν” 
(6.103.2).  This notice comes just after Thucydides records the move of the Athenians’ naval base from 
Thapsus to the Great Harbor (see 6.103.1 with 6.101.3, 6.102.3). 
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Thucydides, then, considered the greatly increased insecurity of the Athenian’s seaborne 
logistical support as the most important cause of the expedition’s eventual defeat.
165
 
The naval fighting in the Great Harbor before the taking of Plemmyrion signaled 
the greater confidence and competitiveness of the Syracusans on the sea.  These were 
confirmed just after their taking of the forts on Plemmyrion, when eleven triremes from 
Syracuse destroyed most of a convoy of boats sailing from Italy with goods for the 
Athenians (“πλοῖα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γέµοντα χρηµάτων”), and also burned in the territory 
of Caulonia a quantity of timber for trireme-building, which had been readied for the 
Athenians (7.25.1-2).  Eventually, the growing naval ability of the Syracusans and 
corresponding loss of Athenian confidence brought about a series of Athenian defeats at 
sea which led to the destruction of the expedition.
166
  Before the last of these defeats, 
which decisively marked the end of the attempt to capture Syracuse, in the late summer 
of 413, the Athenian generals and taxiarchs assembled and discussed the difficulties of 
their situation; the point which pressed them most was “the fact that they no longer had 
supplies for their immediate needs—for in the expectation that they would sail away they 
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 At Plut., Nic. 20.4, Nicias is reported, after the loss of Plemmyrion (see Plut., Nic. 20.2-3, a summary 
account of Thucydides’ narrative of the battle on land and sea around Plemmyrion), as not wishing to fight 
the Syracusans at sea out of an unwillingness to fight with his then inferior forces, which were wretchedly 
supplied (“καὶ χορηγουµένων φαύλως”), before the arrival of the reinforcements sent from Athens.  This 
notice is not found in Thucydides.  The following sentences (Nic. 20.4-5) on Menander’s and Euthydemus’ 
ambitious desire to fight on sea are also not found in Thucydides and so could derive from a Sicilian 
source, so that the whole section could be from a source independent of Thucydides; it is safer, however, to 
see the passage as an invention of Plutarch’s originating in his tendency to attribute to Nicias an 
unwillingness to fight and an inclination to delay.  See Marasco (1977) 160. 
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 On the loss of Athenian mastery at sea, see esp. 7.55.2:  the Athenians completely bewildered because 
they had suffered a defeat at sea, where they had never expected defeat.  See also, e.g., Macleod (1983) 





had already sent word to Catana and stopped the bringing in of provisions,”
167
 “ὅτι τὰ 
ἐπιτήδεια οὔτε αὐτίκα ἔτι εἶχον (προπέµψαντες γὰρ ἐς Κατάνην ὡς ἐκπλευσόµενοι 
ἀπεῖπον µὴ ἐπάγειν)”—“and that they would not have any in the future unless they could 
command the sea,” “οὔτε τὸ λοιπὸν ἔµελλον ἕξειν, εἰ µὴ ναυκρατήσουσιν...” (7.60.2).
168
  
Two points emerge from these considerations:  firstly, the expedition is again presented 
as having been relying solely on seaborne imports for its food (having stopped these, it no 
longer had provisions for its immediate needs); secondly, and crucially, its ability to 
reprovision itself in the future is presented as dependent on its naval superiority (without 




The expedition, then, depended on seaborne supply from nearby friendly states 
for its provisions for the duration of its attempted siege of Syracuse.  Athenian naval 
superiority was seen as essential for the security of this supply; once that superiority was 
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 The Athenian generals had decided to leave Syracuse earlier in the summer, but an eclipse of the moon 
changed the minds of the men, and Nicias refused even to consider the question of departure until they had 
waited the twenty-seven days prescribed by the soothsayers (7.50.3-4). 
 
168
 Cf. 7.60.5:  the men of the expedition were anxious to risk a battle as soon as possible on account of the 
scarcity of provisions (“διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων σπάνιν”).  “ναυκρατήσουσιν” here should be taken to denote 
tactical superiority in a specific military and geographical context:  see Figueira (1985) 64 n.35 (although 
he incorrectly reports Thucydides as using the term ναυκράτωρ rather than ναυκρατήσουσιν at 7.60.2). 
 
169
 In the summer of 413, Demosthenes and Eurymedon sailed from Athens to Syracuse with a second 
armament consisting of about 5,000 hoplites, “not a few Barbarian and Greek javelin-men, slingers, and 
bowmen, and a sufficient amount of material and provisions” (“... ἀκοντιστάς τε βαρβάρους καὶ Ἕλληνας 
οὐκ ὀλίγους καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ τοξότας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἱκανήν”) (7.42.1) (for the translation 
of “τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν” here, see pp.77-78 and n.150 above).  The provisions mentioned in this 
passage seem to have been used solely for the second armament’s voyage, since the implication of 7.60.2 is 
that the expedition (including the second force under Demosthenes and Eurymedon) had been continually 





lost, the bringing in of provisions by sea to the Athenian base of operations could no 
longer be guaranteed.   
 
Thucydides, with one exception,
170
 never gives an explicit indication from where 
the Athenians sourced their provisions from the late fall of 415, when they established a 
base of operations at Catana (6.51.3),
171
 until the early summer of 414, when they began 
the siege of Syracuse.
172
  But the facts that:  i. naval superiority was considered crucial 
for the food supply of the expedition before it had established a base of operations at 
Catana;
173
 ii. naval superiority was crucial (and considered crucial) for the food supply of 
the expedition from the early summer of 414 onwards; iii. the Athenians had 
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 See pp.88-89 below. 
 
171
 The Athenians also used Naxos as a base for part of the winter of 415/414:  see 6.72.1, 6.74.2, 6.88.3. 
 
172
 We do hear that the sixty ships which left Rhegium for Naxos in the late summer of 415 provisioned 
themselves (“τὰ ἐπιτήδεια λαβόντες”) before leaving Rhegium (6.50.2); presumably, these ships’ crews 
bought their provisions from the agora provided by the Rhegians (though, perhaps, there was still some 
grain available from the thirty grain-transporters?).  Thucydides also mentions that, after the Athenian 
success in the battle of the Anapus in the early winter of 415/414, it did not seem possible to the generals 
for the moment to carry on the war so near to Syracuse until (amongst other things) “τά τε ἄλλα καὶ σῖτον 
καὶ ὅσων δέοι παρασκευάσωνται ὡς ἐς τὸ ἔαρ ἐπιχειρήσοντες ταῖς Συρακούσαις,” “they might prepare other 
things, both food and whatever else was needed, with a view to attacking Syracuse the next spring” 
(6.71.2)—but he does not tell us which source the Athenian generals envisaged this food as coming from.  
6.71.2, taken together with 6.48 (see n.174 below) and the evidence gathered above for the sources of the 
food supply of the expedition from the early summer of 414 until its destruction in the late fall of 413 (see 
p.110 n.241 for this date), does prove, however, that the Athenians never expected to live solely on the 
provisions they had brought with them on the supply ships from Athens (again contra Green ([1970] 110, 
Kohl [1977] 156, Kagan [1981] 187).  See also 6.94.3:  in the early summer of 414, the expedition, before 
making attacks on some unfriendly Sicel cities, reprovisioned at Catana (“ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐπισιτισάµενοι”).  In 
this case, it is impossible to know whether the men of the expedition obtained their provisions in a market 
provided by the Catanians, or from the supplies brought in from nearby states; the latter is more likely, 
however (see main text just below). 
 
173
 See again Nicias, speaking before the assembly considering the παρασκευή of the expedition (6.22):  “... 





unchallenged control of the sea during the period from the late fall of 415 until the early 
summer of 414—mean that it is (almost) certain that the expedition’s provisions during 
this time came (primarily) from seaborne imports—safeguarded by the expedition’s 
superiority at sea. 
Thucydides does mention that, at some point in the (it appears) late winter of 
415/414, the independent Sicels of the interior brought down grain to the army, and in 
some cases even money (6.88.4:  “καὶ σῖτόν τε κατεκόµιζον τῷ στρατεύµατι καὶ εἰσὶν οἳ 
χρήµατα”).
174
  This grain must have provisioned the expedition for at least some time, of 
course, but the Sicels’ delivery of grain is presented by Thucydides as a singular event, 
and not as a continuing or integral part of the usual means of supply for the expedition 
(i.e., Thucydides does not present this grain as food upon which the expedition was 
depending, but rather as an unexpected and welcome addition to its usual means of 
supply).  The next (and only other) time we hear of Sicel grain, it is mentioned as part of 
Nicias’ as yet unfixed and uncertain plan
175
 for the escape of the remnants of the 
expedition after the destruction of its fleet (“προπέπεµπται δ’ ὡς αὐτούς, καὶ ἀπαντᾶν 
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 At the Athenian generals’ conference at Rhegium, convened after they had found out that there was not 
the money promised them at Egesta (6.46), Alcibiades urged amongst other things that “ἔς τε τὰς πόλεις 
ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι πλὴν Σελινοῦντος καὶ Συρακουσῶν τὰς ἄλλας, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι καὶ τοὺς Σικελοὺς τοὺς µὲν 
ἀφιστάναι ἀπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων, τοὺς δὲ φίλους ποιεῖσθαι, ἵνα σῖτον καὶ στρατιὰν ἔχωσι,” “they send 
heralds to the other cities, except Selinus and Syracuse, and try to detach some of the Sicels from the 
Syracusans, and to make friends of others, in order that these might furnish grain and troops” (6.48).  That 
the clause “ἵνα σῖτον καὶ στρατιὰν ἔχωσι” refers to military and provisioning aid from the Sicels (and not 
from the poleis other than Syracuse and Selinus mentioned here, as the scholiast on this passage has it) can 
be seen from the verbal parallels with 6.62.5 (the Athenians urge their Sicel allies to send them a 
“στρατιὰν”) and 6.88.4 (the Sicels of the interior brought down “σῖτόν” to the Athenians, and in some cases 
even money); since these terms are only used to describe aid from the Sicels, and not for military and 
provisioning help from Sicilian poleis (or regions of Italy), we can state with certainty, relying on the 
method of elucidating Thucydides’ speeches (even indirect ones as Alcibiades’ here) by the surrounding 
narrative of events (see Stahl [2003] 174, and appendix 1), that the clause refers to aid from the Sicels. 
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εἰρηµένον καὶ σιτία ἅµα κοµίζειν,” “directions have been sent ahead to the Sicels that 
they are to meet us and bring provisions with them” (7.77.6)).  The grain brought by the 
Sicels will have played, then, a role in the provisioning of the expedition in the late 
winter of 415/414 while it was based at Naxos, but at no time before or after this.   
  
The expedition during its operations in Sicily depended, then, for its provisions on 
seaborne imports from friendly states (with the exception of a brief period in the late 
winter of 415/414, when it also had access to supplies delivered overland by friendly 
Sicels).
176
  These food supplies were shipped by and belonged to merchants.  This 
follows from Thucydides’ description of the immediate consequences of the Syracusan 
capture of the forts at Plemmyrion (where the imports of grain to the expedition were 
arriving):  Thucydides comments that in the capture of the forts many men were killed or 
captured, and much property in all was taken, 
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 Bauslaugh ([1991] 148) is incorrect to state that “commerce with the belligerents... [in the form of] 
shipment to the war zone in Sicily (6.103.2; 7.14.3; 7.25.1)... evidently was not considered inconsistent 
with neutral status.”  But, at 6.103.2, Thucydides is describing the results of Athenian military success after 
the Athenians had had the best of the engagements at the beginning of their attempt to besiege Syracuse:  
many of the Sicels came as allies to the Athenians, three 50-oared ships came from Etruria, and provisions 
came in from all parts of Italy; the sending of provisions is thus included by Thucydides as an example of 
military aid from (now) friendly states to the Athenians.  At 7.14.3, where Nicias writes that he fears that 
the Athenians’ deteriorating military and naval situation would lead the Italian states that had been 
supplying the expedition at Syracuse to cease doing so and go over to the enemy:  the sending of provisions 
is thus clearly presented again as an act of positive military help from an ally, and dependent on the 
military success of the Athenians.  In light of these passages, there is no reason to think that the ships full of 
cargo sailing from Italy at 7.25.1 were from neutral states; it makes much the most sense in fact, in light of 
6.103.2 and 7.14.3, to take these ships to be from states friendly to the Athenians.  Cf. 6.48 and 6.88.4 for 
the sending of provisions to the Athenians presented as (part of) the military help given to Athens by an 
ally (although the provisions are sent to the Athenians by different institutional means in these cases).  
(Note also that none of the other passages Bauslaugh cites as providing evidence for neutral commerce with 
belligerents in fact do so ([1991] 148 n.9:  the passages he cites are 5.28.2; Ar., Peace 475-77; 2.67.4; 
Diod. 19.103.4-5; Plut. Demetr. 33.3; also (contra Bauslaugh (ibid.)), the Corinthians decided at 7.34.1 to 
keep guard at Naupactus to protect holkades which were functioning as troop-transports, and not as neutral 





ὥστε γὰρ ταµιείῳ χρωµένον τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῖς τείχεσι πολλὰ µὲν ἐµπόρων 
χρήµατα καὶ σῖτος ἐνῆν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν τριηράρχων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἱστία 
τεσσαράκοντα τριήρων καὶ τἆλλα σκεύη ἐγκατελήφθη καὶ τριήρεις 
ἀνειλκυσµέναι τρεῖς. 
  
for since the Athenians used the forts as a warehouse, there were in them much 
property and grain belonging to merchants, and also much property belonging to 
the trierarchs—in fact the sails and other tackle of forty triremes were taken 




The seaborne supplies the Athenians obtained from nearby friendly states were not 
therefore direct contributions in kind from these states—as it seems the food brought to 
the expedition from the Sicels was
178
—or food requisitioned from them,
179
 but food 
which was bought in these friendly states by merchants who then transported and sold it 
to the members of the expedition.
180
 
                                                 
177
 This is a slightly altered version of the Loeb translation “... there were in them many wares belonging to 
merchants as well as food”:  I alter the Loeb to emphasize the fact that the grain belongs to the merchants 
(see, e.g., Jowett, Crawley).  Pritchett’s statement ([1971] 44) that “[i]n the Syrakusan [sic] conquest of 
Plemmyrion, many merchants (emporoi), who had provided an agora for the Athenian soldiers, were 




 Note that the Sicels themselves bring the money and grain to the Athenians (6.88.4).  It appears that 
Sicel rulers could have centralized control over at least part of their subjects’ agricultural production: cf. 
Diod. 14.95.7, describing direct state provisioning by some Sicels of the army of Dionysius I in 392:  
Agyris, a Sicel king “σῖτον καὶ τἄλλα ὅσα ἦν χρεία προθύµως ἐδωρήσατο”, “readily provided the entire 
army of Dionysius with food and whatever else it needed.”  In contrast, Greek poleis did not have access to 
any of their citizens’ agricultural production through taxation-in-kind.  It is impossible to state with 
certainty how these supplies brought down to the expedition were distributed to their recipients (i.e. the 
members of the Sicilian expedition). 
 
179
 See again p.23 n.28:  the far western Greek poleis (and other states) were too powerful for the Athenians 
to be able to coerce contributions of food from them.  See also 6.71.2:  it did not seem possible to the 
Athenian generals (at the start of winter 415/414) to continue the war on Syracuse until, amongst other 
things, “καὶ χρήµατα δὲ ἅµα αὐτόθεν τε ξυλλέξωνται καὶ παρ’ Ἀθηναίων ἔλθῃ,” “they collected money 
from the island itself, and to have a supply come from Athens,” and “τά τε ἄλλα, καὶ σῖτον καὶ ὅσων δέοι, 
παρασκευάσωνται,” “and they prepared other things, both food and whatever else was needed.”  The 




 Note, in this respect, Classen/Steup, vii.55 ad 7.24.2:  “τῶν vor τριηράρχων, aus Vat. hinzugefügt, 
bezeichnet die Trierarchen als zusammengehörigen Stand, nicht als zufälligen zusammengekommen wie 
die ἔµποροι.”  For more on the mechanisms by which merchants acquired, shipped, and sold food to 




b. The Sicilian expedition:  foraging and plundering 
Foraging was never an important means of acquisition of provisions for the 
expedition in Sicily; it was only in the last desperate stages of the campaign, when the 
remnants of the defeated expedition fled inland from Syracuse, that foraging assumed a 
major role in its provisioning, and then only briefly and as a desperate recourse in 
exceptional circumstances.  But before I demonstrate the minimal role played by foraging 
in the food supply of the expedition, I will first specify how I will use the terms foraging 
and plundering, since these terms have often been used mistakenly and indiscriminately 
in the literature on classical Greek provisioning, with the result that previous work has 
frequently been vague, if not simply incorrect, in treating this subject.   
As Roth notes, “[i]n a strict sense, the English word “foraging” refers only to the 
gathering of fodder for animals.  It is also used more broadly, however, to refer to the 
regular collection of specific provisions by groups of soldiers from the immediate area of 
operations.”
181
  Although foraging can mean, then, the gathering of fodder, firewood, 
water, and/or provisions,
182
 I will take ‘foraging’ throughout this dissertation to refer to 
attempts by sailors and soldiers to collect provisions (i.e. food supplies) from their 
immediate area of operations.
183
  I will take ‘plundering,’ on the other hand, to refer to 
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 (1999) 118. 
 
182
 Roth (1999) 154; cf. Erdkamp (1998) 11. 
 
183





soldiers and sailors ‘forcibly stealing goods from enemy communities.’
184
  In practice, the 
boundaries between foraging and plundering would often have been indistinct.
185
  In the 
process of foraging for provisions, soldiers and sailors will have had opportunities to steal 
goods and property; conversely, on plundering expeditions, men will also have had the 
opportunity to seize grain and other foodstuffs.
186
  But there were still important 
differences in objective and effect between the two activities.
187
  Plundering operations 
took place especially in captured cities, but, if they took place in the countryside, they 
ranged over a much wider area (than foraging parties); they aimed primarily at the seizure 
of objects in order to (re-)sell them to raise money;
188
 and they also focused much more 
on the destruction of enemy property.
189
  The gathering of provisions would have been an 
incidental activity for men on plundering operations, and the opportunity to collect 
foodstuffs may have been in some cases (and especially in the pillaging of captured 
cities) spurned by soldiers and sailors intent on stealing other goods that could gain high 
                                                 
184
 Based on the Oxford Concise Dictionary definition of ‘plunder’:  ‘forcibly steal goods from, especially 
in time of war.’  Cf. its definition of ‘pillage’:  ‘rob or steal with violence, especially in wartime.’ 
 
185
 To paraphrase Roth (1999) 117. 
 
186
 See Erdkamp (1998) 123:  “[f]rom a tactical point of view a clear distinction between the gathering of 
food and fodder, and between ravaging, plundering and foraging cannot easily be made.  All these activities 
were often executed simultaneously and could be aspects of the same activity.”  Cf. (1998) 124 (on Roman 
Republican foraging expeditions):  “[w]e may infer that in many cases when soldiers are sent out according 
to the source frumentandi causa, they at the same time plundered in search of booty and spoiled what they 
could not use or take with them.” 
 
187
 To use Erdkamp’s formulation at (1998) 124. 
 
188
 On the sale of plunder from military operations in order to raise money, see section ivb below, chapter 7 
sections iv, v. 
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prices on their (re-)sale.  In contrast, foraging parties were often larger, operated in closer 
formation in the open countryside, and in more concentrated areas (than plundering 
operations), and aimed at the collection of specific foodstuffs (in contrast to men engaged 
in plundering, who would have aimed to steal nothing more specific than valuable items 




The men who had survived the defeat in the final naval battle in the Great Harbor 
and the malarial conditions that had afflicted the Athenian camp in the summer of 413
191
 
were forced to forage for their provisions on the retreat from the Athenian camp before 
Syracuse because they were not able to pack up sufficient supplies for the march since 
there was no longer food in the camp (“ἔφερον δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανά· σῖτος γὰρ οὐκέτι ἦν 
ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ”) (7.75.5; cf. 7.74.1, 7.77.6).  There was no longer food in the camp 
because the usual source of the expedition’s provisions—seaborne imports secured by 
naval superiority—had ceased to exist:  the Athenian generals, in the expectation that 
they would be sailing shortly for home, had told the Catanians not to send any more 
supplies to the camp (see again 7.60.2 and p.86 above).
192
   
                                                 
190
 See Erdkamp (1998) 124; Roth (1999) 117.  Hanson’s ([1998]) failure to distinguish between foraging 
and plundering (note that there is no entry under ‘foraging’ in his index) is a serious methodological error, 
one of several that invalidates his larger argument.  See also chapter iii section ivb. 
 
191
 See 7.75.3 with 7.47.1-2 (and Hornblower, CT iii.632). 
 
192
 Although the Athenians still had more triremes than the Syracusans after the final battle, their crews 
were utterly demoralized and refused to man the ships (7.72.3-4), so that the Syracusans effectively 
possessed complete naval superiority after the battle:  this meant that the bringing in of provisions would 





But the attempt by the remains of the expedition to subsist on foraging during the 
attempted retreat by land to friendly territory had no chance of success.  Reliance on 
foraging for food supplies was “only feasible for armies that were certain of their tactical 
superiority.”
193
  Strength in numbers of cavalry and light-armed troops played the most 
important part in determining whether a force could gain this tactical superiority, since 
 [i]n the attack on foraging, cavalry played an important role, because 
horsemen covered a large terrain and could make hit-and-run attacks without 
involving themselves in large-scale fighting.  The strength of one’s own cavalry 
forces compared to those of the opponent determined whether such an attack on 
foragers could successfully be executed.  Light-armed troops were also more 
suited to this kind of fighting than... heavily armed soldiers...
 194
 
   
Because of their great numbers of cavalry and light-armed troops, the Syracusans 
had, at all points during the retreat, complete tactical superiority over the Athenians and 
their allies; this superiority allowed the Syracusans to constantly attack the retreat,
195
 and 
thus to prevent the Athenians and their allies from foraging, until on the third day of the 
march 
 καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκέτι ὁµοίως εἶχον· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀποχωρεῖν οἷον τ’ ἦν 
ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων. 
  
they no longer had provisions as before,
196
 for by reason of the enemy’s 
cavalry it was no longer possible to leave the main body (of the army). (7.78.7) 
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 Erdkamp (1998) 24.  Cf. (ibid.) 123:  “[o]bviously, a tactically strong army was a precondition for living 
off the land.” 
 
194
 Erdkamp (1998) 126.  Cf. 6.52.2 for Syracusan cavalry successfully preventing a plundering raid by 
some Athenian light-armed troops in 415. 
 
195
 For the attacks of the Syracusan cavalry and light-armed, see 7.78.4, 7.78.6-7, 7.79.2, 7.79.5, 7.81.2, 
7.81.5, 7.82.1, 7.83.2, 7.84.1.  The retreat was particularly vulnerable to constant harassment since it moved 
slowly on account of the men’s need to forage for all of their provisions (because of the unavailability to 
them of any other means of acquiring provisions) (cf. Lazenby [2004] 163). 
 
196
 “Before” because they did have some supplies (though very few) on leaving the camp; and because, on 
the second day of the retreat, the Athenians and their allies had been able to encamp in a level area with 





Two nights later, the men on the retreat were still “in wretched plight, since by now they 
were in want of all supplies and many had been wounded in many assaults made by the 
enemy.”
197
  Two days after this, and still suffering continuous harassment from the 
Syracusan cavalry and light-armed, the Athenians and their allies “were in a wretched 
plight through want of food and all necessities.”
198
  The retreat’s doomed attempts to 




 In Nicias’ letter home to Athens (sent in the late fall of 414), after he had told the 
Athenians that the expedition no longer had superiority in the number of its ships over the 
Syracusans, he elaborated on the reasons for the decline of the expedition’s naval 
strength.  The first reason Nicias gave was that  
τῶν ναυτῶν τῶν
200
 µὲν διὰ φρυγανισµὸν καὶ ἁρπαγὴν καὶ ὑδρείαν µακρὰν 
ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἀπολλυµένων... 
 
of the sailors, some have been killed by the cavalry because of 
expeditions for firewood and plunder, and the distance from which water has to 
be fetched... (7.13.2)   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
provision the men for only one day, however:  camping in the same place on the next day and the day after 
that, the men no longer had provisions (7.78.7, and 7.79.5 with 7.80.1). 
 
197
 7.80.1:  “ἐπειδὴ κακῶς σφίσι τὸ στράτευµα εἶχε τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων πάντων ἀπορίᾳ ἤδη καὶ 
κατατετραυµατισµένοι ἦσαν πολλοὶ ἐν πολλαῖς προσβολαῖς τῶν πολεµίων γεγενηµέναις...”  See again 
7.79.2, 7.79.5 for the continuing Syracusan attacks on the retreat. 
 
198
 7.83.3:  “εἶχον δὲ καὶ οὗτοι πονήρως σίτου τε καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀπορίᾳ...”  See again 7.81.2, 7.81.5, 
7.82.1, 7.83.2 for the Syracusan attacks. 
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 See 7.82-87 for their fate.  Cf. already 6.52.2 for Syracusan cavalry having  
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Almost every scholar who has translated or commented on 7.13.2 has taken “ἁρπαγὴν” to 
mean ‘foraging,’
201
 and thus this passage has been taken as evidence that the Sicilian 
expedition did depend on foraging for its provisions,
202
 and that the sole means for 
classical Greek fleets of acquiring provisions in hostile territory was through foraging.
203
  
The translation of “ἁρπαγὴν” as ‘foraging’ at 7.13.2 can be shown to be incorrect, 
however, both from examination of Thucydides’ usage of the term ἁρπαγή throughout his 
work, and from analysis of the narrative surrounding Nicias’ letter.   
In almost every other instance of Thucydides’ use of ἁρπαγή, the surrounding 
narrative offers sufficient context to suggest strongly or require that the term should be 
taken as indicating the activity of plundering.  Thucydides uses ἁρπαγή
 
to denote the 
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 Smith (Loeb):  “... for the reason that our sailors, forced to go out to a distance for wood and forage and 
water, are constantly being killed by the cavalry”; Hobbes:  “[f]or our mariners, fetching wood and water 
and foraging far off, are intercepted by the horsemen...”; Jowett:  “that the sailors, having to forage and 
fetch water and wood from a distance, are cut off by the Syracusan horse...”; Crawley:  “[e]xpeditions for 
fuel and forage, and the distance from which water has to be fetched, cause our sailors to be cut off by the 
Syracusan cavalry...”; Graham (1992) 259:  “[o]f the sailors, some have been killed by the cavalry owing to 
the distance from which firewood has to be fetched, supplies seized and water brought.”  Cf. Marchant 
(1893) 127 ad διὰ φρυγανισµὸν:  “cf. lignatum, pabulatum, aquatum ire.”  Kagan ([1981] 279] in his 
paraphrase of Nicias’ letter to Athens, states the sailors were going for “wood, forage and water.”  
(Hornblower (CT iii.564) is incorrect to gloss ‘φρυγανισµόν’ as ‘foraging.’) 
 
202
 Hanson ([2005] 370 n.39) cites 7.4.6 for the statement “[c]ommon was the sudden ambush of and attack 
on sailors who were foraging for food, water, and firewood—especially by horsemen and light-armed 
troops.  Indeed, provisioning was a prime reason for the Athenians’ defeat on Syracuse.  Their sailors had 
to bivouac and search for supplies...” ([2005] 259), but this must be a mistake for 7.13.2.  See also van 




 van Wees (2004) 63:  “[a] fleet needed supplies on a massive scale, and the only way to obtain these in 
enemy territory was by force.  The hoplites would not have been capable of gathering enough for the entire 
fleet, so the oarsmen would have had to do their own plundering, just as in friendly territory they did their 
own provisioning.  In a letter home, the general Nicias commented on the casualties suffered when his 
rowers were attacked by the enemy cavalry while out ‘gathering wood, pillaging, and fetching water’ 





activity of men engaged in the plundering of cities or their surrounding precincts;
204
 to 
denote the plunder some Thracians hope to acquire in joining the campaign of Sitalces 
against Macedonia;
205
 and to describe plundering raids.
206
  Thucydides can, in fact, 
                                                 
204
 Strombichides, the Athenian general, having taken Lampsacus at the first assault (in the summer of 
411), made booty of the goods and slaves in the city:  “καὶ σκεύη µὲν καὶ ἀνδράποδα ἁρπαγὴν 
ποιησάµενος” (8.62.2); this passage is the most explicit indication we have that ἁρπαγή should be taken to 
mean ‘plunder’ in Thucydides.  After the Dian Thracians being conducted by Diitrephes from Athens to 
their home region (see n.206 below) had taken Mycalessus by surprise (7.29.3) (in the summer of 413), 
some of them were killed there, being caught “while engaged in plundering” “δι’ ἁρπαγὴν ἐγκαταληφθὲν” 
in the city by a Theban force (7.30.2) :  the operational context here (action after the unexpected capture of 
a city) requires a translation of plundering here.  (And cf. 7.29.4 (with p.106 n.229 on the meaning of 
πορθῶ in Thucydides), describing the same actions:  the Thracians, having burst into Mycalessus, were 
sacking the houses and the temples (“... τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ἐπόρθουν”).)  In the aftermath of 
Brasidas’ crossing of the bridge over the Strymon to Amphipolis (in the winter of 424/3), the 
Amphipolitans were thrown into great confusion (4.104.1), and “it is said that if Brasidas had been willing 
not to allow the army to plunder, but to go immediately against the city, it was thought that he might have 
taken it,” “καὶ λέγεται Βρασίδαν, εἰ ἠθέλησε µὴ ἐφ’ ἁρπαγὴν τῷ στρατῷ τραπέσθαι, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς χωρῆσαι 
πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, δοκεῖν ἂν ἑλεῖν.”  Gomme (HCT, iii.577) comments on ἐφ’ ἁρπαγὴν here:  “after so long 
and so rapid a march, foraging for food—to be obtained by looting the countryside—was probably almost a 
necessity, and Brasidas consented.”  But a consideration of the military context and surrounding narrative 
shows that Gomme is incorrect here.  Thucydides had already mentioned that, in getting across the bridge, 
Brasidas had immediately became master of all the property outside the city, an area that was full of houses 
of Amphipolitans (4.103.5).  Since the crossing of the bridge over the Strymon was a complete surprise to 
the Amphipolitans, many of those living outside were captured (4.104.1, 4.106.1) and those who escaped 
inside the walls of the city will have had no time to transport their goods inside with them:  there would 
have been, then, in addition to the Amphipolitans living outside the walls themselves, much property 
outside the walls to capture and steal, given the circumstances.  (Note here that unexpected attacks on 
settlements or their surrounding territories were associated in Thucydides, Xenophon, and Herodotus with 
opportunities to take much plunder (cf. pp.104-105 n.226 below on 6.49.3; chapter 2 section iic).)  The 
translations of 4.104.1 of, e.g., the Loeb above, Crawley (“stopping to pillage”), and Jowett (“allowing his 
army to plunder”) should be taken as correct, then, contra Gomme.  (For “τρεπέσθαι ἐφ’ ἁρπαγὴν” meaning 
individual members of a military force “turning to plunder” after the capture of a city or a camp, see also 




 Thucydides narrates that Sitalces, when passing over Mount Cercine on his way to invade Macedonia in 
the winter of 429/8, lost none of his army on the march except perhaps by sickness, but received some 
additional troops from many of the independent Thracians volunteering to join him in the hope of plunder, 
“πολλοὶ γὰρ τῶν αὐτονόµων Θρᾳκῶν ἀπαράκλητοι ἐφ’ ἁρπαγὴν ἠκολούθουν” (2.98.3).  The independent 
Thracians cannot have joined Sitalces’ campaign in the hope of foraging for provisions. 
 
206
 Thucydides relates that, in the summer of 413, after Diitrephes was instructed by the Athenians to 
conduct to their home country the Dian Thracians (who had arrived at Athens too late to go to Sicily) and 
to use them, if he could, to harm enemy territory on the way (“... καὶ τοὺς πολεµίους, ἤν τι δύνηται, ἀπ’ 
αὐτῶν βλάψαι”) (7.29.1), he first landed them in the territory of Tanagra, “καὶ ἁρπαγήν τινα ἐποιήσατο διὰ 
τάχους” (7.29.2).  The operational context suggests strongly that ἁρπαγή here must mean plunder:  firstly, 
the Thracians will not have lacked for provisions so shortly after embarking from Athens; secondly, the 




closely associate ἁρπαγή with the activities of λῃσταί (“raiders”):  at one point, he relates 
that a (mainly) Athenian force fortified a sort of isthmus opposite Cythera, in order that 
Helots might desert there “and that at the same time raiders might make plundering raids 
from it, as they had done from Pylos,” “καὶ ἅµα λῃσταὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου, 
ἁρπαγὴν ποιῶνται” (7.26.2).
207
  These excursions from Pylos were not regular military 
operations, but raids carried out to gain booty and inflict damage on the surrounding 
countryside.
208
  In fact, ἁρπαγή (almost) always has this further connotation of the taking 
of plunder by irregular military forces or plunder taken by military forces as part of raids 
                                                                                                                                                 




 Cf. 1.5.1:  in very early times, before the rise of Minos, the Greeks and the barbarians of the coast and 
the islands turned to piracy (“ἐτράποντο πρὸς λῃστείαν”), and often falling “upon a town unprotected by 
walls, and consisting of a mere collection of villages, they would plunder it,” “καὶ προσπίπτοντες πόλεσιν 
ἀτειχίστοις καὶ κατὰ κώµας οἰκουµέναις ἥρπαζον.” 
 
208 For raids from Pylos taking plunder from the surrounding countryside, see esp. 5.115.2 (416):  “καὶ οἱ 
ἐκ τῆς Πύλου ¨Αθηναῖοι Λακεδαιµονίων πολλὴν λείαν ἔλαβον,” “and the Athenians from Pylos took so 
much plunder from the Lacedaemonians...”  See also 4.41.2-3, 5.14.3, 5.56.3 for raiding excursions from 
Pylos.  For raids from Pylos inflicting damage on the surrounding countryside, see 4.3.3:  Demosthenes 
thought Pylos would be an especially good place for a fortification since “the Messenians... would be able 
to inflict very great damage if they made that their base” (“τοὺς Μεσσηνίους... πλεῖστ’ ἂν βλάπτειν ἐξ 
αὐτοῦ ὁρµωµένους”).  Note that Thucydides distinguishes ravaging of territory by regular military forces (in 
each case, the verb used is δῃώω) from raiding excursions from Pylos on three occasions:  see 6.105.2, 
7.26.2, and esp. 7.18.3:  the Athenians “had ravaged a part of Epidauros and Prasiae and other places, and 
at the same time were making predatory excursions from Pylos,” “Ἐπιδαύρου τέ τι καὶ Πρασιῶν καὶ ἄλλα 
ἐδῄωσαν καὶ ἐκ Πύλου ἅµα ἐλῃστεύοντο.”  In addition, although in Xenophon λῃσταί can make forays for 
firewood and provisions (Hell. 2.4.25-26), and some Cyreans are recorded as subsisting by “λῃζόµενοι” the 
territory of Paphlagonia (Anab. 6.1.1), it is highly unlikely that the raids from Pylos were primarily (or even 
partly) for foraging:  the surrounding countryside was unoccupied (4.3.2-3) and thus produced no food 
(4.27.1).  See chapter 2 section iic below (and esp. 7.28.1 there: Thucydides characterizes garrisoned forts 
as relying solely on imports for their food).  Cf. 7.27.4-5 on the effects of the garrisoning of Deceleia:  
booty was carried off (“λῃστείας ποιουµένης”), and all the Athenians’ sheep and beasts of burden were lost 
to the raids from Deceleia (“πρόβατά τε πάντα ἀπολώλει καὶ ὑποζύγια”).  (Hanson’s statement that “[t]he 
enemy ravagers, then, were always more interested in collecting food and supplies (Thuc. 7.27.4)...” 
([1998] 161) finds no support from the text of 7.27.4.)  For raids by λῃσταί inflicting damage, see also that 
raiding activities were especially associated with exiles wishing to harm the territory of their native poleis:  





or other irregular operations:  in addition to the raiding from Pylos, there is the booty 
taken from the quick Thracian raid in the territory of Tanagra; the plundering of 
Mycalessus by the bloodthirsty and indisciplined Thracians;
209
 and the army of Brasidas 
turning to individual plundering after the army as a whole had captured the bridge to 
Amphipolis and the inhabited district outside the city.
210
 
 Examination of the narrative surrounding Nicias’ letter also shows that we should 
understand ἁρπαγή at 7.13.2 as referring to plunder taken by military forces as part of 
raids or other irregular operations.  Before presenting Nicias’ letter home to Athens, 
Thucydides had related that Nicias’ decision to base the triremes at Plemmyrion had been 
the crucial factor in the deterioration of the condition of the crews 
τῷ τε γὰρ ὕδατι σπανίῳ χρώµενοι καὶ οὐκ ἐγγύθεν, καὶ ἐπὶ φρυγανισµὸν ἅµα 
ὁπότε ἐξέλθοιεν οἱ ναῦται, ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων τῶν Συρακοσίων κρατούντων τῆς γῆς 
διεφθείροντο.  τρίτον γὰρ µέρος τῶν ἱππέων τοῖς Συρακοσίοις διὰ τοὺς ἐν τῷ 
Πλεµµυρίῳ, ἵνα µὴ κακουργήσοντες ἐξίοιεν, ἐπὶ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυµπιείῳ πολίχνη 
ἐτετάχατο. 
  
for their water supply was scanty and not near at hand, and at the same time, 
whenever the sailors went out to fetch firewood they were being killed by the 
Syracusan cavalry who were in control of the country.  For the Syracusans had 
posted a third part of their cavalry at the small settlement of Olympieion to 





Thucydides’ analysis at 7.4.6 of the new strategic situation brought about by the 
move of the Athenian naval base to Plemmyrion mentioned the collection of water and 
                                                 
209
 See 7.29.2. 
 
210
 See the primary definition of ἁρπαγή given in the LSJ:  “seizure, robbery, rape.”  “Almost” always, 
because at 8.62.2, “ἁρπαγὴν ποιησάµενος” refers to the sacking of a polis by an amphibious expedition 
operating as a concerted force.  It is also this latter sort of operation that Thucydides indicates when he 
employs the verb “διαρπάζω”:  see 1.49.5, 4.130.5, 8.31.4, 8.36.1. 
 
211
 The Loeb translation, with the exception of “were being killed” for “διεφθείροντο,” and the last clause, 





firewood, because excursions from the Athenian camp for these goods would have been a 
necessity.  The expedition’s trireme crews needed large amounts of water and firewood 
for their subsistence
212
— and therefore needed to make regular, if not daily, expeditions 
locally (locally because water and firewood were bulky and awkward to transport).
 213
  
The collection of water and firewood would have been a constant necessity at the 
Athenians’ previous naval bases (the bottom of the Great Harbor, Thapsus), too, but the 
change to Plemmyrion and the stationing of the Syracusan cavalry at Olympieion made 
the crews now particularly and newly vulnerable to attack when they left their camp to 
obtain these items.
214
  Thucydides makes no mention of ἁρπαγή, however, at 7.4.6.  This 
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 See Roth (1999) 35-37 on military forces’ need for water, and (ibid.) 59-61 on military forces’ needs for 
firewood (Roth is specifically discussing Roman armies, but his comments in these sections hold for any 
pre-industrial military force).  See also (ibid.) 118, 326 for the necessity for ancient armies to gather 
firewood and water frequently.  See also Lazenby (1994) 14-15 for passages evidencing the need for 
firewood for Greek armies for cooking (though he mistakenly states there that classical Greek armies had to 
cook meat and bake bread) and warmth.  See, too, Horden and Purcell (2000) 111:  a settlement of 10,000 
inhabitants in pre-industrial Europe may have required between 30 and 50 tons of firewood a day.  On 
classical Greek military forces’ need for water, see van Wees (2004) 106 and Harthen’s chapter on ‘The 
Importance of Adequate Water Supplies’ ([2001] 76-105). 
 
213
 See Roth (1999) 118, 326 for the necessity to gather firewood and collect water locally because of the 
problems of transporting them.    See also van Creveld (1989) 47:  “[a]nother very important provision for 
[pre-industrial] armies... was firewood for cooking... firewood was too heavy and bulky by far to be 
transported by an army.  Local supplies had to be found instead, often consisting of the houses and 
furniture of the inhabitants [of the country].”  The costs of transporting these very low or no value per-unit 
of weight goods would have stopped traders from shipping them to the expedition, since they could not 
have hoped to make a profit in doing so. 
 
214
 The fact that their water supply was not now near at hand would have made the men collecting water 
vulnerable to attack by the Syracusan cavalry (especially on their return to camp when they would have 
been laden with waterskins or hydriae); in addition, the fact that the crews’ water supplies were scarce—
and thus presumably confined to a few locations—made their movements when out collecting water 
predictable and therefore made them even more vulnerable to ambush by the enemy cavalry.  See Erdkamp 
(1998) 135 for both of these points; note, too, Roth (1999) 326:  “[s]ince water sources are fixed, water 
parties were particularly vulnerable, and were often ambushed.”  See also Dover (HCT iv.383) ad 7.4.6:  
“soldiers, too, need firewood; but the bulk of the army was on Epipolai, where good warning could be 
given of the approach of enemy cavalry and intervention was less profitable to the cavalry themselves.”  
But see below on 7.11.4:  the problem of the attacks of the Syracusan cavalry was just less acute for the 





activity, then, must not have been a continuous requirement for the crews, since it was 
not one which now made them susceptible to attack by Syracusan cavalry.
215
  (It should 
be noted in this respect, too, that 7.4.6 shows that at 7.13.2, µακρὰν should only be taken 
with ὑδρείαν:
216
 the point is that this means that, at 7.13.2, Nicias states that the trireme 
crews were not forced to go out at a distance for firewood or ἁρπαγή, but only for water; 
that is, Nicias does not present ἁρπαγή as something that the men were compelled to 
leave camp for.)
217
  “ἁρπαγὴν” at 7.13.2 therefore denotes an activity that was not 
necessary for the subsistence of the men (as opposed to the collection of water and 
firewood), but one which they left their base to carry out voluntarily.  Given this, and the 
meaning ἁρπαγή takes elsewhere in Thucydides, “ἁρπαγὴν” should be taken at 7.13.2 to 
indicate opportunistic raiding for the sake of plunder by the some of the men manning the 
Athenian (and other) triremes.
218
  (That “ἁρπαγὴν” here means something other than 
foraging should have been expected, in any case, given that, as I have shown, the 
                                                 
215




 See Smith (1886) 21-22 ad 7.13.2, ‘µακράν’:  “adv. with ἀπολλυµένων (“at a distance from their camp”), 
and rightly placed in Vat. after ὑδρείαν, not after ἁρπαγήν.  It would seem, however, to have esp. reference 
to ὑδρείαν if we compare c. 4.29, ὕδατι σπανίῳ χρώµενοι καὶ οὐκ ἐγγύθεν.  The Schol. explains, ἁρπαγὴν 
µακράν:  διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πολλοῦ διαστήµατος ἐφ’ ἁρπαγὴν ἐξιέναι; but no doubt wrongly.” 
 
217
 I stress this point because previous translators who have taken µακράν as qualifying φρυγανισµὸν and 
ἁρπαγὴν as well as ὑδρείαν (Hobbes, Jowett, Smith (Loeb) (though this conflicts with his commentary ad 
7.13.2 cited in the previous note), and Graham) have therefore taken 7.13.2 to mean that the men were 
compelled to go out at a distance for ἁρπαγὴν.  This seems to have caused them to translate this word as 
‘foraging’ vel sim. (that is, the thinking underlying their translations seems to be:  why would men be 
forced to go out at a distance to plunder)? 
 
218
 Cf. Lazenby (2004) 152 (paraphrasing 7.13.2):  “[t]he crews were deteriorating because of the attentions 
of the Syracusan cavalry when they went out for firewood, plunder or water...”  ἁρπαγὴν at 7.13.2 could be 
referring either to raiding undertaken solely for booty or to raiding carried out as an incidental activity to 





expedition is described both in Nicias’ letter and in Thucydides’ narrative preceding and 




 Some scholars have taken another passage, 6.49.3, to indicate that one of the 
expedition’s generals envisaged foraging as the major means of provisioning the 
expedition during its siege of Syracuse.  Lamachus, as part of his proposed strategy for 
the expedition at the generals’ conference at Rhegium, stated that if the Athenians 
attacked Syracuse immediately 
εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς πολλοὺς ἀποληφθῆναι ἔξω διὰ τὸ ἀπιστεῖν σφᾶς 
µὴ ἥξειν, καὶ ἐσκοµιζοµένων αὐτῶν τὴν στρατίαν οὐκ ἀπορήσειν χρηµάτων, ἢν 
πρὸς τῇ πόλει κρατοῦσα καθέζεται.  
 
                                                 
219 Thucydides’ use of the term “κακουργήσοντες” to describe the activity the Syracusan cavalry at 
Olympieion were positioned to prevent lends further support to the interpretation of “ἁρπαγὴν” at 7.13.2 
argued for here.  While “κακουργῶ” has the general meaning in classical Greek of inflicting damage on 
property and agriculture (Hanson [1998] 189; this seems to be its primary meaning at 6.7.3), it often takes 
in Thucydides a more precise meaning:  raiding.  Thus, at 2.32.1 and 4.53.3, it describes the activities of 
λῃσταί at sea (cf. 1.8.1-2, where κακοῦργοι and λῃσταὶ are virtual synonyms).  At 2.22.2 and 3.1.2, it is 
used to describe the activities of light-armed troops leaving the Peloponnesian camp to raid the fields and 
properties nearest the city-walls of Athens, in contradistinction to the verbs δῃώω and τέµνω, which are 
used to describe the devastation of Athenian agriculture by the Peloponnesian army as a whole (see, e.g., 
2.21.2, 2.23.1, 2.23.3; 3.1.2).  At 7.19.2, Thucydides states that the purpose of the occupation of the 
Peloponnesian fortification of Deceleia was to dominate the plain and the most fertile parts of the country 
“ἐς τὸ κακουργεῖν.”  Since Thucydides describes the effects of the occupation of Deceleia as the taking of 
booty, and the loss of all the Athenian’ sheep and beasts of burden (7.27.4-5 and cf. p.98 n.208), and 
Alcibiades forecast as one of the effects of the occupation of this site as the capture of most of the property 
in the countryside (“οἷς τε γὰρ ἡ χώρα κατεσκεύσται, τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς ὑµᾶς τὰ µὲν ληφθέντα...”) (6.91.7:  
see Dover [1965a] 92 ad οἷς τε γὰρ ἡ χώρα κατεσκεύσται:  this includes all the tangible means of human 
utilization of the land: farms, livestock, equipment, orchards, slave workers [see 6.91.7ff.], and mines” (cf. 
chapter ii section iic on 2.5.4, 2.14.1), we should take κακουργεῖν at 7.19.2 to be referring to plundering 
raids (and the coincident infliction of damage of Athenian property and agriculture).  (Hanson ([1998)] 
186) is wrong to think 2.22.2, 3.1.2, and 7.19.2 refer primarily to devastation of agriculture (his statement 
that “in many of these cases dêoô or temnô appears nearby in apparent elaboration of the damage inflicted” 
is precisely wrong.)  In light of Thucydidean usage elsewhere, then, “κακουργήσοντες” at 7.4.6 should be 
taken as indicating (primarily) raiding for plunder (this examination of Thucydidean usage and a 
consideration of the whole of 7.4.6 shows that to interpret “κακουργήσοντες” as “search[ing] for provisions” 
(Hanson ([1998] 187) is definitely wrong).  Cf., e.g., the translation of Crawley:  “... a third of the enemy’s 
cavalry being stationed at the little town of Olympieum, to prevent plundering incursions on the part of the 
Athenians at Plemmyrion”; and Smith (Loeb):  “[f]or the Syracusans had posted a third part of their cavalry 






[t]hey might also count upon surprising many in the fields outside, incredulous of 
their coming; and at the moment that the enemy was carrying in his property the 





“χρηµάτων” here has been taken to mean “supplies” or “provisions,” and thus to 
show that Lamachus planned for the expedition to live from foraging while it invested 
Syracuse.
221
   But if we put this passage back into its narrative context, this translation of 
“χρηµάτων” can be shown to be incorrect. 
Lamachus proposed his strategy for the expedition in a conference of the 
Athenian generals at Rhegium after they had just found out that that the Egestans had lied 
to the Athenians, and that the former did not have an abundance of money to provide for 
the support of the expedition (6.8.2), but only thirty talents (6.46.1):  having counted on 
the money of the Egestans to fund the expedition, the expedition was therefore about to 
soon run out of the money it had brought from Athens.  The looming lack of money for 
the expedition and how to resolve this issue was, then, the main problem facing the 
Athenian generals as they made their proposals for the immediate and continuing strategy 
of the expedition.
222
  The surprise attack proposed by Lamachus was designed to address 
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 The translation is Crawley’s, with the exception of the last clause which is Smith’s (Loeb). 
 
221
 See Smith (1913) 96:  “and while they were attempting to carry in (their property) the army would not 
lack supplies, if it encamped under the walls victorious”; Jowett:  “and while the villagers were trying to 
convey their property into the city, their own army, which would be encamped close under the walls, would 
be masters of the field and could have no lack of provisions”; Liebeschutz (1968) 294:  “Lamachus’ 
proposal was intended to save money by bringing matters to a head immediately.  At the beginning they 
would live on the country; the Syracusans would not have time to take their stores into the city”; Jordan 
(2000) 73:  Lamachus aimed to maintain the expedition “and to capture enough Syracusan property with 
which to feed the army”; Hanson (2005) 209:  “Lamachus, as an old veteran of fighting the Spartans in 
Attica who knew something about raiding and plundering, believed that upon arrival the Athenians should 
have immediately scoured the Syracusan countryside to find supplies from the unguarded farms and to shut 
off the city’s access to its vital hinterlands.” 
 
222
 See Jordan (2000) 73:  Nicias’, Alcibiades’, and Lamachus’ “proposals leave no doubt that lack of 




and solve this problem:  the unexpected Athenian attack would prevent a Syracusan 
evacuation of the countryside; the inhabitants of the countryside and their goods would 
be intercepted;
223
 and these could be sold off, so that the expedition “would not be at a 
loss for money” (“τὴν στρατίαν οὐκ ἀπορήσειν χρηµάτων”).  That is, “χρηµάτων” at 
6.49.3 should be taken in its primary and most common meaning in Thucydides—
“money”—and not as “supplies” or “provisions,” meanings for “χρήµατα” that are found 
nowhere else in Thucydides,
224
 nor in the rest of ancient Greek literature.
225
  Lamachus, 
then, in his plan for the capture of Syracuse, did not see the expedition as subsisting on 
foraging, but planned that the sale of property plundered from the unexpected attack on 
the Syracusan countryside would finance the expedition’s siege of the city.
226
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
223 See Dover, HCT iv.315 ad loc.:  “when the Athenians had landed, the Syracusans would attempt a 
belated evacuation of the countryside, but their attempt to get themselves and their property (χρήµατα) into 
the city would be intercepted by the Athenians.”  We should understand this to be the intention of 
Lamachus’ proposal, even if ἐσκοµιζοµένων is used absolutely here (Classen-Steup, vi.109 ad loc., citing 
2.18.4 as a parallel). 
 
224
 See LSJ, ‘χρῆµα.’ 
 
225
 See esp. (contra Smith (1913) 96 ad 6.49.3) 7.24.2, where “χρήµατα” is distinguished from “σῖτος” in 
Thucydides’ description of the merchants’ property lost with the capture of Plemmyrion.  If 
Lamachus(/Thucydides) had really intended to mean that the expedition would not be at a loss for 
provisions, he simply could have said so:  cf. 6.33.5, where Hermocrates speaks of large expeditions 
potentially having to abandon operations “δι’ ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων.”  Note that “χρηµάτων” at 6.49.3 
has also been taken by scholars to mean “property” or “goods,” a meaning it does have elsewhere in 
Thucydides:  see esp. Classen/Steup vi.110 ad χρηµάτων at 6.49.3:  “nicht bloß Geld, sondern in der 
allgemeinen Bedeutung von Gut jeder Art, wie Thuk. das Wort auch c. 97.5; 1.49.5; 3.74.2; 7.24.2, 7.25.1 
gebraucht hat.”  (At 6.97.5, however, “χρήµασιν” should be taken to mean “money” and not “property” 
(Hornblower, CT iii.526)).  See also Freeman:  “[m]any, not fully believing that the Athenians were 
coming, would not yet have sought shelter in the city. They would be made prisoners in the open country, 
and their property would be useful”; Dover, HCT iv.315; Hanson (1998) 104 n.1.  But this translation is, if 
its logic is pursued, nonsensical:  how could the expedition ever be or have been at a loss for pieces of 
domestic architecture or farm implements? 
 
226
 See therefore Crawley’s translation (quoted above in the main text) for the sense in which we should 




Towards the end of the campaign, another Athenian general also envisaged the 
funding of the expedition through plunder.  After the night attack on Epipolae had ended 
in disaster, the Athenian generals deliberated about the expedition’s chances of achieving 
its aim of the capture of Syracuse; these seemed increasingly dim since, in addition to the 
failed attempt on Epipolae, the men were suffering badly with malaria.  Demosthenes’ 
final contribution to the deliberations was to state that he would not agree at all to 
continue the siege, but  
εἰ δὲ δεῖ µὴ ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιὰν ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων ψηφίσµατος, ἀλλὰ τρίβειν 
αὐτοῦ, ἔφη χρῆναι ἢ ἐς τὴν Θάψον ἀναστάντας τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ἐς τὴν Κατάνην, 
ὅθεν τῷ τε πεζῷ ἐπὶ πολλὰ τῆς χώρας ἐπιόντες θρέψονται πορθοῦντες τὰ τῶν 
πολεµίων καὶ ἐκείνους βλάψουσι...  
 
if they could not lead the army home without a vote of the Athenians, but must 
stay on in Sicily, he said that they should do this only after removing to Thapsus 
or Catana.  From this new base they could overrun with their army large tracts of 
the country and support themselves by plundering the enemy’s property, and at 




                                                                                                                                                 
point out—if they acted quickly, and established themselves in a dominant position outside Syracuse, they 
stood to collect some quick, easily negotiable loot:  many of the Syracusans, large landowners in particular, 
would be cut off on their country estates before they could transfer their goods and chattels for safe-keeping 
within the walls.”  Cf. Hobbes:  “[a]nd that it was likely that many men might be cut off in the villages 
without, as not believing they would come; and though they should be already gotten in, yet the army, 
being master of the field and sitting down before the city, could want no money...”  (Note that unexpected 
attacks on cities and other settlements are also associated with the taking of much plunder in other passages 
in Thucydides, Herodotus, and Xenophon:  see p.139 n.63 below.)  It should be noted that Thucydides 
thought that Lamachus’ plan to take Syracuse had an excellent chance of success:  see 6.63.2 and 7.42.3 
with Dover (1988) and (e.g.) Morris (2001) 71; Stahl (2003) 183; Hornblower, CT iii.622-623. 
 
227
 The translation is taken from the Loeb, with the exception of “plundering the enemy’s property” for the 
Loeb’s “by ravaging the enemy’s property.”  Demosthenes continued “ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐν πελάγει καὶ οὐκ ἐν 
στενοχωρίᾳ, ἣ πρὸς τῶν πολεµίων µᾶλλόν ἐστι, τοὺς ἀγῶνας ποιήσονται, ἀλλ’ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ, ἐν ᾗ τά τε 
τῆς ἐµπειρίας χρήσιµα σφῶν ἔσται καὶ ἀναχωρήσεις καὶ ἐπίπλους οὐκ ἐκ βραχέος καὶ περιγράπτου 
ὁρµώµενοί τε καὶ καταίροντες ἕξουσιν,” “while the fleet would have the open sea to fight in, that is to say, 
instead of a narrow space which was all in the enemy’s favour, a wide sea room where their skills would be 
of use, and where they could retreat or advance without being confined or circumscribed either when they 





The verb “πορθοῦντες” is the key term here.  “πορθῶ” (and its compounds) has a primary 
meaning of “to destroy,”
 228
 from which came its most common meaning in classical 
Greek historians: “to plunder.”  It is most often used by Thucydides in this sense, and 
especially to refer to the sacking of poleis and other settlements.
229
  Thucydides also uses 
πορθῶ (and διαπορθῶ), however, to refer to the plundering of countryside (which 
produces booty),
230
 and this should be taken to be the meaning of “πορθοῦντες” in this 
passage.
231
   
                                                 
228
 See LSJ, ‘πορθέω.’  Cf. 6.102.2: In the fighting before Syracuse in the summer of 414, the Syracusans 
took and thoroughly destroyed (“αἱροῦσι καὶ διεπόρθησαν”) the Athenian outwork of ten plethra. 
 
229
 The plundering of poleis:  1.73.4 (Peloponnesian poleis); 2.56.6 (Prasiae); 3.33.2 (Ionian poleis); 3.57.2 
(Plataia); 7.29.4 (plundering of houses and temples within the polis of Mycalessus).  The plundering of 
other settlements: 2.80.8 (Limnaea, a village); 3.7.2 (χωρία on the coast of the Peloponnese).  (πορθῶ does 
not refer to agricultural devastation at 1.73.4 or 3.7.2, contra Hanson [1998] 187 n.3.)  See also 8.28.3: the 
Peloponnesians, on taking Iasus, plundered it thoroughly and took much property there, “καὶ τὴν Ἴασον 
διεπόρθησαν καὶ χρήµατα πάνυ πολλὰ ἡ στρατιὰ ἔλαβεν,”for the place was one of ancient wealth (cf. 
8.36.1).  Note that Thucydides also uses “ἐκπορθῶ” twice to refer to the sacking of poleis:  4.57.3 (Thyrea), 
8.41.2 (Cos Meropis). 
 
230 Where there is sufficient context to tell, this is, with one exception (see next note), the meaning of 
πορθῶ when Thucydides uses the term to describe military operations in the countryside.  See esp. 2.93.4 
with 2.94.3:  the Peloponnesians, attacking Salamis with a surprise night attack, take the Athenian fort 
there, towed off the triremes empty, and surprising the inhabitants began to plunder the rest of Salamis, 
“τήν τε ἄλλην Σαλαµῖνα ἀπροσδοκήτοις ἐπιπεσόντες ἐπόρθουν”; on becoming aware of approaching relief 
from Athens, the Peloponnesians, after they had overrun most of Salamis, hastily sailed off with their 
plunder and captives, “οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι... καταδραµόντες τῆς Σαλαµῖνος τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ 
λείαν λαβόντες...”  See also 8.57.1 (with chapter ii section iv):  Tissaphernes afraid that the Peloponnesian 
sailors, in their search for money for subsistence, might plunder the mainland (“πορθήσωσι τὴν ἤπειρον”).  
See, too, 8.24.6:  some of the Chians tried to bring the city over to the Athenians, since their city was shut 
in by sea and plundered by land, “εἰργοµένοις οὖν αὐτοῖς τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ κατὰ γῆν πορθουµένοις...”  That 
this refers to plundering (rather than the foraging) of the countryside can be seen from 8.40.1 (the raids on 
the chora of Chios are being plundered by raids “καὶ κατὰ γῆν λῃστείαις πορθουµένην”) and esp. from 
8.24.3: the Athenians, having defeated the Chians a couple of times in the field (with the result that the 
Chians ceased to meet them in the field), “οἱ δὲ τὴν χώραν καλῶς κατεσκευασµένην καὶ ἀπαθῆ οὖσαν ἀπὸ 
τῶν Μηδικῶν µέχρι τότε διεπορθήσαν...,” “plundered the chora, which was well stocked and had been 
unharmed from the Persian wars down to that time.”  See again p.102 and n.219 above:  the term 
“κατεσκευασµένην” should be taken to indicate all the tangible means of human utilization of the land: 
farms, livestock, equipment, orchards, slave workers, and mines; the context clearly shows, then, that 
πορθῶ and διαπορθῶ at 8.24.3, 8.24.6, and 8.40.1 should be taken to refer to Athenian plundering raids 
targeting the property of the Chians in their chora (contra Hanson [1998] 189).  Hanson cites Tuplin (1986) 
for “the clear sense that portheô and its compounds refer either generally to attack or more particularly to 




That this is the meaning of “πορθοῦντες” here and 7.49.3 shows that Demosthenes 
was proposing to fund the expedition during the rest of its operations in Sicily through 
the profits of plunder can be seen to be true if we examine his first and Nicias’ 
contributions to the debate on the future course of the expedition after the defeat on 
Epipolae.  Speaking first, Demosthenes had argued for an immediate withdrawal while 
the expedition still had some naval superiority, because the Athenians had greater need of 
the forces of the expedition in the war against the Peloponnesians and because Syracuse 
would be now harder to capture (7.47.3-4); furthermore, he urged that “it was not right 
that [the Athenians] should continue the siege and spend a great deal of money to no 
purpose,” “οὐδ’ αὖ ἄλλως χρήµατα πολλὰ δαπανῶντας εἰκὸς εἶναι προσκαθῆσθαι” 
(7.47.4).  Nicias, although acknowledging the miserable situation of the expedition, 
disagreed with Demosthenes.  He argued that the Athenians should remain before 
Syracuse since, among other reasons, he had received information that the Syracusans’ 
situation would be soon worse than theirs if the siege continued, as the Athenians would 
                                                                                                                                                 
πορθῶ and its compounds in classical Greek historians, Tuplin ([1986] 332-333) only deals with the term 
“ἐκπορθῶ,” and only in Diodorus, whose use of πορθῶ is much looser than Thucydides’, Herodotus’, or 
Xenophon’s, and can mean simply “ravaging” (see, e.g., 12.65, 13.73.5-6 for this meaning (and πορθῶ and 
δῃώω apparently used for the same activity)).  Finally, the actions described by πορθῶ may sometimes have 
included some stealing of provisions (cf., e.g., Xen., Anab. 7.7.3, 5, 12; Xen., Hell. 6.5.27), but this would 
always have been incidental to the main activity of plundering. 
 
231 As noted, πορθῶ does connote destruction as well as plundering.  In this sense, Thucydides once uses 
the verb δῃώω for the same action which he also describes with πορθῶ.  See 3.79.3:  in the summer of 427, 
the Peloponnesians refraining from attacking the city of Corcyra, “but they landed upon the promontory of 
Leukimme and plundered the fields,” “ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν Λευκίµµην τὸ ἀκρωτήριον ἀποβάντες ἐπόρθουν τοὺς 
ἀγροὺς...”  At 3.80.2, this action is described as “δῃώσαντες τὴν γῆν” (see Jackson [1969] 13 and n.12).  
πορθῶ and δῃώω, however, normally refer in Thucydides to two distinct activities:  plundering (for booty) 
as opposed to ravaging (see Jackson [1969] 12-13).  (Thus Hornblower (CT iii.639) is incorrect to cite 1.96 
to support a translation of “πορθοῦντες τὰ τῶν πολεµίων” at 7.49.2 as ‘ravaging the enemy’s territory’; the 
verb used at 1.96 is δῃώω, not πορθῶ (see Jackson [1969] passim).)  Most importantly, at 7.49.2, 
πορθοῦντες is accompanied by a verb which explicitly describes the ravaging activity of destruction alone 
(“βλάψουσι”) and so should be taken here to mean strictly “plundering” (cf. Hanson [1998] 188; thus the 





then “wear out the Syracusans by lack of money” (“χρήµατων γὰρ ἀπορίᾳ αὐτοὺς 
ἐκτρυχώσειν”)
232
 (especially since the arrival of the second expeditionary force from 
Athens had strengthened their naval superiority) (7.48.2).  Nicias elaborated later in his 
speech upon the desperate financial situation of the Syracusans: 
τά τε Συρακοσίων ἔφη ὅµως ἔτι ἥσσω τῶν σφετέρων εἶναι· καὶ χρήµασι γὰρ 
αὐτοὺς ξενοτροφοῦντας καὶ ἐν περιπολίοις ἅµα ἀναλίσκοντας καὶ ναυτικὸν πολὺ 
ἔτι ἐνιαυτὸν ἤδη βόσκοντας τὰ µὲν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ δ’ ἔτι ἀµηχανήσειν· δισχίλιά τε 
γὰρ τάλαντα ἤδη ἀνηλωκέναι καὶ ἔτι πολλὰ προσοφείλειν, ἤν τε καὶ ὁτιοῦν 
ἐκλίπωσι τῆς νῦν παρασκευῆς τῷ µὴ διδόναι τροφήν, φθερεῖσθαι αὐτῶν τὰ 
πράγµατα, ἐπικουρικὰ µᾶλλον ἢ δι’ ἀνάγκης ὥσπερ τὰ σφέτερα ὄντα.  τρίβειν 
οὖν ἔφη χρῆναι προσκαθηµένους καὶ µὴ χρήµασιν, οἷς πολὺ κρείσσους εἰσί, 
νικηθέντας ἀπιέναι. 
 
And as bad as their own situation was, that of the Syracusans, he said, was still 
worse; for in point of money, since they were supporting a mercenary force and 
at the same time bearing the expense of patrol guard-posts,
233
 and had now for a 
year been maintaining a large fleet besides, and hereafter would be quite without 
resources; indeed, they had spent 2,000 talents already and were in debt for many 
talents more,
234
 and if they should lose any portion whatsoever of their present 
force by not being able to pay for its maintenance,
235
 their cause would be ruined, 
since it depended upon mercenary troops and had not, like their own, the backing 
of necessity. [6] They ought, therefore, he concluded, to stay on and continue the 





                                                 
232
 Crawley’s translation; Smith’s (Loeb) translation of this clause, “for they would wear the enemy out by 
cutting off his supplies,” is incorrect. 
 
233
 Cf. 6.45:  these had been manned in preparation for the invasion of the Athenians. 
 
234
 It is a nice question as to who the Syracusans were in debt to. 
 
235
 See Dover (1965b) 41:  “τροφή, ‘sustenance’, is commonly used of the pay on which a soldier or sailor 
supports himself.  Nikias’ point is that if Syracuse cannot pay the forces of her allies they will go home.” 
 
236 See also 7.49.1:  since Nicias had accurate knowledge of affairs in Syracuse, he spoke confidently of the 





Financial considerations were thus at the forefront of the generals’ thinking when 
they made their cases for how the expedition should proceed.
237
  Demosthenes’ final 
proposal at 7.49.2, then, was made not only to address the strategic problems of the 
expedition,
238
 but also to stop the outlay of money from Athens on the expedition.  If 
Demosthenes’ proposal had been followed, that is, the expedition would have been 
financed from the profits of the sale of plunder. 
 
Lamachus’ and Demosthenes’ plans to fund the expedition through the capture 
and sale of booty were feasible;
239
 events during the expedition demonstrated that it was, 
in fact, possible to raise large amounts of money in Sicily from the sale of plunder.  
When the expedition was underfunded in the late summer of 415, because of the 
deception of the Egestans, the Athenians obtained sufficient money to finance the 
expedition through capturing Hyccara and enslaving its inhabitants; the sale of the 
Hyccarans at Catana raised 120 talents (6.62.3-4).
240
  The Sicilian expedition, then, not 
                                                 
237
 Cf. Kallet (2001) 156-157:  “[j]ust as Demosthenes had employed financial arguments—and even here it 
is not that they lack the resources but that they should not be wasted—as support for an evacuation, Nikias 
responds to Demosthenes with financial considerations as well (namely, that the Syracusans would be worn 
out by a lack of money should the Athenians persevere in the siege), which he brings up toward the 
beginning of his speech given in oratio obliqua (48.2).  He returns to the same topic at much greater length 
at its end (48.5)...” 
 
238
 By moving to Thapsus or Catana, the expedition would no longer be so susceptible to attacks from 
Syracusan cavalry and light-armed troops. 
 
239
 Note that Eurymedon agreed with Demosthenes’ proposals (7.49.3) and that the expedition stayed only 
because Nicias objected and it was suspected that he had positive information to underlie this objection 
(7.49.4).  Note again, too, that Thucydides thought that Lamachus’ plan had an excellent plan of success 
(see above p.105 n.226). 
 
240
 Cf. Westlake (1968) 179:  the decision to use the fleet to transport the Hyccarans to Catana, which 
meant that it could not be used against Selinus, “confirms that the financial needs of the Athenians were 




only depended on markets for its provisioning, but also depended for some months—and 
could be envisaged by its generals as depending for some time—on markets to provide its 
funding through the sale and purchase of plunder. 
 
 v. Thucydides’ narrative of the Sicilian expedition and grain markets in Sicily and 
Italy 
 
 The Sicilian expedition operated in a world of markets.  On their way to (and 
around) Sicily, the Athenians and their allies touched at coastal poleis that were all 
capable of providing markets sufficient to feed the passing expedition.  Once established 
in Sicily, the 30,000 to 50,000 men who constituted the expedition subsisted for roughly 
two years on grain imported by merchants from nearby friendly states in Sicily and 
Italy.
241
  It was taken for granted by the Athenians at all points in the planning and 
(actual) operations of the campaign that the enormous force sent out from Athens could 
                                                                                                                                                 
(7.13.2).  Note also that, after the destruction of the expedition, private raiding activities by just one 
Athenian cavalryman based at Catana raised just over five talents:  see [Lys.] 20.24 (more than 30 mnai 
were paid as a tithe to Athena from the raids carried out from Catana by the son of Polystratus (who was 
back in Athens by 410, when the speech was delivered (Dover, HCT iv.460)); the total of the proceeds from 
the sale of the booty he took were therefore just over five talents). 
 
241
 30,000-50,000 men:  see appendix 2.  Roughly two years:  that is, from when the expedition first 
established a base of operations at Catana in the fall of 415 until the destruction of the expedition in the late 
fall of 413.  Thucydides states that the fleet departed for Sicily “θέρους µεσοῦντος ἤδη” (6.30.1):  this 
expression means ‘after the middle period of the summer had begun’ and “could be used of any date 
between early May and late July” (Dover, HCT iv.271).  Opinions on the date of the expedition’s departure 
have varied widely (see the summary at Bloedow [1993] 121), but Bloedow has made a convincing case for 
a date somewhere in July of 415 ([1993] 121-122).  Since it is not possible to estimate with any certainty 
the time required for the voyage from Athens to Rhegium, or the time taken for the operations described at 
6.50-52 or at 6.62 (see Dover, HCT iv.272-273), it is impossible to come up with a date any more precise 
than somewhere between late July and late September 415 for the first establishment of a base at Catana.  
The Athenian generals had probably just sent to Catana to tell that polis to stop sending grain (7.60.2) when 
the lunar eclipse of 27 August, 413 took place (see 7.50.4 with Hornblower, CT iii.642 for the date).  The 
expedition was destroyed somewhere between this latter date and the end of October 413 (Thucydides 
records its destruction towards the end of his summer:  see Dover, HCT iv.272:  “[t]he end of the 





and would depend for its food supplies on markets provided by poleis and merchants;
242
 
no other means of acquisition of supplies, whether foraging or requisitioning from allies, 
assumed any importance in the provisioning of the expedition. 
 We cannot, however, use this information to build a (robust) model of the grain 
market in Sicily and Italy in the late fifth century.  The impossibility of determining 
precisely the numbers of combatants and non-combatants taking part in the expedition (as 
well as the length of the operations in Sicily) means that the possible margins in error in 
calculating the total grain consumption of the participants in the expedition are too great 
to construct such a model.
243
  This is quite apart from the fact that we only have the 
roughest of indications from Thucydides of where the expedition’s grain was imported 
from during its operations.  It appears to have been imported primarily from Italy (“τὰ 
τρέφοντα ἡµᾶς χωρία τῆς Ἰταλίας” (7.14.3) (cf. 6.103.2)), but Thucydides does not 
specify from which regions or states there.  It seems unlikely, too, that Catana was the 
only Sicilian polis that exported grain to the expedition:  surely grain was sent from the 
other poleis friendly to the expedition (Naxos, Egesta, and perhaps the unknown “other 
                                                 
242
 Again, markets provided by poleis in the region and by merchants from poleis in the region; it bears 
repeating, in the light of previous work on the provisioning of the Sicilian expedition, that at no point in his 




 On the impossibility of calculating precisely the numbers of men taking part in (the Athenian side on) 
the Sicilian campaign, see appendix 2.  Models for relatively small economic systems such as the Greek far 
west and the Aegean are difficult to construct:  systems such as these are too small to make arguments 
based on orders of magnitude, since even small errors in estimating consumption can lead to wildly 
incorrect (final) models.  See Morris (1994a) 361 on the problems of modeling the economy of classical 
Athens:  “[b]ut it has proved more difficult to build models for Athens than for Rome.  Because we are 
dealing with a smaller system, disagreements over parameters are more problematic:  models of the 
Athenian economy are simply less robust than those of Rome.  Errors of ± 15 percent in estimating 
population or production would have little impact on the overall shape of Hopkins’ models of the Roman 
economy, but for Athens they are devastating... Relatively minor changes to the numbers totally transform 
the models.  This does not prevent us from evaluating theories... but it does mean that we depend more on 





states” which supplied cavalry to the Athenians in the summer of 414 (6.98.1)), too.  
There is also the obvious and important problem that Thucydides never provides any 
indication as to what type of grain was being bought by the Athenians and their allies in 
the far west.
244
  Although Sicily is better suited to wheat production than ‘mainland’ 
Greece, the scholarly orthodoxy that saw classical Greek Sicily solely as a place of wheat 
monoculture has now been successfully deconstructed, and there is increasing evidence 
for barley production and consumption in Sicily in the classical period.
245
  In Italy, barley 
was the predominant cereal cultivated at Metapontum, and barley (at least) was grown at 
Cumae, too, in the classical period.
246
  It is possible, therefore, that, just as in 
contemporary campaigns in the Aegean, the men on the Sicilian expedition ate (mostly) 
ἄλφιτα,
247
 but certainty on this point is impossible. 
                                                 
244
 Diodorus states that the Athenian prisoners kept captive in the stone-quarries at Syracuse received two 
kotylai of “ἀλφίτων” (13.19.4), and Plutarch states that they received the same amount, but of “κριθῶν” 
(Nic. 29.1).  But, since both Diodorus’ and Plutarch’s accounts are merely elaborations of Thucydides’, 
which states that the prisoners received two kotylai of “σίτου” (7.87.2), they have no independent evidential 
value (in any case, rations given to prisoners would not be representative of usual consumption habits):  see 
Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 61. 
 
245
 See de Angelis (2006) 31, 39-41 for a summary of recent research with references.  Note, however, that 
“[a]t present there is no evidence on how Katane [Catana] made use of its territory” (de Angelis [2000] 
130, and see full discussion at [2000] 129-130). 
 
246
 On Metapontum, see, e.g., Carter (1980) 10-11, 13 (I am grateful to David Yoon for this reference).  
Barley is on the classical coins of Metapontum and Cumae (Lacroix [1965] 109).  At Umbro, a late fifth to 
fourth century small rural Greek site a few kilometers from the coast about halfway between Locri and 
Rhegium, the only identified bits of grain through the 2005 archeological season were one of free-threshing 
wheat and one of barley (there were seven unidentified cerealia):  Yoon (2006). 
 
247





For all of these reasons,
248
 then, it is impossible to use the information derived 
from Thucydides’ narrative of the Sicilian expedition to construct a model of the grain 
market(s) in Sicily and Italy at this time.  While acknowledging this, we can still use the 
information gleaned from Thucydides’ narrative to make some interesting ‘back of an 
envelope’ calculations which, however imprecise, still have important and indicative 
results.  Taking a figure of 30,000 men for the expedition—and this figure is definitely 
too low for the first year, and almost definitely too low for its second
249
—it will have 
needed to import a minimum of just over 450,000 medimnoi of barley-flour per year, (or 
nearly seven and a half thousand tons of wheat equivalent) per year for the men to have 
received adequate sustenance.
250
  I should emphasize that these figures are (probably far) 
too low for the amount of grain actually transported by traders to the expedition:  again, 
there were definitely more than 30,000 men on the expedition (at least in its first year); in 
addition, large amounts of grain meant for the expedition will have been spoiled as a 
result of inadequate storage (either during transportation to the Athenian base of 
operations or while stored there).
251
  When these figures are put into the context of the 
                                                 
248
 We might add that Thucydides (naturally) (nor any of the later accounts of the Sicilian expedition 
(again, naturally)) does not provide any information on the organization of production of the grain 
consumed by the expedition, or on the institutional and physical infrastructure that underlay the markets in 
which grain was sold to the expedition; all of this could be assumed by Thucydides to have been known to 
his audience (which is significant in itself). 
 
249
 See appendix 2. 
 
250
 Taking one choinix of wheat or two choinikes of barley-flour as the usual daily rates of consumption of 
these foods in classical Greece:  see appendix 3.  The figure for wheat equivalent (for definition of this 
term, see appendix 3 section iii) is actually 7,416,900kg.  There is no reason to think that the members of 
the Sicilian expedition were not receiving adequate sustenance at any point during the operations in Sicily 
before the decision to send to Catana to tell that polis to stop the export of provisions. 
 
251





few numbers we have for the grain trade and grain production in the Greek world, 
however, they are striking.  Athens in the mid-fourth century imported 800,000 medimnoi 
of grain per annum to meet its population’s subsistence needs;
252
 in 329/8, its own 
chora—at about 2,500 km
2
, the second largest in ‘mainland’ Greece behind Sparta’s
253
—
produced 339,925 medimnoi of barley and 27,062.5 of wheat.
254
  At some point in the ten 
years before 323, Cyrene, which possessed one of the largest chorai in the Greek 
world,
255
 donated 1,207,500 medimnoi of wheat to forty-one Greek states throughout the 
Aegean and western Greece, and to the mother (Olympias of Macedonia) and sister 
                                                 
252
 To take Dem. 20.31-32 at face value.  Demosthenes states in this passage that as much grain came to 
Athens from the Pontus as from all other areas of Athenian supply put together (20.31), and then states that 
400,000 medimnoi of grain came from Pontus (20.32).  Demosthenes supports the figure of 400,000 
medimnoi from the Pontus with a reference to documentary evidence (the records of the sitophylakes); we 
can accept with certainty, then, that Athens imported 400,000 medimnoi from the Bosporus per annum 
(rather than one year:  see Moreno [2007] 32 n.185 contra Garnsey [1988] 97, [1999] 194).  Demosthenes 
does not, however, cite any documentary evidence for the claim that half of Athens’ imports came from 
there; this latter claim is therefore less secure than the first (see again Garnsey [1988] 97, [1999] 194).  It 
seems to me hypercritical, however, to reject this passage as evidence for the amounts of grain imported to 
Athens from areas other than the Pontus (see, e.g., again Garnsey [ibid.]); the order of magnitude must be 
roughly right and, if anything, to convince his audience of his case and the importance of the connection 
with the Bosporus, Demosthenes may have overestimated rather than underestimated the proportion of 
grain coming from the northern Black Sea (see Bresson [2000] 278 n.66).  Demosthenes speaks at 20.31-32 
of “σίτος,” which has often been taken by scholars to mean wheat.  As Gallo points out ([1983] 462 n.15), 
however, σίτος in the classical period denotes both wheat and barley:  it is therefore impossible to be 
certain as to how many of the 800,000 medimnoi mentioned by Demosthenes were of wheat, and how many 
of barley(-meal).  Note in this respect that it can be implied that substantial amounts of ἄλφιτα were 
imported to Athens in the late fifth century (at least) from the scholia to Aristoph., Ach. 548 (the Great Stoa 
in the Piraeus was also called the ‘Stoa Alphitopolis’:  see Garnsey [1988] 99 n.27 for this point). 
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 1672, with Garnsey (1988) 98 for collation of the figures from Attica. It has been argued that the 
figures reported in IG II
2
 1672 represent ‘a bad year,’ but certainty on this issue is impossible (see Scheidel 
[1999] 196-197 for discussion and summary of the competing positions on this issue; it should be noted 
that the arguments for the ‘bad year’ hypothesis are informed by and part of larger arguments wishing to 
maximize grain production in Attica and thus minimize the importance of grain imports into Athens (see, 
e.g., esp. Garnsey [1999] 183-195). 
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(Cleopatra of Epirus) of Alexander.
256
  Mytilene, one of the largest and most important 
poleis in the Aegean outside of Athens,
257
 appears to have been importing something 
more than 100,000 medimnoi of grain per year around 350.
258
  But a relatively minor 
polis such as Aphytis could subsist in the 420s, it seems, importing a maximum of 10,000 
medimnoi of grain per year.
259
  
 The examination of the provisioning of the Sicilian expedition introduces 
therefore an important and striking new figure for grain imports into the bleak evidential 
landscape for the trade in grain in the classical Greek world.  It provides evidence for an 
important and substantial trade in grain around Italy and Sicily, a phenomenon otherwise 
(almost) unattested for the fifth century.
260
  It shows, in sum, a world where the 
development of marketing structures and networks of merchants was sufficiently strong 
                                                 
256
 SEG IX 2+ = Tod II, 19.  See Garnsey (1988) 160 (with Horden and Purcell [2000] Map 8) for the list of 
contributions in tabular form (the contributions of grain were measured in the Aiginetan standard, which 
should be multiplied by 1.5 to be converted to the Attic-Euboic standard):  Athens was the largest recipient 
of grain, receiving 150,000 medimnoi of wheat; Corinth and Argos the next largest (of the poleis), receiving 
75,000 medimnoi.  See also Garnsey (1988) 158-162 for discussion of the donations from Cyrene.  See 
IACP ad loc. 
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 62: the Athenians allow the Aphytaeans to import up to 10,000 medimnoi.  See IACP 825. 
 
260
 3.86.4 provides the only other irrefutable evidence of a trade in Sicilian grain in the fifth century:  
Thucydides comments that the Athenians sent their first expedition to Sicily in 427 on the pretext of aiding 
the Leontines against Syracuse in response to their plea of shared Ionian descent, but in reality to prevent 
the exportation of Sicilian grain to the Peloponnese (“βουλόµενοι δὲ µήτε σῖτον ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον 
ἄγεσθαι αὐτόθεν...”) and to test the possibility of bringing Sicily into subjection.  There is no evidence of 
imports of Sicilian or Italian grain to Athens in the fifth century (Garnsey [1988] 128-129).  The mentions 
in Dionysus of Halicarnassus and Livy (and other later authors) of Roman frumentationes being granted by 
Sicilian tyrants in the early and late fifth century (see references at Fantasia [1993] 9-11) are of dubious 





to permit an invading amphibious force which could be likened to a polis,
261
 and which in 
fact had a population as large as any polis’ outside of Athens and Syracuse, and perhaps 
as large as these cities,
262
 to get its food through markets for years at a time. 
 
 The crews of the Syracusan navy also relied on purchasing in a market for their 
provisions, as Thucydides’ description of a ruse which laid the basis for the Syracusans’ 
first clear naval success over the Athenians in the summer of 413 makes clear: 
καὶ ἀντικαταστάντες ταῖς ναυσὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον αὖθις ἐπὶ πολὺ διῆγον τὴς 
ἡµέρας πειρώµενοι ἀλλήλων, πρὶν δὴ Ἀρίστων ὁ Πυρρίχου Κορίνθιος, ἄριστος ὢν 
κυβερνήτης τῶν µετὰ Συρακοσίων, πείθει τοὺς σφετέρους τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἄρχοντας, 
πέµψαντας ὡς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιµελοµένους κελεύειν ὅτι τάχιστα τὴν ἀγορὰν 
τῶν πωλουµένων ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν µεταστῆσαι κοµίσαντες, καὶ ὅσα τις ἔχει 
ἐδώδιµα, πάντας ἐκεῖσε φέροντας ἀναγκάσαι πωλεῖν, ὅπως αὐτοῖς ἐκβιβάσαντες 
τοὺς ναύτας εὐθὺς παρὰ τὰς ναῦς ἀριστοποιήσωνται καὶ δι’ ὀλίγου αὖθις καὶ 
αὐθηµερὸν ἀπροσδοκήτοις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρῶσιν.  Καὶ οἱ µν πεισθέντες 
ἔπεµψαν ἄγγελον, καὶ ἡ ἀγορὰ παρασκευάσθη, καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐξαίφνης 
πρύµναν κρουσάµενοι πάλιν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔπλευσαν, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκβάντες αὐτοῦ 
ἄριστον ἐποιοῦντο· οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι νοµίσαντες αὐτοὺς ὡς ἡσσηµένους σφῶν πρὸς 
τὴν πόλιν ἀνακρούσασθαι, καθ’ ἡσυχίαν ἐκβάντες τά τε ἄλλα διεπράσσοντο καὶ 
τὰ ἀµφὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὡς τῆς γε ἡµέρας ταύτης οὐκέτι οἰόµενοι ἂν ναυµαχῆσαι.  
ἐξαίφνης δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πληρώσαντες τὰς ναῦς ἐπέπλεον αὖθις· οἱ δὲ διὰ 
πολλοῦ θορύβου καὶ ἄσιτοι οἱ πλείους οὐδενὶ κόσµῳ ἐσβάντες µόλις ποτὲ 
ἀντανήγοντο.  
 
... a great part of the day the [Athenians and Syracusans] spent as before, 
confronting and skirmishing with each other; until at last Ariston son of 
                                                 
261
 For the idea of the Sicilian expedition as a polis in Thucydides, see esp. 7.77.4-9 with Mossé (1963) 
(better than Hornblower [2004]).  For the ‘expedition as city’ motif generally in Thucydides (and other 
classical authors), see Gomme, HCT i.456-457 ad 1.142.3; Mossé (1963); Hornblower (2004); Greenwood 
(2006) 97-98.  Cf. Jones (1987) 46 on the logistics of ancient armies:  “[a]n army gathered together for a 
campaign was comparable to a town:  it had a dense population and did not produce its own provisions.  
But, unlike a town, it had neither a preexisting transportation network nor any established pattern of local 
suppliers for its various needs.” 
 
262
 See, e.g., Morris (2001) 26 for Athens and Syracuse being the most populous cities in the Greek world 
in the fifth century.  Referencing Muggia (1997) and de Angelis (2000), Morris also states (ibid.) that fifth 
century Sicily probably had half a dozen cities with populations of 40,000-50,000 inhabitants.  But the 
works of Muggia and de Angelis fail for the reasons outlined above at p.100-101 n.242:  the amount of 
probabilistic (and sometimes more or less baseless) assumptions each scholar has to make to produce their 
estimates of population size render those estimates nothing more than guesswork.  See also Erdkamp 





Pyrrhikos, a Corinthian, the ablest helmsman in the Syracusan service, persuaded 
their naval commanders to send to the officials in the city, and tell them to move 
the market as quickly as they could down to the sea, and oblige everyone to bring 
whatever edibles he had and sell them there, thus enabling the commanders to 
land the crews and dine at once close to the ships, and shortly afterwards, the 
same day, to attack the Athenians again when they were not expecting it. [7.40.1] 
In compliance with this advice a messenger was sent and the market got ready, 
upon which the Syracusans suddenly backed water and withdrew to the city, and 
immediately landed and took their dinner upon the spot; [2] while the Athenians, 
supposing that they had returned to the city because they felt they were beaten, 
disembarked at their leisure and set about getting their dinners and about their 
other occupations, under the impression that they had done with fighting for that 
day. [3] Suddenly the Syracusans manned their ships and again sailed against 
them; and the Athenians, in great confusion and most of them hungry, got on 
board, and with great difficulty put out to meet them. (7.39.2-7.40.3)
263 
 
It is apparent from Thucydides’ description of the ruse that the crews of the Syracusan 
navy normally purchased their food in the “ἡ ἀγορὰ τῶν πωλουµένων,” i.e. in the 
Syracusan agora, and that it was only in the singular context of Ariston’s suggestion that 
the stores of all the residents of Syracuse were for sale (as opposed to just the 
retailers’),
264
 and the Syracusan agora moved from its normal location down to the sea.
265
  
That is, the 16,000 men or so who constituted the Syracusan navy at this time usually 
obtained their food through purchase in the agora of the city.
266
  The fact that so many 
men could provision themselves in the regular Syracusan agora for a period upwards of a 
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 The translation is Crawley’s. 
 
264 See Dover (1965b) 30 ad 7.39.2, ‘τὴν ἀγορὰν τῶν πωλουµένων’:  “lit., ‘the market of things (sc. 
normally) sold’, clearly distinguished from (lit.) ‘whatever edibles one has’, which would be the private 
stores of individuals, not normally for sale.”  Cf. Dover (1965b) 30 ad 7.39.2, ‘ὅπως αὐτοῖς κτλ.’:  “αὐτοῖς 
refers to all the people who would then be selling food,” i.e. retailers and private individuals alike (see 
Dover, HCT iv.417). 
 
265
 Note also that the capacity of the regular agora of the Syracusans to feed the men crewing the Syracusan 
triremes is not in question here: the point of the ruse was that the supply of greater than usual amounts of 
food in the market would shorten the time the men would need to buy and prepare their food. 
 
266
 The Syracusan fleet comprised 80 triremes at this time:  see 7.22.1 and 7.37.3.  It remained around this 







 points to the presence of robust commercial grain supply and distribution 
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 The fleet had been maintained on a large scale for a year (very roughly):  see 7.7.4 with 7.48.5. 
 
268
 Cf. Morris (2006) 45-46 for the lack of explicit evidence for the grain supply of Syracuse in the fifth 
century.  16,000 men would needed just over 330 medimnoi of wheat a day, or just under 670 medimnoi of 
barley-meal a day to ensure adequate sustenance.  It is probable that the men referred to as hired for service 
on land and receiving pay from the Syracusans at 7.48.5 purchased their supplies in the Syracusan agora, 
too.  There were, at a definite minimum, 7,600 of these men:  see 7.1.5 (Gylippus in the late summer/fall of 
414 taking 700 of his own sailors and marines; 1,000 hoplites and light-armed troops and 100 horse from 
Himera, some light troops and cavalry from Selinus, a few Geloans, and Sicels numbering 1,000 in all); 
7.21.1 (Gylippus coming to Syracuse in the spring of 413 with as many troops as he was able to gather 
from the poleis which he had persuaded to join the Syracusan cause); 7.25.3 (a holkas arriving from the 
Peloponnese carrying Thespian hoplites); 7.32.2 (1,500 allied troops coming to Syracuse from allied 
poleis); 7.33.1 (Camarinaeans sending 500 hoplites, 300 javelineers, and 300 archers, the Geloans sending 
400 javelineers and 200 horse); 7.50.1 (Gylippus coming back to Syracuse with large numbers of troops 
raised in Sicily, and the hoplites sent off in the spring by the Peloponnesians in holkades (apparently the 
1,600 mentioned at 7.19.3-4)).  We cannot state with certainty if the citizen Syracusan land forces 




Chapter 2:  The Provisioning of Classical Greek Overseas Campaigns 
 
i. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that Nicias attempted to dissuade the 
Athenians from undertaking a major amphibious expedition to Syracuse by contrasting 
the requirements in παρασκευή for such an expedition with those of ‘normal’ major 
amphibious Athenian operations in the Aegean; I demonstrated there, too, that 
examination of those aspects of the provisioning of the Sicilian expedition that were 
unusual helped to bring out crucial features of the food supply of typical Athenian 
operations in the Aegean.  In this chapter, I will build on the insights gained from the 
analysis of Nicias’ speech and examine further the provisioning of ‘normal’ major 
Athenian amphibious expeditions, i.e. those military operations most characteristic of the 
Athenian empire at its height:  the reduction by prolonged (circumvallation) sieges of 
coastal or island poleis in the Aegean that had revolted from the Athenians (or had 
refused to become subject to them).
1
  Before 415, Athenian(-led) amphibious expeditions 
successfully reduced by siege the poleis of Eion (in 476), Naxos (469), Thasos (465-463), 
Aegina (458-457), Samos (440-439), Potidaea (432-winter 429), Mytilene (428-427), 
Scione (423-421), and Melos (416).
2
 
                                                 
1
 For the suppression of revolts by (more or less) lengthy sieges (supported by naval operations) as the 
characteristic military activity of the Athenian empire, see, e.g., Davies (1993) 68, Hanson (2005) 176-177, 
Strauss (2007) 237-238. 
 
2
 For a list (with references) of Athenian circumvallation sieges post-441, see Krentz (2007) 180 Table 6.3; 
for circumvallation sieges before this date, see pp.132-133 n.37 below.  Note also that, in the aftermath of 
the Persian War, the Athenians and their allies successfully reduced Sestos by siege in 479/8 (Thucy. 
1.89.2, Hdt. 9.114-118); in addition, Athenian forces seem to have formed a substantial part of the force 
that reduced Byzantium by siege in 478 (Thucy. 1.94, cf. Diod. 11.44).  Before the Sicilian expedition, only 
one attempted full-scale Athenian circumvallation siege—Kition in 451 (Thucy. 1.112.2-4)—was 
unsuccessful (see section iic below for discussion of this siege).  (The dates of the sieges undertaken by the 
Athenians post-Eion and pre-Samos are all controversial, but the controversy over the precise dating of 
  
120 
In the first and second Peloponnesian Wars, the Athenian state also sent out 
amphibious forces around the Peloponnese (and the eastern and northern coastlines of 
‘mainland’ Greece) on short-term raiding and devastating campaigns, and I will devote 
the third section of the chapter to the examination of the food supply of the men serving 
on these periploi.  I will then analyse the provisioning of the naval operations embarked 
upon by Athens and the other combatant states engaged in the Ionian War.  I will 
conclude by building on this latter analysis to investigate more closely the methods used 
by classical Greek states other than Athens to supply amphibious and naval expeditions, 
and by considering what the provisioning of classical Greek amphibious and naval 
operations can tell us about the structure and scale of Aegean economies in the fifth and 
early fourth centuries.  
 
 ii. The provisioning of Athenian sieges in the fifth century (prior to the Sicilian 
expedition) 
 a. Thucydides and the Trojan War 
In the Archaeology,
3
 Thucydides justified his belief that the Peloponnesian war 
was greater than any past war, as well as his expectation at its beginning that it would be 
so, by setting out the factors that determine the magnitude of wars (and other state 
enterprises) and using these to demonstrate that the greatest conflicts and military 
                                                                                                                                                 
these sieges makes no difference to the argument I am making in this chapter (see Rhodes [1985] 12-21 for 
a sober discussion of the issue).) 
 
3
 For sake of convenience, I use the conventional term for Thucy. 1.1.1-1.23 3 while noting Irwin’s point 
that it brings problematically modernistic connotations to the study of Thucydides’ proem ([2007] 193-





undertakings in the Greek past were inferior to the Peloponnesian war.
4
  The most 
important of the (new) criteria Thucydides used to judge the likely magnitude of previous 
wars and military enterprises were the levels of naval power and financial resources 
(which made possible the projection of naval power) controlled by states (empires):
5
  in 
his choice of these factors as criteria, Thucydides was clearly distilling his thoughts on 
and experiences of the contemporary Athenian archē.
6
  He used these criteria, then, not to 
write a survey of early Greek history,
7
 but in order to demonstrate that those wars that 
were commonly considered to be the greatest of the past were, in fact, lesser affairs than 
the conflict he was writing up.
8
  Finally, Thucydides indicated to his readers that (since 
(contemporary) evidence was lacking) he was basing his analysis of the organization of 
                                                 
4
 See esp. Ellis (1991) 364-365:  “[t]he Archaeology was written to demonstrate first that the Peloponnesian 
War was the greatest and most momentous conflict to that time.  That contention, the main thesis, is carried 
through to its final proof at 21.2-23.3 by reference to the war itself.  Then, within its limits and in order to 
justify the claim that its author had begun to write not at the end of the war... but at the very outset, a 
logically prior, subordinate thesis is stated.  Thucydides explains that he anticipated that this would be the 
greatest of wars because the formative conditions from which it took its impetus were themselves greater 
than any before...  It follows then that the bulk (Chapters 2-19) of the Archaeology is taken up with two 
broad subjects:  the factors that determine the likely magnitude of wars, and the actual magnitude of the 
greatest wars of the past.  The first is the basis of the subordinate thesis, while the second will provide the 
standard by which, finally (23.1-3), the greatness of the Peloponnesian War will be judged.”  Cf., e.g., 
Finley (1967) 13; Hunter (1980) 194; Kallet-Marx (1993) 21. 
 
5
 See, e.g., Momigliano (1944) 3; de Romilly (1967) 261; Hornblower, CT i.9; Kallet-Marx (1993) 33-35, 
37-38, 68-69; Morris (2001) 20. 
 
6
 See, e.g., de Romilly (1967) 261; Finley (1967) 140-143; Parry (1972) 53; Hunter (1980) 194; Connor 
(1984) 33-34, 47-50; Kallet-Marx (1993) 23-35, 57-58, 93-98. 
 
7
 See esp. Kallet-Marx (1993) 21 n.1; cf. Connor (1984) 22. 
 
8
 See esp. Luraghi (2000) 230-231 and esp. 233-234:  “[i]f [Thucydides] feels the need to show that also 
mythical thalassocrats like Minos had been less powerful than fifth-century Athens, the reason is not 
necessarily that he believes in what we would call their historicity, but rather that he takes for a moment the 
standpoint of someone who does believe in it, in order to argue that also from that standpoint the sea-




past societies and conflicts on probable deduction corroborated by observable indications 
from the past;
9
 in other words, in his reconstruction of past wars and military enterprises, 
Thucydides was offering a personal thesis founded on arguments from probability and 




Because the Trojan War was considered by Thucydides’ contemporaries to be one 
of the greatest undertakings of the Greek past, the argument that it was fought on a 
smaller scale than the Peloponnesian War holds a central place in the Archaeology.
11
  
                                                 
9
 On Thucydides’ use of “τεκµήρια,” “σηµεῖα,” and “µαρτύρια” in the Archaeology, see esp. de Romilly 
(1967) 242, and Connor (1984) 28:  “[these] are not “proofs” of incontrovertible evidence, but 
“indications”—facts or observations that point in a certain direction.  They do not entail generalizations; 
rather the leading themes of the Archaeology—the importance of sea power and financial reserves—guide 
him in the selection of corroborating instances from myth, poetry, archaeology, anthropology, and the like.”  




 See again de Romilly (1967) 242:  in his reconstruction of the distant Greek past, Thucydides “n’avait 
d’autre arme que le raisonnement.”  See also Hunter (1982) 112-113:  “[a]nalogical reasoning is closely 
related to argumentation based on probabilities.  For analogy like probability is based on the perception of 
similarities, the belief that individuals acted in the past, or will act in the future, much as they do in the 
present, and so that behavior in the past can be reconstructed by using the analogy of the present... In the 
case of Thucydides... [a]nalogical reasoning is at the heart of his evolutionist theory of civilization.  For 
uniform development and uniform stages of growth also imply similarities and parallels.  Thus such a 
theory also affords the means to approach data, to rationalize, and to reconstruct events in the past by using 
the analogy of the present.  In a word, analogy serves as a kind of rational principle in Thucydides’ 
speculative reconstruction of the past.”  And see, too, Canfora (1977) 459:  “[l]e jugement [in the 
Archaeology] est fondé sur le comparaison, mais c’est inévitablement une comparaison avec le présent.  L’ 
instrument de ce jugement comparatif est l’analogie:  le passé est ramené à des catégories ‹‹modernes››...”  
Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 68-69.  And see again the works cited at n.6 for the contemporary operations and 
enterprises of the Athenian empire serving as the model for Thucydides’ arguments from likelihood and 
analogy in the Archaeology. 
 
11
 See Ellis (1991) 356, 360-361, 372-374 for the centrality (literally and figuratively) of the discussion of 
the Trojan War to the argument of the Archaeology.  It should be noted here (again) that Thucydides 
discusses the Trojan War not because he believes in the literal truth of Homer’s account, but because this 
war was commonly believed by his contemporaries to be one of the greatest of all wars:  see again esp. 
Luraghi (2001) 230-231, 233-234, 238; cf. Ellis (1991) 373; Kallet-Marx (1993) 27 and n.21.  In this 
regard, note that, while using Homer as his main source for the Trojan War, Thucydides criticizes his 
reliability and uses his account for different means than it was originally intended:  see 1.10.3-5 with de 




Using Homer’s figures in the Catalogue of Ships as the basis for his calculations, 
Thucydides argued that the force that sailed from Greece against Troy was not great in 
size, considering it represented the armed strength of the whole of Greece (1.10.3-5).
12
  
He ascribed the reason for the relatively small size of the Trojan expedition to lack of 
money:  this lack of money meant that the expedition could not bring sufficient 
provisions; the size of the force that sailed out from Greece was therefore limited to the 
number of men who could live off the land during the campaign; in addition, the Greeks’ 
lack of supplies also led to the great duration of their siege of Troy.
13
  The full argument 
runs as follows (1.11.1-2): 
αἴτιον δ’ ἦν οὐχ ἡ ὀλιγανθρωπία τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἡ ἀχρηµατία.  τῆς γὰρ τροφῆς 
ἀπορίᾳ τόν τε στρατὸν ἐλάσσω ἤγαγον καὶ ὅσον ἤλπιζον αὐτόθεν πολεµοῦντα 
βιοτεύσειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόµενοι µάχῃ ἐκράτησαν (δῆλον δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἔρυµα τῷ 
στρατοπέδῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐτειχίσαντο), φαίνονται δ’ οὐδ’ ἐνταῦθα πάσῃ τῇ δυνάµει 
χρησάµενοι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς γεωργίαν τῆς Χερσονήσου τραπόµενοι καὶ λῃστείαν τῆς 
τροφῆς ἀπορίᾳ.  ᾗ καὶ µᾶλλον οἱ Τρῶες αὐτῶν διεσπαρµένων τὰ δέκα ἔτη 
ἀντεῖχον βίᾳ, τοῖς αἰεὶ ὑπολειποµένοις ἀντίπαλοι ὄντες. [2] περιουσίαν δὲ εἰ ἦλθον 
ἔχοντες τροφῆς καὶ ὄντες ἁθρόοι ἄνευ λῃστείας καὶ γεωργίας ξυνεχῶς τὸν 
πόλεµον διέφερον, ῥᾳδίως ἂν µάχῃ κρατοῦντες εἶλον, οἵ γε καὶ οὐχ ἁθρόοι, ἀλλα 
µέρει τῷ αἰεὶ παρόντι ἀντεῖχον, πολιορκίᾳ δ’ ἂν προσκαθεζόµενοι ἐν ἐλάσσονι τε 
χρόνῳ καὶ ἀπονώτερον τὴν Τροίαν εἶλον.  ἀλλὰ δι’ ἀχρηµατίαν τά τε πρὸ τούτων 
ἀσθενῆ ἦν καὶ αὐτά γε δὴ ταῦτα, ὀνοµαστότατα τῶν πρὶν γενόµενα, δηλοῦται 
τοῖς ἐργοις ὑποδεέστερα ὄντα τῆς φήµης καὶ τοῦ νῦν περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τοὺς ποιητὰς 
λόγου κατεσχηκότος...  
  
[And the inconsiderable size of the expedition] was due not so much to scarcity 
of men as of money.  Lack of provisions made the invaders reduce the size of the 
army they brought to a point at which it might live on the country during the 
                                                 
12
 See esp. 1.10.5:  “... οὐ πολλοὶ φαίνονται ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἀπὸ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος κοινῇ πεµπόµενοι.”  This 
point of Thucydides’ argument has been criticized on the grounds that his calculations lead to a total of 
102,000 men on the Trojan expedition—a not inconsiderable total:  see esp. Gomme, HCT i.114; Hunter 
(1982) 35; Connor (1984) 21 and n.6.  But the fact that, as Thucydides indicates, the Trojan expedition 
represented all the forces of Hellas means that it was actually (quite) inferior to all the forces potentially 
available to the Greek world as a whole in his time:  see de Romilly (1967) 248; Crane (1998) 83-87.  In 
any case, as Luraghi points out ([2001] 230) regarding Thucydides’ calculations here, “[w]e should not 
forget that Thucydides’ text would most probably be heard rather than read, and the audience would not be 
in the condition to stop, do the sum and check the accuracy of Thucydides’ statement.” 
 
13




prosecution of the war.  Even after the victory they obtained on their arrival—and 
a victory there must have been, or the fortifications of the naval camp could 
never have been built—there is no indication of their whole force having been 
employed; on the contrary, they seem to have turned to cultivation of the 
Chersonese and to piracy from want of lack of provisions.  This was what really 
enabled the Trojans to keep the field for ten years against them; the dispersion of 
the enemy making them always a match for the detachment left behind.  If they 
had brought an abundance of provisions with them, and had prosecuted the war 
en masse without scattering for piracy and agriculture, they would have easily 
defeated the Trojans in the field; since they could hold their own against them 
with the part on service.  In short, if they had stuck to the siege, they would have 
captured Troy in less time and with less trouble.  But as lack of money proved 
the weakness of earlier expeditions, so from the same cause even the one in 
question, more famous than its predecessors, may be pronounced on the evidence 
of what it accomplished, to have been inferior to its renown and to the current 
opinion about it formed under the tuition of the poets.
14 
 
There are two crucial and related points to bear in mind when analysing this 
passage.  Firstly, Thucydides was explaining here why the forces of the Trojan expedition 
were smaller than the forces undertaking overseas expeditions in his day; this can be seen 
from the prefatory remarks he makes before his consideration of the size of the 
expedition sailing to Troy (1.10.3): 
οὔκουν ἀπιστεῖν εἰκός... νοµίζειν δὲ τὴν στρατείαν ἐκείνην µεγίστην µὲν γενέσθαι 
τῶν πρὸ αὑτῆς, λειποµένην δὲ τῶν νῦν, τῇ Ὁµήρου αὖ ποιήσαι εἴ τι χρὴ 
κἀνταῦθα πιστεύειν, ἣν εἰκὸς ἐπὶ τὸ µεῖζον µὲν ποιητὴν ὄντα κοσµῆσαι, ὅµως δὲ 
φαίνεται καὶ οὕτως ἐνδεεστέρα. 
 
... but we may safely conclude that this expedition [to Troy] surpassed all before 
it, just as it fell short (in size) of expeditions today; if we can here also accept the 
testimony of Homer’s poems in which, without allowing for the exaggeration 
which a poet would feel himself licensed to employ, we can see that it was far 
from equaling ours. 
 
                                                 
14
 This is an adapted version of Crawley’s translation.  There is no need for Kallet-Marx’s hesitations 
concerning the meaning of τροφή in this passage ([1993] 29-30) or the meaning of χρήµατα (and its 
derivatives, such as ἀχρηµατία at 1.11) ([1993] 35-36) throughout the Archaeology:  τροφή at 1.11 clearly 




Secondly, at 1.11 Thucydides was, as throughout the Archaeology, working from 
probability and analogy;
15
 that is, his description of the Trojan expedition, and the 
principles underlying this description, were abstracted from his own personal experience 
and knowledge of the practices of (amphibious) warfare in his time.
16
  There is therefore 
throughout Thucydides’ account of the reasons for the (inconsiderable) size of the Trojan 
expedition and the (considerable) duration of its operations at Troy an implicit 
comparison (and contrast) with (the greater and more efficient) Athenian amphibious 
expeditions of his own day:
17
  Thucydides was making the point at 1.11 that the Trojan 
expedition did not operate with the same scale of naval power as contemporary Athenian 
expeditions since it did not possess the financial resources available to the contemporary 
Athenian empire; in addition, he made the related point that, because the Trojan 
expedition did not have the financial resources available to fifth-century Athens, its siege 
of Troy had to be prosecuted in a different manner to the (circumvallation) sieges 
                                                 
15
 See again p.122 n.9 above and also esp. de Romilly (1967) 242 for a list of words showing that 
Thucydides’ argument that the Trojan War was inferior to the Peloponnesian War was a personal thesis 
based on probability and supported by observable indications (note esp. δῆλον δέ at 1.11.1, and δηλοῦται at 
1.11.2; note also φαίνονται at 1.11.1, showing that Thucydides is not reporting, but reconstructing (from 
probability)).  Cf. Kallet-Marx (1993) 27-28:  “[b]ecause the Trojan expedition was considered one of the 
greatest events of the Greek past, Thucydides had to demonstrate its weakness to support his own 
argument.  He did so through his own opinion (moi dokei) and deduction, through a cold, dispassionate 
rationality which derived from, but ultimately rejected, the epic traditions of his day.”  Cf. also Connor 
(1984) 21 n.6:  “[t]he Trojan war is dismissed by an argument based on the likelihood that the attacking 
force had inadequate logistics (ch. 11) and by a calculation derived from the figures in Homer’s Catalogue 
of the Ships (Iliad II).” 
 
16
 See again p.122 n.10 above and also esp. Gomme, HCT i.115 for the point that Thucydides’ description 
of the operations of the Trojan expedition was based on the conditions of contemporary warfare.  Cf., e.g., 
M. I. Finley ap. Hornblower, CT i.8:  Thucydides’ view of the development of early Greece “is a theory 
derived from prolonged meditation about the world in which Thucydides lived”; Irwin (2007) 194:  
“Thucydides’ past times are very much the creative projection of his and his audience’s present time.” 
 
17
 Cf. here Canfora (1977) 459:  “... le point qui sert à chaque fois de référence [i.e. the activities of the 
Athenian empire in the Peloponnesian war] contient déjà en soi l’interprétation du fait pris en 




conducted by the Athenians in his time.  In the process of comparing and contrasting the 
size and operations of the Trojan expedition with the amphibious expeditions of his own 
day, Thucydides thus incidentally (although crucially for his argument) illuminates the 
usual practices of fifth-century Athenian siege warfare:
18
 
1. Unlike the Trojan expedition, Athenian amphibious expeditions 
launched to reduce rebellious or uncooperative poleis in Thucydides’ 
                                                 
18
 Hunter ([1980] 203-204, repeated substantially at Hunter [1982] 40-42) and Kallet ([2001] 97-115 and 
119-120 (the idea is derived from Hunter) argue that Thucydides’ presentation of the problems of the 
Trojan expedition was based on his thinking about the Sicilian expedition.  This view is incorrect for 
several reasons.  To deal with only its most serious problems:  firstly, Hunter’s and Kallet’s view stems 
from a misunderstanding of the phrase “living off the land.”  Hunter (followed by Kallet [2001] 99) argues 
that the Sicilian expedition was similar to the Trojan expedition in that both expeditions embarked on 
campaign with insufficient supplies and therefore had to provision themselves from local resources ([1980] 
203-204 and esp. n.48); Hunter cited Gomme (HCT i.114) for the view that both expeditions expected “to 
live on the country.”  But Gomme was misleadingly loose in his terminology here (and inconsistent:  see 
HCT ii.21 n.2 where he states that “an army, save in exceptional cases such as the Sicilian expedition, 
would expect to live off the land”).  The Athenian expedition to Sicily did expect to provision itself from 
local resources:  but it expected (at all times) to acquire these provisions through purchase—whereas the 
Trojan expedition expected (in Thucydides’ analysis) to provision itself through pillaging (or foraging) or 
farming.  The methods of supply of the two expeditions were therefore completely different (see Lynn 
[1993a] 15-19 on the importance of defining precisely what one means by “living off the country” and the 
various provisioning mechanisms this phrase covers; cf. Erdkamp [1998] 11).  Secondly, because of their 
different means of acquiring provisions, the strategic difficulties facing each expedition were completely 
different:  the Achaeans were not able to unite to besiege Troy because of their lack of food; the Athenians, 
united and massed for the siege of Syracuse, had trouble in securing their food supply because of their 
gradual loss of control over the sea.  Thirdly, Hunter and Kallet miss the point that Thucydides’ judgment 
of previous military enterprises and wars in the Archaeology was formed by comparison with the normal 
practices of the Athenian empire (before the Peloponnesian War):  the judgment that the Peloponnesian 
War would be the greatest led him to write up that war; and this judgment was based on criteria abstracted 
from Thucydides’ knowledge and experience of the Athenian empire before the war.  Fourthly, the 
(implicit) comparison between the Trojan expedition and Athenian expeditions of Thucydides’ day—and 
the conclusion therefrom that the Trojan expedition was (much) inferior to contemporary expeditions—
would have lost all of its value if the comparison was with the failed Sicilian expedition:  the point of the 
Archaeology was to show that the Peloponnesian War and the fifth-century Athenian empire represented 
the acme of human development, superior to all earlier wars and empires.  Fifthly, Kallet pronounces the 
analysis at 1.11 “unusual” and “strange” and therefore concludes that its motivation must be found outside 
the Archaeology ([2001] 98-99; cf. [2001] 232 n.14:  1.11 “comes out of the blue” and is only explicable if 
Thucydides was thinking there about the Sicilian expedition).  But the motivation for the analysis at 1.11, 
as noted above (and by Kallet herself in an earlier work—see the quotation at n.15 above), clearly comes 
from the fact that Thucydides needed to show for his argument that the Trojan War was inferior to the 
Peloponnesian War (see 1.9.5 and 1.11.2 for Thucydides explicitly signaling this).  Finally, note that, in 
order to support her argument that Thucydides’ analysis of the Trojan expedition was based on the 
experience of the Athenians in Sicily, Kallet has to adopt a tendentiously incorrect translation of 




day were sufficiently financed.
19
  Because of this, they were able 
(unlike the Trojan expedition) to embark from Athens with plenty of 
supplies (“περιουσίαν... τροφῆς”).20 
2. Because they were sufficiently financed and had plenty of supplies, 
Athenian amphibious expeditions sent out to besiege island or coastal 
poleis into subjection could (once they had established their mastery by 
success in an initial battle) devote all of their forces to the 
circumvallation and continuous blockades of those poleis:
21
  unlike the 
Trojan expedition, Athenian besieging forces did not have to scatter to 
acquire supplies through foraging or pillaging (or farming).
22
 
                                                 
19
 Rawlings ([2007] 75) states that:  “Thucydides rationalised the duration of the Trojan War on just these 
terms:  the force of 1,200 Achaean ships was so large that it created supply problems (1.11).  The Greeks 
could only keep part of their force in the field; the rest worked the land to grow food.”  This is incorrect:  it 
was the Trojan expedition’s lack of money (and not its size) that led to its supply problems. 
 
20
 Cf. Hornblower, CT i.36 ad 1.11:  “[m]uch of what follows is sheer guesswork.  Nor do all of Th.’s 
remarks make very good sense.  He argues that the Greeks must have been poor because they did not bring 
plenty of food supplies with them.  Without tinned food there was not much that Greek armies of Th.’s own 
day (which is what he has in mind) could do after a day or two except what he describes the army before 
Troy as doing, viz. to forage.  Th.’s remarks must, however be taken as evidence that fifth-century Greek 
armies did bring some supplies with them.”  Although a moment’s thinking on the food supply of pre-
industrial cities or the food storage practices of pre-industrial peasants—never mind the evidence here and 
elsewhere (see chapter 1 passim, section iii below) for classical Greek military forces bringing and storing 
provisions (not to mention all the evidence for other pre-industrial European forces engaging in these 
practices)—shows that Hornblower’s remarks on the impossibility of storing food supplies before the 
advent of tinned food supplies are incorrect, the content of his last sentence quoted here is a valid and 
necessary inference from 1.11. 
 
21
 See Gomme, HCT i.115-116 on Thucydides’ description of the experiences of the Trojan expedition:  
“[i]t would seem then natural to suppose that the picture of the Trojan war which Thucydides has in mind is 
as follows:  the Greeks won the first battle on land... and in the ordinary way [my emphasis], with so large 
a force, would have proceeded to invest Troy which could not have held out very long; as it was, they had 
to scatter their forces, with the result that the Trojans... were able to dispute the mastery of the land with 
them..., so that the city could not be invested...” 
 
22
 Cf. Krentz (2007) 180:  “[Thucydides] argues that insufficient financial resources hampered the Greek 
siege of Troy, because the Greeks had to turn to farming and piracy to support themselves, making the 
Trojans a match for the Greeks who remained at Troy (1.11).”  Thucydides says the leaders of the Trojan 
expedition only brought out so many men as could expect to live off the country:  “ὅσον ἤλπιζον αὐτόθεν 
πολεµοῦντα βιοτεύσειν” (1.11.1) (cf. Xen., Cyr. 3.2.25 where Xenophon says that the Chaldaeans were 
accustomed to live from pillaging raids:  “εἰθισµένοι ἀπὸ πολέµου βιοτεύειν...”); in practice, this meant 
either farming or “λῃστεία.”  The noun “λῃστεία” normally denotes pillaging rather than foraging (see 
chapter 1 section ivb nn.205, 206, 218), but it is probably best here not to press the distinction between the 
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3. From these two points, the conclusion follows that, for their voyages to 
revolting or recalcitrant poleis, and during their sieges of those poleis, 
Athenian amphibious forces used money to acquire their provisions:  
i.e., they acquired their provisions through purchase. 
 
These insights—together with the conclusions from the analysis in chapter 1 of 
Nicias’ second speech to the assembly before the departure of the Sicilian expedition—
will provide the framework for the detailed discussion of the provisioning of Athenian 
siege warfare that follows. 
 
b. The provisioning of Athenian amphibious forces during their voyages to targets 
of operations 
Although the conditions of warfare for Athenian amphibious expeditions in the 
Aegean could be taken for granted by Thucydides and his readers, and therefore the 
preparations for the provisioning of those expeditions could normally be assumed in—
and thus omitted from—Thucydides’ narrative,
23
 analysis of 1.11 and Nicias’ speech 
before the departure of the Sicilian expedition shows that normal Athenian amphibious 
expeditions brought (some) provisions on their voyages to their targets of operations.  
Both of these points receive further illumination from Thucydides’ description of the 
terms of the debate for the second assembly discussing the παρασκευή for the Sicilian 
expedition (6.8.3).  Thucydides tells us that a second assembly was held regarding the 
expedition to Sicily “καθ’ ὅτι χρὴ τὴν παρασκευὴν ταῖς ναυσὶ τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι, καὶ 
                                                                                                                                                 








τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, εἴ του προσδέοιντο, ψηφισθῆναι ἐς τὸν ἔκπλουν” (“to consider how the 
παρασκευή for the ships might be prepared as quickly as possible, and to vote whatever 
else might be required by the generals for the expedition”); παρασκευή here should be 
taken to mean all the heavy and light infantry, cavalry, and grain supplies brought for an 
expedition.
24
  What is interesting here is that the terms of the debate show that the fact 
that there would be a παρασκευή for the expedition was taken for granted; i.e., the 
question to be decided in the assembly was not whether there would be a παρασκευή for 
the expedition, but how it might be prepared as quickly as possible.  There is no 
indication from Thucydides that there was anything unusual about the reasons for the 
calling of this assembly, or that there was anything peculiar to the Sicilian expedition that 
meant that the organization of provisions (as part of a παρασκευή) could be assumed for 
this expedition, but not for others.
25
  The only thing unusual about 6.8.3 is that 
Thucydides saw fit to include consideration of a debate on the παρασκευή of an 
expedition in the first place:  Thucydides did this uniquely here, because it enabled him, 
by describing the speeches of Alcibiades and Nicias, and especially the latter’s second 
address to the assembly, to bring out and emphasize those factors that he saw as crucial to 
the outcome of the Sicilian expedition—i.e., those things that make up the παρασκευή of 
an expedition:  infantry, cavalry, triremes, and grain supplies.
26
  It was only the fact that 
                                                 
24
 See again p.27 n.37 for this definition. 
 
25
 Moreover, the fact that Thucydides could casually mention that the assembly was called to consider the 
quickest means of preparing the παρασκευή for the triremes of the expedition, without feeling the need for 
any explanation of the reason for the assembly or that any indication that it was unusual, demonstrates that 
this was quite a normal procedure, and not one peculiar to the Sicilian expedition. 
 
26
 See appendix 1 section iii.  It is because of the close relationship between speech and narrative in 
Thucydides, and the emphasis placed on the παρασκευή of the expedition in the second speech of Nicias, 
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the Sicilian theater of operations was atypical—i.e., that certain important features of 
overseas warfare in the Aegean could not be assumed there and therefore that an 
expedition to Sicily would require certain special forms of παρασκευή—that led to the 
detailed concentration on παρασκευή in Nicias’ speech, and thus, as at 6.8.3, in the 
preceding and ensuing narrative.
27
  Thus, although the mention of παρασκευή at 6.8.3 is 
atypical, paradoxically this passage shows us again that the organization of provisions for 
Athenian overseas expeditions within the Aegean was a normal procedure—but (apart 
from here) always taken for granted by Thucydides.
28
 
 But again, because they operated surrounded by allied/subject states, Athenian 
amphibious expedition sailing out against rebellious or uncooperative poleis in the 
Aegean did not have to bring substantial amounts of provisions for their (relatively short) 
                                                                                                                                                 
that occurrences of παρασκευ- forms are more numerous in Book 6 (and especially from 6.1-44) than in any 




 Kallet ([2001] 44 n.81) comments on Nicias’ speech:  “[i]t seems reasonable, given the emphasis on the 
paradoxical nature of the assembly’s reaction to Nikias’ speech, to suggest that the amount of detail and 
kinds of things mentioned were unusual, not the sorts of things that a general might normally relate in a 
speech before the assembly.  If so, then it follows that the assembly was not accustomed to hearing this 
degree of detail, nor to learning the extent of the preparations necessary.”  This comment misses the 
implications from 6.8.3 that it was usual for Athenian expeditions to bring παρασκευή from home, and for 
this παρασκευή to be discussed in the Athenian assembly; though Kallet is right to note that the nature and 
amount of the παρασκευή Nicias recommended for the expedition were unusual. 
 
28
 Thus Krentz ([2007] 154) is incorrect to state that merchant ships only followed expeditions that were 
sailing to hostile territory; as is Raaflaub ([2007] 100) in stating that transporters only accompanied 
Athenian naval expeditions once “they moved out of their power sphere.”  It should be noted here that, in 
his description of Hagnon’s reinforcing expedition to the siege of Potidaea in 430, Diodorus notes that 
Hagnon, in his preparations for the siege, “µηχανάς... παντοδαπὰς παρεσκεύασε πολιορκητικὰς καὶ ὅπλων 
καὶ βελῶν πλῆθος, ἔτι δὲ σίτου δαψίλειαν ἱκανὴν πάσῃ τῇ δυνάµει”; “had made ready every kind of engine 
used in sieges, a multitude of arms and missiles, and an abundance of grain, sufficient for the entire army” 
(12.46.2).  This passage cannot be taken as independent evidence (from Thucydides) for the provisioning of 
Athenian amphibious forces in the Aegean in the fifth century, however.  Diodorus is here clearly simply 
extrapolating from the account of Hagnon’s expedition found in Thucydides (2.58.1-2), his main source for 
this period (see Meiggs [1972] 457, Davies [1993] 2, Samons [2000] 95-96) (for another example of 




voyages to war zones.  Assured during their voyages of reception at allied/subject 
poleis—and therefore markets at which they could reprovision
29
—the supplies they 
brought from Athens served a dual function:
30
  firstly, as an emergency reserve in case of 
sailing delays caused by bad weather; secondly, and more importantly, to provide a 
sufficient amount of food to cover their provisioning requirements during initial 
operations at their target (and until additional shipments of supplies from nearby 
allies/subjects and Athens began to arrive there).
31
  The proper execution of these 
functions did not require Athenian amphibious expeditions in the Aegean to be 




c. The provisioning of Athenian circumvallation sieges 
 After having arrived at their target, and establishing there in initial operations 
complete superiority on land and sea,
33
 the (principal) method used by Athenian 
                                                 
29
 See again chapter 1 sections i, iiia; see also section iv below. 
 
30
 See again chapter 1 sections i, ii, iiib. 
 
31
 See again Erdkamp (1998) 56 for the idea. 
 
32
 In addition, see also section iii below:  sailors on-board Athenian triremes, before setting out on overseas 
expeditions, usually purchased provisions for the first few days of sail; this would have decreased the 
amount of provisions required to be brought on supply-ships for (relatively) short voyages within the 
Aegean.  I should note here the men who served on-board classical Athenian triremes were as likely to be 
slaves or foreigners as Athenian citizens (Graham [1992], [1998]; cf. van Wees [2004] 211-212).  
Notwithstanding this fact, for the sake of brevity, I will sometimes use (throughout this dissertation) 
‘Athenian sailors’ or ‘Athenian rowers’ as shorthand for the men serving on-board Athenian triremes, in 
contexts where no ambiguity or uncertainty will result from this usage. 
 
33
 For operations on land, see again 1.11, with Gomme, HCT i.115-116 and references cited there (esp. 
6.23.2, 6.37.2).  For naval operations, see 1.100.2 (Thasos), 1.105.2 (Aegina), 1.116.2 (Samos), and 3.4.2 
(Mytilene) for naval victories establishing Athenian superiority on sea prior to the sieges of poleis 
possessing (significantly sized) navies. 
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amphibious forces to take revolting or recalcitrant poleis by siege was to (completely) 
surround these poleis’ fortified urban centers with walls and, by means of a continuous 
and highly constrictive blockade, reduce their inhabitants (who would have fled inside 
their city walls at the approach of the Athenians) by hunger.
34
  The adoption of this 
strategy was forced on the Athenians by the primitiveness of Greek siege techniques in 
the fifth century.
35
  The process of reducing cities by starving out their inhabitants was 
always a prolonged one:
36
  the siege operations at Thasos lasted three years;
37
 at Aegina 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
34
 For the phrase “highly constrictive blockade,” see Robinson (1999) 139. 
 
35
 The key discussion remains Gomme, HCT i.16-18:  see esp. HCT i.16 for Athenian use of the siege 
technique of blockade by circumvallation being forced on them by the “immense superiority [in the fifth 
century] of the defensive weapon, the wall whether of stone or mud-brick, over the offensive—javelins, 
arrows, or hand-worked battering-rams.”  Cf., e.g., Grundy (1948) 283-290; Hanson (2005) 192; Strauss 
(2007) 239, 243.  Although there were some innovations in Greek siege techniques over the course of the 
fifth century (see, e.g., van Wees [2004] 139-141, Rawlings [2007] 134-135), these were limited, and 
always insufficient to overcome the superiority of city-wall defenses; circumvallation (followed by 




The exceptional case of Nisaea proves the rule:  in 424, the Peloponnesian garrison there surrendered 
immediately after being invested with walls by Athenian forces (4.69); unlike a polis, the garrison had no 
stores of provisions and could not hope to hold out any length of time (4.69.3). 
 
37
 See 1.100.2-1.101.3.  Krentz ([2007] 179) notes correctly that the first attested Greek circumvallation 
wall was at Samos in 440.  But that the strategy of besieging cities by circumvallation wall and blockade 
attested in Thucydides for Athenian operations at Samos and later sieges in the Peloponnesian War was 
also used at the siege of Thasos and other Athenian sieges before Samos can be proved both from general 
considerations and from descriptions of these sieges in Thucydides and other authors.  Firstly, assault 
techniques were, if anything, more primitive in the pre-Samos period; the walling in of cities followed by 
continuous and ‘air-tight’ blockade was therefore—as at Samos and later fifth-century sieges—the sole 
strategic option that had a (high) chance of reducing cities in this period.  Secondly, the prolonged duration 
of siege operations before Samos (when known, see this and next note) suggests very strongly that 
circumvallation followed by blockade was the technique used by the Athenians pre-Samos to reduce cities 
by siege.  Thirdly, Thucydides uses πολιορκεῖν or πολιορκία to describe the sieges of Eion (“πολιορκίᾳ” 
(1.98.1)), Naxos (“πολιορκίᾳ” (1.98.4), “ἐπολιόρκει” (1.137.2)), Thasos (“πολιορκούµενοι” (1.101.1, 
1.101.3)), Aegina (“ἐπολιόρκουν” (1.105.2)), and Kition (“ἐπολιόρκουν” (1.112.2)).  Although Thucydides’ 
does not describe any of these sieges in detail, Robinson notes ([1999] 139 (and see his entire discussion at 
[1999] 139-143)) that  “[w]here Thucydides uses πολιορκεῖν or πολιορκία with sufficient narrative context 
for us to judge precisely, the terms always connote a highly constrictive blockade which cuts off the 





at Samos some time over a year;
39
 at Potidaea two and a half years;
40
 at 
Mytilene just less than a year;
41
 at Scione two years;
42
 at Melos somewhere less than a 
year.
43
   
In some of these cases, however, only part of the initial amphibious force sent out 
from Athens to establish the circumvallation of cities remained for the entire duration of 
the ensuing blockade.
44
  Since Athens had complete naval superiority over the Aegean 
before 413,
45
 blockaded island poleis could not hope for outside aid in relieving sieges:
46
  
                                                                                                                                                 
when he was using these terms to describe Athenian sieges pre-440.  In addition, Plut., Cim. 7 suggests that 
Eion was probably starved out by blockade (see Grundy [1948] 283 with n.4), and Polyaenus, Strateg. 2.33 
(describing starvation in Thasos caused by an Athenian siege) provides evidence that Thasos was, too.  
Note also that Thucydides uses the language of πολιορκεῖν to describe the sieges of Sestos in 479/8 
(“ἐπολιόρκουν” (1.89.2)) and Byzantium in 478 (“ἐξεπολιόρκησαν” (1.94.2)); that the siege of Sestos lasted a 
number of months (Hdt. 9.114-118, esp. 9.117); and that guard-duty (“φρουροῦντ’”) during a siege blockade 
of Byzantium—almost certainly in 478—is attested at Aristoph., Wasps 236-237 (cf. Sommerstein [1983] 
171).  This suggests that these cities, too, were first invested with walls before becoming subject to a 
blockade.  Finally, for the whole question, see 1.102.2:  the Athenians in the 460s were reputed to be 
excellent at the siege technique of “τειχοµαχεῖν.” 
 
38
 1.105.2, 1.108.4 with Diod. 11.78.4 (cf. Gomme, HCT i.319). 
 
39
 See 1.115.2-1.117 with IG I
3
 363 and the discussion at chapter 5 section iv below. 
 
40
 1.64-65, 2.58, 2.70.2. 
 
41
 3.6.1-2, 3.18.4-5, 3.27-28. 
 
42
 4.131-4.132, 4.133.4, 5.2.2, 5.18.7, 5.32.1. 
 
43
 The siege started in the summer of 416 before the end of the Panathenaic year (see 5.114.1-2 with IG I
3
 
370.24-35) and ended some time before the end of winter 416/5 (5.115.4, 5.116.2-4). 
 
44
 See Gomme, HCT i.18. 
 
45
 See below pp.141-145, pp.164-167. 
 
46
 Cf. Guilmartin (1974) 102-103. 
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for this reason, once Athenian forces had successfully walled in rebellious or 
uncooperative island poleis, their commanders could sometimes dismiss—as at Aegina in 
458 and Melos in 416—the majority of the men that had completed the circumvallation 
of the urban center;
47
 at Scione in 423, too—which, because of its position at the southern 
tip of the Pallene peninsula, was a virtual island on account of the Athenian occupation of 
Potidaea
48
—the Athenians, once they had successfully and completely invested the city, 
left only a detachment from the original amphibious force sent against the polis to guard 
the fortifications.
49
  In these instances, only enough men as were sufficient to man the 
walls of the circumvallation and deal with the few sorties emanating from the invested 
city could be left behind to maintain the blockade.
50
   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
47
 Aegina:  see again Gomme, HCT i.18; Melos:  see 5.114.2.  Another factor (in addition to the fact that 
Athenian naval superiority made access by enemy forces to these islands impossible) permitting the 
Athenian dismissal of the majority of the initial forces that had sailed against these poleis was that there 
were no other poleis on either Aegina or Melos:  there was thus no possibility of an enemy attack by land 
on the forces left behind by the Athenians to maintain the blockades of these cities.  Because of these 
factors, it is probable that the blockade of Naxos starting in 469 was also continuously maintained by only 
part of the force that had been sent to force that polis back into the Athenian fold.  Contrast, in this regard, 
the one thousand hoplites (and forty triremes) sent out against Mytilene in 428 both establishing and 
remaining for the duration of the siege blockade of that city (see p.136 and n.56 below) because of the 
threat of attack by land by the forces of the Lesbian poleis friendly to Mytilene (i.e. all the other poleis on 
Lesbos apart from Methymna)—although cf. 3.18.4:  the thousand Athenian hoplites blockaded Mytilene 
with a single wall, rather than constructing the usual double wall for the circumvallation; as Gomme notes 




 For Scione as a virtual island, see 4.120.3, 4.121.2. 
 
49
 See 4.133.4, 5.2.2. 
 
50
 It should be noted here that defense against sieges in the Greek world in the fifth century was almost 
entirely passive (cf. p.132 n.35 above), limited to occasional sorties against siege works or raids for 
provisions (see, e.g., 5.115.4, 5.116.2).  In the fifth century, it was only the exceptional polis of Syracuse—
possessed of the biggest urban population in the Greek world outside Athens (see chapter 1 section v)—that 




In other cases, however, tactical considerations forced the entirety of the initial 
force sent out from Athens to reduce a polis to remain for the duration of a blockade.  At 
Samos in 440, the investment and blockade of the city was established by one hundred 
and twenty-five triremes (1.116.2).
51
  After Pericles had taken sixty ships from the 
blockading squadron to sail to Caunus and Caria against the reported approach of a 
Phoenician fleet (1.116.3), the Samians sortied out and defeated the remaining Athenian 
and allied triremes, and “for about fourteen days they were masters of the sea off their 
coast, bringing in and carrying out whatever they wished” (“καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης τῆς καθ’ 
ἑαυτοὺς ἐκράτησαν... καὶ ἐσεκοµίσαντο καὶ ἐξεκοµίσαντο ἂ ἐβούλοντο”) (1.117.1); but 
when Pericles returned, after the rumors of the coming of the Phoenician fleet proved 
unfounded, the Samians were again blockaded by the Athenian and allied triremes 
(“πάλιν ταῖς ναυσὶ κατεκλῄσθησαν”) (1.117.2).  Because of the real threat of the Samian 
navy and the rumored threat of the Phoenician fleet, all of the original one hundred and 
twenty-five triremes (minus however many were lost in the fighting with the Samians 
(probably only a few)) had to remain for the entire duration of the re-established blockade 
(which lasted eight months before the Samians capitulated (1.117.3)); as did the sixty 
Athenian and thirty allied triremes that joined the blockade soon after it was reinstated 
(1.117.2).  Similarly, none of the one hundred and forty triremes of the Athenian 
expedition that walled and blockaded Kition in 451
52
 left the blockade of that city—until 
they were forced to because of lack of provisions (see p.145 n.80 below)—since the 
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 Cf. Robinson (1999) 143-144 for what follows. 
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presence nearby of hostile and substantial land and naval forces from Phoenicia, Cyprus, 
and Cilicia (1.112.4) meant that the presence of all of the Athenian and allied triremes 
was needed to guard against the possibility of enemy forces breaking their lines from 
outside and raising the siege.
53
  The initial force of three thousand hoplites (and seventy 
triremes) sent out against Potidaea in 432 (1.57.6, 1.61.1, 1.61.4) also stayed for the 
whole two and a half years that it took to reduce that city by starvation;
54
 as Gomme 
notes, the initial Athenian forces stayed at Potidaea because “the besiegers had to be 
prepared for attack by land from Olynthus and Spartolos.”
55
  The forty Athenian triremes 
(3.3.2) and one thousand hoplites (3.18.3-5) who established the blockade of Mytilene in 
428 also remained for the duration of the blockade of that city, both because of the 
(limited) threat of the Mytilenian fleet and because of the possibility of forces from the 
other Lesbian poleis allied to Mytilene attacking their lines by land.
56
 
 The Athenian amphibious forces that did stay to prosecute blockades of revolting 
or uncooperative poleis did not acquire their provisions through foraging.
57
  There were 
two main reasons for this.  Firstly, the poleis that revolted from the Athenians or refused 
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 I owe the phrasing of this last clause to Guilmartin (1974) 103. 
 
54
 I demonstrate this in chapter 4 section iv. 
 
55
 HCT ii.275.  See 1.62.3-4, 1.63.1-2, 1.65.2 for fighting on land between the Athenians and the cities in 
the vicinity of Potidaea (and allied to that city) before the establishment of the blockade of Potidaea.  And 
note again chapter 4 section iv:  the seventy triremes sent out in 432 also appear to have remained for the 
duration of the siege. 
 
56
 Thucydides never mentions the dismissal of any part of the Athenian forces besieging Mytilene.  The 
entire Athenian land and naval force remained although neither the naval threat (see 3.4.2) nor the threat of 
hostile forces from Lesbian poleis relieving the siege by land (see p.134 n.47 above) was very great. 
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to become their subjects broke openly with the Athenians only after a period of sustained 
planning and preparation.
58
  This meant that rebellious or recalcitrant poleis had the 
opportunity and time to take countermeasures before and against the (inevitable) 
Athenian reaction and circumvallation of their cities.  As part of their preparations for 
their resistance to the expected Athenian invasion, the inhabitants of poleis wishing to 
break free from or unwilling to submit to Athenian subjection would have removed their 
property—including crops, stored provisions, and livestock—from the chora of their 
polis into its astu as part of their preparations for resistance to invasion, just as the 
inhabitants of every (other) Greek city did when they were threatened by possible 
invasion or siege.
59
  (Related to this point, it should be presumed, too, that poleis 
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 Although this is only explicitly attested for some of the poleis that revolted from or disobeyed Athens, it 
can be taken as certain that this was the case for all those states who tried to liberate themselves from 
Athenian subjection.  For preparations before revolts from Athens, see 1.115.4-5 (Samian planning and 
preparations in 440); 1.58.1, 1.60.1 (Potidaean preparations in 432); 3.2.2 (extensive Mytilenian 
preparations in 428, comprising the construction of triremes, city-walls, and moles for their harbors as well 
as the importation of archers and grain from the Black Sea); 4.123.4 (preparations at Scione in 423).  See, 
too, Kraay (1984) 4:  Mytilene minting a special denomination of electrum coinage on the pattern of the 
Cyzicene stater (“the normal trade currency of the Black Sea”) to pay for the archers and grain from 
Pontus.  See also Kraay (1984) 5: concluding from a hoard of large and varied late fifth century silver 
coinage struck by the polis of Melos that “[i]t looks as though the Melians, shortly before 416, undertook 
the conversion into coin of their stock of silver bullion with a view to purchasing supplies and mercenaries 
to withstand another Athenian attack, which perhaps came sooner than expected.” 
 
59
 Although the evacuation of property from the countryside is never explicitly attested in Thucydides for a 
polis revolting from or refusing to submit to the Athenians (because it could be assumed by his audience), 
that such measures were taken is certain from the many references to the practice found in other contexts.  
For the practice of bringing food and other property from the countryside into the fortified urban center as 
the usual response by a classical Greek polis to a threatened invasion, see Aen. Tact. 7.1, 8.1, 10.3, 15.1-2; 
cf. Xen., Cyr. 3.1.3.  For (late sixth and) fifth century examples of evacuation of food and property from the 
chora surrounding cities, see esp. Hdt. 5.34.1:  the inhabitants of Naxos (in 500), having been forewarned 
of the coming Persian attack on their city by Megabates, Aristagoras, and exiles from their polis, “αὐτίκα 
µὲν ἐσηνείκαντο τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος,” “immediately brought everything from the fields within 
the town walls...”  Thucydides describes the Athenians bringing their property into the city from the 
countryside during the Peloponnesian army’s delay at Oenoe in 431 (2.18.3-4) (cf. 2.13.2, 2.14.1).  See also 
Diod. 13.81.3:  the inhabitants of Akragas in 406, presuming that the Carthaginians would attack their city, 
“ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς τόν τε σῖτον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καρπούς, ἔτι δὲ τὰς κτήσεις ἁπάσας, ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας 
κατακοµίζειν ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν,” “decided to gather not only their grain and other crops but also all their 
possessions from the countryside within their walls.”  At some point in the final years of the fifth century, 
the Milesians, having heard that Tissaphernes was planning to invade their city, “τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν εἰς ἄστυ 
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planning to revolt—since they could choose the timing of their break with Athens—did 
so only after their harvest had been brought in.)
60
  Even in the cases of Potidaea and 
Mytilene, when the Athenians found out about these poleis’ revolts before the 
preparations for the revolts had been fully completed (1.58.2; 3.2.3ff.), the impossibility 
for the Athenians of keeping secret their preparation of amphibious forces to suppress 
these rebellions,
61
 combined with the weeks or even months it would take for the 
Athenians to mobilize their forces and for these forces to reach the theater of 
operations,
62
 meant that the arrival of the Athenian expeditions could have been expected 
and thus prepared for in both cases (i.e., property and provisions could have been taken in 
from the countryside of Potidaea and Mytilene before the expected Athenian amphibious 
                                                                                                                                                 
ἀνεκοµίσαντο,” “brought their property into the town from the fields” (Polyaenus, Strateg. 7.18.2).  For 
fourth century examples, see Plut., Phoc. 11.1:  because of their mistreatment at the hands of Athenian 
generals in the mid-fourth century, the allies of the Athenians in the Aegean came to regard all Athenian 
generals except Phocion as enemies, and therefore as men who obstructed their harbors, and forced them to 
bring their herds, slaves, women, and children into their cities. See also, e.g., Dem. 19.86, 19.125-126 (cf. 
18.36) and Aesch. 2.139 (esp.), 3.79-80 for the evacuation of the Athenian countryside in 346 in response 
to a threatened invasion. 
 
60
 For classical Greek poleis that did not have overwhelming naval superiority—i.e., all those cities other 
than Athens in the fifth century—enemy invasion before harvest could lead to their immediate surrender:  
see, e.g., 4.84.1-2, 4.88.1 (Acanthians joining Brasidas because of fear for their grapes which were still on 
the vine); Xen., Hell. 4.7.1 (Acarnanians surrendering immediately after Agesilaos’ invasion because their 
inland location made replacement of the (threatened) standing crop impossible).  It may have been the fact 
that Aegina and Melos were invaded by the Athenians at times not of their own choosing—and thus 
possibly before the time of the harvest on those islands—that made the sieges of these poleis (relatively) 
short in duration (compared to others in the fifth century). 
 
61
 See 3.3.5 for a classic illustrative example: the Mytilenians were informed of the Athenian dispatch of an 
expedition of forty Athenian triremes (to take them by surprise) in 428 by a man who crossed over from 
Athens to Euboea, went overland to Geraestos, and, coming across there a merchant ship that was putting 
to sea, embarked and, on the third day after leaving Athens, reached Mytilene (to tell the Mytilenians of the 
impending approach of the Athenian fleet).  Cf. Thorne (2001) 234 on the (great) difficulty for a general 
land invasion of achieving surprise. 
 
62
 See van Wees (2004) 215-218 on the process of launching a fleet from Athens possibly taking several 
weeks.  It should be noted, however, that the Athenian force sent out in 432 on news of the revolt of 




force disembarked in their territory).
63
  Thus, even if total evacuation of crops, stored 
provisions and livestock from the countryside of revolting or uncooperative poleis was 
practically impossible,
64
 by the time an Athenian overseas expedition arrived at the 
territory of a revolting polis, there would have been very little left in the countryside 
surrounding its fortified center for the Athenians to forage or pillage.
65
 
 Secondly, tactical considerations—highly constrictive blockades by definition had 
to be continuously manned in order to achieve their aims—compelled Athenian forces 
besieging poleis to remain immobile.  The forces maintaining blockades of cities could 
therefore range only over short distances to forage
66
 (in any case, their range of foraging 
was severely limited by the fact that they were normally besieging cities on small 
                                                 
63
 Thucydides, other contemporary historians, and later authors closely linked unexpected attacks on 
territory with the opportunity to gather much plunder and provisions, on the reasoning that the inhabitants 
of the invaded territory, not expecting an attack, usually left their property in the countryside in times of 
(expected) peace; the implication underlying every description of the plunder deriving from unexpected 
invasions is that attacks that were expected usually failed to find much property to pillage or forage in the 
countryside surrounding an urban center (in contrast to surprise attacks).  For examples of unexpected 
attacks actually gaining (or expected to gain) much booty in Thucydides, see 2.5.4 (and contrast 2.5.7) 
(Theban attack on Plataea in 431); 2.93.4 (Peloponnesian attack on Salamis in the winter of 429/8); 
4.103.5-104.1, 4.104.3, 4.106.1 (see chapter 1 section ivb above); 6.49.3 (see chapter 1 section ivb above 
and Dover, HCT iv.315 ad loc.).  For another contemporary classical Greek historian, see, e.g., Xen., Anab. 
6.2.17 (Arcadian Cyreans’ attack on Bithynian territory in 400); Xen., Hell. 3.4.12 (Agesilaos attacking 
Phrygia in 396); Xen., Hell. 4.7.7 (Agesipolis attacking Argive territory in 388).  Note that ruses linked to 
the use of unexpected attacks to gain large amounts of plunder also appear often in Polyaenus’ Strategica: 
see, e.g., 1.40.2, 3.9.36, 3.9.44. 
 
64
 See Thorne (2001) 242-246; cf. Erdkamp (1998) 138-139. 
 
65
 The inhabitants of poleis expecting an Athenian force to besiege their city may also have taken measures 
to hide food in the countryside or simply to destroy it:  cf. Erdkamp (1998) 138-139 for such measures (and 
also Contamine [1972] 123). 
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islands).   Restricted to foraging over a limited area
67
—and an area from which the 
inhabitants of the (now) besieged polis would have attempted to remove all food stores 
(within their city walls)—the blockading Athenian sailors and soldiers would have 
stripped the land surrounding their circumvallation walls of its remaining food stores in 
(at most) a matter of weeks.
68
  In addition, since a blockade would obviously prevent the 
inhabitants of the invested polis from sowing or planting any crops, there would be no 
opportunity for a force maintaining a blockade to acquire provisions through foraging 
after the first summer and fall of a siege.
69
 
 It was therefore impossible for Athenian sailors and soldiers engaged in 
protracted sieges of coastal or island poleis to subsist on foraging.  Rather, in order to 
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 And see 3.6.1-2:  the forty Athenian triremes that established the naval blockade of Mytilene were almost 
completely shut off from the rest of the island of Lesbos—and therefore would have had no opportunity to 
forage for provisions. 
 
68
 See esp. Erdkamp (1998) 150; and cf. Diod. 16.13.3:  Dionysius II, holed up in the citadel of Syracuse in 
357/356, “πάντων δ’ εὐπορῶν πλὴν σίτου καὶ θαλαττοκρατῶν ἐλῄστευε τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰς τροφὰς ἐκ τῶν 
προνοµῶν κακῶς ποριζόµενος ἐξαπέστειλε ναῦς φορτίδας καὶ χρήµατα πρὸς τὸν τοῦ σίτου καταγορασµόν”; 
“[h]aving plenty of everything but grain and being in control of the sea, he began to raid the countryside 
and, finding it difficult to provide subsistence from his foraging parties, he dispatched merchant ships and 
money to buy grain.”  For stationary pre-industrial European military forces quickly eating out the area 
surrounding their camps, and therefore having to rely on a method of food supply other than foraging, cf., 
e.g., Contamine (1972) 123; Mallett (1974) 139; Engels (1978) 45-46; Keegan (1993) 302; Roth (1999) 
171, 299; Bachrach (2002) 86-89.  Cf. also Harari (2000) 310: “it seems that [northern European medieval] 
armies relying on local supply [i.e. foraging] alone usually could not camp in enemy country much longer 
than a week.”  We might contrast here the very restricted opportunities for foraging available to Athenian 
amphibious forces blockading strongly fortified and forewarned Greek urban centers with the experiences 
of the Cyreans on their parabasis along the southern Black Sea coast.  Not restricted to their bases by 
tactical considerations, and operating in a surrounding territory with many unfortified (or weakly fortified) 
non-Greek settlements, the relatively small numbers of Cyreans (between seven and nine thousand men on 
this part of the march (Lee [2007] Table 2)) were able to (partly) subsist by foraging for more than a month 
during their stays at Trapezus, Cotyora, and Calpe (Lee [2007] 205-206) (“partly” because the mercenaries 
also acquired provisions through purchase during each of these halts (see chapter 3 section iiia)).  Note, 
however, that during their stay at Heraclea—where there were no surrounding non-Greek settlements to 
pillage or cultivated territory to forage in—the Cyreans did not consider foraging or pillaging as a viable 
means of acquiring provisions for their onward journey from that polis (see again chapter 3 section iiia). 
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ensure their permanent security of supply, so that they could maintain a continuous 
blockade,
70
 Athenian besieging forces required a continuous supply of external 
provisions:  in other words, the Athenian forces blockading rebellious or recalcitrant 
poleis were completely dependent for their provisions on continuous sea-borne supply 
lines.
71
  Permanent security of supply for Athenian blockades of maritime poleis 
therefore required naval superiority (in order to guarantee the integrity of their supply 
lines):
72
  but the complete control Athens enjoyed over the Aegean in the fifth century 
prior to 412 ensured that the continuous supply of provisions required for Athenian siege 
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 See Erdkamp (1998) 150 for the phrase “permanent security of supply.” 
 
71 But not just Athenian forces.  See Isoc. 18.60:  an Athenian telling a court of his patriotic acts as a 
trierarch during the siege of Athens by Peloponnesian forces in 405/4 states:  “τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον προειπόντος 
Λυσάνδρου, εἴ τις εἰσάγοι σῖτον ὡς ὑµᾶς, θάνατον τὴν ζηµίαν, οὕτω φιλοτίµως εἴχοµεν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, 
ὥστε τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲ τὸν σφέτερον αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν τολµώντων ἡµεῖς τὸν ὡς ἐκείνους εἰσπλέοντα 
λαµβάνοντες εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατήγοµεν”; “finally, when Lysander proclaimed that if anyone should import 
grain to you he would be punished with death, we were so zealous for the city’s welfare that although no 
one else dared to bring in even his own, we intercepted the grain that was being brought into them and 
discharged it at the Piraeus.”  Cf. Diod. 20.82.4-5, 20.84.6:  hundreds of ships sailing to the force of 
Demetrius Poliorcetes during his siege of Rhodes in 305/4 for the sake of trade.  For the necessity of sea-
borne supply lines in supporting lengthy operations in which continuous pressure on the enemy was the 
paramount strategic requirement, see Harari (2000) 327-328.  See also Engels (1978) 45-46, 61, 120-121 
for stationary military forces needing access to the sea (or a navigable river) in order to acquire provisions.  
Cf. Erdkamp (1998) 150; Roth (1999) 171:  “[w]hen the army was forced to remain immobile, local 
resources were quickly used up and everything had to be brought in by way of supply lines.”  Cf. also, e.g., 
Leyser (1993) 94-95, Bachrach (2002) 89-96 for access to sea-borne supplies crucial to the success of the 
First Crusades’ siege of Antioch. 
 
72
 Erdkamp (1998) 55; see also Rawlings (2007) 136.  Cf. Dem. 19.123 (delivered in the summer of 343:  
Demosthenes prosecuting Aeschines for malversation committed by him as a member of the embassy sent 
to Macedonia in the year 346):  if the Athenians had attempted to provide aid to the Phocians, it would have 
been impossible for Philip to remain at Thermopylae since “οὔτε γὰρ σῖτος ἦν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, ἀσπόρῳ διὰ τὸν 
πόλεµον γεγονυίᾳ, οὔθ’ ἡ σιτοποµπία δυνατή τριήρων οὐσῶν ὑµετέρων ἐκεῖ καὶ τῆς θαλάττης κρατουσῶν, 
αἵ τε πόλεις πολλαὶ καὶ χαλεπαὶ λαβεῖν αἱ τῶν Φωκέων, µὴ οὐ χρόνῳ καὶ πολιορκίᾳ...”; “[t]here was no 
grain in the country, as the war had prevented sowing; and the conveyance of grain was impossible so long 
as your fleet was there and commanded the sea.  The Phocian cities were numerous, and not easy of 




operations was never halted (or even threatened) by a hostile fleet.
73
  (The Athenians’ 
overwhelming superiority over the Aegean and the seas around ‘mainland’ Greece also 
enabled them to ensure uninterrupted security of grain supplies to the Piraeus and to the 
ports of their allies connected by “long walls” to their urban centers;
74
 it also enabled the 
Athenians to maintain unbroken supply lines to their garrisons scattered around the coasts 
of the Aegean and western Greece.)
75
  Because of their control of the sea, the sea-borne 
                                                 
73
 For Athenian control of the Aegean in the fifth century, see esp. 1.142.5-1.143.5, 2.62.2, 3.32.3, 5.97.1, 
5.109.1; and ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. 2.2-7, 2.11-12, 2.14, 2.16 (with, e.g., the good brief discussion at Rawlings 
[2007] 111-112).  See also next two notes.  Note also 7.57.7:  the Cephallenians and Zacynthians, though 
nominally independent allies, having to accompany the Sicilian expedition since, as islanders, they were 
forced to because of Athenian control of the sea.  See also, e.g., IG I
3
 174.11-18:  the Athenians believing 
(at some point between 430 and 410) that they were in control of the sea including (apparently) access to 
the Gulf of Corinth.  Complete Athenian control over the Aegean was established with the defeat of the 
Persian fleet at the Eurymedon (1.100.1) and survived until the beginning of the Ionian War, despite 
localized attempts to challenge it (which were always unsuccessful:  1.100.2 (Thasos), 1.105.1 
(Cecryphalia), 1.105.2 (Aegina), 1.116-1.117 (Samos), 3.4.2 (Mytilene)).  When control of the sea was 
contested, convoys of supply ships could be attacked:  see all in chapter 1 section iva; and Diod. 13.88.3-5 
(Carthaginian naval attacks on Syracusan ships transporting grain to Akragas in 406); Diod. 15.3.3 
(Evagoras attacking merchant ships supplying Persian forces operating on Cyprus in 386); Diod. 16.13.3 
(Syracusan triremes attacking merchant ships carrying grain to Dionysius II in 357/6).  In these 
circumstances, supply ships had to be accompanied by trireme support:  see Diod. 14.64.1 (Syracusan 
triremes escorting a supply of provisions against possible Carthaginian attacks in 396); Polyaenus, Strateg. 
5.13.1 (with Salmon [1984] 129-130 n.11) (Corinthian triremes escorting supply ships at some point during 
the Peloponnesian War (?)).  Contrast 2.67.4 (with section iii below):  ships carrying grain to an Athenian 
amphibious expedition operating around the Peloponnese in the early years of the Peloponnesian War 
(apparently) unaccompanied by trireme support. 
 
74
 The building of long walls at Athens in 459:  1.107.1 (but see Plut., Cim. 13.6 for a slightly earlier date).  
For the building of long walls at other cities allied to Athens, see 1.103.4 (Megara (in 459)) (cf. Plut., Phoc. 
15.2 for the rebuilding of long walls between Nisaea and Megara in the later fourth century for the same 
purpose); 5.52.2 (Patrae (in 419)); and esp. 5.82.5:  the democracy at Argos building long walls down to the 
sea in 417, in order that, “ἢν τῆς γῆς εἴργωνται, ἡ κατὰ θάλασσαν σφᾶς µετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγὴ 
τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ὠφελῇ”; “should they be cut off from the land, they might with the help of the Athenians 
have the advantage of importing supplies by sea” (these walls were destroyed by the Spartans in the 
following winter (5.83.2)).  (For the building of long walls at Corinth in the middle of the fifth century, see 
Salmon [2001] 197; cf. Hornblower, CT i.197.) For (brief) discussion of the subject, see esp. Gomme, HCT 
i.18; Osborne (1987) 154; Tchernia and Viviers (2000) 774; cf. Rawlings (2007) 135; Strauss (2007) 237-
238.  Cf. also IG I
3
 61, IG I
3
 62.1-5 (with, e.g., Rhodes [2007a] 35):  decrees regulating the import of grain 
from the Black Sea to Methone and Aphytis showing that the Athenians could use their control of the sea to 
allow their allies import what they needed. 
 
75
 Garrisons were characterized by Thucydides as (solely) dependent on (sea-borne) imports for their 
supplies:  see 7.28.1, describing Athens after the Peloponnesian occupation of Decelea:  “τῶν δὲ πάντων 
ὁµοίως ἐπακτῶν ἐδεῖτο ἡ πόλις, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ πόλις εἶναι φρούριον κατέστη”; “everything alike which the 
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supply of Athenian siege operations during the Peloponnesian War could (usually) be 
assumed by Thucydides.
76
  It was only in the extraordinary conditions of the blockade of 
Sphacteria that Thucydides described an Athenian blockading force experiencing 
difficulties in acquiring provisions through sea-borne imports:  since the Athenian force 
at Pylos was operating in an uninhabited area surrounded by enemy states,
77
 and because 
                                                                                                                                                 
city needed had to be imported, and Athens ceased to be a city and became a garrisoned fortress.”  Cf. IG I
3 
174.11-17:  Lycon the Achaean permitted by the Athenians (some time between 430 and 410) to sail and 
trade from Achaea to all places controlled by the Athenians and their garrisons:  “τὴν δὲ ναῦν ἣν δ`ται 
ἐκκοµίσασθαι ἐξ Ἀχαιΐας ἐκκοµισάσθω καὶ ἐξ`ναι αὐτῶι πλ`ν καὶ χρήµατα ἐσάγεν ὅσης Ἀθηναῖοι 
κρατbσι, καὶ ἐς τὰ Ἀθην[α]ίων φρόρια” (see Mackil [2003] 410-411 for brief discussion and references).  
See also IG I
3 
175:  a separate very fragmentary inscription from the same period as IG I
3 
174 apparently 
granting the same allowances to sail and trade with all places controlled by the Athenians and their 
garrisons (see Walbank [1978] 286 and Lewis (at IG I
3
 p.176) for this inscription not being a copy of IG I
3 
174).  The raiding characteristic of Athenian garrisons in hostile territory was not (primarily) for 
provisions:  see chapter 1 section ivb.  For a listing and (excellent) discussion of Athenian overseas 
garrisons in the fifth century, see Moreno (2007) 126ff. (numbers of men in garrisons mostly unknown but 
small (in the low hundreds rather than thousands)).  Cf. Horden and Purcell (2000) 135 for the existence of 
these garrisons made possible by supply from the sea.  Note that overseas garrisons were associated with 
(considerable) expense:  4.3.2-3; 8.4 (the Athenians in 413/412 abandoning the recently built fortress on 
Cythera as part of their efforts to cut expenditures after the Sicilian disaster (though see Andrewes, HCT 
v.11 ad loc. (Pylos not abandoned at this time)); cf. IG I
3
 375.10 for a payment of six talents in 410/9 for 
the garrison at Pylos; and IG I
3
 377.20 for a payment of one talent for the fortress at Thorikos between 
409/8 and 407/6. 
 
76 In Thucydides’ narrative, it is, in fact, only in the recklessly exaggerated Athenian “grand plan” to reduce 
the whole Peloponnese by blockade—imagined into existence by Alcibiades to goad the Spartans into 
supporting Syracuse—that the resources of Athens (and the Aegean) were considered not great enough to 
fund and provision an Athenian blockading force (for discussion of Alcibiades’ plan, see, e.g., Robinson 
[1999] 141; Debnar (2001) 207-210; Hornblower, CT iii.511; Fields [2008] 45).  Alcibiades told the 
Spartans that the Athenians wished to capture not just Sicily, but also Italy and Carthage, too (6.90.2); 
deploying the manpower and resources of these areas, they would blockade the Peloponnese (“τὴν 
Πελοπόννησον πέριξ πολιορκοῦντες”) and reduce the cities one-by-one in land operations (6.90.3) (see 
Dover [1965a] 91 ad “τὴν Πελοπόννησον πέριξ πολιορκοῦντες”:  “[t]his is essentially a metaphor; the fleet 
corresponds to a circumvallation which seals off the enemy from supplies and communications, whereas 
operations on land correspond to the assaults on a besieged city”).  Alcibiades ended his description of the 
supposed Athenian plan by adding that “χρήµατα δἑ καὶ σῖτον, ὥστε εὐπορώτερον γίγνεσθαί τι αὐτῶν, 
αὐτὰ τὰ προσγενόµενα ἐκεῖθεν χωρία ἔµελλε διαρκῆ ἄνευ τῆς ἐνθένδε προσόδου παρέξειν...”; “money and 
grain for the better execution of these plans were to be supplied in sufficient quantities by the newly 
acquired places in those countries [i.e., Sicily, Italy, Carthage], independently of our revenues here at 
home” (6.90.4).  It was, then, only for this ‘make-believe’ campaign and the fantastically enormous force 
Alcibiades conjures up for it that the Athenians would have to obtain resources from outside Athens and the 
general area of the Aegean. 
 
77
 Although Demosthenes could send for a force from the allies nearby to Pylos (4.30.3)—i.e. the 
Zacynthians and Cephallenians (see 3.94.1 and pp.155-156 n.118 below) (Corcyra was experiencing a civil 
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it would be impossible to send grain-carrying ships from Athens the relatively long 
distance (around the notoriously stormy and dangerous Cape Malea) to Pylos during 
winter (it had been difficult to do so even during the summer),
78
 the Athenians feared the 
blockade of Sphacteria might have to be raised.
79
  In contrast, Athenian forces engaged in 
                                                                                                                                                 
war at this time)—the possibility that supplies might reach the Athenian forces at Pylos from these allies is 
not considered by the Athenians (see 4.27.1 at n.79 below).  It is impossible to know why.  The fact that 
Zacynthus and Cephallenia formed part of a regional economy with Corcyra rather than the Peloponnese 
could go some way to explaining this (see Kraay [1976] 96 for Zacynthus and Cephallenia minting on a 
standard derived from Corcyra rather than on the Aeginetan standard common in the Peloponnese).  But 
there may also been contingent local and temporary factors (e.g., an unusually poor harvest, weather 
conditions)—unnecessary for Thucydides to include in his account of the military operations at 
Pylos/Sphacteria and thus unknowable to us—that excluded the possibility of supplies from these islands 
from the considerations of the Athenians.  It should be noted here that, by the time of the assault on 
Sphacteria, there were somewhere over fifteen and a half thousand Athenian sailors and soldiers at Pylos 
(see Wilson [1979] 65-66, 104-105) and that roughly three months elapsed between the arrival of the first 
forty ships from Athens at Pylos and the final assault on Sphacteria (see Wilson [1979] 124-125). 
 
78
 For the difficulties of sailing around the western coast of the Peloponnese, see Braudel (1972) 1118, 
Pryor (1988) 93.  Cf. Diod. 13.64.6:  an Athenian fleet of thirty triremes sent to relieve the garrison at Pylos 
(from Spartan investment and attack) in 409 was unable to round Cape Malea because of storms. 
 
79
 4.27.1:  “ἠπόρουν καὶ ἐδεδοίκεσαν µὴ σφῶν χειµὼν τὴν φυλακὴν ἐπιλάβοι, ὁρῶντες τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων 
τὴν περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον κοµιδὴν ἀδύνατον ἐσοµένην, ἅµα ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήµῳ καὶ οὐη’ ἐν θέρει οἷοί τε 
ὄντες ἱκανὰ περιπέµπειν, τόν τε ἔφορµον χωρίων ἀλιµένων ὄντων οὐκ ἐσόµενον”; “[the Athenians] were 
perplexed and became apprehensive that the winter would overtake them while still engaged in the 
blockade.  They saw that conveyance of supplies round the Peloponnese would be impossible—Pylos being 
a desolate place at best, to which they were unable even in summer to send round adequate supplies—and 
that, since there were no harbors in the neighborhood, the blockade would be a failure.”  See also 4.3.3 
(with Wilson [1979] 48-50 contra Gomme, HCT iii.439) and 4.9.1 for Pylos and the territory surrounding it 
being uninhabited; see section iii below for the western coast of the Peloponnese either being uninhabited 
or hostile to the Athenians at this time.  Note that because of the very restricted storage space on-board 
triremes and their limited seakeeping capability, “naval blockades [mounted by triremes] could not 
permanently guard hostile coasts or harbours without a nearby harbour to use as a base and to take shelter 
from adverse weather” (Erdkamp [1998] 55; cf. Guilmartin [1974] 16ff.).  From Thucydides’ description of 
the extraordinary difficulties facing the Athenian forces blockading Sphacteria, some of the facilities 
expected for a normal base of operations for a blockade can be reconstructed:  a water supply (4.26.1); 
space (to eat, amongst other things) (4.26.3, 4.30.2); a harbor (and anchorage) (4.27.1, 4.26.4).  To these 
could be added (cf. Davies [2007a] 81-82):  space for an agora; and facilities for traders to unload 




the blockades of poleis in the Aegean—operating surrounded by allies and (relatively) 
near to Athens—could be supplied safely by short coastal trips all year round.
80
 
  The provisions imported to Athenian siege bases in the fifth century were 
transported and owned by private traders; the sailors and soldiers maintaining the 
blockades of coastal or island poleis acquired their provisions from these traders by 
purchase.  That purchase was the primary means of acquisition of provisions for fifth 
century Athenian besieging forces engaged was shown by the analysis of 1.11 above; that 
these provisions were purchased from private traders can be demonstrated both from the 
two explicit references we possess for the provisioning of Athenian sieges in the fifth 
century and from consideration of the institutional structures of classical Greek poleis.  
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 See again 6.21.2 with chapter 1 section i, and Erdkamp (1998) 55ff.  Only one Athenian full-scale 
circumvallation siege of a walled city in the fifth century (before the Sicilian disaster) was unsuccessful:  
the siege of Kition on Cyprus in 451 (1.112.2-4). (Diodorus has it that the Athenians under Cimon captured 
Kition (and Marion) by siege (12.3.3) but his whole account of this campaign is confused (see Gomme, 
HCT i.330), and Thucydides’ account should be preferred.)  One hundred and forty triremes blockaded (see 
pp.135-136 above) the city until they were compelled to retire by the death of Cimon and by scarcity of 
provisions: “καὶ λιµοῦ γενοµένου” (1.112.4) (some earlier scholars preferred to read λοιµοῦ instead of λιµοῦ 
here (see Gomme, HCT i.330 for brief discussion), but this alternate should be dismissed:  see 
Classen/Steup i.292 ad loc.)  Thucydides’ summary account is brief and provides no reasons for the dearth 
of provisions suffered by the Athenian-led besiegers (see Osborne [2000a] 3-4 on the summary nature and 
goals of Thucydides’ narrative of the Pentekontaetia).  But, based on the preceding discussion, we can mark 
out four crucial differences between the conditions confronting the participants in the siege of Kition and 
those facing forces taking part in the “normal” sieges of poleis in the Aegean that may have led to the 
shortage of food on Cyprus.  Firstly, the Athenian-led force was exceptionally large—twenty-eight 
thousand men (140 triremes x 200 men per trireme)—and all of these men remained at Kition as long as the 
siege lasted (see again pp.135-136 above).  Secondly, the Athenians were operating surrounded by hostile 
territory.  Thirdly, they were undertaking the blockade at a great distance not just from Athens but from 
their allies in the Aegean.  Both of these latter two factors would have made re-provisioning for the 
besiegers at Kition extremely difficult.  Fourthly, any external supplies which were sent to the force 
blockading Kition may have been delayed or even intercepted by enemy naval forces from Phoenicia, 
Cyprus, and Cilicia (1.112.4).  Thus, the exceptionally large demand of the Athenian-led force at Kition, 
together with a combination of exceptional factors that prevented or may have prevented this demand from 
being met by continuous external supply, probably led to the famine among the besiegers on Cyprus and 
the raising of the blockade.  The force under Cimon besieging Eion in 476 also suffered from lack of 
provisions—among the challenges that faced it was “fiery famine” (“λιµόν τ’αἴθωνα”) (Plut., Cim. 7)—
although this did not prevent it from successfully reducing the city by blockade (see pp.132-133 n.37 
above).  A force under Pericles failed to take Oeniadae by siege (assault and blockade) in 453 (1.111.3; 
Plut., Per. 19.3) but Oeniadae here was not the sole target of a major full-scale Athenian amphibious 




Again, Thucydides normally took for granted the provisioning of Athenian and other 
Greek overseas expeditions—but he did mention it in some limited circumstances:
81
  for 
example, when it helped to clarify the strategic geography of military operations,
82
 or 
when provisioning facilities became inadvertently involved in fighting.
83
  Thus—after 
narrating that the Athenians had brought their ships to a station south of Mytilene, 
fortified two camps, one on each side of the city, and instituted a blockade of both of the 
harbors of the city (3.6.1)—Thucydides stated that, although the Mytilenians were now 
shut off from the sea, they still commanded the whole of the countryside,  
τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα οὐ πολὺ κατεῖχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ναύσταθµον δὲ µᾶλλον 
ἦν αὐτοῖς πλοίων καὶ ἀγορὰ ἡ Μαλέα. 
 
the Athenians only holding a limited area round their camps, and using Malea 




Likewise, in describing the course of the blockade of Melos in the summer of 416, 
Thucydides noted that 
εἷλον δὲ καὶ οἱ Μήλιοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ περιτειχίσµατος τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν 
προσβαλόντες νυκτός, καὶ ἄνδρας τε ἀπέκτειναν καὶ ἐσενεγκάµενοι σίτόν τε καὶ 
ὅσα πλεῖστα ἐδύναντο χρήσιµα ἀναχωρήσαντες ἡσύχαζον: καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι 
ἄµεινον τὴν φυλακὴν τὸ ἔπειτα παρεσκευάζοντο. 
 
meanwhile the Melians attacked by night and took the part of the Athenian lines 
near the market, and killed some of the men, and brought in grain and all else that 
                                                 
81
 See again introduction section iv. 
 
82
 Cf. 1.62.1 (with section v below). 
 
83
 Cf. 8.95.4 (with section iv below). 
 
84
 Cf. Gomme, HCT ii.257 on µᾶλλον ἦν:  “more than what?  Perhaps ‘more than the other one’:  i.e. Malea 
is the site of one of the two camps.  But, more probably, a station was maintained at Malea, separate from 
both camps, and this was used for the import of supplies; i.e. ‘rather as a ναύσταθµον πλοίων καὶ ἀγορὰ 




they could find useful to them, and so returned and kept quiet, while the 




When the provisioning of Athenian blockades of maritime poleis does burst to the surface 
of Thucydides’ narrative, then, it takes place through the institution of the agora.  And—
crucially—the fact that Thucydides can mention these agorai in such a casual and 
offhand manner (without, that is, feeling the need to explain or elaborate on the reasons 
for their presence in the Athenian bases at Mytilene and Melos) demonstrates that he (and 
his audience) assumed agorai to be a normal part of Athenian siege bases—and the 
normal means of provisioning for Athenian sieges of maritime poleis. 
 Markets supplied by private traders were the only mechanism available to the 
Athenian state in the fifth century to acquire provisions for its amphibious forces engaged 
in blockades.
86
  Requisitioning of provisions was used only for the unique requirements 
of the Sicilian expedition.
87
  Direct supply of provisions for military forces through 
                                                 
85
 The translation is Crawley’s.  Andrewes (HCT iv.189) (followed by Hornblower, CT iii.253) rejected the 
identification of the agora mentioned here with the agora set up for the Athenian force blockading the 
Melians.  He did this on the grounds that the Melians are the subject (and thus one would expect the agora 
to be theirs) and that “there is some expectation that the landmark is something permanent.”  But taking the 
agora to be the Athenians’ does no great violence to Thucydides’ Greek—he describes the agora with 
reference to the Athenians’ circumvallation wall—and he gives no indication that the agora should be a 
permanent one; moreover, the fact that the Melians were able to gather grain and other useful goods during 
their attack makes most sense if they had attacked an area of the Athenian camp in which such goods were 
stored—i.e., the agora (Andrewes does not deal satisfactorily with this objection to his position).  For 
previous editors taking the agora mentioned at 5.115.4 as that part of the Athenian camp which they used 




 Erdkamp (1998) 12-18 provides the framework for the discussion in this paragraph. 
 
87
 See chapter 1 section ii.  Direct contributions from subjects/allies were always exacted in money:  see 
section iv below.  Although requisitioning from allies/subjects was not used by the Athenians to acquire 
provisions for overseas expeditions, it appears that it was sometimes used to provision the Athenian 
archontes stationed in the poleis of the empire:  see IG I
3
 62.5-6:  the polis of Therambos required to supply 
food (in proportion to its population (Meritt [1980] 23)) to the Athenian archontes in Aphytis (“τὸς δὲ 
ἄρχοντας σιk[τοδοτόντων] τὸς ἐν Ἄ[φυτι παρ’ ἑαυτῶ]ν Θραµβαῖοι κατὰ τ[ὸ] πλῆθος”).  Rawlings ([2007] 
118) cites ps.-Arist., Oec. 2.2.8, 1347b3-15 as evidence that trireme crews were sometimes provisioned for 
overseas expeditions by purchasing grain from accompanying state tamiai (treasurers)—grain that had been 
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contractors possessing access to large amounts of capital, and with networks of agents 
spread over wide areas, was impossible, since such men did not exist in the classical 
Greek world:  the absence of the legal concept of partnership or corporation, together 
with the lack of development of the concept of agency, limited trading enterprises to a 
one- to two-person scale and therefore prevented the development of private contractors 
who could have provisioned overseas expeditions numbering thousands of men.
88
  In 
addition, the Athenian state in the fifth century did not directly tax the crops of its 
citizens in kind,
89
 and thus could not directly supply its overseas expeditions through 
                                                                                                                                                 
forcibly purchased by the state in question (Heraclea Pontica) from merchants.  But Rawlings misses the 
point that the Heracleots’ measure is an atypically clever stratagem to raise funds and provide supplies for a 
fleet and therefore cannot be used as evidence for the normal provisioning of naval/overseas expeditions 
(see chapter 4 section iii below on using evidence from ps.-Aristotle’s Oeconomica).  Gomme (HCT i.16) 
was incorrect to list purchase, requisition, and foraging and raiding as the main methods of acquisition of 
supplies for classical Greek overseas expeditions. 
 
88
 No legal concept of partnership or corporation:  see Harris (1989).  Lack of development of concept of 
agency:  Reed (2003) 36-37.  One- to two-man trading enterprises:  Reed (2003) 18, 38 (no “large classical 
trading “combines””), 79, 85-88.  The one trading network throughout the eastern Greek Mediterranean 
attested for the classical period—that of Cleomenes, deputy of Alexander in Egypt, in the 320s (Reed 
[2003] 37 and n.17)—was an illegal enterprise and had no legal or institutional basis.  The Athenian state 
did once purchase provisions in bulk from a satrap in the late 360s for a force operating in Asia Minor (see 
Briant [1994] 71-72 for reference and discussion), but this was an exceptional measure. 
 
89
 With the exception of the anomalous cases of Sparta and Crete, no classical Greek directly taxed crops in 
kind; and direct state taxation on crops or property raised in coin was irregular, levied only for wars (e.g. 
the Athenian eisphora (Thomsen [1977])) or in other times of pressing financial need (see, e.g., Littman 
[1988]; Möller [2007] 377-378; for discussion of those few examples of direct taxation (in coin) attested 
for the classical period, see Pleket [1973] 251-252; Migeotte [2003]) (Isager and Skydsgaard ([1993] 137-
141), Hodkinson ([2000] 191), and Bresson ([2008a] 109-110) are wrong to imply that direct taxation was 
regular in the classical Greek world).  See esp. ps.-Arist., Oec. 2.1.4, 1346a6-8:  in contrast to provincial 
satraps (2.1.4, 1345b29), poleis receive no revenues “ἀπὸ γῆς.”  See, too, ps.-Arist., Rhet. Alex. 
38.1446b17-20:  taxes on crops not included in the usual revenues of a polis.  One has to go back to the 
archaic period for a (doubtful) mention of taxes in kind in Athens:  see Bresson (2000) 208.  (Note that the 
grain received by the sanctuary of Eleusis that was not used for sacrifices was sold on the open market:  see 
Stroud [1998] 110).  The measures of Agyrrhios’ grain-tax law of 374/3 (Stroud [1998]), decreeing a tax-
in-kind of 8⅓% on the crops of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros—the proceeds of which were to be sold at 
reduced prices in the agora at Athens (ll.41-55)—seem to have been implemented for a few years at most 
(see Rhodes and Osborne [2000] ad loc.).  Note finally, in this regard, Curtis (2001) 278-279:  classical 
Greek states did not develop large-scale public grain storage facilities; as for Athens, “[o]n present 
evidence, it seems that the Athenians did not maintain a large central grain reserve; the state paid close 
attention to the acquisition of grain from Attica or abroad, through private traders, and sought to control its 
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state agents from its own resources.
90
  Rather, the Athenians provided solely monetary 
pay (“µισθός” or “τροφή”)91 to their sailors and soldiers, part of which was to be used to 
buy provisions in markets.
92
  In every blockade the Athenian state ever undertook of a 
coastal or island polis during the fifth century, then, its forces always acquired their food 




                                                                                                                                                 
availability, primarily in an unprocessed state, in the markets” ((ibid.)).  Lines 15-16 of the grain-tax law of 
374/3 show that Athens had no regular public storage facility for grain at this date. 
 
90
 Note that even the grain allowances for Athenian cavalry were distributed in cash, and not in kind:  see 
Bugh (1988) 58-62 for discussion of IG I
3
 375, the accounts of the treasury of Athena for the year 410/9, 
and the only accounts of her treasury that record σῖτος payments for cavalry.  In contrast to the Hellenistic 
period (see appendix 6 section iii), the payment in kind of classical Greek military forces is (almost) 
unattested:  Iphicrates’ distribution of grain to his force at Corcyra (ps-Aristot., Oec. 2.2.24, 1350b20-30) 
seems to have been an opportunistic distributions of spoils of war (see Xen., Hell. 6.2.31, 33, 38). 
  
91
 See chapter 5 sections i, iv and chapter 6 section ix for discussion of these terms. 
 
92
 Note esp., in this regard, that no portion of the pay of classical Greek sailors or soldiers was ever 
“stopped” to take account of the state’s expense in providing supplies to them (contrast military payment 
practices in medieval France (Contamine [1972] 127) and Tudor England (Davies [1964] 235, 238)).  The 
following scholars who refer to Athenian sailors and soldiers receiving both pay and provisions from the 
state are therefore incorrect:  Amit (1965) 51; Jordan (1975) 112-113; Kallet-Marx (1993) 12, 47; de Souza 
(1999) 33; Samons (2000) 88 nn.24, 26, 104 n.98, 105; Hanson (2005) 251.  In addition to the general 
considerations raised here, see also chapter 6 section ix and appendix 4 for detailed refutation of Griffith’s 
view ([1935] 264-273) that classical Greek military forces received part of their pay in kind.  (See also 
p.154 n.111 below:  Plut., Mor. 349A should not be taken as providing evidence, as has sometimes been 




 Pritchett thought that state pay was not introduced until soon before the (second) Peloponnesian War 
([1971] 7-14; followed by Kallet-Marx [1993] 10) and that Athenian sailors must have received rations in 
kind before then ([1971] 35).  But, firstly, as just demonstrated, Athens did not have state reserves of grain 
in this period from which to distribute rations to its sailors; and, secondly, state naval (monetary) pay (and 
only monetary pay) is attested for other Greek states from the last quarter of the sixth century and for 
Athens from 480 onwards—see the discussion and collections of evidence at Wallace (1974) 25-26; van 
Wees (2004) 237; Burrer (2008) 75-76.  We can therefore take it that Athenian amphibious forces engaged 
in blockades before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War also received pay which they used to buy their 
provisions.  In the light of this discussion, it can be seen that Strauss ([2007] 244) is incorrect to state that 
“raiding the countryside” and markets were the main methods of provisioning classical sieges without 




iii. The provisioning of Athenian periploi around the Peloponnese 
 During the first and second Peloponnesian Wars, Athens frequently dispatched 
amphibious expeditions of (relatively) short duration to devastate the Peloponnese.  The 
goal of these expeditions was to exert economic pressure on the Spartans and their allies 
through the destruction of their crops and property;
94
 Athenian periploi did not aim at the 
permanent occupation of territory or attempt to undertake full-scale blockades of enemy 
poleis (they did sometimes, however, opportunistically capture smaller, isolated 
settlements).
95
  The Athenians mounted (at least) three of these amphibious operations in 
the first Peloponnesian War:  in 458 or 457 (with an uncertain number of triremes and 
infantry);
96
 in 456 or 455 under Tolmides with (apparently) fifty triremes and one or four 
thousand hoplites;
97
 in 454 or 453 under Pericles with (apparently) one hundred 
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 For the exertion of economic pressure as the main strategic aim of Athenian periploi, see esp. 1.143.4 (cf. 
1.142.3) and Thorne (2001) 236-238 (cf. Westlake [1945] 83-84).  For devastation as the strategy of 
Athenian periploi, see esp. ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. 2.4-5; Westlake (1945) 80-84 and Thorne (2001) 236-238.  
In his (fuller) descriptions of the periploi of the second Peloponnesian war, Thucydides (nearly) always 
uses the language of devastation, i.e.  δῄουν (2.25.3, 2.25.5, 4.45.1, 4.54.4, 4.56.1, 4.56.2, 6.105.2, 7.26.2), 
τέµνειν (1.143.4, 2.56.4, 2.56.5, 2.56.6, 2.57.2), or κακόω (2.25.1) to describe their activities (cf. Thorne 
[2001] 237 n.36); see also ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. 2.4:  Athenian periploi are able to “τέµνειν τὴν γὴν τῶν 
κρειττόνων.”  But see next note. 
 
95
 See esp. Westlake (1945) 83; cf. Thorne (2001) 238.  See, e.g., 3.7.1, 3.16.2 for an Athenian periplous 
plundering minor coastal settlements (πορθεῖν in both cases) in 428; 4.57.3 for the small settlement of 
Thyrea being plundered (“ἐξεπόρθησαν”) by an amphibious expedition under the leadership of Nicias in 
424.  The same expedition had (exceptionally) the capture of a minor settlement (Cythera) as its primary 
aim; having achieved which, it then devastated Peloponnesian territory (4.53.1-4.57.3).  Cf. p.154 n.112 for 
the storming of minor settlements by Athenian periploi.  See also below p.160 on Pericles’ failed attempt to 
capture Oeniadae by siege in 453.  Note that Athenian periploi did sometimes establish garrisons in 
Peloponnesian territory:  see pp.143-145 above and p.152 n.105 below. 
 
96
 See 1.107.3 with Ryder (1978), Davies (2007a) 84. 
 
97
 1.108.5; see Hornblower, CT i.173 for the date.  Fifty triremes:  Diod. 11.84.6.  One thousand hoplites:  






  Athens sent massive amphibious forces to raid the Peloponnese in the first 
two years of the second Peloponnesian War:  one hundred triremes with one thousand 
hoplites and four hundred archers on-board (joined later by at least fifty triremes from 
their allies in the north-west) in 431;
99
 one hundred and fifty triremes (of which fifty were 
from Chios and Lesbos), four thousand hoplites, and three hundred horse in 430.
100
  But 
these expeditions necessitated enormous expenditures that were not sustainable 
(especially when coupled with the costs of the siege of Potidaea).
101
  Later amphibious 
expeditions around the Peloponnese were accordingly on a (sometimes much) smaller 
scale:  thirty ships in 428 (3.7.1);
102
 thirty ships in 426 (3.91.1); eighty ships, two 
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 1.111.2-3.  One hundred triremes:  Plut., Per. 19.2-3.  The Athenian alliance with Megara (1.103.4) made 
the possible the embarkation of the force under Pericles from Pegae rather than Athens (see Davies [2007a] 
84-85 on the importance of Pegae for the Athenians in these years); the periplous in 458 or 457 may also 
have been launched from Pegae rather than Athens (Ryder [1978] 123).  The loss of Pegae in the settlement 
with the Spartans and the allies at the end of the first Peloponnesian War (1.115.1) meant that all Athenian 
periploi in the second Peloponnesian War were launched from Athens. 
 
99
 See 2.17.4, 2.23.2, 2.25.1 (the force from Athens reinforced by fifty Corcyran triremes and some other 
triremes from the allies in those parts).  The infantry and archers mentioned at 2.23.2 by Thucydides were 




 2.56.1-2.  Westlake, noting the greater numbers of heavy infantry on this expedition and the presence of 
horses (for which horse-transports were now constructed for the first time (2.56.2)), states that “it is... 
probable that the raids of 431 disclosed the need for stronger and more mobile landing-parties if the work 
of devastation was to be sufficiently thorough and cover a sufficiently wide area” ([1945] 82).  Note also 
Rhodes (1988) 234 commenting on the presence of the Chians and the Lesbians on this expedition:  “[t]hey 
had not joined in the expedition of 431, which went to the west side of Greece; Athens’ western allies did 
not join in this expedition [which only went as far as Prasiae in Laconia].” 
 
101
 See Rhodes (1988) 210 for this point.  For the massive drain on Athenian state finances in the first years 
of the war, see chapter 6 section iii. 
 
102
 Forty ships had been originally prepared to sail around the Peloponnese in this year; on the news of the 
revolt from Mytilene, they were dispatched to that polis instead (3.3.2).  In this year, too, in order to deter 
the Peloponnesians from a massive attack by land and sea on Athens, the Athenians used exceptional 
measures to rapidly mobilize a fleet of one hundred triremes, manning the ships with Athenian citizens 
(except those from the classes of the knights and pentekosiomedimnoi) and metics (3.16.1); in other words, 
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thousand hoplites, two hundred cavalry, and some allied troops in 425 (4.42.1); sixty 
ships, two thousand hoplites, a few cavalry, and some allied troops from Miletus and 
other states in 424 (4.53.1);
103
 thirty ships in 414 (6.105.1);
104




Athenian sailors (and almost certainly Athenian soldiers, too) purchased supplies 
in Athens to bring on their periploi around the Peloponnese.  This comes out clearly from 
a passage in Aristophanes’ Acharnians in which Dicaeopolis pokes fun at the Athenians’ 
propensity to begin wars and launch major expeditions for the slightest of causes:  if the 
Spartans had seized a puppy-dog of the Seriphians (an insignificant Athenian ally) (541-
543),  
καὶ κάρτα µέντἂν εὐθέως καθείλκετε 
τριακοσίας ναῦς, ἦν δ’ ἂν ἡ πόλις πλέα 
θορύβου στρατιωτῶν, περὶ τριηράρχους βοῆς, 
µισθοῦ διδοµένου, Παλλαδίων χρυσουµένων, 
στοᾶς στεναξούσης, σιτίων µετρουµένων, 
ἀσκῶν, τροπωτήρων, κάδους ὠνουµένων, 
σκορόδων, ἐλαῶν, κροµµύων ἐν δικτύοις, 
στεφάνων, τριχίδων, αὐλητρίδων, ὑπωπίων· 
τὸ νεώριον δ’ αὖ κωπέων πλατουµένων, 
τύλων ψοφούντων, θαλαµιῶν τρυπωµένων, 
                                                                                                                                                 
the massive force was an exceptional measure forced by the impending threat of a major Peloponnesian 
attack.  (The measure worked (3.16.2, 4).) 
 
103
 The figure of two thousand found at 4.54.1 for the number of Milesians on this expedition cannot be 
right:  see Classen/Steup iv.108; Gomme, HCT iii.509. 
 
104
 This expedition ravaged Spartan territory in support of Argos (6.105.2).  It also emerges from 6.105.2 
that the Athenians had been making amphibious expeditions in the years previous to 414 to devastate non-
Spartan territory in the Peloponnese in support of Argos and Mantinea:  a terminus post quem of the 
summer of 417 (when a pro-Athenian democracy came to power at Argos (5.82.2)) can be established for 
the first of these expeditions. 
 
105
 Charicles’ ravaging of Spartan territory and construction of a garrison at Cythera (7.26.2-3) was aided 
by the huge force under Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent out from Athens to reinforce the Sicilian 




ἀυλῶν, κελευστῶν, νιγλάρων, συριγµάτων. 
 
Why, on the very instant you’d have been launching three hundred ships, and the 
city would have been full of the hubbub of sailors, noisy crowds surrounding 
ships’ captains, pay being handed out, the measuring out of provisions, leathers 
and oar-loops and people buying jars, garlic and olives and onions in nets, 
crowns and anchovies and flute-girls and black eyes; and the dockyard full of the 
planing of oar-spars, the hammering of dowel-pins, the strapping of oar-ports, 




 Since the expedition is against the Spartans, Dicaeopolis is describing here the 
preparations for a major periplous.
107
  The humor here lies in the incongruity between the 
flimsiness of the reason for the sending of the expedition and the realities of the 
preparations necessary for a typical major overseas expedition (against the 
Peloponnese).
108
  Those typical realities included the sailors purchasing barley-meal in 
the Stoa Alphitopolis
109
 (which groans here because of the great number of buyers) and 
also buying water containers,
110
 garlic, olives, and onions before they embarked.
111
     
                                                 
106
 The translation is taken from Sommerstein (1980):  with the exception of “the measuring out of 
provisions” for “rations being handed out” at 548 and “strapping” for “boring” at 553, for which see 
Casson (2005) 183, 183 and n.4 respectively. 
 
107
 van Wees ([2004] 209, 215-216) and Rawlings ([2007] 117-118) use the passage as evidence for the 
preparations for a major naval expedition. 
 
108
 There is humor, too, in the defeating of expectation with the inclusion of the ridiculous element of the 
black eye amongst an otherwise “straight description”:  cf. Osborne (2000a) 5.  For realistic and familiar 
detail being the basic backdrop of Aristophanic comedy, see esp. Handley (1985) 8-9, (1993) 114; cf. 
Pelling (2000) 123-126, 130-131. 
 
109
 The stoa mentioned at 548 is identified in the scholia as the Stoa Alphitopolis:  see Sommerstein (1980) 
183, Olson (2002) 216.  Note that the measuring out at 548 refers to the ordinary process of the measuring 
out of grain before it was sold:  see Aristoph., Knights 1009 (complaints “περὶ τῶν µετρούντων τἄλφιτ’ ἐν 
ἀγορᾷ κακῶς...”); cf. Aristoph., Clouds 638-639, 641. 
 
110
 Which they would to use to fill their water-skins:  see Casson (2005) 184-185. 
 
111
 See also Aristoph., Knights 599-600:  the chorus-leader, picturing Athenian horses jumping on-board 
horse-transports before an expedition, describes them as behaving as if human sailors before a voyage:  
“πριάµενοι κώθωνας, οἱ δὲ καὶ σκόροδα καὶ κρόµµυα”; “buying water-bottles (some of them also bought 
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 But, since Athenian periploi around the Peloponnese could last anywhere from 
forty to one hundred and twenty days in duration,
112
 whereas sailors and soldiers on these 
expeditions, because of the limitations of storage space on-board triremes, could only 
take a few day’s provisions with them on their embarkation from Athens,
113
 these 
amphibious expeditions depended on other means of acquisition for their supplies during 
(the bulk of) their operations.
114
  Markets provided by friendly (or neutral) poleis 
constituted one of these means of acquisition of supplies.  Opportunities to acquire 
provisions from markets provided by allied (or neutral) poleis varied according to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
garlic and onions).”  The humor lies in the incongruity of the horses behaving like typical humans (cf. Σ 
vet; Tr:  VEΓΘMLh ad 600a (I)):  i.e., sailors typically bought provisions before embarking on overseas 
expeditions (cf. Olson [2002] 216).  The weight of the contemporary evidence from the two Aristophanic 
passages for sailors purchasing provisions should be taken over the statement at Plut., Mor. 349A that 
Athenian trierarchs, before embarking their men, provided barley-meal, onions, and cheese to them (cited 
for normal Athenian fifth century practice by Jordan [1975] 107; Gabrielsen [1994] 119-120; Rawlings 
[2007] 118); it should be noted, too, that Plutarch’s statement is part of an axe-grinding exercise in 
rhetorical criticism of the excesses of Athenian choregoi.  Note also 3.49.3:  in order to quicken its 
dispatch, the Mytilenian envoys at Athens prepare barley-meal and wine for the Athenian trireme being 
sent to Mytilene to inform the Athenian general there of the reversal of the decision to kill all the 
Mytilenians after their revolt—this would seem to imply that neither the state nor the trierarch was 
normally involved in the provisioning of Athenian triremes.  (At Aristoph., Frogs 1073, when the crew of 
the Paralus are remembered as calling for their maza (“µᾶζαν καλέσαι”), this means that they were calling 
for the opportunity to eat or prepare maza (and not that they were issued rations of maza).) 
 
112
 See Krentz (2007) 154.  Although Thucydides never provides any figures for the duration of periploi, 
the range and variety of operations he describes for them (sometimes including the installation of garrisons 
(4.45.2 (425), 4.54.4 (424), 7.26.2 (413)) and the storming of settlements (1.108.5 (456/5?), 1.111.3 
(attempted siege of Oiniadae in 454/3?), 2.30.1 (431), 2.56.5 (428), 4.54.1-2 (424), 4.57.3 (424)) in 
addition to ravaging operations) must have taken several weeks.  The amphibious expeditions around the 
Peloponnese in 428 seem to have been unusually short:  on the first, Asopius, having ravaged the seaboard 
of Laconia, sent eighteen of the thirty triremes home before continuing around the Peloponnese (3.7.2-3); 
in the second, the one hundred triremes, after making descents on the coast of the Peloponnese before 
Laconia (see 3.16.2), sailed home after their show of strength quickly scared the Spartans off the invasion 
by land and sea of Attica (3.16.1-4). 
 
113
 See again chapter 1 section i. 
 
114
 Therefore Morrison et al. ([2000] 99) are incorrect to think that the sailors on triremes engaged in 
amphibious operations around the Peloponnese were provisioned primarily through the supplies which they 




area of operations of each particular periplous and changes over time in Athenian 
diplomatic relations with the poleis on the coastline of the Peloponnese and its vicinity.  
The periploi of the 450s could count on reception on the eastern coast of the Peloponnese 
at the allied or subject poleis of Argos, Halieis, Troezen, and Hermione;
115
 and at the 
ends of their expeditions at Naupactus and Pegae, and (for Pericles’ expedition) in 
Achaea, too.
116
  Athenian expeditions in the late 430s and 420s could not, however, count 
on co-operation (and thus facilities for marketing) at any poleis on the eastern seaboard of 
the Peloponnese—with the possible exception of neutral Argos;
117
 although, off the 
north-west of the Peloponnese, they could rely on reception at Zacynthus, Cephallenia, 
Acarnania, and Naupactus, all allies at the beginning of the (second) Peloponnesian 
War.
118
  The amphibious forces ravaging the eastern Peloponnese in the mid-410s could 
                                                 
115
 Davies (2007a) 84. 
 
116
 For Achaea, see Plut., Per. 19.3 (with Stadter [1989] 215).  Zacynthus and Cephallenia were won over 
to the Athenian side by Tolmides in 456/5(?) (Diod. 11.84.7) but marketing facilities on these islands 




 Gomme (1933) 22-23. 
 
118
 The Zacynthians, (most of) the Acarnanians, and the Messenians at Naupactus, allies at the outbreak of 
the war:  2.9.4.  Cephallenia allied in the first year of the war:  2.30.2 (and 2.7.3).  For these peoples 
remaining friendly to Athens until the start of the summer of 424 (i.e. the time of the last Athenian 
periplous in the 420s), see 2.30.1 (Acarnania friendly to Athens in 431); 2.33.2-3 (Peloponnesian attacks on 
Acarnania and Cephallenia in the winter of 431/0); 2.66.1-2 (Peloponnesians attacking the Zacynthians in 
the summer of 430 but the latter not submitting); 2.69.1 (Phormio using Naupactus as a base in the winter 
of 430/29); 2.80.1 (Peloponnesian planned attacks on Acarnania, Zacynthus, Cephallenia, and Naupactus in 
the summer of 429); 2.81-82 (Acarnanians repelling Peloponnesian invasion in the summer of 429); 
2.83.1ff. (Athenian fleet under Phormio stationed at Naupactus in the summer of 429); 2.102.1-3 (Phormio, 
embarking from Naupactus, launching an attack on Oineadae “a place which, unlike the rest of Acarnania, 
had always been hostile to [the Athenians]” in the winter of 429/8); 3.7.3 (Asopius sailing on to Naupactus 
and launching an expedition from there against Oiniadae in the summer of 428); 3.94.1 (cf. 3.95.2) 
(Demosthenes’ expedition against Leucas in 426 reinforced by the whole levy of the Acarnanians (except 
Oineadae), and by the Zacynthians and the Cephallenians); 3.102.3 (cf. 3.100.1-2) (Demosthenes’ 
persuading the Acarnanians to lend aid to the defense of Naupactus against a Peloponnesian attack in 426); 
4.30.3 (Demosthenes summoning military aid from allies in the vicinity of Pylos for an attack on 
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rely on reception at their partner polis of Argos and (possibly) Halieis,
119
 while in 413 
(the time of Charicles’ periplous) Athenian forces could count on the provision of 
markets at these cities, and also (if necessary) on Zacynthus and Cephallenia, in 
Acarnania, and at Naupactus.
120
 
 Comparing this list of allied (or neutral) poleis and ethnoi to the recorded scope 
and targets of Athenian periploi in the first and second Peloponnesian Wars, it can be 
seen that polis-provided markets made a limited contribution to the provisioning of some 
campaigns and none to others.  Tolmides’ periplous could have benefited from the 
granting of agorai by cities on the eastern seaboard of the Peloponnese, but his men 
thereafter would not have had the opportunity to provision in an agora provided by a 
polis again until (possibly) Zacynthus.  Pericles’ expedition in 453 was (almost certainly) 
granted agorai in Achaea or Naupactus, but would not have had access to a polis-
provided market during its siege of Oineadae (obviously).  The periploi of the 420s 
would not have been received by the hostile cities of the eastern Peloponnese coastline, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sphacteria in 425).  Cf. Davies (2007a) 91.  Note again, however, that the possibility of provisioning 
support from these islands and ethnoi for the blockade of Sphacteria was not considered by the Athenians 
(see n.## above). 
 
119
 For Argos, see p.152 n.104 above.  For Halieis, see its treaty with Athens made in 424/3 (IG I
3
 75); note 
the restoration at ll.7-8 (cf. ll.21-22):  “ᾶς Ἀθεναί[οις ναύσταθµον καὶ προθύµος ὀφελὲν] Ἀθενkαίος.”  4.118.4 
should not be taken as evidence of a treaty between Troezen and Athens existing in the spring of 423 (see, 
e.g., MacDonald [1984] 80):  it most probably refers to an arrangement with the Troezenians concerning 
the Athenian garrison at Methana. 
 
120
 See 6.85.2:  Euphemus at Camarina stating the islands around the Peloponnese (Zacynthus, Cephallenia) 
are independent allies “διότι ἐν χωρίοις ἐπικαίροις εἰσὶ περὶ τὴν Πελοποννήσον,” “because they occupy 
convenient positions around the Peloponnese.”  Cf. 7.57.7:  the Zacynthians and Cephallenians sending 
contingents for the Sicilian expedition, forced as islanders to do so by the fact of Athenian domination of 
the sea; 7.31.2:  Demosthenes taking on-board hoplites for the Sicilian campaign from these islands in 413.  
See also 7.31.2, 5:  Demosthenes recruiting for the Sicilian campaign from Acarnania in 413.  See also 
7.17.4, 7.19.5, 7.31.4-5:  an Athenian squadron of twenty triremes stationed at Naupactus in the winter of 




which means that the expeditions of 430, 428 (both in this year), 425, and 424 did not 
have a single opportunity to provision in an agora prepared by a polis (with the possible 
exception of Argos), since they operated solely along the eastern Peloponnese (and also, 
in some cases, along Spartan territory).  The Athenian periploi of the mid-410s, operating 
on the eastern seaboard of the Peloponnese, will have had access to markets only in 
Argos and (perhaps) Halieis; the expedition under Charicles in 413 could have used 
these, too, but thereafter could not be expected to be received at any city (since its 
operations took it no farther than Pylos before it returned to Athens (7.26.2-3)). 
 Because, then, Athenian amphibious expeditions to and around the Peloponnese 
operated mostly or solely along hostile territory—or along the thinly populated or desert 
coastline of the western Peloponnese
121
—they had to use accompanying (merchant) 
supply-ships as their primary means of provisioning.
122
  The strategy of periploi also 
prevented them from making much use of markets provided by poleis; rather, it mandated 
a reliance on supply-ships as their (primary source of) supplies.  The key text in this 
respect is ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. 2.4-5:
123
 
ἔπειτα δὲ τοῖς ἄρχουσι τῆς θάλαττης οἷόν τ’ἐστὶ ποιεῖν, ἅπερ τοῖς τῆς γῆς ἐνίοτε 
τέµνειν τὴν γῆν τῶν κρειττόνων· παραπλεῖν γὰρ ἔξεστιν ὅπου ἂν µηδεὶς ᾖ 
πολέµιος ἢ ὅπου ἂν ὀλίγοι, ἐὰν δὲ προσίωσιν, ἀναβάντα ἀποπλεῖν· καὶ τοῦτο 
                                                 
121
 See already p.143 and n.77 above on the territory around Pylos being uninhabited; and also 4.3.3:  
plenty of deserted headlands other than Pylos in the (western) Peloponnese.  See also esp. Xen., Hell. 
6.2.27-30 (with Morrison et al. [2000] 97, 99) for the coastline of the Peloponnese being thinly populated.  
Cf. Xen., Hell. 4.8.7:  Pharnabazus ending an amphibious campaign of devastation of the Peloponnese 
because of worries about the lack of harbors; the possibility of relief forces arriving; and the shortage of 
food supplies (“τὴν σπανοσιτίαν”). 
 
122
 See already 6.34.5 and chapter 1 section iiib:  supply-ships necessary to provision trireme-based forces 
in hostile or uninhabited territory. 
 
123




ποιῶν ἧττον ἀπορεῖ ἢ ὁ πεζῇ παραβοηθῶν. [5] ἔπειτα δὲ τοῖς µὲν κατὰ θάλατταν 
ἄρχουσιν οἱόν τε ἀποπλεῦσαι ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν ὁπόσον βούλει πλοῦν, τοῖς 
δὲ κατὰ γῆν οὐχ οἱόν τε ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν ἀπελθεῖν πολλῶν ἡµερῶν ὁδόν· 
βραδεῖαί τε γὰρ αἱ πορεῖαι καὶ σῖτον οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔχειν πολλοῦ χρόνου πεζῇ ἰόντα· 
καὶ τὸν µὲν πεζῇ ἰόντα δεῖ διὰ φιλίας ἰέναι ἢ νικᾶν µαχόµενον, τὸν δὲ πλέοντα, οὗ 
µὲν ἂν ᾖ κρείττων, ἔξεστιν ἀποβῆναι... ταύτης τῆς γῆς, ἀλλὰ παραπλεῦσαι, ἕως 
ἂν ἐπὶ φιλίαν χώραν ἀφίκηται ἢ ἐπὶ ἥττου αὑτοῦ.  
 
Again, a sea power can do what a land power can sometimes do, ravage the lands 
of those more powerful than itself.  For it can sail along until they reach a place 
where there is no enemy, or only a few, and, if the enemy approach, can embark 
and sail away.  It has fewer difficulties doing this than the power which resists 
with a land army.  [5] Again, those who rule over the sea can sail as far as they 
like from their own country, but those who rule over land cannot travel many 
days’ journey from their own land.  For journeys are slow, and it is not possible 
to carry provisions for a long time if one travels on foot.  An army traveling on 
foot must either pass through friendly territory or fight and conquer, but a naval 
force can land wherever it is superior and, where it is not, it need not put in but 
can sail past until it comes to a friendly land or one weaker than itself.
124 
 
A crucial difference comes out in the contrast made here between the mobility of land 
and (we should understand) Athenian naval/amphibious expeditions:  because (unlike 
land campaigns) amphibious expeditions could carry provisions for a long period, they 
were highly mobile; in other words, because amphibious forces could be supported by 
supply-ships, they could disembark and devastate where they want.  Pseudo-Xenophon’s 
generalizing comments on the conduct of operations of amphibious expeditions are 
consistent with the descriptions of periploi in Thucydides’ narrative, where they are 
characterized by their mobility, unpredictability, and the frequency and short duration of 
their raids onshore.
125
  Relying (solely or mainly) on re-provisioning at friendly ports, 
periploi would have had a radius of only one to three days and their range of operations 
and levels of unpredictability would therefore have been greatly decreased:
126
  that is, if 
                                                 
124
 The translation is taken from Osborne (2004). 
 
125
 See esp. Thorne (2001) 236-238; cf. Westlake (1945) 82-83. 
 
126
 See again the classic discussion of Gomme (1933) 18-23. 
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periploi were restricted to using the agorai of friendly poleis for their supplies, they 
would have been much less effective at achieving their main aim of devastation of enemy 
territory, and could not have remained stationary anywhere for more than a day or two 
before having to return to re-provision at an allied polis. 
 In contrast, the accompaniment of supporting merchant ships enabled Athenian 
amphibious expeditions “to maneuver freely... unimpeded by supply considerations” for 
limited periods of operations.
127
  The presence of sea-borne supply-trains on their 
expeditions gave periploi both freedom of action and a provisioning safety-net in case of 
weather-enforced disruption or delay to their voyages.
128
  In sum, it allowed them to 
conduct a moderate raiding strategy:
129
 because they were accompanied by supply-ships, 
periploi could engage not just in ravaging operations, but they could also, in some cases, 
remain stationary for limited periods of time in order to install garrisons or to attempt to 
take settlements by storm.  But merchant ships supporting periploi could not offer the 
permanent security of supply that enabled a longer term, continuous blockade;
130
 it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
127
 See Harari (2000) 319. 
 
128
 See (ibid.) 321-322.  By not taking into account the possibility that Athenian amphibious expeditions 
could be supported by supply-ships, Davies (in his otherwise very fine and stimulating article) therefore 
radically over-emphasizes the importance of friendly or subject poleis for the provisioning and operations 
of periploi around the Peloponnese ([2007a] esp. 90-91).  In general, discussions of the limited range of 
triremes do not do enough to take into account the ability of supply-ships to extend this range (see, in this 
respect, e.g., Gomme (ibid.); Amit [1965] 54; Gabrielsen [1994] 119). 
 
129
 See Harari (2000) 301 for the concept. 
 
130
 See section iic above:  this required continuous supply lines.  The difference between a supply line and a 
supply-train is that the former consisted of a continuous connection between a source of supplies and a 
military force in the field, whereas a supply-train accompanied (from the beginning of a campaign) and 
remained (constantly) beside a military force in the field:  see Roth (1999) 157, Harari (2000) 311 n.43. 
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almost certainly for this reason that Pericles’ siege of Oineadae failed in 454/3(?) (and 
that no other periplous thereafter attempted to besiege a polis by a long-term blockade).  
On one occasion, however, for a particularly large and lengthy amphibious expedition 
around the Peloponnese, more supply-ships did have to be sent out from Athens, in 
addition to the supply-train of merchant ships that had accompanied the expedition since 
its embarkation from the Piraeus, in order to ensure that it had a safely sufficient amount 
of supplies for its operations.  This emerges from Thucydides’ description of a diplomatic 
murder in the late summer of 430:  the Athenians killed Aristeus, and other envoys from 
the Peloponnese captured at the court of Sitalces in Thrace (2.67.1-3), without a trial and 
threw their bodies in a pit— 
δικαιοῦντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀµύνεσθαι οἷσπερ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιµόνιοι ὑπῆρξαν, τοὺς 
ἐµπόρους οὓς ἔλαβον Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυµµάχων ἐν ὁλκάσι περὶ Πελοπόννησον 
πλέοντας ἀποκτείναντες καὶ ἐς φάραννας ἐσβαλόντες.  πάντας γὰρ δὴ κατ’ 
ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέµου Λακεδαιµόνιοι ὅσους λάβοιεν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ὡς πολεµίους 
διέσθειρον, καὶ τοὺς µετὰ Ἀθηναίων ξυµπολεµοῦντας καὶ τοὺς µηδὲ µεθ’ ἑτέρων. 
 
in justification they claimed that they were taking the same kind of measures to 
protect themselves as the Spartans had done previously, when they had killed and 
thrown into pits the Athenian and allied traders whom they had caught sailing 
around the Peloponnese in merchant ships.  For, at the beginning of the war the 
Spartans put to death as enemies every single man whom they caught at sea, both 
those who were allies of Athens and those who did not belong to either side. 
(2.67.4) 
 
The Spartan killing of Athenian and allied traders caught sailing around the Peloponnese 
referred to in this passage was clearly a particular and notable event,
131
 and one 
connected to the war (since the Athenians could use it to justify their breaking of the 
customary norms of war and diplomacy).  It must, then, be referring to the killing of 
Athenian and allied emporoi sailing out to an Athenian periplous—almost certainly the 
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 See Gomme, HCT ii.200 (ad τοὺς ἐµπόρους οὓς ἔλαβον):  “probably some special occasion here referred 
to.”  Contrast (with Rusten [1989] 216) the aspect of the aorist ἔλαβον with the iterative optative of λάβοιεν 




massive expedition that embarked from Athens in 431 with 22,400 men (to be later 
joined by at least 10,000 men from their allies in the north-west) and that stayed away 
from Athens for an exceptionally long time (for a periplous).
132
 
 Athenian amphibious expeditions around the Peloponnese will also have obtained 
some provisions through foraging and pillaging.
133
  The unpredictable and unexpected 
forays ashore of periploi will have caught food stores and property unguarded in the 
countryside;
134
 in addition, some expeditions will have enjoyed windfalls of provisions 
(and plunder) when they took settlements by storm.
135
  But foraging (and pillaging) can 
never have been of structural importance in the provisioning of periploi around the 
Peloponnese.  The usually rapid and short duration of their attacks on the Peloponnesian 
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 See again Krentz (2007) 154:  one hundred and twenty days (an estimate but one which must be on the 
right order of magnitude since Thucydides’ description implies that this expedition was away from Athens 
for most of the summer).  For the view that the traders referred to at 2.67.4 were supplying an Athenian 
expeditionary force, see Reed (2003) 24 n.61, Krentz (2007) 154.  The periplous of 430 embarked from 
Athens with 38,600 men but stayed away from Athens for a much shorter time (somewhere around forty 
days:  see 2.56.5, 2.57.2 and again Krentz [2007] 154).  The length of the periplous of 431 makes it much 
more likely that it is the expedition to which the traders at 2.67.4 were sailing to (note that no Athenian 
expedition other than these two periploi operated around the Peloponnese in these years).  (The figures 
found here for the numbers of men on the expeditions of 431 and 430 assume that there were two hundred 
men on each trireme departing from Athens, and that each of the hoplites (not serving as epibatai) and 
cavalry on these expeditions was accompanied by a slave attendant:  see appendix 2.) 
 
133
 At Aristoph., Knights 1078, Demos asks the Sausage-Seller where pay will be found for his fox-cubs.  
The reference to fox-cubs is explained at 1075-76; in the supposed oracle given by Apollo to the Sausage-
Seller, he likens Athenian sailors to fox-cubs because they eat grapes in vineyards, i.e. they forage for food 
while on campaign.  Since Knights was first performed at the Lenaea of 424—and other naval and 
amphibious campaigns in this period took place in subject/allied territory—the reference here should 
probably be taken to refer primarily to sailors foraging while on periploi. 
 
134
 See p.139 n.63 above for unexpected invasions of territory expected to gain much plunder in the 
classical Greek world (and its surrounds); cf. Thorne (2001) 237 specifically on periploi.  Note, however, 
that the expeditions of 431 and 430 may have not left Athens until after the harvest in the Peloponnese:  
Westlake (1945) 80 and n.4. 
 
135




seaboard may have not given all raids the time to locate food stores in the countryside,
136
 
and, in any case, the storage limitations of triremes precluded the sailors and soldiers 
deployed on periploi from gathering much food to bring with them for their onward 
journeys.
137
  In addition, those expeditions that sailed along the desolate western coast of 
the Peloponnese will not have had any opportunity there to acquire supplies through 
foraging.  Furthermore, and fundamentally, the provisioning of amphibious expeditions 
of six thousand to thirty-eight thousand six hundred men simply could not be entrusted to 
foraging (even on these campaigns of relatively short duration):  the acquisition of 
provisions through this method was too dependent on the contingencies of local supply 
conditions and could not offer security of supply to these (sometimes massive) 
expeditions.
138
  Embarkation or a weather-enforced delay at a location where an 
expedition could not (for whatever reason) acquire (many) provisions through foraging 
would have rapidly lead to a supply crisis for an expedition relying primarily on foraging 
for its food.
139
  Moreover, the use of foraging as a primary means of provisioning would 
have constrained the strategic options of periploi:  it would have precluded them from 
remaining immobile (to assault a town or install a garrison); and it would have limited 
their range of operations to those areas of the Peloponnese where they could be sure that 
they would be able to obtain provisions through raiding the countryside.  Foraging, then, 
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 Cf. Erdkamp (1998) 139; Bachrach (2002) 88. 
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 Cf. Thorne (2001) 238. 
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 Cf. Guilmartin (1974) 96. 
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was an occasional (and occasionally important) source of supplies for amphibious 
expeditions around the Peloponnese:  but it was the merchant ships accompanying 
periploi that served as their primary method of provisioning and enabled them to be so 
mobile and unpredictable (and thus gave them the opportunity to acquire provisions 
occasionally through foraging). 
 The provisioning of the amphibious expeditions sent out by the Athenians in the 
fifth century to devastate the Peloponnese therefore differed markedly from the 
provisioning of the amphibious expeditions they sent out in this period to suppress by 
siege those poleis that wished to liberate themselves from subjection to their empire.  
Athenian amphibious expeditions launched from the Piraeus to suppress revolts sailed to 
their targets surrounded by allied/subject poleis, and normally halted on their journeys (of 
at most a couple of weeks’ length) only to reprovision at allied/subject poleis.
140
  They 
acquired their supplies during their voyages to war zones from markets provided by 
poleis; the merchant supply-ships that accompanied them did so solely as an emergency 
reserve and thus did not normally play any important role in their provisioning.  Once 
established at their target of operations, they provisioned themselves solely through sea-
borne supply lines.  In contrast, the strategy of Athenian periploi sent around the 
Peloponnese required them to make many halts on their voyages, so that they could 
inflict as much damage as possible in as many places as possible on their enemies.  
Sailing along (almost entirely) hostile coastlines and (normally) with no allied poleis in 
their vicinity—and thus not able to count on re-provisioning in markets provided by 
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allies/subjects—periploi depended for their provisioning primarily on supporting 
merchant supply-ships for the duration of their operations.
141
  It was the presence of these 
sea-borne supply-trains that enabled the raiding strategy of Athenian amphibious raiding 
expeditions around the Peloponnese (and their occasional foraging).  
 
iv. The Provisioning of the Combatants in the Ionian War 
The strategic situation in the Aegean changed radically after the Athenian disaster 
in Sicily.  In the wake of the catastrophe in the far west, Athens no longer enjoyed an 
overwhelming financial superiority over its enemies.  Encouraged by the news of the 
Athenians’ total defeat, most of their (important) allies/subjects revolted in the following 
months and years—and, in so doing, deprived their former oppressors of the bulk of their 
most important source of current revenue.
142
  Secondly, the Peloponnesians now began to 
                                                 
141
 See Krentz (2007) 154, Raaflaub (2007) 100:  Athenian expeditions dependent on supply-ships when 
they sailed into hostile territory (again, van Wees ([2004] 63) is incorrect to state that fleets could only 
obtain provisions in hostile territory by foraging or pillaging).  It should be noted here that the Athenians 
also sent amphibious expeditions on two occasions to devastate Opuntian Locris and to prevent the 
inhabitants of that region from launching piratical raids on Euboia:  in 431, they sent thirty ships under 
Cleopompus (2.26.1) (the expedition captured the minor settlement of Thronium and “ἐδῃωσε” Locris; in 
426, sixty ships under Nicias ravaged Locris on their way back to Athens (having disembarked two 
thousand hoplites at Oropus (3.91.3)) (3.91.6:  “τέµνειν” the verb used to described the triremes’ activities 
in Locris).  In addition, in 413, one thousand three hundred Thracians who were considered too expensive 
in light of the Decelean War (see chapter 5 section ii) were sent homewards under the command of 
Diitrephes, who had the instruction to use them to devastate (“βλάψαι”) enemy territory (such as Boeotia) 
on their voyage back to Thrace (7.29.1ff.).  On account of their location, the provisioning requirements of 
these expeditions could be met by different means to those sent around the Peloponnese.  The expedition 
under Cleopompus could have been provisioned solely from allied/subject poleis in Euboea, since nowhere 
in Locris would be outside a one- to three-day sailing range from Euboea; but it was almost certainly 
accompanied by supply-ships also, in order to give it the tactical leeway to storm Thronium.  Similarly, the 
expeditions under Nicias and Diitrephes will never have been far away from allied/subject states, either; 
thus, they probably supplied themselves, too, primarily through polis-provided markets (while being 
supported by some supply-ships to ensure tactical flexibility). 
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 See 8.2 for the reaction in the Aegean to the Athenians’ defeat in Sicily.  For revolts from Athens, see, 
e.g., those explicitly recorded in the last book of Thucydides (covering the first two years of the Ionian War 
(summer 412 – summer 411) :  (summer 412) Chios (Athens’ most important ally in terms of trireme 
numbers) (8.14.1-2); Erythrae (8.14.2); Clazomenae (8.14.3) (recovered by Athens in the same summer 
(8.23.6)); Teos (8.16.3); Miletus (8.17.1-2); Lebedos (8.19.4); Aerae (8.19.4); Methymna (8.22.2); 
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receive substantial Persian financial support, as the satraps of Asia Minor (and the King 
himself) attempted to create a power vacuum in the eastern Aegean (in order to fill it 
themselves eventually).
143
  This support—although not always reliable, especially in the 
first two years of the Ionian War when it was dispensed (or not, as the case often was) by 
Tissaphernes
144
—was indispensable to the eventual Peloponnesian victory in the war.
145
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Mytilene (8.22.2); Eresus (8.23.4) (but each of these Lesbian poleis were quickly recovered by Athens 
(8.23.6)); (winter 412/11) all of the Rhodian poleis (8.44.2); (summer 411) Abydus (8.62.1); Lampsacus 
(8.62.1) (quickly recovered by the Athenians (8.62.2)); Byzantium (8.80.3); Cyzicus (8.107.1) (quickly 
recovered (ibid.)).  In addition, many more poleis revolted in the first two years of the war than explicitly 
recorded by Thucydides:  see Andrewes, HCT v.50, 342.  For the revenues from its subject poleis as the 
crucial foundation for the overwhelming financial superiority of the Athenian empire over its enemies (and 
thus the control of its subjects), see 1.19, 1.80.3, 1.81.2-4, 1.83.2, 2.13.2, 3.13.6, 3.31.1, 3.39.8, 3.46.3-4.  
The Athenians had, in the summer of 413, replaced the annual tribute imposed on their allies/subjects with 
a five per cent tax on sea-borne trade throughout their empire (see Blamire [2001] 114 for (brief) discussion 
and sources); but we do not know how much was raised by this tax in 413 (or in subsequent years) or by 
tribute in the years before 413 (Samons [2000] 252). 
 
143
 See Lewis (1989) 231-232 for an excellent summary of the changes in intensity of Persian financial 
support for the Peloponnesian forces in the Ionian War.  See Pritchett (1971) 47 for a list of Persian 
subsidies to the Peloponnesians in the years from 412 to 404 (though note that his no.8 and no.11 refer to 
the same payment, as do his no.9 and no.12).  Cf. chapter 5 section iii for detailed discussion of Cyrus’ 
financial aid to the Peloponnesians in 408.  Note esp. Hell. Oxy. 19.2:  the Persians had been poor payers 
until Cyrus arrived in the Aegean theater; and Xen., Hell. 2.3.8:  at the end of the war, the balance of the 
war fund given over to Lysander by Cyrus was 470 talents (see also Krentz [1989] 192 ad loc.:  “Lysandros 
had earlier sent Gylippos home with one thousand (Plut. Nik. 28.3) or fifteen hundred talents (Diod. 
XIII.106.8-10).”)  For the importance of Persian subsidies in funding the war, cf. 8.47-8.48.3 (with Blamire 
[2001] 115):  the Athenian oligarchic revolution in 411 being largely motivated by the prospect of gaining 
financial support from the Persians through the influence of Alcibiades.  Cf. also Xen., Hell. 1.1.14:  
Alcibiades telling the Athenian fleet in 410 that they have no money, while the enemy has plenty from the 
King; and Xen., Hell. 1.5.8-9:  the Athenians in 407 sending to Cyrus to attempt to gain his (financial) aid.  
(I should note here that the naval forces opposed to the Athenians in the Ionian War were not just from the 
Peloponnese, but also from the poleis of the Ionian seaboard (most notably Chios), Sicily (see Lévy [1983] 
226 and nn.45-48), southern Italy (8.84.2, 8.91.2), and Boeotia, Phocis and Locris (8.3.2).  For sake of 
convenience, however, I will refer to the naval forces engaged against the Athenians in this war as 
Peloponnesians tout court.) 
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 For discussion of Tissaphernes’ machinations concerning the distribution of pay to Peloponnesian forces 




 Without Persian subsidies, the Spartans/Peloponnesians were reduced to ad hoc measures to fund their 
forces, measures that would have been (completely) insufficient in the longer term to prosecute the war on 
the scale needed to defeat the Athenians.  See 8.3.1:  at the beginning of the winter of 413/412—before the 
arrival of ambassadors from Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes with promises to fund a Peloponnesian fleet 
(8.5.4ff.)—King Agis, in order to fund the preparation of a fleet to support Athens’ rebellious subjects in 
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It enabled the Peloponnesians to fund large fleets of triremes, operating in the waters off 
Asia Minor, for its entire duration (i.e., from the summer of 412 to the eventual reduction 
(by blockade) of Athens in 404).  It also forced the Athenians (in order to be able to 
operate in the Aegean against the new Peloponnesian navy) to maintain correspondingly 
large naval forces in the eastern Aegean—and thus into a series of increasingly desperate 
measures to raise the money to pay these forces.
146
  As a first step, the iron reserve of one 
thousand talents set aside in 431 in case of a direct attack on Athens (2.24.1) was 
deployed in the summer of 412 to fund the preparation of a fleet to sail against Chios 
(8.15.1; Philoc. FGrH 328 F 138).  Despite the deployment of the iron reserve, and the 
reduction of Athenian military/naval pay from one drachma to three obols at some point 
between the summer of 413 and the winter of 412/11,
147
 the Athenians’ financial reserves 
were virtually exhausted by the summer of 411, and their fleets reduced to funding 
themselves through the exactions of ad hoc contributions in money from poleis in their 
area of operations.
148
  Self-financing—through the exaction of ad hoc levies of money 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Aegean, levied money from the allies, plundered and exacted money from the Oetaeans, and also 
exacted money from the Phthiotic Achaeans and other Thessalian subjects.  See also 8.44.4:  in the winter 
of 412/11, having broken with Tissaphernes, the Spartans levied thirty-two talents from the Rhodians; 
Xen., Hell. 1.6.12: in 406, having broken with Cyrus, Callicratidas levied money from Miletus and Chios; 
Xen., Hell. 2.1.1:  in the summer of 406, in the absence of any financial support from the Persians, the 
Peloponnesian forces on Chios hired themselves out to earn pay; Xen., Hell. 2.1.5:  in the winter of 
406/405, Eteonicus levied money from the Chians.  Cf. Aristoph., Frogs 365:  contributions in money to 
Athens’ enemies apparently common in 405.  See also pp.169-171 below for Peloponnesian plundering (to 
raise money) during the Ionian War. 
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 For a survey of Athenian state finance from 413 to 404, see Blamire (2001) 115-123. 
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 See chapter 5 section iii, chapter 6 section iv. 
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 Virtual exhaustion of capital reserves in the summer of 411:  see 8.76.6 with Andrewes, HCT v.269-270; 
Blamire (2001) 115.  Exaction of money from Cyzicus in the late summer of 411: 8.107.1 (cf. Diod. 




from poleis and the sale of plunder
149
—continued to be the main source of pay for 
Athenian and amphibious forces operating in the Ionian and Hellespontine theaters 
throughout the war;
150
 from 410 onwards, the money raised through forced contributions 
and the sale of booty was supplemented by the revenue derived from a dekate imposed on 
shipping in and out of the Black Sea.
151
  Some money was sent from Athens to the forces 
off Asia Minor, raised through the tribute on allied/subject poleis re-established in 410/9 
(but now necessarily much reduced because of the revolts of many former subjects),
152
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 References to Athenian exactions of money during the Ionian War:  Xen., Hell. 1.1.8, 1.1.12 (winter 
411/10); Xen., Hell. 1.1.20-21, Diod.13.47.7 (410); Xen., Hell. 1.3.8, Diod. 13.66.3-4, Plut., Alc. 30.2-5 
(408); Xen., Hell. 1.4.9 (407).  For the references in Thucydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus to the capture of 
plunder (by both Athenian and Peloponnesian forces) in the Ionian War, see Pritchett (1991) 512-514, 530-
531.  For references to the sale of plunder during the war, see (ibid.) 420-422.  Note esp. there (with [ibid.] 
421, Gabrielsen [2007] 252) Diod. 13.47.7 (411):  Theramenes, wishing to relieve both the citizens and 
allies of their eisphorai, “τήν τε τῶν πολεµίων χώραν ἐπόρθησε καὶ πολλὰς ὠφελείας ἤθροισεν,” 
“plundered enemy territory and collected great quantities of booty”; Diod. 13.64.4 (409):  Alcibiades and 
Thrasyllus (Diodorus incorrectly has Thrasybulus) plundered Pharnabazus’ territory, sated their soldiers 
with booty, “καὶ αὐτοὶ χρήµατα συνήγαγον ἐκ τῶν λαφύρων, βουλόµενοι κουφίσαι τὸν δῆµον τῶν 
εἰσφορῶν,” “also themselves realized money from the booty, since they wished to relieve the Athenian 
people of the property-taxes imposed for the prosecution of the war.”  See also Diod. 13.69.5:   Alcibiades 
plundering both Cos and Rhodes to raise pay for his soldiers (“καὶ συχνὰς ὠφελείας ἤθροισε πρὸς τὰς τῶν 
στρατιωτῶν διατροφάς”) (these operations should probably be dated to 407/6:  Krentz [1989] 133).  It 
should be noted here that, although Athenian amphibious expeditions had raised great sums of money 
through the sale of plunder before the Ionian War (see conclusion below), it was (with the partial exception 
of the Sicilian expedition (chapter 1 section ivb)) only from 412 onwards that proceeds from the sale of 
plunder played a structurally important role in the financing of Athenian overseas forces.  Also, note that, 
for the preceding discussion and for what follows in this section, the value of Diodorus as a historical 
source increases markedly after 411.  See esp. Davies (1993) 2-3:  “... after 411 [Diodorus] was using 
historical sources otherwise lost save for fragments.  We can mostly identify them and be confident that he 
was using the best standard accounts, but he was not always very good at summarizing them.”  Diodorus in 
his post-411 narrative is still characterized, however, by the use of unreliable figures (appendix 2 n.31), 
extrapolation from sources (see p.130 n.28, p.263 n.23), and stereotypical descriptions of campaign 
preparations (see p.182 n.199 below). 
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 See, e.g., Andrewes (1953) 5-6:  inferring from the accounts of the treasury of Athena for 410/9 that the 
Hellespontine fleet under Alcibiades and Theramenes was entirely self-financed. 
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 See Xen., Hell. 1.1.22 with Blamire (2001) 118. 
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the melting down of sacred dedications, and the striking of emergency coinages;
153
 but 
these sources of funding (by themselves) never provided income anywhere on the scale 
sufficient to maintain the Athenian naval forces in the eastern Aegean theater. 
 The new conditions of the Ionian war
154
—opposing fleets of anywhere from 
fourteen thousand to forty thousand men operating away from home for years at a 
time
155
—produced, then, a huge and unprecedented demand for money.  The need to find 
the money to fund the payment of sailors’ µισθός and τροφή (and discussions and 
disagreements about their payment) dominates the narrative of the last book of 
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 See p.306 n.46 for bibliography for these latter two measures. 
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 Cf. Krentz (1989) 134. 
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 Ship numbers in the last book of Thucydides (see Andrewes, HCT v.27-32 for references and full 
discussion (I note that Erbse [1989] 67-75 disagrees with some of Andrewes’ conclusions; but quibbles 
over one or two ships here or there does not affect the point I am making here):  93 Athenian and 80 
Peloponnesian ships in the Ionian theater at the end of summer 412; roughly 100 triremes (the numbers 
fluctuate) on each side during the winter 412/11; 114 Athenian and 112 Peloponnesian triremes in the 
summer of 411 (see 8.79.1 with Andrewes, HCT v.31); 76 Athenian and 86 Peloponnesian triremes at the 
battle of Cynossema near the end of the summer of 411.  For the later years of the war:  86 Athenian and 90 
Peloponnesian triremes at the battle of Abydus at the beginning of the winter of 411/410 (see Xen., Hell. 
1.1.13 with 1.1.7 and Krentz [1989] 96-97 (10 (Diod. 13.46.4, 13.50.2) or 30 (Xenophon, ibid.) of the 
Peloponnesian triremes were lost in this battle)); 74 Athenian triremes at Sestos in 411 (Diod. 13.45.2); 100 
Athenian triremes (and 1,000 hoplites and 150 cavalry) embarking from Athens under Alcibiades in the 
summer of 407 (Xen., Hell. 1.4.21; cf. Diod. 13.69.1); 70 Peloponnesian triremes in 407 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.1); 
90 Peloponnese triremes in 407 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.10); 115 (or 93) Athenian and 90 (or nearly 70) 
Peloponnesian triremes at the battle of Notium in 406 (see Krentz [1989] 141 for sources for these figures); 
114 or 134 Athenian triremes in spring 406 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.20 with Krentz [1989] 144-145 (but see 
below); 140 Peloponnesian triremes in 406 (Xen., Hell. 1.6.3, Diod. 13.76.3); 170 Peloponnesian (Xen., 
Hell. 1.6.26) and roughly 150 Athenian triremes (see Krentz [1989] 151 for sources) engaged in operations 
before the battle of Arginusae in 406; 180 Athenian triremes before the battle of Aigospotamoi in 405 
(Xen., Hell. 2.1.20; Diod. 13.105.1 (but see Diod. 13.104.2: 153 triremes (20 left at Samos)); 200 
Peloponnesian triremes sailing against Athens in 405 (Xen., Hell. 2.2.7); 150 Peloponnesian triremes 
besieging Athens and (roughly) 40 or 50 besieging Samos in 405/4 (see Xen., Hell. 2.2.9 and Krentz [1989] 
183).  See, however, Xen., Hell. 1.5.20: Conon manning 70 triremes out of the over 100 Athenian triremes 
that had been campaigning in the Aegean.  The implication of Conon’s measure must be that some 
Athenian triremes were under-manned.  It is impossible to know how frequent a phenomenon under-
manning of triremes was in the Ionian War, but the frequent difficulties with pay and the duration of 
service may have meant that desertion was common at some points in the war.  (It should be noted here, 
however, that neither Athenian nor Peloponnesian triremes were under-manned at the moment of their 






 whereas, before this point, the payment of military and naval forces 
(especially Athenian forces) was simply assumed by Thucydides, and mentioned only in 
exceptional circumstances.
157
  The details of naval financing—and especially the 
increasingly desperate expedients adopted by both sides (but particularly the Athenians) 
to fund their fleets—dominate Xenophon’s and Diodorus’ narratives of the Ionian War, 
too.  But, in contrast, from the winter of 413/412 to the summer of 411, the provisioning 
of the enormous fleets manned by the Athenians and Peloponnesians continues to be 
taken for granted in Thucydides, and their provisioning is also taken for granted in 
Xenophon’s and Diodorus’ accounts of the later phases of the war.  Thus, again, in order 
to reconstruct the means used by the men of these fleets to acquire their provisions, it is 
necessary to combine the few explicit references we do have for their food supply with 
consideration both of the strategic demands facing their commanders, and the 
institutional structures of classical Greek states. 
 Naval movements to and around the theaters of operations along the Ionian 
seaboard and the Hellespont in the Ionian War were provisioned primarily through 
markets provided by poleis.  The casual and incidental mentions of the convention of 
reception and the provision of an agora by a friendly or allied polis to a passing fleet 
(without any prior mention or explication of this convention) in Thucydides’ and 
Xenophon’s accounts of the Ionian War (and throughout the historical narratives of those 
authors) demonstrate that both of these historians (and their readers) took it for granted 
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 Cf., e.g., Kallet (2001) 228-229, 281-282. 
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 See chapter 5 sections ii, iii for the funding of military and naval forces being mentioned only in 





that agorai were the usual means of provisioning of naval detachments and fleets on the 
move during this war.  Thus, in Thucydides’ account of the operations of the summer of 
411, he reported the provision of an agora by the Eretrians to the crews of thirty-six 
Athenian triremes (which had sailed to Euboea in order to guard the island from attack by 
the Peloponnesians (8.95.2)) only because the location of this agora played an integral 
part in a ruse executed by the Eretrians (8.95.4):  having advised an approaching 
Peloponnesian fleet of their plans, the Eretrians had set up the agora for the Athenian 
sailors not in the market-place, but in some houses in the part of town furthest from the 
harbor
158
 (so that the Athenian crews would not be able to prepare quickly and properly 
for battle when the Peloponnesians sailed into the harbor).
159
  Xenophon mentions the 
buying of provisions from an allied polis in his narrative of the Ionian War only because 
it was the fact that the Athenian crews had to walk some distance from their triremes to 
purchase provisions in Sestos that led directly to their lack of readiness for the battle of 
Aegospotami (and thus their subsequent (and decisive) defeat in that battle).
160
  Finally, 
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 8.95.4:  “οἰόµενοι σφίσι παρὰ ταῖς ναυσὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας εἶναι· οἱ δὲ ἔτυχον οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἄριστον 
ἐπισιτιζόµενοι (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπωλεῖτο ἀπὸ προνοίας τῶν Ἐρετριῶν), ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν ἐπ’ ἔσχατα τοῦ ἄστεως 
οἰκιῶν...” (“But [the Athenian crews], instead of being by their ships, as [their commanders] supposed, 
were gone away to purchase provisions for their dinner in the houses in the outskirts of the city; the 
Eretrians having so arranged that there would be nothing for sale in the market-place” (Crawley’s 
translation (slightly adapted)).) 
 
159
 Although this episode, strictly speaking, does not form part of the operations of the Ionian War, the fact 
that Thucydides includes it in the midst of his narrative of that war shows that he was taking the provision 
of agorai by friendly or allied poleis for granted in his description of the fighting off Asia Minor and in the 
Hellespont.  See chapter 1 sections i, iiia for agorai provided by friendly/allied/subject poleis to passing 
military forces being taken for granted throughout Thucydides’ narrative. 
 
160
 See Xen., Hell. 2.1.27:  the Athenian crews having to go a long way to buy their food (“τά τε σιτία 
πόρρωθεν ὠνούµενοι”)—at Sestos, as 2.1.25 makes clear.  Diodorus makes no mention of a market, but only 
reports that there was famine in the navy (13.105.2, 13.106.1).  The contemporary evidence of Xenophon 
should be preferred (and, in any case, what is important here is that the contemporary author Xenophon 
believed that the Athenians could purchase supplies in an agora at Sestos).  See chapter 3 section iii for 
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although Diodorus does not include any mention of polis-provided markets in his 
summarizing description of the Ionian War, the fact that he could take the convention of 
reception for granted later in his history shows that he, too, was assuming the reception of 
fleets by friendly or allied poleis in his description of the operations from 412 to 404.
161
 
 The fact that there were so many poleis so close together on the Ionian and 
Hellespontine coastlines (even if their differing allegiances meant that the Athenians and 
the Peloponnesians could not expect to be received in every polis they sailed by)
162
 meant 
that both fleets—and any detachments from both fleets—were never more than a day’s 
sail away from reception by a friendly polis (and thus the provision of an agora).  This 
nearness and number of poleis on and just off the seaboard of Asia Minor allowed the 
rapid darting naval movements so characteristic of (especially the first years of) the 
Ionian War:
163
  assured of provisioning at nearby polis-provided markets, detachments of 
triremes could operate unencumbered by supply-ships.  The fact, too, that any area of the 
Ionian or Hellespontine theater of operations was easily reachable within a few days for 
                                                                                                                                                 
other examples of the convention of the provision of markets by friendly poleis to passing military forces 
being taken for granted in the Hellenica and other historical works of Xenophon. 
 
161
 See the discussion of 14.108.1-2 at chapter 3 section iiib.  See also 15.46.1-2:  in 374/3, the Spartans 
dispatch a fleet against Corcyra in order to help some oligarchs take that city; the twenty-two triremes 
dispatched to the city pretended to be sailing to Sicily “ἵνα ὡς φίλοι προσδεχθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Κορκυραίων 
κατάσχωσι τὴν πόλιν µετὰ τῶν φυγάδων,” “in order to be received as friends by the Corcyrans and then 
with the assistance of the exiles to occupy the city.” 
 
162
 The first naval operations in the Ionian theater demonstrated that the Athenians could no longer assume 
reception at every polis in the Aegean.  See, e.g., 8.17.2:  the Milesians not receiving the Athenians in the 
summer of 412 (“ὡς αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐδέχοντο οἱ Μιλήσιοι”).  See also, e.g., 8.16.3, 8.20.2 for delays and 
indecision concerning the reception of Athenian and Peloponnesian forces by Ionian poleis.  Note that it is 
only with the onset of the Ionian War that Thucydides reports the reception of Athenian fleets by Aegean 
poleis:  before this, their reception could be assumed in his narrative. 
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triremes already within the general area of operations meant that even whole fleets—
having provisioned in agorai provided by the poleis they were embarking from—could 
move without supply-ships from one theater (or part of a theater) to another: thus, in the 
summer of 411, eighty-six Peloponnesian triremes under Mindarus were able to reach 
Sestos from Chios in two days, having spent two days provisioning in Chios (8.101.1-
2).
164
  Other movements of whole fleets from one base of operations to another during the 
war (that had less need for speed than Mindarus had (see just below)) may have been 
normally accompanied by supply-ships in case of weather- or enemy-enforced sailing 
delays;
165
 but even in these cases, because there would have been almost always a 
friendly polis nearby at any point of a voyage along the coast of Asia Minor, the number 
of supporting merchant-ships will not have needed to be large.
166
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 Cf. Morrison et al. (2000) 97 for Mindarus’ journey.  The mode of provisioning in Chios was clearly 
purchase:  the crews of the triremes got their provisions (“ἐπισιτισάµενοι”) in Chios and received from the 
Chians three Chian fortieths (coins of unknown value (see Hornblower, CT iii.1043-1044 for bibliography)) 
for each man (8.101.1). 
 
165
 The fact that naval operations in the Ionian War did not stop with the onset of winter meant that sailing 
disruptions due to weather conditions were more common in this conflict than in earlier wars:  see 8.31.4 
(the Peloponnesians remaining at an island off Clazomenae for eight days on account of the winds), 8.32, 
8.34, 8.42.1-2 (and Andrewes, HCT v.74) (see also, e.g., Xen., Hell. 1.1.16).  But storms could affect the 
sailing of triremes in the summer during the war, too:  see 8.80.3 and esp. 8.99:  Mindarus forced “ὑπὸ 




 Naval detachments would not have presented so much of a burden to a friendly polis if forced to halt at 
one for several days (because of enemy movements or poor sailing conditions); in addition, even if delayed 
for some days in enemy territory, the (relatively) small numbers of men could expect to survive by living 
off the proceeds of foraging or pillaging (see, e.g., 8.31.4)—for both of these reasons, naval detachments 
could sail where they wanted without supply-ships.  In contrast, it was only in the exceptional cases of the 
sacking of a settlement that entire fleets (of up to forty thousand men) could provision themselves from the 
proceeds of pillaging.  Note esp. Xen., Hell. 2.1.19:  in 405, the provisions gained in the capture and 
pillaging of Lampsacus—a city full of wine, grain, and other supplies—(almost certainly) gave Lysander 




 Other operations during the war, however, required the fleets of both sides (or 
detachments thereof) to remain immobile for (shorter or longer) periods of time.  
Attempts to prevent enemy triremes from moving to or around the theater of operations 
sometimes forced fleets to remain stationary for short periods of time.  Thus, for 
example, at the start of the war, in the early summer of 412, twenty Athenian triremes 
briefly blockaded in Spiraeum (an uninhabited harbor) twenty-one Peloponnesian 
triremes which had been attempting to sail from Corinth to Chios (the Peloponnesian 
triremes eventually escaped by defeating their blockaders in a naval battle) (8.10.3-8.11, 
8.20.1);
167
  and in the winter of 412/11, twenty Athenian triremes were posted at Syme to 
remain on the watch for twenty-seven Peloponnese triremes arriving in the Ionian theater 
from the Peloponnese (8.41.3-8.42).
168
  In the summer of 411, Thrasyllus planned to 
station himself with fifty-five ships at Lesbos in order to attack the fleet of Mindarus if it 
delayed at Chios for any period of time (it was this movement which forced Mindarus to 
dash from Chios to Sestos) (8.100.2). 
  But both the Athenians and Peloponnesians also mounted naval blockades or full-
scale sieges (by land and sea) of poleis, which compelled them to remain immobile for 
longer periods.  In the summer of 412, nineteen Athenian triremes (later twenty (8.24.1)), 
having stationed themselves at the island of Lade, began a naval blockade of Miletus 
which lasted for a short time (perhaps a month?) (8.17.3, 8.24.1, 8.25) before it was lifted 
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 Note that of the thirty-seven Athenian triremes that forced the Peloponnesian ships into Spiraeum, a 
detachment of only twenty were left to prosecute the blockade (8.11.1) and that some of these were later 
taken for other naval operations (8.15.1).  See also 8.11.2:  the Peloponnesians in great perplexity because 
of the difficulty of guarding triremes in a desert place (“ὁρῶντες τὴν φυλακὴν ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήµῳ ἐπίπονον 
οὖσαν ἠπόρουν”); the particular difficulty of guarding blockaded triremes in an uninhabited location was 
almost certainly because of the impossibility of provisioning in such a location (cf. 4.27.1, 6.34.5). 
168
 Cf. 8.35.2-4:  six Peloponnesian triremes on watch at Triopium in the winter of 412/11 to seize merchant 




on the approach of fifty-five Peloponnesian ships (8.26.1-2, 8.27).
169
  The Athenians 
established a naval blockade of Chios in the summer of 412 with twenty ships (8.24.3, 6) 
which were called back to the Athenian base at Samos at the beginning of the following 
winter (8.30.1).  Reinstituting the blockade of the city later in the same winter with thirty-
two triremes and somewhere under one thousand hoplites, it lasted into the spring of 411 
before the Chians were eventually able to break it.
170
  In the summer of 409, the 
Athenians also mounted conventional circumvallation blockades of Chalcedon and 
Byzantium.  Both of these, however, were relatively short in duration, ending in the same 
summer:  negotiations with Pharnabazus led to the sparing of the Calchedonians; while 
Byzantium was taken by treachery.
171
  In the summer of 406, the Peloponnesians under 
Callicratidas, having defeated the Athenian fleet under Conon in battle in the harbor of 
Mytilene, blockaded that city (with the crews of the remaining forty Athenian triremes 
inside it) by land and sea with one hundred and seventy triremes and an unknown number 
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 The twenty Athenian ships had been joined during the blockade by one thousand Athenian and two 
thousand five hundred allied infantry (8.25.1).  After these forces defeated the Milesians (and their 
Peloponnesian allies) in a land battle before the city (8.25.2-4), the Athenians had prepared to a build a 
circumvallation wall around the city (8.25.5), before the arrival of the Peloponnesian triremes forced them 
to withdraw.  See also 8.30.1-2:  an Athenian plan (never executed) in the winter of 412/11 to blockade 
Miletus with seventy-four triremes. 
 
170
 For the blockade, see 8.38.2-5, 8.40.1, 8.56.1, with 8.61 and 8.63.1 (cf. 8.99) for the Chians’ eventual 
breaking of the Athenian naval domination.  See Andrewes, HCT v.29-30 for Athenian trireme numbers 
during the siege. 
 
171
 For the siege of Calchedon, see Xen., Hell. 1.3.4, 8-9 and the slightly different account at Diod. 13.66.1-
3.  For the siege of Byzantium, see Xen., Hell. 1.3.10, 14, 16-22; Diod. 13.66.3-6.  (Note that the 
Byzantines were starving by the end of the siege but only because Clearchus had requisitioned all of the 
food in the city for his forces.)  Xenophon provides no figures for the amount of Athenian triremes and men 
involved in these sieges, but Diod. (13.66.1) gives a number of 70 triremes and 5,000 infantry operating at 
Calchedon, joined by (at least) 30 triremes under Alcibiades and Thrasyllus (13.64.3); and the same forces 
operating at Byzantium (13.66.3) (although, in both cases, the triremes under Alcibiades sailed off after 
initial operations).  Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus give any indication as to the duration of either siege.  
Note that an Athenian attempt to blockade Phocaea by land in 407 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.11) was abandoned after 




of land troops from Methymna.  One hundred and twenty triremes left the siege after two 
months to sail against an Athenian relieving force of one hundred and ten triremes; the 
remaining fifty lifted the blockade some days later after the defeat at Arginusae.
172
  
Finally in 405, two hundred Peloponnesian triremes began the siege of Athens, of which 
forty or fifty were detached to the siege of Samos.
173
  The siege of both cities took the 
form of a complete blockade by land and sea:  Athens was reduced by starvation after 
almost a year;
174
 Samos surrendered soon afterwards.
175
 
 Each of these blockades and sieges was provisioned primarily through (merchant) 
supply-ships.  The same considerations apply here as in the discussion of the provisioning 
of the (circumvallation) sieges undertaken by the Athenians prior to 413.
176
  Forced by 
tactical considerations to remain immobile,
177
 the men engaged in naval blockades and 
sieges of poleis had a (very) restricted range of foraging, and thus would have consumed 
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 See Xen., Hell. 1.6.16-26, 37; Diod. 13.78-79, 13.97.2, 13.100.5.  Within two months:  on the fifth day 
of the siege, Conon sent out two triremes from Mytilene to bring word to Athens of the siege; one of these 
triremes made it to Athens by way of the Hellespont; the Athenians mobilized their relieving fleet within 
thirty days; when Callicratidas heard that this fleet had reached Samos, he left Mytilene with one hundred 
and twenty triremes (see Xen., Hell. 1.6.16-26). 
 
173
 See p.168 n.155 above for sources. 
 
174
 Xen., Hell. 2.2.10-23:  the siege started in the late summer of 405 and ended in the early summer of 404. 
 
175
 Xen., Hell. 2.3.6-7. 
 
176
 See section iic. 
 
177
 This was especially true for those men engaged in naval blockades or watches, since they had to be 




any provisions in the areas surrounding their camps within a short period.
178
  The siege of 
Mytilene may have been a (very) limited exception to this, as the blockade of that city 
started quickly after a surprise naval battle in its harbor (and so the Mytilenians did not 
have time to prepare to bring much property or food within the walls of the city before 
the siege).  Foraging probably played a limited role in the provisioning of the blockades 
of Chios and Calchedon, since where we learn from Thucydides and Xenophon, 
respectively, that the blockading forces in each case managed to obtain substantial 
amounts of plunder from the territory of the city they were blockading.
179
  But, in the 
main, all of the naval guards and sieges in the Ionian War will have needed to have been 
provisioned by continuous sea-borne supply lines—or, in the case of naval guards, 
operations of shorter term and smaller scale, the laying in of sufficient stores of 
provisions
180
—in order to maintain the continuous pressure they needed to exert on their 
                                                 
178
 We may take it that the plunder taken by Athenian forces from enemy territory mentioned at 8.27.4 (“ἃ 
δ’ ἐκ τῆς πολεµίας”) was taken from the countryside surrounding Miletus after the Athenian victory on 




 Plundering raids on Chian territory by the force blockading it:  8.24.3, 8.24.6 (the first blockade); 8.40.1 
(the second blockade).  On hearing of the Athenians’ approach, the Calchedonians had entrusted all of their 
portable property to the Bithynian Thracians (Xen., Hell. 1.3.2). The Bithynians were forced to hand over 
this property to the Athenians by Alcibiades, who brought it back to the Athenian camp before undertaking 
the blockade of Calchedon (Xen., Hell. 1.3.3-4).  In the case of the raids on Chian territory, the raids were 
primarily for plunder (Thucydides always the verb πορθεῖν or its derivatives to describe them (chapter 1 
section ivb)) and thus provisions will have constituted only a part of their property targeted and (therefore) 
stolen.  In the case of the Calchedonians, we may take it that, expecting the Athenians, they will have 
transported as many of their food stores as possible within the walls of their city. 
 
180
 See 8.100.2:  Thrasyllus, having learned of Mindarus’ presence at Chios and having sailed to 
Methymna, “ἄλφιτα τε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιτήδεια παρασκευάζειν ἐκέλευεν ὡς, ἢν πλείων χρόνος ἐγγιγνηται, 
ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου τοὺς ἐπίπλους τῇ Χίῳ ποιησόµενος” (“gave orders to prepare barley-meal and other 
provisions, in order to attack [Mindarus’ fleet] from Lesbos in the event of its remaining any length of time 
at Chios”).  The laying in of provisions would guarantee the logistical security and operational flexibility of 
Thrasyllus’ fleet during its watch on Chios.  (Thrasyllus’ order to the Methymnaians (Tucker [1892] 293) 
to ‘prepare’ barley-meal and other foods tells us nothing about the Methymnaians means of acquiring that 
food (although it should be noted that it does not rule out purchase:  see 3.49.3 (the Mytilenian 
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enemies.  With no other means of acquisition of supplies available to the Athenians or the 
Peloponnesians,
181
 these supply lines were manned and provisioned by private traders 
transporting their privately bought stores of grain (and other foods).  This conclusion is 
supported by our one explicit reference to the provisioning of a circumvallation blockade.  
When Eteonicus, engaged in the siege of Mytilene, heard of the Peloponnesian defeat at 
Arginusae, he pretended to his forces that the Peloponnesians had secured a great victory 
(Xen., Hell. 1.6.36-37); as part of his deception (carried out in order to ensure an orderly 
withdrawal of his fleet from Mytilene to Chios), he ordered “... τοὶς ἐµπόροις τὰ χρήµατα 
σιωπῇ ἐνθεµένους εἰς τὰ πλοῖα ἀποπλεῖν εἰς Χίον” (“... the traders to put their goods 
quietly aboard their ships and then set sail to Chios”) (Xen., Hell. 1.6.37).  The traders in 
the camp of the besieging force at Mytilene are mentioned exceptionally here, then, 
because they (inadvertently) play a role in a ruse; but the fact that Xenophon could refer 
to them casually—and with the definite article although he has not previously mentioned 
them in his narrative—shows that traders were an assumed part of sieges and blockades 
during the Ionian War.
182
    
                                                                                                                                                 
ambassadors in Athens acquiring food for the Athenian trireme sailing to Mytilene with news of the 
assembly’s change of mind) where “παρασκευασάντων” has to be referring to purchase).) 
 
181
 For the latter, see the conclusion to this chapter.  Note that all payments to naval forces in this period 
remain in cash;  see chapter 5 sections iii, iv, chapter 6 section iv for references and discussion. 
 
182
 We can assume therefore that the provisions being brought in by sea to the forces besieging Athens in 
405/4 (see Isoc. 18.60 at p.141 n.71 above) were being transported by private traders to sell to the besieging 
forces.  This conclusion receives further proof from the facts that the Athenians only undertook the 
circumvallation sieges of Calchedon and Byzantium after they had established (almost) total control of the 
sea through successive victories at Cynossema, Abybus, and Cyzicus (Cynossema: 8.103.7; Abydus: Xen., 
Hell. 1.1.4-7; Cyzicus: Xen., Hell. 1.1.16-18); and that the Peloponnesians only started the blockades by 
land and sea of Mytilene, Athens, and Samos when there were no Athenian fleets on the sea.  In other 
words, full-scale sieges of poleis were attempted during the Ionian War only when one side or the other had 
(almost) total naval superiority and so could ensure the security of continuous sea-borne supply lines, and 
thus the continuous security of supply required for besieging forces.  (Shorter term naval guards or 
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The tens of thousands of men constituting the Athenian and Peloponnesian forces 
in the Ionian War spent, however, only a part of their time engaged in naval movements, 
guards, and sieges; the majority of their time in the Ionian theater was spent encamped at 
operational bases.
183
  These bases—camps located at or beside allied or friendly poleis—
functioned as secure locations in which forces could be gathered before major operations, 
provided operational security as a base from which detachments could attack and retire 
to, and served (most importantly) as winter-quarters.
184
  Samos was the most important 
operational base for the Athenians during the Ionian War:  the Athenians based 
themselves there from the summer of 412 to near the end of the summer of 411,
185
 from 
early 407 till the summer of 405 (and the movement of the fleet to its defeat at 
Aegospotami);
186
 from 411 to 409, the Athenians based first themselves at various poleis 
in the Hellespont,
187
 and in the winter of 410/9 at Lampsacus,
188
 before settling down 
                                                                                                                                                 
blockades could rely on stores of provisions laid in (see n.180 above)—and, in any case, only needed local 
tactical superiority on sea for their operations.) 
 
183
 See Roth (1999) 169-177 for the concept and discussion of operational bases. 
 
184
 See (ibid.) esp. 171. 
 
185
 See 8.27.4 for the establishment of the base at Samos in the summer of 412, and 8.100.1 for the 
Athenian fleet leaving Samos for the Hellespont.  For the importance of Samos as a base of operations for 
the Athenians in these years, see esp. 8.76.4-5. 
 
186
 408 (Xen., Hell. 1.4.8); 407 (Xen., Hell. 1.4.23); 406 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.18, 20; Diod. 13.76.1, 13.100.6); 
405 (Xen., Hell. 2.1.12, 2.1.16; Diod. 13.104.1). 
 
187
 Xen., Hell. 1.1.1-1.2.13 passim. 
 
188




before Calchedon and Byzantium in the summer of 409.  The Peloponnesians’ most 
important operational bases during the war were Chios, Ephesus, Miletus, and Rhodes.
189
  
Foraging or pillaging did not play any important part of the provisioning of the 
Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets at their bases.  Those operational bases located on 
islands—Samos, Chios, and Rhodes—necessarily had no nearby enemy territory 
accessible by land from the sailors’ camps which they could forage from; some petty 
stealing from the inhabitants of the poleis of these islands or occasional raiding of enemy 
territory on the mainland opposite did take place,
190
 but nothing that could feed tens of 
thousands of men for any significant duration of time.  The Athenians did raid the King’s 
territory in the winter of 410/9 from their base at Lampsacus; but the purpose of these 
raids was primarily plunder.
191
  For the Peloponnesian bases at Miletus and Chios, 
however, foraging or pillaging of the interior was forbidden by the fact that it belonged to 
their ally, the King.
192
  It has sometimes been thought by scholars that the Peloponnesian 
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 Chios:  summer of 406-summer of 405 (Xen., Hell. 2.1.1-10).  Ephesus: 406 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.1; Diod. 
13.70.4-13.71.1; Plut., Lys. 3); summer 406 (Xen., Hell. 1.5.10-15, 1.6.26; cf. Diod. 13.76.3); summer 406: 
(Xen., Hell. 1.6.1, 1.6.26).  Miletus: summer 412 (8.26-27.1, 8.29.1); winter of 412/11 (8.29.1, 8.33.1, 
8.36.1, 8.36.4-5, 8.50.2, 8.60.3); summer of 411 (8.60.3, 8.63.1, 8.78-85, 8.99, 8.100.1); part of summer 
406 (Xen., Hell. 1.6.8-12).  Note also that the ninety-four triremes of the Peloponnesian fleet spent eighty 
days at Rhodes in the winter of 412/11 (8.44.2, 8.44.4, 8.60.2) and some time there, too, in 407 (Xen., Hell. 




 That is, we should imagine these activities as providing supplies for some sailors for days or a few 
weeks, rather than months or years.  See, e.g., Xen., Hell. 2.1.1:  the Peloponnesians on Chios apparently 
living by stealing food in the summer of 406; and Xen., Hell. 2.1.16: raiding of the King’s territory by the 
Athenian fleet based on Samos in the summer of 405. 
 
191
 Xen., Hell. 1.2.17:  “ἐπόρθουν τὴν βασιλέως χώραν...” with chapter 1 section ivb on the meaning of 
πορθεῖν.  Note also Erdkamp (1998) 23 at n.196 below on the difficulty for large stationary forces of 
provisioning by foraging or pillaging in winter. 
 
192
 See Xen., Hell. 3.1.8 for the conventional understanding that classical Greek military forces were not 
allowed to plunder (or forage from) the territory of their friends; although some private raiding by sailors or 
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sailors at Miletus in the winter of 412/11 planned to raid the King’s territory in search of 
provisions, because Tissaphernes was paying them so badly.  Thucydides narrates that 
Tissaphernes decided to start paying the Peloponnesians again near the end of that winter 
chiefly because, due to the sailors’ lack of pay, “ἐφοβεῖτο µάλιστα µὴ τῆς τροφῆς 
ζητήσει πορθήσωσι τὴν ἤπειρον” (“he was afraid that, in search of τροφή, they might 
plunder the mainland”) (8.57.1).
193
  But τροφή here, as the surrounding narrative shows, 
clearly means pay (i.e., money to pay for food):  it is found twice with this meaning at 
8.57.1 (which describes the reasons for Tissaphernes’ fear of potential Peloponnesian 
plundering of his territory); τροφή = pay was what Tissaphernes gave to the 
Peloponnesians in order to prevent them attacking the interior (8.57.2); it was also what 
he guaranteed to pay them in an immediately subsequent agreement (8.58.5, 8.58.6).  In 
fact, τροφή always means pay, and never supplies, in book 8 of Thucydides.194  In 
addition, πορθεῖν always has the primary meaning in Thucydides of the plundering of 
property (rather than the foraging of food).
195
  In sum, then, Tissaphernes was afraid at 
8.57.1 that, as a desperate recourse because of their lack of money, the Peloponnesian 
sailors would plunder the mainland in search of property to sell, so that they could raise 
                                                                                                                                                 
soldiers of friendly territory sometimes went on (see, e.g., Xen., Hell. 4.8.30), raiding or plundering by 
entire armies or navies of friendly territory is almost never heard of (Xen., Hell. 3.1.8 is the only recorded 
example from the entire classical period). 
 
193
 Kagan ([1987] 97), Hanson ([1998] 187), Kallet ([2001] 265, 304), and Hornblower (CT iii.922, 926) 
(and Smith’s (Loeb) and Crawley’s translations) take this sentence to mean that Tissaphernes was afraid 
that the Peloponnesians would ravage the mainland in search of provisions. 
 
194
 See 8.5.5, 8.29.1, 8.43.4, 8.45.6, 8.46.5, 8.78, 8.80.2, 8.81.3, 8.83.3, 8.86.6, 8.87.1, 8.87.3, 8.99. 
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money to buy provisions.
196
  (The subsequent agreement with the Peloponnesians made 
sure that his fears never became a reality.)   
Foraging, then, was never of structural importance in the provisioning of the 
Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets at their operational bases.  Rather, just as in the case 
of the provisioning of forces remaining immobile for sieges, continuous supply lines 
were needed to provision the tens of thousands of sailors on both sides as they remained 
stationary for long periods at their bases.
197
  Again, in the absence of any other means of 
state acquisition of supplies, the provisions making possible the functioning of these 
operational bases were owned and transported by private traders, and sold to the men in 
agorai in or at the outskirts of their camps.  Our one explicit reference to the provisioning 
of operational bases during the Ionian War is consistent with this conclusion:  Andocides, 
defending himself in an Athenian court, told the assembled dikasts that, in addition to 
providing oar-spars to the Athenian fleet on Samos in 411, he also imported grain and 
bronze to it (“εἰσήγαγον δὲ σῖτόν τε καὶ χαλκόν”) (2.11).198  In other words, the existence 
of markets in grain (and other foods) made the provisioning of operational bases during 
                                                 
196
 For other scholars taking the passage in this way, see Jackson (1969) 13 and n.13; Lewis (1977) 102-
103; Lazenby (2004) 186.  Note that, given the time of year (late winter), the Peloponnesian sailors could 
not, in fact, have been thinking of living from foraging:  see Erdkamp (1998) 23 on the difficulty of 
provisioning by foraging or pillaging in winter:  “[e]ven the most ruthlessly plundering troops would get 
into difficulty when trying to operate for a long period in the same area... it would be impossible to operate 
in such a way during winter or early spring, that is before harvest time, since at that time of year a huge 
area would be needed to feed an averagely sized army.”  Finally, cf. 8.36.1:  the Peloponnesians living well 
at Miletus in the early winter of 412/11 because they were being paid sufficiently by Tissaphernes and 
because they still had the plunder (not provisions) taken in the capture of Iasus (see 8.28.4). 
 
197
 The fleets also needed some reserves of provisions in order to provide strategic and tactical flexibility:  
see Roth (1999) 170 for this point. 
 
198
 Cf. Andoc. 2.12:  necessary things supplied to the army at Samos by Andocides at that time (“εἰ γὰρ τοῖς 
ἀνδράσιν ἐκείνοις τότε τὰ ἐπιτήδεια µὴ εἰσήχθη...”).  Cf. Reed (2003) 123-124 on Andocides’ career as a 




the Ionian War possible, and enabled tens of thousands of men to remain in their bases 
and at sea for the eight years from the winter of 413/412 to the summer of 404. 
 
v. Conclusions 
 Peloponnesian—and other Greek—forces on overseas expeditions acquired their 
food from markets before the Ionian War, too.  Despite the nearly total absence of 
evidence available for the provisioning of fifth century naval and amphibious expeditions 
mounted by Greek states other than Athens,
199
 this conclusion follows with certainty 
from consideration of the financial administration of classical Greek states and from the 
evidence we possess for the funding and preparation of these expeditions.  Firstly (and to 
repeat myself), no classical Greek state had reserves of tax grain which it could use to 
supply overseas campaigns.
200
  Secondly, there were no private traders—contractors—of 
sufficient scale in the Greek world which classical Greek states could employ to 
provision their campaigns.
201
  Thirdly, classical Greek states did not requisition supplies 
from its citizens for expeditions.
202
  Fourthly, classical Greek states did not exact 
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 But see chapter 1 section v on the provisioning of Syracusan forces; p.177 on the provisioning of the 
Peloponnesian forces besieging Mytilene in 406; p.141 n.71 on the provisioning of the forces besieging 
Athens in 405/4.  See also Andoc. 2.14 (with MacDowell [1991] 189):  the implication of Andocides being 
accused of importing grain and oars to the enemy is that a ship-owner could be thought to be supplying 
provisions to the Peloponnesians during the Ionian War.  Diodorus also reports preparation of grain and 
other supplies for wars by Brasidas at Amphipolis in 424 (12.68.4-5) and Olynthus in 382/1, but as these 
are simply stereotypically formulaic descriptions Diodorus uses often for his descriptions of military 
campaigns:  see Stylianou (1998) 15. 
 
200
 It is commonly thought that the supply of Spartan military forces was centrally organized by the Spartan 
state, but there is no strong evidence for this idea:  see chapter 3 section ivb. 
 
201
 See again pp.147-148 above. 
 
202




contributions in kind from their allies or subjects in order to provision campaigns; rather, 
as in the Ionian War,
203
 they always requested or compelled contributions in cash from 
their allies in order to prepare overseas expeditions or to fund the current expenses of 
those on campaign.  Thus, in 435, before their major expedition against Corcyra, the 
Corinthians, in addition to asking their maritime allies for triremes (1.27.1, 1.46.1), also 
asked for money from the Thebans and the Phliasians (1.27.2), and for money and 
triremes from the Eleans (1.27.2, 1.30.2).  At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the 
Spartans asked their allies in Italy and Sicily both to build ships, and to provide fixed 
sums of money (“καὶ ἀργυρίον ῥητὸν ἑτοιµάζειν”) (2.7.2).204  An inscription from Sparta, 
IG V 1, 1, probably dating to 427,
205
 records a list of irregular voluntary contributions to 
the Spartan war effort of (in Attic value) of thirteen talents and two hundred and seventy-
four drachmas
206
 from a collection of individuals, groups of exiles, and states.
207
  (This 
inscription also unusually records contributions in kind of raisins (ll.13-16) and two or 
                                                 
203
 See again p.165-166 n.45 (Peloponnesians), pp.166-167 (Athenians). 
 
204
 See also Plut., Mor. 190A:  “Ἀρχίδαµου, ἐν τῷ Πελοποννησιακῷ πολέµῳ τῶν συµµαχῶν ἀξιούντων 
ὁρίσαι τοὺς φόρους αὐτοῖς, εἶπεν, “ὁ πόλεµος οὐ τεταγµένα σιτεῖται”” (“when the allies said in the 
Peloponnesian war it was only right that Archidamus set a limit to their contributions, he said, “War does 
not feed on fixed contributions”).  Unfortunately, this saying cannot be safely associated with Archidamus 
since it wanders from speaker to speaker throughout the works of Plutarch:  in addition to the Spartan king 
Archidamus who died in 427 (Crass. 2.8; Agis and Cleomenes 27.1), Plutarch also reports it of the Spartan 
king Archidamus who died in 338 (Plut., Mor. 219A) and Crobylus (i.e. Hegesippus the Athenian orator) 
(Plut., Dem. 17.3). 
 
205
 See Loomis (1992) 56-76. 
 
206
 (Ibid.) 79.  But see (ibid.) 77:  the fragmentary state of the inscription means that we do not have the full 
list of contributors, or the full amounts of all that was given by the contributors we do have. 
 
207
 See also IG V 1, 219 for a fragment of another list of contributions to Spartan war efforts during the 
Peloponnesian War:  this fragment is too small, however, to contain any name of a contributor or any 




three thousand medimnoi of an unknown substance (ll.20-24); but the first is from an 
(unknown) individual and the second contributor in kind is unknown.)
208
  In two treaties 
of the late 420s, Athens enjoined allies not to provide contributions of money to their 
allies:
209
 it can be inferred from this prohibition that it was common practice for classical 
Greek states to support other states engaged in wars with monetary contributions.
210
 
 Money, then, was crucial to the waging of overseas expeditions mounted by states 
other than Athens.  This inference is supported by numismatic evidence.  Thus, for 
example, in the late 430s, Epidamnus may have struck a special coinage to finance 
Corinthian military aid;
211
 the Sicyonians minted coinages from the 430/20 onwards that 
were almost certainly linked to the war effort during those years;
212
 a coinage of the 
Euboean League issued in the late fifth century was almost certainly connected also to the 
Euboean rebellion from Athens and funding of naval squadrons to assist the 
                                                 
208
 Loomis ([1992] 80, 82-83) thinks that the small amounts of cash contributed and the contributions in 
kind mentioned in this IG V 1, 1 shows that the Spartans were less dependent on cash for their military and 
naval efforts than the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War.  No:  the inscription shows, rather, that the 
Spartans simply did not have access to the amounts of money the Athenians possessed from tribute and 
other sources of current revenue (such as the mines at Laurion, their various harbor taxes, etc.). 
 
209 See IG I3 75.10-11:  among other things, Halieis (in 424/3) not to provide money to Athens’ enemies 
(“µεδὲ χρ[έµ]ατα παρέχε[ν τοῖς πολεµίοις”); IG I3 76.19-20:  among other things, certain Bottiaean cities 
swear not to provide money to the enemies of the Athenians (“καὶ οὐκ ὠφελήσω τοὺ]ς ἐχθροὺς τοὺς 
Ἀθηναίων οὔτε χρ[ήµατα παρέχων...”). 
 
210
 For later in our period, see Rhodes and Osborne 57 (Tod II.160):  a list of contributions to the Boeotians 
for the prosecution of Sacred War in the late 350s all in cash from the poleis of Alyzea, Anactorium, and 
Byzantium, as well as a Boeotian proxenos from Tenedos. 
 
211
 Kraay (1976) 84. 
 
212






  If poleis other than Athens either mounted overseas expeditions very 
infrequently or not at all, it was firstly because the resource requirements of trireme 
warfare limited this type of warfare to only a few wealthy states;
214
 and, secondly, 
because no classical Greek states other than Athens (even Syracuse)
215
 possessed the 
concentrations of capital necessary to easily and quickly fund naval and amphibious 
expeditions of protracted length.
216
  (These two factors also resulted in the overwhelming 
Athenian naval superiority that effectively blocked any other Greek state from attempting 
to launch any major amphibious or naval operations in the Aegean during the 
Peloponnesian War before 412.)
217
  But those few major overseas expeditions that were 
mounted by states other than Athens in this period always relied on money to fund their 
                                                 
213
 See Andrewes, HCT v.319 for references and discussion.  Note also here p.137 n.58 above for the 
special coinages struck by the Mytilenians and the Melians to fund their resistance to Athens. 
 
214
 See Davies (2007a) 77-82 and conclusion. 
 
215
 See Morris (2001) 74-75:  Syracuse able to fund major wars against Athens and Syracuse in the last two 
decades of the fifth century and the first decade of the fourth century, but only with difficulty and through 
the use of financial expedients.  Cf. chapter 1 conclusion:  Syracuse owing two thousand talents by the third 
summer of the Athenian expedition (in 413). 
 
216
 See Kallet (1993) passim; Morris (2001), e.g., 78-79, 91; and conclusion.  Note here that it took Corinth 
two years to equip and prepare its expedition of one hundred and fifty triremes that sailed in 433 against 
Corcyra (1.31.1, 1.46.1) (see Kallet-Marx [1993] 77-80 for discussion of the Corinthian preparations and 
what they reveal about the differences between Corinth’s and Athens’ financial resources for war). 
 
217
 The Peloponnesians mounted amphibious campaigns in the north-west in the early years of the 
Peloponnesian War.  The Corinthians launched an amphibious expedition (of forty triremes and one 
thousand five hundred hoplites) against Acarnania and Cephallenia (which would not submit) in the winter 
of 431/430 (2.33.1-3); the Peloponnesian mounted an (unsuccessful) amphibious expedition against 
Zacynthus in the summer of 430 (2.66.1-2); and the Peloponnesians also launched amphibious expeditions 
and fleets to the north-west in the summer of 429, which were all ultimately unsuccessful (2.80-92).  Fleets 
were also sent to Corcyra in the summer of 427 (3.76-80) and in the summer of 425 (4.2, 4.8).  The only 
naval expeditions in areas in the Athenian sphere of influence in the Aegean before 412 were an attempted 
surprise attack on Athens in the winter of 429/28 (2.93-94); and a fleet of forty ships sent to aid the revolt 




expeditions and (especially) to pay their men:  the men employed on these expeditions 
used their monetary pay to acquire provisions by purchase in agorai from private traders 




 One can only produce orders of magnitude for the amounts of grain purchased by 
Athenian and Peloponnesian forces engaged in amphibious and naval operations in the 
Aegean and around ‘mainland’ Greece during the Peloponnesian War, but the figures are 
again strikingly and impressively large.  For the siege of Samos, taking one hundred and 
ten triremes to have stayed for the whole of the eight months (reckoning that fifteen 
triremes (probably too high a number) were lost in the naval battles with the Samians), 
and the reinforcing squadrons of ninety triremes to have stayed for the last six months of 
the siege (they probably will have arrived before this), the Athenian and allied triremes 
will have needed to import 365,000 medimnoi of barley-meal—over six million 
kilograms of wheat equivalent of grain.
219
  The seventeen thousand men who remained at 
Potidaea for the entire duration of the siege from the summer of 432 to the winter of 
430/29 will have bought nearly 640,000 medimnoi of barley-meal—or over ten and a half 
                                                 
218
 Cf. 1.62.1:  a market was established (“ἀγορὰν ποιεῖσθαι”) outside Potidaea for the Potidaeans and the 
Peloponnesians with Aristeus awaiting Athenian attack in 432.  Although this was not an amphibious or 
naval expedition, since the forces under Aristeus made their way to Potidaea by land (see p.216 n.51), the 
provision of a market to Aristeus’ force shows that this was a normal means of provisioning forces of 
classical Greek states other than Athens when they were operating far away from their home poleis.  Cf. 
Xen., Hell. 6.2.23:  many traders in the Peloponnesian camp undertaking the siege of Corcyra in 372. 
 
219
 Assuming two hundred men per trireme (see appendix 2) and 16.482kg as the wheat equivalent of one 
medimnos of ἄλφιτα (see appendix 3 section iii), the one hundred and ten triremes will have consumed 
230,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or 3,790,860kg of w(heat).e(quivalent). of grain), and the ninety 




million kilograms of wheat equivalent of grain.
220
  The nine thousand men who 
blockaded Mytilene for roughly nine months from the summer of 428 to the early 
summer of 427 will have acquired by purchase just over 100,000 medimnoi of barley-
meal—or over one million and six hundred and fifty thousand kilograms of wheat 
equivalent of grain.
221
  The twenty-two thousand and four hundred men who sailed 
around the Peloponnese—taking foraging to have provided a quarter of their provisions 
(almost certainly too high a figure)—will have needed from the supply ships 
accompanying them or sailing out to them from Athens just over 93,000 medimnoi of 
barley-meal—or over one and a half million kilograms of wheat equivalent of grain.
222
  
Finally, each side in the Ionian War will have needed either (taking a conservative figure 
of fifteen thousand men per fleet) nearly 230,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or just over 
three million seven hundred and fifty thousand kilograms of wheat equivalent of grain) 
per year; or (taking a more likely figure of twenty thousand men per fleet) just over 
300,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or just over five million kilograms of wheat 
equivalent of grain) per year.
223
  Placing these figures into the context of the figures we 
already do have the grain trade in the Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries,
224
 one 
                                                 
220
 Actually 637,500 medimnoi of barley-meal, or 10,507,275kg of w.e. of grain. 
 
221
 Actually 101,250 medimnoi of barley-meal, or 1,668,802.5kg of w.e. of grain. 
 
222
 Actually 93,333 medimnoi of barley-meal, or 1,583,320kg of w.e. of grain. 
 
223
 Actually either 228,125 medimnoi of barley-meal, or 3,759,956.25kg of w.e. of grain; or 304,167 
medimnoi of barley-meal, or 5,013,275kg of w.e. of grain. 
 
224




can see that they introduce striking and significant new evidence into the debate on the 
size of that trade. 
 Analysis of the provisioning of amphibious and naval operations launched by 
Greek states in the Aegean and the seas around ‘mainland’ Greece in the fifth century 
provides for the first time, then, explicit evidence of regular large-scale seaborne trade in 
grain in the eastern Greek Mediterranean in the fifth century.
225
  But in order to prove 
conclusively that this trade consisted of (thousands of) market (and not reciprocal) 
exchanges,
226
 it is necessary to show that the prices in these exchanges could vary.
227
  
There is evidence to show that this was the case.  Firstly, at Aristoph., Wasps 552-557 
(produced for the first time in 422), Philokleon, arguing for the power of Athenian 
dikasts, tells his son how, on his arrival the courts, there are big men there who supplicate 
him and plea in a piteous tone (556-557), 
οἴκτιρον µ’, ὦ πάτερ, αἰτοῦµαι σ’, εἰ καὐτὸς πώποθ’ ὑφείλου ἀρχὴν ἄρξας ἢ  }πὶ 
στρατιᾶς τοῖς ξυσσίτοις ἀγοράζων. 
                                                 
225
 Note here, too, that markets provided to military forces are taken for granted in Thucydides’ description 
of the early years of the Peloponnesian War and in Aristophanes’ comedies of the late 420s (in addition to 
Ach. 544-554, see just below on Wasps, 556-557).  The fact that ‘military markets’ could be assumed by 
and represented to Athenian audiences as an expected and customary part of war and war preparations in 
the 420s only makes sense if this institution was a long-established and conventional feature of Greek 
warfare by this time. 
 
226
 Previous scholars have mentioned in passing that the monetization of payments to classical Greek 
military forces presupposes an economy in which the men serving in these forces could spend their money 
buying goods in market exchanges:  see, e.g., Howgego (1995) 18; Morley (2007a) 51-52; von Reden 
(2007) 402, 405; Burrer (2008) 77 (and cf. 1.81.4 for the explicit linkage between Athenian imperial 
revenues and the provisioning of Athenian overseas expeditions).  But none of these scholars have ever 
drawn the full implications from this presupposition, or examined whether the exchanges military payments 
in coin permitted were true market exchanges. 
 
227
 See Temin (2001) 176:  “[i]t is not enough, however, to show that prices were widespread.  Prices affect 
the allocation of resources in market economies, and we need to have evidence of this causal relationship as 
well as indications of the prices themselves.”  See (ibid.) 177:  “[t]he distinction between market and 
reciprocal exchange is whether the rate of exchange – the price – can vary.”  Temin’s article provides the 





Have mercy on me, father, if ever you yourself have nicked anything when you 
were holding some office or buying food for your mess-mates on campaign. 
 
The man supplicating Philokleon could only have been able to embezzle money if his 
sussitoi did not know the price of food in the market in which he was buying (in other 
words, if the price of food could vary, so that it could not be known in advance).  
Secondly, Andocides, as part of his defense mentioned earlier, told the dikasts assembled 
for his trial that not only did he supply oar-spars to the Athenian fleet on Samos, but that 
he refused to charge more for them than they had cost him, although he could have 
obtained a price of five drachmas each for them.
228
  Although he does not state so 
explicitly, it seems very likely that the grain he also supplied to the Athenians on Samos 
could have varied in price, too.
229
   
In addition to these instances, there is, to anticipate chapter 7, conclusive evidence 
that the prices charged for booty in classical Greek military camps were also determined 
by supply and demand (and were not fixed or customary).  Firstly, the Oxyrhynchus 
Historian narrates that, in the last decades of the fifth century, the Thebans were able 
were able to improve their estates and houses greatly since they were able to obtain 
                                                 
228
 Andoc. 2.11:  “... καὶ παρόν µοι πέντε δραχµῶν τὴν τιµὴν αὐτῶν δέξασθαι οὐκ ἠθέλησα πράξασθαι 
πλέον ἢ ὅσου ἐµοὶ κατέστησαν.” 
 
229 
The only mention of fixed low prices in the classical period:  when Alexander of Pherae offered cattle at 
a low price to his new Athenian allies, Epaminondas of Thebes commented “[w]e’ll supply them free wood 
to cook their meat, for we’ll cut down everything in their land if they make trouble’ (Plut., Mor. 193E).  
This exception proves the rule:  as τάγος (and virtual tyrant) of all of Thessaly, Alexander could demand 
immediate access to the resources of his subjects in ways that the administrations of city-states could not 
(Xen., Hell. 6.4.29 is particulary instructive in this regard), and he also ruled a region that was much greater 
in resources (and cities) than a normal city-state (see esp. Xen., Hell. 6.1.5-12, 18-19 on the unusually large 
resources available to Jason of Pherae (Alexander’s father) as ruler of Thessaly); thus, he could prepare 
large amounts of cattle, at little or no cost to himself, for sale to the Athenians at low prices.  Cf. appendix 
6 section iii:  the resources available to Hellenistic rulers also explains why prices in markets provided to 




slaves and booty, as a result of the Deceleian War, at an unusually small price (13.4).
230
  
Secondly, in Thrace in the winter of 400/399, Seuthes sent his agent Heraclides with 
booty to Perinthus in order to sell it there to raise the pay for the Cyreans, whom he had 
been employing (Xen., Anab. 7.4.2).  From the proceeds of the sale of the plunder at 
Perinthus, Seuthes paid twenty days’ pay only of the month that had just passed to the 
mercenaries (Xen., Anab. 7.5.4) (although in fact the Greeks were owed two months’ pay 
(Xen., Anab. 7.6.1)); for Heraclides said that he had not obtained any more money than 
that from the sale of the booty (“ὁ γὰρ Ἥρακλείδης ἔλεγεν ὅτι οὐ πλέον ἐµπολήσαι”) 
(Xen., Anab. 7.5.4).  Xenophon attacked Heraclides for his lack of success in raising 
money, telling him that he should have raised more money by borrowing or by selling the 
clothes off his back (Xen., Anab. 7.5.5):  the assumption being that he could have raised 
more money, and therefore that the prices for the booty he had sold at Perinthus could 
have varied and were not standardized.  Finally, Xenophon praised Agesilaos for making 
use of the sale of booty to enrich his friends during his campaign in Asia Minor (Ages. 
1.17-19).  Up country in Phrygia in the summer/autumn campaign of 396, the plunder 
was so great that things were selling for next to nothing, “ἀντίπροικα.”  Agesilaos told his 
friends that he would be shortly going down to the coast with the army and gave them the 
word to buy, instructing the laphuropolai to sell to them on credit, so that his friends 
made huge profits (“πάντες παµπληθή χρήµατα ἔλαβον”) on their arrival at an unnamed 
city on the coast
231
  (Ages. 1.18).  It is unlikely to be the case that, in military forces 
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 See chapter 7 section iv for more discussion of this passage.  See there also Hell. Oxy. 22.4 for 
Agesilaos for sending the “more valuable part of the booty” from Lake Dascylitis to Cyzicus to be sold. 
 
231
 Unnamed in this text, but Diodorus (14.79.3) tells us that Agesilaos employed Cyme as his base while 




where the allocation of plunder was determined by “‘real prices’ arrived at individually 
by market bargaining,”
232
 grain was exchanged at standardized or traditional prices.  
Rather, the exchanges of grain and other goods in the agorai provided to classical Greek 
military forces were real market exchanges (in which goods were allocated by price).
233
  
The examination of the provisioning of classical Greek naval and amphibious expeditions 
in the eastern Mediterranean shows a world, then, where there were large-scale market 
exchanges in grain and other goods. 
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 Temin (2001) 176. 
 
233
 Cf. Harris (2001b) 76-77, Möller (2007) 372-373 for prices for goods and services at Athens in the 
classical period being determined by individual market bargaining (and not being customary).  Cf. also 
Bresson (2008a) 115 citing Xen., Poroi 4.6 for the fact that price movements determined levels of 
agricultural and craft production in the Greek world.  Cf., too, Xen., Anab. 1.5.6:  the prices charged for 
wheat-flour and barley-meal in the Lydian agora accompanying Cyrus’ army on the march to Cunaxa 





Chapter 3:  The Provisioning of Classical Greek Overland Campaigns 
 
i. Introduction 
In this chapter, I turn from the provisioning of the amphibious and naval 
campaigns launched by Greek states (and especially Athens) in the fifth and early fourth 
centuries to the supply of land campaigns undertaken by Greek poleis in this period.  I 
will begin by discussing the (small) amount of provisions that classical Greek armies 
took with them when they departed for campaigns from their home poleis.  I will then 
examine the provisioning of Greek armies on the move through friendly territory:  firstly, 
I will employ an analysis of Xenophon’s narrative of the parabasis of the Ten Thousand 
along the southern Black Sea coast to show that the reception of land forces—and the 
provision of agorai to them—by friendly or neutral poleis was taken for granted 
throughout the Greek world in the classical period; I will continue from this analysis to 
demonstrate that markets provided by poleis were the primary source of food supplies for 
classical Greek military forces marching through friendly territory.  In contrast, when 
operating in hostile territory, Greek armies necessarily had to rely on some other means 
of provisioning than polis-provided markets.  Many modern discussions of the traveling 
markets that always accompanied classical Greek armies on overland campaigns have 
considered these ‘market mobs’ to have been important sources of food for Greek 
military expeditions in hostile territory; Xenophon’s paradigmatic account of the 
preparations necessary for Cyrus’ long march to Thymbrara (Cyr. 6.2.24-41, esp. 38-39) 
is the passage that has been most often cited in support of this view.  I will demonstrate in 
the fourth section of this chapter, however, that positioning the traveling markets which 




contextualized reading of the passages in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia and other ancient 
works bearing on this question, show that private traders never made a structurally 
important contribution to the food supply of Greek overland military expeditions.  Rather, 
just as in later European societies, traveling markets were never more than a 
supplementary source of provisions for classical Greek armies:  foraging always 
remained Greek armies’ primary means of acquiring food in hostile territory.  I will 
conclude by considering what the provisioning of classical Greek land campaigns can tell 
us about the nature and scale of the overland trade in grain in the Greek world in the fifth 
and fourth centuries.  
 
ii. The amount of provisions brought along on classical Greek land campaigns  
 Classical Greek soldiers took only a few days’ provisions with them when they 
set out on land campaigns.
1
  Athenian soldiers departing for land campaigns in the fifth 
century were typically ordered to bring along three days’ rations (though five days’ 
rations are attested for the late fourth century), and this amount is also the quantity of 
provisions most frequently evidenced for other classical Greek military forces setting out 
on overland marches.
2
  The number of days’ supplies soldiers were ordered to bring with 
                                                 
1
 Gomme, HCT i.16 (though note the serious mistakes in his treatment of classical Greek military 
provisioning discussed at chapter 2 section iia, iic); Rawlings (2007) 74.  Before continuing, I should add 
that classical Greek hoplites did not carry their own food; slave attendants performed this task for them (see 
appendix 2 for discussion). 
 
2
 For sources for the amounts of provisions brought on campaign by classical Greek armies, see 
Cruickshank (1954) 66-68; Pritchett (1971) 32-34; Harthen (2001) 106-108.  The Aristophanic evidence is 
completely consistent in representing “the three-day rations... [as] a well-known and hated feature of 
campaigning...” (Pritchett [1971] 34); for ‘real life’ forming the background to Aristophanic comedy, see 
p.153 n.108.  Cruickshank, Pritchett, and Harthen all miss Eubulus, fr. 19 (PCG), describing the 
preparations for a mock war against an army of ants, which confirms that three days’ provisions were the 
standard amount of food brought on campaign by fifth century Athenian armies:  “ἡµεῖς ποτ’, ἄνδρες, 




them at the outset of a campaign would have varied, however, according to the tactical 
and strategic requirements of the operations they were about to undertake, and the 
opportunities they would have had during those operations to replenish their supplies.
3
  
Thus, the Arcadian forces that occupied Oneum in 367—in order to prevent the Thebans 
from being harassed by enemy forces on their march through the isthmus of Corinth—
took seven days’ provisions with them (Xen., Hell. 7.1.41), since they knew that they 
would have to remain immobile in uninhabited and hostile territory for some time in 
order to achieve their mission.
4
  But the circumstances of this operation were unusual (the 
operations of classical Greek armies were usually characterized by their mobility, and 
soldiers normally had the opportunity to replenish supplies during their operations);
5
 the 
figure found here of seven days’ supplies is, accordingly, the largest attested figure for an 
amount of provisions carried by a classical Greek land force in ‘mainland’ Greece.
6
   
                                                                                                                                                 
χρυσοτεύκτου ψήγµατος πεφηνότος.”  The three days’ rations will have included not only grain, but also, as 
ὄψον, cheese, salt fish, onions, salted olives, and salt (amongst other things) (see, e.g., Aristoph., Ach. 1095-
1141; Peace 368, 529, 1128-1129; Eupolis, fr. 275 (PCG)). 
 
3
 See Erdkamp (1998) 77 for this point. 
 
4
 Cf. Thucy. 7.43.2:  Demosthenes in 413 ordering the taking of five days’ provisions to men who (in case 
of victory on Epipolae) would have been operating in hostile territory (at a Syracusan cross-wall) and 
would have had to have remained immobile for some days (in order to build a wall against the Syracusans). 
 
5
 See sections iiib, ivb, and v below for discussion. 
 
6
 Cf. Cruickshank (1954) 67-68 for seven days’ rations representing a near maximum for the amount of 
supplies that could be carried by one man.  At Diod. 13.95.3, Dionysios is reported as ordering the 
Syracusans to bring thirty days’ provisions with them for a campaign against Leontini (in 406).  This order 
represents an exceptional outlier compared to the extant contemporary evidence for the quantities of 
provisions carried by classical Greek armies for marches overland:  and there were no tactical or strategic 
requirements for this campaign that could have necessitated such an unusually large amount of provisions 
(Grote (ap. Pritchett [1971] 33 n.14) called Dionysius’ order “preposterous”); thus, it should not be cited as 
evidence for the typical provisioning practices of classical Greek armies.  Anderson ([1970] 48) states that 
“[t]hirty days seems to have been considered a reasonable amount of time for an army to live off its own 




That Greek armies in the fifth and fourth centuries usually brought along (very) 
few days’ provisions on campaign is confirmed by two contemporary generalizing 
discussions of overland expeditions.  Firstly, as already discussed,
7
 ps.-Xenophon, in 
                                                                                                                                                 
support for this figure:  firstly, Aristot., Rhet. 1411a has nothing to say on this issue; the “σῖτος” to be 
provided for a month at Thucy. 5.47.6 was monetary pay, and not supplies (see chapter 5 section iv); and, 
as just seen, Diod. 13.95.3 should not be taken as evidence for the usual provisioning practices of classical 
Greek armies.  Ober ([1991] 174) states that “several weeks’ rations” had to be taken on campaign by 
classical Greek hoplite armies.  He cites Engels ([1978] 123-130) and Pritchett ([1971] 30-52) for this 
statement, but neither provide any support (at all) for it; and Engels (who, in any case, is discussing the 
requirements of Alexander’s army, which was operating in completely different circumstances to those 
classical Greek armies typically found themselves in, and had available to it means of acquisition of 
supplies unavailable to Greek armies) even states that “it would have been impossible for the Macedonian 
army to have carried more than a 14-day supply of grain overland, no matter how pack animals were with 
the army” ([1978] 28).  (But see also section ivb below:  Engels’ account of the provisioning of 
Alexander’s army marked by serious errors.)  Lazenby ([1994] 12) cites Xen., Cyr. 6.2.25 for a figure of 
twenty days’ provisions being brought along with a Greek army.  But Cyrus’ army was facing exceptional 
circumstances, as it was setting out on an extraordinarily long march of fifteen days through already 
devastated territory; and Xenophon’s description of the provisioning of this march shows that he 
recognized that twenty days’ supplies was an exceptionally large amount to be brought along on a march 
(see section iva below for full discussion).  (Also, contra Lazenby [1994] 12, the two months’ trophe given 
by Pharnabazus to Peloponnesian sailors in 410 (Xen., Hell. 1.1.24) was clearly monetary pay.)   Hanson 
([1998] 33) states that:  “[f]rom examination of ancient sources and practical considerations of logistics, we 
know that troops usually relied neither entirely on the supplies they had brought along nor on foraging from 
the crops of the enemy.  Instead, soldiers were expected to be provided with anywhere from three to thirty 
days or more rations, depending on the distance and time of the expedition.”  Hanson ([1998] 33-34 n.24) 
cites Anderson ([1970] 43-59) and Pritchett ([1971] 30-51) for this statement, as well as Engels ([1978] 
119-122).  But see just above on Anderson, and note that neither Pritchett’s nor Engels’ work supports 
Hanson’s statement concerning classical Greek armies.  Also, Hanson also cites for his treatment of this 
topic Engels’ statement ([1978] 27-28) that Alexander’s army brought thirty days’ grain with it for its 
march from Macedonia in the spring of 334.  Engels cites Plut., Alex. 15.1 for this statement; Plutarch cites, 
in turn, Duris of Samos.  But Duris in this passage was referring to the amount of provisions that the money 
Alexander had available at this time would buy, and not to any provisions being carried by his army.  In 
any case, Engels was referring (incorrectly) to an amount of provisions carried in ships for Alexander’s 
army, and not to provisions being carried overland, as Hanson incorrectly takes him (and see just above on 
Engels thinking that the Macedonian army could not carry overland more than two weeks’ provisions).  In 
addition:  in 431, the Spartans sent round orders to their allies to get ready the supplies necessary for a 
foreign expedition (Thucy. 2.10.1).  Many scholars have taken this and other Thucydidean evidence to 
mean that the Peloponnesian armies invading Attica during the Archidamian War relied primarily on the 
provisions they had brought with them from their home poleis during their operations in Attica.  This is 
incorrect, however—the Peloponnesian relied mainly on foraging for their provisions during their invasions 
of the Athenian chora:  see section ivb.  Finally, cf. also Cruickshank (1954) 67-68 on the amount of 
supplies carried by Philip II’s army, as mentioned by Frontinus:  “[i]t is true that Frontinus states [Strat. 
4.1.6] that Philip’s soldiers carried 30 days’ rations on their own back; but his words are “in aestiva 
exeuntibus triginta dierum farinam collo portari imperavit”, from which it is clear that this was not a 
tactical march, but the move from winter quarters to the advanced base; it thus forms a special case.” 
 
7





contrasting the mobility and unpredictability of typical amphibious expeditions from the 
(relative) strategic immobility of typical overland expeditions,
8
 states that (Ath. Pol. 2.5) 
“... τοῖς δὲ κατὰ γῆν οὐχ οἱόν τε ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν ἀπελθεῖν πολλῶν ἡµερῶν ὁδόν· 
βραδεῖαί τε γὰρ αἱ πορεῖαι καὶ σῖτον οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔχειν πολλοῦ χρόνου πεζῇ ἰόντα” (“... 
those who rule over land cannot travel many days’ journey from their own land.  For 
journeys are slow, and it is not possible to carry provisions for a long time if one travels 
on foot.”).  Because they could not bring many days’ provisions on campaign, ps.-
Xenophon continues (ibid.), the strategic options of land forces were limited.
9
  Secondly, 
in a lengthy dialogue in the first book of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia between Cambyses and 
Cyrus, which functions as a précis of the personal qualities necessary for an ideal (Greek) 
general and of the requirements in military organization and planning for 
paradigmatically successful (Greek) land campaigns,
10
 Cambyses states that 
... πάντων δὲ χαλεπώτατον στρατιὰν ἀργὸν τρέφειν.  πλεῖστά τε γὰρ τὰ 
ἐσθίοντα ἐν στρατιᾷ καὶ ἀπ’ ἐλαχίστων ὁρµώµενα καὶ οἷς ἂν λάβῃ δαψιλέστατα 
χρώµενα, ὥστε οὔποτε ἀργεῖν δεήσει στρατιάν. 
  
... but the worst burden of all is to support an army in idleness.  For not only are 
the mouths in an army very numerous but the supplies they start with are 
                                                 
8
 Cf. Rawlings (2007) 111. 
 
9
 See sections ivb, v for further discussion of this point. 
 
10
 See, e.g., Gera (1993) 72, Hirsch (1985) 85.  As Stadter points out ([1991] 474-475, 484-485), with his 
instruction from Cambyses in this dialogue, Cyrus completes his development as an ideal general:  the rest 
of the narrative of the Cyropaedia then serves (amongst other things) as an illustration of the military 
lessons which Cyrus (now the complete general) has learned in his discussion with his father.  See Gera 
(1993) 72 and n.152 for examples in book 2 of Cyrus putting into practice the lessons learned from his 
father; cf. also Xen., Cyr. 1.6.43 for Cyrus knowing, at the end of his discussion with his father, all that is 
required of a successful general.  The dialogue at Cyr. 1.6 is then, in sum, a narrative device used by 
Xenophon to set out the basic requirements for the functioning of an ideal Greek army.  On the Cyropaedia 
functioning, in general, as a narrative in which a fictional Cyrus could be presented to a contemporary 
Greek audience as a paradigmatically ideal leader and general (and thus also functioning as a narrative 





exceedingly limited, and they use up extravagantly whatever they get, so that an 
army must never be left idle. (Xen., Cyr. 1.6.17)    
 
Thus, in a summarizing discussion of the needs and characteristics of an idealized 
classical Greek army, a discussion drawn and distilled from Xenophon’s own wide 
experience of such campaigns,
11
 and one in which the provisioning of armies is 
considered crucial for their success,
12
 it is again assumed that an army will depart on 
overland campaigns with very few supplies.
13
 
Finally, it should be noted here that—in all cases—the few days’ provisions 
which were brought on campaign were either bought by individual soldiers, or taken from 
their domestic stores; they were never provided by the state.
14






                                                 
11
 See section iva for full discussion of this point. 
 
12
 See Xen., Cyr. 1.6.9-11, 14-15, 18, 26. 
 
13
 Thucy. 6.7.1 is not evidence for a supply-train (contra Pritchett [1971] 42 (followed by Hornblower, CT 
iii.310):  the Spartans brought the wagons mentioned into Argive territory to carry home plunder (and not 
to supply themselves.  See Xen., Hell. 5.4.42 for the Thebans taking mules into Thespian territory for the 
same reason (in 377). 
 
14
 See the discussion at chapter 6 section ix; see also Pritchett (1971) 33-34; Lee (2006) 494; Rawlings 
(2007) 74.  See, too, Lazenby ([1994] 12) and Lipka ([2002] 190):  the soldiers on Cyrus’ march to 
Thymbrara responsible for their own supplies.  It is commonly thought that Spartan overland expeditions 





iii. The provisioning of overland campaigns in friendly or neutral territory:  
markets provided by poleis 
 a. Markets provided by poleis to the Cyreans
15
 
Xenophon’s narrative of the parabasis of the Cyreans along the southern coast of 
the Pontus mentions provisioning only in exceptional circumstances, in accordance with 
the practices of contemporary Greek military narrative.
16
  But the Ten Thousand were an 
extraordinary military force:  as a stateless entity, their relations with the poleis whose 
territory they passed through were often (and unusually) controversial.  In addition, as 
(exceptionally) there was no ruler or state agent providing pay or access to supplies to the 
Cyreans as they marched (or sometimes sailed) along the Pontic seaboard, provisioning 
was a crucial determining factor in the army’s strategic deliberations throughout this 
time.  For both of these reasons, the provisioning of the Cyreans, and especially the 
agorai provided to them by poleis during their parabasis, are mentioned in Xenophon’s 
narrative of this part of the march unusually often for a Greek historical text; and (almost) 
exceptionally, details of the convention of the granting of agorai by Greek states to 
passing armies are also sometimes explicitly discussed in speeches found in this part of 
the Anabasis (especially when one party or another is accused of not having followed the 
expected, customary pattern of behavior).
17
  Just as, then, Thucydides’ description of the 
Sicilian expedition provides an unusually large amount of information about the 
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 All text references in this section will be to Xenophon’s Anabasis, unless otherwise indicated. 
 
16
 See appendix 4 section i for more detailed discussion of this point. 
 
17





reception by poleis of amphibious forces because the reception of the Athenians was 
unusually controversial (and because Thucydides described the differing receptions of the 
Athenians in Italy and Sicily in order to implicitly judge the competing proposals of 
Nicias and Alcibiades before the Athenian assembly)
18
—so Xenophon’s description of 
the Cyreans’ experiences during this part of the march provides an extraordinarily large 
amount of information on the provision of agorai by poleis to Greek land forces because 
their provision to the Cyreans was extraordinarily controversial (and because of 




The narrative of the march of the Ten Thousand along the Black Sea and the 
Propontis can be summarized as a series of halts at or near Greek cities along the coast 
and the marching through—or sometimes sailing along
20
—non-Greek territory needed to 
get between those cities.
21
  Describing one of these halts, Xenophon narrates that the men 
stayed outside Cotyora for forty-five days, and that they initially got their provisions 
there by foraging (partly from Paphlagonian territory and partly from the estates of the 
Cotyorites), since the Cotyorites did not provide them with a market (“οὐ γὰρ παρεῖχον 
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 See chapter 1 section iiia, appendix 1 section iii. 
 
19
 See, e.g., Erbse (1966). 
 
20
 See 5.3.1:  the sick, the men older than forty, the women and children sailed from Trapezus to Cerasus; 
5.4.1:  this group sails on from Cerasus (to Cotyora); 6.1.14:  the whole army sails from Cotyora to 
Sinope/Harmene; 6.2.1: the whole army sails from Sinope/Harmene to Heracleia; 6.2.17:  the Arcadians in 
the army sail from Heracleia to Calpe Harbor.  The whole army also made short crossings by sea from 
Chrysopolis to Byzantium (7.1.7) and from Thrace to Lampsacus (7.8.1). 
 
21







  The foraging from Cotyorite territory brought Sinopean 
ambassadors to the city, to complain to the mercenaries on behalf of the Cotyorites, who 
were their colonists, that it was not proper for the mercenaries to quarter their ill inside 
the city and take whatever they needed from the Cotyorites without the latter’s 
permission.  If the soldiers continued to do these things, Hecatonymus (who spoke on 
behalf of the Sinopeans) threatened, the Sinopeans would make an alliance with Corylas, 
ruler of Paphlagonia, against the mercenaries (5.5.7-12).  Xenophon responded to the 
Sinopeans with a speech generalizing about the obligations and relationships the Cyreans 
expected to exist between communities and passing armies:  he emphasized especially the 
point that communities who wished to be regarded as friendly by the men ought to 
provide a market to them; the fact that the Cotyorites had not done so explained and 
excused the soldiers’ taking (by force) of provisions from their estates (5.5.13-19).  In 
contrast, he went on to say, when, on their march, the mercenaries had received a market 
from a community, they had regarded this community as friendly.  Xenophon used the 
example of Trapezus to illustrate his point:  since the men had reached Greek cities, they 
had gotten their provisions by purchase in Trapezus, for the Trapezuntians had provided a 
market (“καὶ νῦν ἐπεὶ εἰς τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἤλθοµεν, ἐν Τραπεζοῦντι µέν, παρεῖχον 
γὰρ ἡµῖν ἀγοράν, ὠνούµενοι εἴχοµεν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια...”); in return for this and other signs of 
friendship, the army had behaved as friends towards them (5.5.14-15).  Xenophon 
continued (5.5.16-18):  
ὅποι δ’ ἂν ἐλθόντες ἀγορὰν µὴ ἔχωµεν, ἄν τε εἰς βάρβαρον γῆν ἄν τε εἰς 
Ἑλληνίδα, οὐχ ὕβρει ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκῃ λαµβανόµεν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια.  καὶ Καρδούχους 
µὲν καὶ Ταόχους καὶ Χαλδαίους καίπερ βασιλέως οὐχ ὑπηκόους ὄντας, ὅµως, καὶ 
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µάλα φοβεροὺς ὄντας, πολεµίους ἐκτησάµεθα διὰ τὸ ἀνάγκην εἶναι λαµβάνειν τὰ 
ἐπιτήδεια, ἐπεὶ ἀγορὰν οὐ παρεῖχον.  Μάκρωνας δέ γε καὶ βαρβάρους ὄντας, ἐπεὶ 
ἀγορὰν οἵαν ἐδύναντο παρεῖχον, φίλους τε ἐνοµίζοµεν εἶναι καὶ βίᾳ οὐδὲν 
ἐλαµβάνοµεν τῶν ἐκείνων. 
 
[o]n the other hand, wherever we come, whether it be to a barbarian or to a Greek 
land, and have no market at which to buy, we take provisions, not out of 
arrogance, but from necessity.  The Carduchians, for example, and the Taochians 
and Chaldaeans were not subjects of the King and were exceedingly formidable, 
yet, even so, we made enemies of them because of this necessity of taking 
provisions, inasmuch as they would not provide a market.  The Macronians, for 
their part, provided us with as good a market as they could, and we therefore 
regarded them as friends, barbarians though they were, and took by force not a 
thing that belonged to them. 
 
In a friendly country, then, the Cyreans will use markets as the primary means of 
provisioning, whereas the foraging or plundering of a community’s territory for supplies 
occurs only when that community has shown itself to be unfriendly, thus the taking of 
provisions from the Cotyorites’ lands:  “Κοτυωρίτας δέ, οὓς ὑµετέρους φατὲ εἶναι, εἴ τι 
αὐτῶν εἰλήφαµεν, αὐτοὶ αἴτιοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὡς φίλοι προσεφέροντο ἡµῖν, ἀλλὰ 
κλείσαντες τὰς πύλας οὔτε εἴσω ἐδέχοντο οὔτε ἔξω ἀγορὰν ἔπεµπον...” (“[a]s for the 
Cotyorites, whom you claim as yours, if we have taken anything that belonged to them, 
they are themselves to blame; for they did not behave toward us as friends, but shut their 
gates and would neither admit us within or send a market without...”) (5.5.19).   
Xenophon does not differentiate in this speech between the Cyreans’ expectations 
of and behavior towards Greeks and non-Greeks:  even in (unurbanized) barbarian 
territory, according to Xenophon here, the Cyreans only seized provisions when they 
were not offered a market.  Xenophon’s description of the army’s relations with non-
Greek communities in this speech, however, does not always correspond with his 
preceding narrative of its relations with those communities.  There is, for example, no 
mention in Xenophon’s account of the march through the land of the Taochians of any 




hostile without, it appears, any hesitation or reflection, and were immediately intent on 
taking food from them by force (4.7.1-2).  Moreover, the Greeks did not even march 
through the territory of the Chaldaeans, who are mentioned before this just once in the 
narrative as forming a contingent of the mercenaries of Orontas, the satrap of Armenian 
(4.3.4).
23
  The Cyreans had, in contrast, tried to establish friendly relations with the 
Carduchians:  initially they had taken from their deserted villages only whatever 
provisions they chanced upon (and those only from necessity), but had refrained from 
attempting to make captives of any of the villagers, “εἴ πως ἐθελήσειαν οἱ Καρδοῦχοι 
διιέναι αὐτοὺς ὡς διὰ φιλίας τῆς χώρας” (“on the chance that the Carduchians might 
perhaps be willing to let them pass through their country in friendship”) (4.1.8) (the 
Carduchians rebuffed them, however (4.1.9)).  In addition, when, by chance, the 
mercenaries had had a means of establishing friendly relations with the Macronians 
(4.8.8), the latter had supplied as good as a market as they could (“καὶ ἀγορὰν οἵαν 
ἐδύναντο παρεῖχον”).  
So the impression that Xenophon attempted to create in this speech—that markets 
could be expected on request from even non-Greek friendly communities the army passed 
by on their march to the Black Sea—does not completely cohere with what one reads in 
his prior account of the Cyreans’ relations with those communities.  Rather than attribute 
this admixture of misrepresentations and facts to confusion on Xenophon’s part,
24
 it 
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would be better to explain it in terms of his rhetorical aims in this speech.
25
  Firstly, by 
placing the refusal of the Cotyorites to provide an agora to the Cyreans as outside the 
norms not only of Greek practice but even what could be expected of barbarian 
communities, Xenophon simultaneously characterizes the Cotyorites’ behavior as truly 
aberrant and justifies the mercenaries’ actions.  Secondly, and even more importantly, by 
mentioning here the Carduchians, Taochians, and Chaldaeans, who were all fierce 
fighters,
26
 Xenophon reminds the Sinopeans of the fighting strength and ability of the 
Cyreans.  This sets up nicely Xenophon’s reply to Hecatonymus’ threat to ally with 
Corylas:  “ἃ δὲ ἠπείλησας ὡς ἢν ὑµῖν δοκῇ Κορύλαν καὶ Παφλαγόνας συµµάχους 
ποιήσεσθε ἐφ’ ἡµᾶς, ἡµεῖς δὲ ἢν µὲν ἀνάγκη ᾖ πολεµήσοµεν καὶ ἀµφοτέροις· ἤδη γὰρ 
καὶ ἄλλοις πολλαπλασίοις ὑµῶν ἐπολεµήσαµεν” (“[a]s to the threat you uttered, that if 
you thought best, you would enlist Corylas and the Paphlagonians as allies against us, we 
on our side are quite ready to make war with you both if it be necessary; for we have 
made war before now with others who were many times your numbers”) (5.5.22).  No 
matter whether or not the Cyreans had attempted to negotiate with the Taochians and 
Chaldaeans, adding the names and reputations of these warlike tribes to the list of peoples 
the mercenaries had bettered in war strongly emphasized to the Sinopeans the dangers of 
engaging in war.  Xenophon’s rhetorical strategy worked:  the other Sinopean 
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 See Rood (2004) 314 for “the obvious point that even claims that Xenophon himself makes in his 
speeches are determined by the needs of the immediate audience and cannot automatically be extrapolated 
from their context within the Anabasis.” 
 
26
 Xenophon admired the Carduchians’ fighting ability (4.2.27-28) and the men had suffered more in the 
fighting with them than in all the conflicts with the King and Tissaphernes (4.3.2); the Chaldaeans were 
said to be an independent and valiant people (4.3.4) (see also Xen., Cyr. 3.2.7:  the Chaldaeans very 
warlike); some of the Taochians had fought fiercely for their stronghold and had chosen suicide rather than 





ambassadors besides Hecatonymus quickly made it clear in response that they did not 
wish to make war but to be friends with the men, and that they would direct the 
Cotyorites to behave similarly (5.5.24). 
In addition to the misleading mention of the Taochians and Chaldaeans in 
connection with the provision of markets, Xenophon’s speech also jars with the 
preceding narrative in another (just as) significant way.  Again, at 5.5.16-18, Xenophon 
did not differentiate between the Cyreans’ expectations of Greeks and non-Greeks 
concerning the provision of agorai, in order to depict the Cotyorites’ behavior as outside 
the pale of convention.  But Xenophon’s earlier narrative shows that the mercenaries did 
not always expect that a friendly community in the non-Greek and unurbanized lands 
Xenophon refers to in this speech (i.e., those in northern Mesopotamia, and eastern and 
central Anatolia) could always provide them with a market.
27
  Thus, in the agreement 
with Tissaphernes, allowance was made for the fact that the soldiers might pass through 
lands in which a market could not be provided:  in this case, they would be allowed to 
requisition food.
28
  In the agreement with Tiribazus, made in isolated western Armenia, 
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 2.3.26-27:  “Καὶ νῦν ἔξεστιν ὑµῖν πιστὰ λαβεῖν παρ’ ἡµῶν ἦ µὴν φιλίαν παρέξειν ὑµῖν τὴν χώραν καὶ 
ἀδόλως ἀπάξειν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀγορὰν παρέχοντας· ὅπου δ’ ἂν µὴ παρέχωµεν ἀγοράν, λαµβάνειν ὺµᾶς ἐκ 
τῆς χώρας ἐάσοµεν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια.  ὑµᾶς δὲ αὖ ἡµῖν δεήσει ὁµόσαι ἦ µὴν πορεύεσθαι ὡς διὰ φιλίας ἀσινῶς 
σῖτα καὶ ποτὰ λαµβάνοντας ὁπόταν µὴ ἀγορὰν παρέχωµεν· ἢν δὲ παρέχωµεν ἀγοράν, ὠνουµένους ἕξειν τὰ 
ἐπιτήδεια.” (“And now you may receive pledges from us that in very truth the territory you pass through 
shall be friendly and that we will lead you back to Greece without treachery, providing you with a market; 
and wherever we do not furnish a market we will allow you to take provisions from the country.  And you, 
on your side, will have to swear to us that in very truth you will proceed as you would through a friendly 
country, doing no damage and taking food and drink from the country only when we do not provide a 





there was again no provision for a market; instead, the mercenaries were once more to 
take their provisions by requisitioning.
29
  
As important, when the mercenaries were provided with a market by a non-Greek 
community—i.e. the Macronians—in the mountains of Anatolia, Xenophon’s description 
of this market implies that markets were not a regular institution among that people.  
Xenophon writes that, after the mercenaries had established friendly relations with the 
Macronians, the latter “ἀγορὰν οἵαν ἐδύναντο παρεῖχον,” “provided as good a market as 
they could” (exactly the same phrasing is used at 5.5.18 as in the earlier description in the 
narrative of the market at 4.8.8).  The limiting clause Xenophon attaches to his mention 
of the agora amongst the Macronians strongly implies that the market must have been 
provided in response to a request of the Greeks.  In not simply saying that the Macronians 
provided a market, but by attaching the rider that they had provided one as best they 
could, Xenophon implies that the Macronians had extemporized, employing an 
unaccustomed means of allocating resources to distribute supplies to the Greeks.
30
 
In contrast, the description of the mercenaries’ relations with the Cotyorites (and 
the Trapezuntians) in Xenophon’s speech to the Sinopeans and in his narrative presents a 
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 4.4.6: Tiribazus “δὲ εἶπεν ὅτι σπείσασθαι βούλοιτο ἐφ’ ᾧ µήτε αὐτὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀδικεῖν µήτε 
ἐκείνους καίειν τὰς οἰκίας, λαµβάνειν τε τἀπιτήδεια ὅσων δέοιντο.”  (“[Tiribazus] replied that he wished to 
conclude a treaty with these conditions, that he on his side would not harm the Greeks, and that they should 
not burn the houses, but might take all the provisions they needed.”) 
 
30
 Cf. Plut., Ages. 16.1:  after Agesilaos crossed the Hellespont in 394 on his return from campaigning in 
Asia Minor, he sent envoys to all the non-Greek peoples asking whether he was to pass through their 
country as friend or enemy:  all (but the Trallians) received him as a friend and assisted them on his way, 
“as they were each able” (“οἱ µὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πάντες φιλικῶς ἐδέχοντο καὶ παρέπεµπον, ὡς ἕκαστος 
δυνάµεως εἶχεν”).  Cf. also 5.7.13:  during the army’s stay at Cerasus, some indigenous villagers came 
down from their mountain settlements to sell cattle and other things which they had to the soldiers; some of 
the soldiers also went to the villages to do some buying.  These transactions seem to have been organized 
informally, i.e. Xenophon does not mention an agora in association with them.  Discussion with David 





clear difference with the arrangements made with the Macronians, Tiribazus and 
Tissaphernes:  the capacity of the Cotyorites to provide a market is taken for granted, and 
their failure to provide one is explained by their attitude towards the mercenaries (5.5.19:  
“for they did not behave towards us as friends, but shut their gates and would neither 
admit us within or send a market without...”).  Similarly, the only consideration 
Xenophon mentions in his speech to the Sinopean ambassadors as influencing the 
Trapezuntians’ provision of a market to the Cyreans is their attitude (friendliness) 
towards the army (see again 5.5.14-15).  In contrast to the description of the market 
provided by the Macronians, the provision of markets by Greek cities is never described 
with restricting comments in either of these speeches or anywhere else in the Anabasis.  
The point that the capacity of Greek poleis to provide agorai to the army could be taken 
for granted by the mercenaries is confirmed in a second speech Xenophon made to the 
men at Cotyora (the day after his speech to the Sinopeans) on the growing lawlessness in 
the army as demonstrated by the murder of the Colchian ambassadors and the stoning of 
the agoranomoi.
31
  In this speech, Xenophon comments on the possible consequences if 
the men continued to behave outrageously against the representatives of other 
communities (5.7.33):  “πόλις δὲ φιλία τίς ἡµᾶς δέξεται, ἥτις ἂν ὁρᾷ τοσαύτην ἀνοµίαν 
ἐν ἡµῖν;” (“[a]nd what friendly city will receive us when it sees so great lawlessness 
amongst us?”).  In a speech to approximately eight and a half thousand men, drawn from 
all over the Greek world (and beyond),
32
 then, Xenophon could presume it as a given that 
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 See chapter 7 section iib for full discussion of this speech. 
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the assembled soldiers would share his belief that the decision of a Greek city to receive 
the army was not based on its capacity to do so, but as one based on whether or not that 
city wished to be friendly to the passing military force in question.
33
  
  Although Xenophon’s two speeches at Cotyora were made in highly charged 
contexts, where Xenophon was defending either his or the army’s actions, the statements 
and the preconceptions present in these speeches are completely consistent with what we 
find in comments made by Xenophon in less controversial contexts and also with his 
description of the army’s relations with Greek communities in the rest of his narrative of 
the parabasis; therefore they can and should be used as representative of classical Greek 
thought and practice regarding the provision of agorai by friendly Greek poleis to 
passing military forces.  Markets provided by poleis—once friendly relations are 
established with the mercenaries—are taken for granted throughout the account of the 
parabasis; they are mentioned solely in this account as an underlying, uncontroversial 
background to discussions or decisions concerning the army’s position on the march.  
Thus, after Xenophon’s persuasive speech to the Sinopeans, friendly relations between 
the army and the Cotyorites were established by the latter giving xenia to the army 
(5.5.25).  The day after friendship between the mercenaries and the Cotyorites was 
established, Timasion the Dardanian and Thorax the Boiotian began a scheme to extort 
money from the Heracleots and Sinopeans in order that the Greeks would have provisions 
for the voyage from Cotyora (“µισθὸν ὥστε ἔχειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐκπλέοντας”) (5.6.19).  
This plan assumed that there must have been a market provided by the Cotyorites in 
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 See also 6.6.9, 6.6.12-13, 6.6.36 for the reception of the army by Greek cities as determined by 






which the Greeks could buy supplies, but there is no market mentioned in the narrative at 
this point; the market is mentioned by Xenophon only in a later brief summary of the 
Cyreans’ stay at Cotyora, when Xenophon narrates that, while the army delayed there, 
some of the men lived by purchasing from the market, and others by pillaging the 
territory of the Paphlagonians (“... οἱ µὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἔζων, οὶ δὲ καὶ λῃζόµενοι ἐκ 
τῆς Παφλαγονίας”) (6.1.1).  These details are included at 6.1.1, however, only as a 
prelude to a description of relations between the army and the Paphlagonians who lived 
in the hinterland of the city (the plundering, not surprisingly, caused hostilities between 
the men and the Paphlagonians); Xenophon does not include this mention of the market 
provided by the Cotyorites for its interest per se, then, but as part of an explanation of the 
army’s strategic situation. 
This pattern of offhand, incidental mentions of markets or their inclusion in the 
text as part of the army’s tactical or strategic considerations is found throughout 
Xenophon’s narrative of the parabasis, all the way from Trapezus to Perinthus.  So at 
Trapezus (where the men stayed in some Colchian villages near the city, and used these 
villages as a base to plunder Colchis (4.8.22-23)), the Trapezuntians provided a market 
(“ἀγορὰν δὲ παρεῖχον τῷ στρατοπέδῳ Τραπεζούντιοι...”), received the Cyreans, and 
provided xenia of oxen, barley-meal and wine (4.8.23).  The provision of a market by the 
Trapezuntians is mentioned therefore as part of a series of actions taken by them to 
establish friendly relations with the mercenaries.  Xenophon also mentions the agora 
given by the Trapezuntians in the context of a mention of the army’s strategic position.
34
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 Both mentions also nicely prefigure Xenophon’s speech to the Sinopeans at Cotyora:  see pp.200-201 





After staying thirty days in the Colchian villages,
35
 the army held an assembly to 
determine its future course of action (5.1.1).  Chirisophus volunteered to sail to 
Anaxibius, the Spartan nauarchos, in order to get ships from him to transport the men the 
rest of the way home, a measure that delighted the men (5.1.1-4).  In the meantime, 
however, there was still the question of supplies to consider:  Xenophon suggested in a 
speech to the army more supervision and organization of the men’s foraging for 
provisions (5.1.7-8), since the army “τὰ ἐπιτήδεια δεῖ πορίζεσθαι ἐκ τῆς πολεµίας· οὔτε 
γὰρ ἀγορὰ ἔστιν ἱκανὴ οὔτε ὅτου ὠνησόµεθα εὐπορία εἰ µὴ ὀλίγοις τισίν...” (“had to 
obtain provisions from hostile territory, for we neither have an adequate market, nor have 
we, with some few exceptions, the means wherewith to buy...”) (5.1.6).  
Later, at Heracleia, there is no mention of the provision of an agora by the 
Heracleots in Xenophon’s description of the army’s arrival at that city, though Xenophon 
does mention the xenia which the Heracleots gave the army to institute a formally 
friendly relationship with it.
36
  The presence of a market provided by the Heracleots can 
be inferred, however, from Lycon the Achaean’s plan, raised in an assembly of the army 
called to discuss its progress from Heracleia, to demand (in the absence of any other 
source of supplies for the men) three thousand Cyzicene staters from the Heracleots so 
that the men might purchase supplies for their onward journey (6.2.4-5).  Lycon was 
astonished that “... τῶν στρατηγῶν ὅτι οὐ πειρῶνται ἡµῖν ἐκπορίζειν σιτηρέσιον· τὰ µὲν 
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 Lee (2007) 36 n.122. 
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 The Heracleots provided three thousand medimnoi of barley-meal, two thousand jars of wine, twenty 
cattle, and a hundred sheep (6.2.3).  On the function of xenia as establishing a formal relationship of 
friendliness, see Herman (1987) (esp. 12 on the giving of xenia not limited to individuals, but also practiced 





γὰρ ξένια οὐ µὴ γένηται τῇ στρατιᾷ τριῶν ἡµερῶν σιτία· ὁπόθεν δ’ ἐπισιτισάµενοι 
πορευσόµεθα οὐκ ἔστιν...” (“the generals do not endeavor to supply us with money to buy 
provisions; for our gifts of hospitality will not make three days’ rations for the army; and 
there is no place from which we can procure provisions before beginning our journey”) 
(6.2.4).
37
  Lycon’s plan presupposed that the men would be able to buy provisions, and 
thus in turn presupposed a market provided by the Heracleots.  But the market provided 
to the army is included by Xenophon in the narrative only at the point when the 
Heracleots decided to move it within their city walls as part of their defensive response to 
the demands and threats of the mercenaries (6.2.8):  i.e., Xenophon mentions the agora 
only in the context of an extraordinary measure taken by the Heracleots in response to the 
threatened violence and blackmail of the mercenaries (and not because of its intrinsic 
interest to the narrative).
38
   
When the Cyreans reached Byzantium, the Spartan nauarchos, Anaxibius, refused 
to give them the pay he had promised them and demanded that they leave the city—at 
which the soldiers became angry because they had no money with which to procure 
provisions for the journey (7.1.7).  Cleander (the Spartan harmost of the polis) told 
Xenophon that he would be blamed for the soldiers’ failure to go home immediately, but 
Xenophon replied that it was not his fault, but that the soldiers were not returning home 
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The latter comment refers to the fact there was no indigenous settlements nearby which the Greeks could 
plunder:  see Lee (2007) 37 and n.135.  For further discussion of 6.2.4, see pp.473-474 n.79. 
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 The incident has heightened importance for Xenophon because it once again demonstrates the dangerous 
consequences for the army of men acting violently towards Greek cities:  Xenophon and Chirisophus, who 
had been nominated commander of the entire army at Sinope (6.1.32), had refused to go to the Heracleots 
to ask for money on the grounds that it was not right to force a friendly polis to give unwillingly what it did 





at once because they were despondent because of their inability to get supplies for their 
journey (“ἐπισιτισµοῦ δεόµενοι”) (7.1.9).  The soldiers had to have expected to have 
purchased their provisions from somewhere, and this somewhere must have been the city 
agora, since the Cyreans were staying inside the city walls of Byzantium;
39
 the fact that 
they were quartered inside the city walls shows that they had been received—and thus 
treated as friendly—by the Byzantines.
40
  But the market is never mentioned, and the 
soldiers’ participation in it is taken for granted (to be inferred only from the rancor about 
the soldiers’ pay), since it is not incidentally involved in any action, nor was it illustrative 
of the city’s attitude to the army. 
Finally, there is also no explicit mention on the mercenaries’ arrival at Perinthus 
(7.2.11), nor in the subsequent brief narrative of their stay there, of an agora being 
provided by the Perinthians to the perhaps five thousand or so Cyreans who had made it 
to that polis
41
 (nor any mention of the establishment of friendly relations between the 
Perinthians and the mercenaries).  The presence of a market provided to the soldiers at 
Perinthus can be inferred, however, from Xenophon’s speech there to the assembled 
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 Lee ([2007] 41) states that “the soldiers quartered in Thracian villages” near Byzantium (and cf. [2007] 
38 where he includes the Byzantines among those poleis who provided markets outside their city walls to 
the Cyreans).  But Anaxibius ordered the men to go forth (“ἐξιέναι”) from the city (7.1.7), and Cleander, 
after warning Xenophon that it would be better for him if the army left the city, advises him to go forth 
(“ἐξελθεῖν”) from the city as though he were planning a journey, and to leave the army only when it had 
gotten outside the city (“ἐπειδὰν δ’ ἔξω γένηται τὸ στράτευµα”) (7.1.10:  cf. 7.1.8 (“ἐξέρπει”) and 7.1.9 
(“ἔξοδον”) referring to the army’s proposed departure from Byzantium)).  The men eventually march forth 
(“ἐξῇσαν”) from the city, and Eteonicus (a Spartan officer) shuts the gates of the city behind them (7.1.12).  
It is only then that Anaxibius ordered the soldiers to go to the Thracian villages in order to get provisions 




 See 6.6.36:  Cleander’s prior promise to receive the Cyreans as splendidly as he could. 
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soldiers on whether they ought to serve in the Chersonese under the Spartans or in Thrace 
under Seuthes, where he states that it was his opinion that “ἐπεὶ ἐνθάδε οὔτε ἀργύριον 
ἔχοµεν ὥστε ἀγοράζειν οὔτε ἄνευ ἀργυρίου ἐῶσι λαµβάνειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια” (“seeing that 
here we neither have money with which to buy provisions nor do they permit us to take 
them without money”), the army ought to proceed to some villages from which the 
Aristarchus the Spartan and the Perinthians would allow them to seize provisions and 
then decide their course of action, with provisions in hand (7.3.5).
42
  A market can also be 
inferred from some of the considerations that eventually led the men to serve for hire 
under Seuthes (7.3.13):  “χειµὼν γὰρ εἴη καὶ οὔτε οἴκαδε ἀποπλεῖν τῷ τοῦτο βουλοµένῳ 
δυνατὸν εἴη, διαγενέσθαι τε ἐν φιλίᾳ οὐχ οἷον τ’ εἴη εἰ δέοι ὠνουµένους ζῆν...” (“for the 
season was winter, and it was impossible to sail back home, if that was what one wished, 
and impossible also to get along in a friendly country if they had to maintain themselves 
by purchasing.”).  Again, Xenophon’s speech and the considerations of the army imply 
that a place to buy provisions must have existed, i.e. a market provided by the 
Perinthians.  But it is only much later, in a speech defending his actions to the army, 
when Xenophon states explicitly that the Perinthians had provided a market outside their 
walls to the mercenaries (7.6.24).  Again, Xenophon mentions the market only within the 
context of a description of a (desperate) strategic situation—namely the mercenaries’ lack 
of any means of provisioning—that confronted the men while they were encamped 
outside the city (7.6.24):  “ἀγορᾷ δὲ ἐχρῆσθε σπάνια µὲν ὁρῶντες τὰ ὤνια, σπάνια δ’ 
ἔχοντες ὅτων ὠνήσεσθε...” (“... and you got your provisions by purchase at a market, 
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 The idea brought up here and at 7.3.13 of the possibility of the army obtaining provisions from a Greek 





though scanty were the supplies you saw offered for sale and scanty the means you had 
with which to buy.”)
43
 
Xenophon, then, in his narrative of the Cyreans’ parabasis describes in detail the 
dealings that the remnants of the Ten Thousand had with the Greek cities they came to, 
and especially those actions—by both the men and the poleis—that determined the tenor 
of the relationships between the traveling army and the settlements they passed by.  In 
doing so, he mentions agorai provided by these Greek cities very often (relatively 
speaking), but he does so incidentally and in an offhand manner,
44
 demonstrating that he 
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 It should be noted here that the presumption that friendly cities could be expected to grant markets to 
passing armies was not limited to Greek cities.  This can be seen in Xenophon’s description of the site of 
Calpe Harbor, in which he gives the reasons why it had come to exist as a stopping point:  Calpe had a 
harbor and a plentiful water supply (6.4.4), and it also lay roughly halfway along the Black Sea coast from 
Heracleia to the nearest Greek city, Byzantium:  this gave the site importance, for as Xenophon writes 
(6.4.2):  “καὶ τριήρει µέν ἐστιν εἰς Ἡράκλειαν ἐκ Βυζαντίου κώπαις µάλα µακρᾶς πλοῦς· ἐν δὲ τῷ µέσῳ 
ἄλλη µὲν πόλις οὐδεµία οὔτε φιλία οὔτε Ἑλληνίς, ἀλλὰ Θρᾷκες Βιθυνοί...” (“i]t is an especially long day’s 
journey for a trireme to row from Byzantium to Heraclea, and between the two places there is no other city, 
either friendly or Greek, only [hostile] Bithynian Thracians...”).  (Contrast Xenophon’s mention of poleis 
here to his earlier statements to the Sinopean ambassadors on what the army expected from Greek or 
barbarian communities (i.e. in northern Mesopotamia and in southern and central Anatolia):  there, he uses 
the word γῆν rather than polis.)  The point Xenophon is making here is that Calpe had to come to exist as a 
halt for voyages because the fact that there was no city, either friendly or Greek, between Heracleia and 
Byzantium meant that there was no location where passing travelers (or, in this case, a passing army) could 
expect the facilities implied by reception:  water, a harbor, and the right to use a market provided by a city.  
Cf. chapter 1 section iiia on Thucy. 6.42.1:  the decision is made by the Athenian generals to divide the 
Sicilian expedition into three so that the ships might not be at a loss for harbors, water and provisions; and 
on Thucy. 6.44.2:  the expedition was granted water and the right to use harbors (but not markets) by some 
Greek cities on the coast of southern Italy, and not even that by Tarentum and Locri.  (Cf. also Braudel 
[1972] 107-108:  “[s]ometimes on a coast where the hinterland was sparsely populated, like North Africa, a 
port, with its indispensable source of water, might exist as a meeting point for boats and fishermen, without 
a town having grown up around it...”)  Xenophon’s description of the site of Calpe, with its harbor, water 
supply, defensible position, large amounts of ship-timber, and fertile soil (6.4.3-6), shows that he thought it 
an excellent one for the foundation of a polis:  see, e.g., Brulé (1995) 3-4, Dillery (1995) 89.  For the 
presumption that the army could also expect markets from non-Greek cities, see also see appendix 4 section 
i:  markets were provided to the Cyreans by non-Greek cities in Asia Minor, Syria, and southern 
Mesopotamia.  Also, note that the fact that at Gymnias—a friendly (and large and prosperous and 
inhabited) city (“πόλιν µεγάλην καὶ εὐδαίµονα καὶ οἰκουµένην”)—there is no mention of provisioning 
(marking it out as almost exceptional in Xenophon’s description of this part of the march:  cf. appendix 4 
section i) may also mean that the soldiers got their supplies there through purchase at a market provided by 
the ruler of the city. 
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 Lee (2007) 15:  “[i]f, in the course of narrating the campaign, Xenophon makes offhand, repeated 




(and his audience) assumed that these agorai were a normal means of provisioning for 
classical Greek armies moving through friendly territory.   In sum, it is taken for granted 
throughout Xenophon’s account of the mercenaries’ experiences in northern Asia Minor 
and Thrace that friendly Greek cities (in contrast to the communities in the unurbanized 
lands the Greeks had marched through on their trek to the Pontus) would provide agorai 
to the army—and that their decision to provide markets to the army was determined by 





                                                                                                                                                 
are embedded in an otherwise self-interested, selective narrative.”  It should be noted here that markets are 
mentioned or can be inferred at Trapezus, Heracleia, Byzantium, and Perinthus because the men’s lack of 
money at these cities and their resultant inability to use the markets there to supply themselves impinged on 
the army’s strategic considerations.  At Chrysopolis (6.6.38) and Calchedon (7.2.24, 7.2.26), however, the 
men will have had plenty of money from selling plunder (6.6.38:  the mercenaries stayed at Chrysopolis for 
seven days selling their booty).  Xenophon does not mention agorai at the poleis near which the Greeks 
encamped after their service with Seuthes and before they took up service with Thibron (Lampsacus, 
Ophyrnium, Antandrus, Pergamum) (Xenophon also mentions that the mercenaries passed through the 
territories of Adramyttium and Certonium, and by Atarneus, on their way to Pergamum (7.8.8)), but it is 
unclear if they stayed at these latter poleis for any time).  The men would have had money at Lampsacus 
(7.8.1), since they had sold plunder at their camp on the Thracian coast before this (7.7.56).  They also had 
money to buy in any market provided at Ophyrnium, since two Spartiates (from Thibron) had arrived there 
with money for the men (7.8.5-6).  This money, presumably (at least) a month’s pay (see 7.6.1), would 
have sufficed if the men had been given markets at any of the cities they passed by on their way to 
Pergamum, and at this city, too (7.8.5-6).  In sum, it is probable that, in the case of these cities, Xenophon 
did not mention agorai because the men were sufficiently supplied with money to purchase in the markets 
provided by them and because nothing exceptional occurred in connection with these markets.  Xenophon 
may not have mentioned an agora at Sinope since the xenia provided by the Sinopeans (three thousand 
medimnoi of barley-meal and fifteen hundred jars of wine) were enough to feed the men for the five days 
they were at Sinope (Harmene).  Finally, Xenophon’s failure to mention in his speech to the Sinopean 
ambassadors a market provided by the polis of Cerasus (in contrast to the mention of one at Trapezus) 
should not be taken as evidence that the Cerasuntians did not provide one:  some of the mercenaries had 
acted scandalously in murdering some Colchian envoys at Cerasus and in mistreating Cerasuntian 
ambassadors at Cotyora (see chapter 7 section iib); any mention of the army’s relations with Cerasus could 
therefore have clouded the claims of moral rectitude that Xenophon was making for the army and which 
were crucial for the rhetorical strategy in his speech to the Sinopeans. 
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 Although in the cases of Trapezus and Perinthus, the markets proved insufficient to supply the 





b. Markets provided by poleis as the primary means of provisioning for classical 
Greek armies marching to theaters of operations 
The provision of agorai as a component of the convention of the reception of 
classical Greek land forces by poleis was “an assumed part of the background” in other 
ancient military narratives besides the Anabasis:
 46
  accordingly, markets granted by 
poleis are rarely mentioned in these narratives, too, and then also only in exceptional 
circumstances, i.e., when they formed part of a ruse, or in order to clarify the tactical or 
strategic situation of an army.
47
  Thus, Xenophon narrates in the Hellenica that Agesilaos, 
in order to trick Tissaphernes into believing that he would be attacking Caria in 396, sent 
instructions to all the cities on the route from Ephesus to Caria that they should make a 
market available for his army.
48
  In the same work, Xenophon writes that Agesilaos used 
the same trick again in 377 so that his army could make its way safely into Boeotia:  
planning to advance by the route to Erythrae, he made it look to the Thebans as if he were 
going to Thespiae by sending messengers ahead to that polis to ask that a market be 
prepared for his men there.
49
  In 391, Dionysius I deceitfully manufactured a diplomatic 
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 The quote is taken from Millar’s ([2002] 227-228) comments on the mentions of long-distance trade by 
sea in the narratives of the conflicts of the Roman revolution. 
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 Cf. Thucy. 1.62.1:  a market established for the Potidaean and Peloponnesian land forces outside of 
Potidaea as they awaited the Athenian attack by land. 
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 3.4.11:  “... ταῖς δὲ πόλεσιν εἰς ἃς ἀνάγκη ἦν ἀφικνεῖσθαι στρατευοµένῳ ἐπὶ Καρίαν προεῖπεν ἀγορὰν 




 And also that embassies should wait for him there:  “... πάλιν προσεποιήσατο εἰς τὰς Θεσπιὰς πρῶτον 
ἰέναι, καὶ πέµπων ἀγοράν τε ἐκέλευε παρασκευάζειν καὶ τὰς πρεσβείας ἐκεῖ περιµένειν” (5.4.48).  The ruse 
worked partly because Agesilaos had made Thespiae his base of operations for the invasion of Boeotia in 
the previous year (Xen., Hell. 5.4.38).  Cf. Xen., Hell. 6.5.12:  Agesilaos, taking the polis of Eutaia by 
surprise while its adult males of fighting age were attending the Arcadian assembly, treated the polis as 




controversy over the provision of an agora by either Rhegium (so Diodorus and 
Frontinus) or Himera (so Polyaenus) in order to declare war on the ‘offending’ polis.
50
  
Also, pseudo-Xenophon must have been referring to the provision of agorai by friendly 
cities when he stated that, because journeys on land were slow and it was not possible for 
armies to bring many days’ provisions with them, it was necessary “καὶ τὸν µὲν πεζῇ 
ἰόντα δεῖ διὰ φιλίας ἰέναι ἢ νικᾶν µαχόµενον,” “for an army traveling on foot to either 
pass through friendly territory or fight and conquer [in hostile territory]” (Ath. Pol. 2.5):  
i.e., it was necessary for armies traveling overland (since they departed for campaigns 
with so few provisions) to supply themselves by either passing through the territory of 
friendly poleis and purchasing in the markets provided to them, or to gain tactical 
superiority—and the ability to forage—in hostile territory by military success.
51
 
                                                                                                                                                 
καὶ ἡρπάσθη, ὅτε εἰσῄει εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἐξευρὼν ἀπέδωκε” (“... but allowed the inhabitants to continue to 
dwell there, and his troops got everything they needed by purchase; and if anything had been taken as booty 
at the time when he entered the city, he searched it out and gave it back.”). 
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 Diod. 14.108.1-2, Frontinus, Strat. 3.4.3; Polyaenus, Strateg. 5.2.10. 
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 Brasidas’ overland expedition to Thrace in the autumn of 424 (Thucy. 4.78-4.79.1) has been taken by 
some modern scholars to disprove ps.-Xenophon’s assertion at Ath. Pol. 2.5 that it was not possible for 
Greek land forces to travel many days’ journey from their own land:  see, e.g., Bowersock (1968) 463-464; 
Forrest (1970) 108-111; Marr and Rhodes (2008) 5.  But see Gomme (1962) 50-51 on this passage 
(followed by Hornblower, CT ii.279):  “[s]o is 2.5 [in general true], the well-known paragraph on 
expeditions far afield, possible for those who control the seas, impossible for land-powers, which so many 
have thought could not have been written after Brasidas’ expedition to Thrace in 424... It was true in the 
fifth century, in the fourth, and it has been true in all subsequent history, that land-powers find it 
impossible, in ordinary circumstances, to send distant expeditions and that sea-powers can; and the 
difficulties which Brasidas and succeeding commanders experienced (Thuc. 4.78-79, 132.2, 5.12-13) 
illustrate and do not contradict the statement in our author.  There is some exaggeration... armies 
occasionally make distant journeys; but in general the statement of the military position is true... The most 
we can say, in view of Brasidas’ brilliant successes, is that it was perhaps not written immediately after; a 
layman in particular might have been excused for thinking that the difficulties of land-powers had proved 
to be non-existent; but it could have been written a few years later, for it was, in essence, true.  Besides if 
the passage must be earlier than Brasidas, it should be earlier than Aristeus’ expedition in 432 as well, and 
for that matter, than the Peloponnesian to Phokis and Boeotia in 457, when Athens controlled the Megarid 
and the Corinthian Gulf... ”  See also de Ste. Croix (1972) 309:  ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. 2.5 “a sensible 





Pseudo-Xenophon “must have been referring” to the provision of agorai by 
friendly cities at Ath. Pol. 2.5 because classical Greek armies traversing the territory of 
friendly poleis normally had no means of acquisition of supplies other than markets 
provided by those poleis.
52
  The preparation by classical Greek states of magazines for 
their armies on the move to and from campaign theaters was normally impossible since 
they lacked the means (requisitioning, taxation-in-kind, private contractors operating on a 
sufficient scale) to acquire supplies to fill magazines for their forces:
53
 the establishment 
of a magazine by Derkylidas at Atarneus in 397 seems to have been a unique occurrence 
contingent on special circumstances;
54
 some exiles from Chios had already assembled 
large supplies of grain in Atarneus, proceeds from the raiding of Ionia, before Derkylidas 
had reduced that polis by siege (and set up his supply depot there).  The politico-social 
structures of the classical Greek world ruled out the feeding of armies marching to war 
                                                 
52
 See Erdkamp (1998) 24-25 for the basic framework of this paragraph. 
 
53
 See also Anderson (1970) 53 on magazines not normally established for classical Greek armies.  See 
chapter 2 section iic for access to supplies for military forces through requisitioning, taxation-in-kind, or 
private contractors unavailable to classical Greek states.  For the use of magazines by states in pre-
industrial European and near Eastern warfare, see, e.g., Erdkamp (1998) 46-52 (Republican and imperial 
Roman forces); Pryor (2006b) 284 (summarizing evidence for magazines set up for Byzantine, Fatimid, 
and Mamluk armies); Lynn (1993b) (late seventeenth century French armies); Aksan (1995) 4-6 (Ottoman 
armies in the 1768-1774 war).  For contractors, see also, e.g., Burford (1960) 16-18:  no great overland 
contractors in classical Greece.  At Theophr., Characters 8.4, an ἐργολάβος (contractor) is mentioned as 
coming back from a battle between Polyperchon and Cassander (thus between 317 and 310), but the 
unspecified services this contractor provides do not seem to have anything to do with the supply of grain 
(see Diggle [2004] 29-32 for the date; Jebb (1909) ad loc. for the contractor probably having do with the 
supplying of siege machines). 
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 Xen., Hell. 3.2.11:  “καὶ κατασκευάσας ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ ἔκπλεω πάντα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, ἵνα εἴη αὐτῷ 
καταγωγή, ὁπότε ἀφικνοῖτο...” (“[Derkylidas] filled the place with great stocks of supplies of all kinds so 
that he could use it as a centre for rest and re-equipment whenever he came that way”).  See also Anderson 
(1970) 53.  The fact that Xenophon explains Derkylidas’ actions at Atarneus in detail demonstrates clearly 





zones through the requisitioning of food from friendly or subject poleis on their route.
55
  
Foraging for provisions in the territory of friendly poleis was not consonant with the 
conventions of Greek warfare or international relations and is almost never attested.
56
  
Finally, as demonstrated in section ii, classical Greek armies were not accompanied by 
supply-trains (on any structurally important scale).
57
   
In fact, one reason why classical Greek overland expeditions were able to depart 
on campaigns with so few food supplies was precisely because they presumed they could 
depend on being provided with markets by poleis as they marched through friendly or 
neutral territory on their way to campaign theaters.
58
  In addition to the evidence of the 
Anabasis collected and analysed above showing that it could be assumed that classical 
Greek land forces could provision themselves sufficiently at polis-provided markets, the 
ruses of Agesilaos in Asia Minor and Boeotia, and ps.-Xenophon’s generalizing 
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 Tänzer ([1912] 22-23, 48-49) and Cruickshank ([1954] 75, 79) refer to the purchase of classical Greek 
armies in the agorai provided to them by poleis as requisitioning:  there is no evidence or indication, 
however, that classical Greek armies ever engaged in forced purchases of provisions in the agorai provided 
to them by poleis; the trade in these agorai was clearly voluntary.  For other pre-industrial European and 
near Eastern states relying on requisitioning from friendly or subject territory to provision their armies as 
they marched to war zones, see, e.g., Rawlinson (1871) 192, Briant (1986) esp. 40 (Persian empire); 
Mitchell (1983) 139-143, Erdkamp (2002) 57-64 (imperial Rome); Haldon (2006a) 15-16 (Byzantium); 
Blastenbrei (1987) 265-266 (fourteenth and fifteenth century Italian armies); Kennett (1967) 100-101 
(eighteenth century France). 
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 See again the references at pp.179-180 n.192:  Thibron exiled from Sparta for allowing his troops 
plunder allied territory. 
 
57
 Pritchett ([1971] 41-44) and Harthen ([2001] 205-228), by treating indiscriminately supply-trains 
accompanying land forces and supply-trains accompanying or sent out to amphibious forces, mistakenly 
conclude that supply-trains made a quantitatively important contribution to the provisioning of Greek 
overland campaigns.  Rawlings ([2007] 76-77) implies that classical Greek land forces were sometimes 
provisioned by accompanying supply ships; but, as the examples he cites show, this practice was limited to 
Carthaginian and Persian expeditions, and to Alexander’s campaigns. 
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 See already Gomme, HCT i.16; Cruickshank (1954) 75 (though see n.55 above on Cruickshank wrong on 





description of fifth-century Greek land warfare, also show that Greek armies could rely 
on agorai provided by friendly cities to supply themselves during their marches to 
theaters of operations.  Agesilaos’ stratagems could only have worked if all the actors 
involved believed that both Thespiae and the poleis on the route from Ephesus to Caria 
had the capability to feed his armies; whereas ps.-Xenophon simply took it for granted in 
his discussion of land campaigns that all armies could provision themselves in friendly 
territory (through markets)—no discussion of the subject was felt necessary.   Because 
the capacity of friendly poleis to provide markets sufficient to feed armies on the move to 
war zones could be taken for granted, classical Greek armies did not have to be 
accompanied by substantial supply-trains when moving through the territory of friendly 




 In conclusion, then, in the absence of any other possible means of provisioning,
60
 
and because classical Greek poleis could always be assumed to be able to provide 
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 Cf. Haldon (2006b) 149.  Compare here the étape—similar in its early usage to markets provided by 
classical Greek poleis—a method employed by early modern European states (in addition to magazines and 
requisitioning) to feed their armies in national or friendly territory, in order to release these armies from 
having to rely on supply-trains.  See Lynn (1993a) 17-18:  “[t]he étapes system provided another method of 
supplying troops with food that they need not drag behind them.  Through étapes, troops on the march drew 
their food from local markets or depots at set intervals along the route.  The term “étapes” originated in the 
word for market.  In the earliest form, troops on the march notified local officials in advance of the day 
they would arrive and the amounts of food that would be required.  These authorities then set up a market at 
which soldiers or commissaries bought what was needed.  Such a system provided for the march of troops 
in Italy and along the Spanish Road in the sixteenth century.  By the mid-seventeenth century... 
[a]dministrative decree set stops along along these routes at which local authorities or private contractors 
supplied the troops directly, without the soldiers having to pay for their food.”  See also esp. Parker (2004) 
81-90 for definition and discussion of this system of provisioning; cf. Kennett (1967) 109, 120; Perjés 
(1970) 34-35; van Creveld (1977) 7; Roth (1999) 187 and n.237.  (Cf. Contamine [1972] 329: étapes also 
used by fifteenth century French armies.) 
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 Note that, although the lengths of the Cyreans’ halts at poleis along the Black Sea coast were 
exceptionally long (over a month in some cases (see chapter 2 section iic, chapter 7 section iiia) as 
compared to the normal Greek armies few days’ stay at a friendly polis), since they used their camps near 




sufficient amounts of food for sale to passing armies, classical Greek armies provisioned 
themselves through polis-provided markets when they marched through friendly territory 
on their way to campaign theaters. 
 
iv.  Provisioning in hostile territory 
a. Traveling markets 
Private traders were a constant presence on the overland marches of classical 
Greek armies.
61
  Because Greek historians could take it for granted that their audiences 
would be thoroughly familiar with the basic facts of military life, and because the crowds 
of sutlers and pedlars that accompanied armies were one of those basic facts, they and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
exceptionally, non-Greek territory to forage and plunder was easily reachable from the poleis the Cyreans 
were encamped near—markets provided by Greek cities are assumed throughout Xenophon’s narrative to 
be the primary means of provisioning for the mercenaries, and foraging for provisions something only 
turned to when a market fails for some reason (when it proves to be scanty, or the men do not have enough 
money to buy in it), or when a polis fails to provide a market.  In other words, throughout their parabasis, 
when the mercenaries were in the territory of a friendly city, a market provided by that city is presented by 
Xenophon as the men’s default mode of provisioning.  See again Xen., Anab. 5.1.6 (Trapezus); 5.5.14-19 
(Cotyora); 6.2.4 (Heracleia); 7.3.5, 7.3.13, 7.6.24 (Perinthus).  Compare the provisioning of the various 
Crusades on their way to the East:  since other means of acquiring provisions were generally unavailable to 
them as they passed through friendly or neutral territory, the Crusaders also relied primarily on markets 
provided by friendly cities or rulers to meet their provisioning requirements as they marched to or around 
the war zone:  see, e.g., Leyser (1984) 83 on the forces of the First Crusade purchasing in eastern 
Macedonia, and Murray (2006) 230-231, 242-243, 244 for the First Crusade purchasing in cities on their 
way to Anatolia, and also in Byzantine territory, and on their way from Antioch to Jerusalem (markets 
granted by the amirs there); France (2006) 80-81, 85 on the forces of the Second Crusade asking for and 
receiving markets from the King of Hungary, King of Sicily, and the Byzantine Emperor; Glasheen (2006) 
passim on the provisioning of Peter the Hermit’s Crusade relying on markets provided by cities; Madden 
(2006) 215 on the Franks purchasing supplies from markets provided by cities on their way to Venice for 
the launch of the Fourth Crusade.  (The Crusaders were, however, sometimes provisioned in Byzantine 
territory through magazines set up for them by Byzantine emperors: see, e.g., Pryor (2006b) 287 for 
examples.)  (The foregoing is not meant to imply that other pre-industrial land forces did not use markets 
provided by cities, or that these markets did not sometimes combine with other means to provision other 
pre-industrial armies marching overland:  see, e.g., Mallett [1974] 139 on fourteenth and fifteenth century 









markets they provided on land campaigns were not normally mentioned in conventional 
historical narratives, but were presumed as part of the background to events, to be 
mentioned only in exceptional circumstances.  Examining two of the explicit references 
to traders following armies we do have will illustrate the point.
62
  Describing the 
beginning of the battle of Leuktra in 371, Xenophon mentions the traders who were 
providing a market to the Boeotian army (Hell. 6.4.9):  when both sides were getting 
under arms and it was already clear that there was going to be a battle, 
 ...πρῶτον µὲν ἀπιέναι ὡρµηµένων ἐκ τοῦ Βοιωτίου στρατεύµατος τῶν τὴν 
ἀγορὰν παρεσκευακότων καὶ σκευοφόρων τινῶν καὶ τῶν οὐ βουλοµένων 
µάχεσθαι, περιιόντες κύκλῳ οἵ τε µετὰ τοῦ Ἱέρωνος µισθοφόροι καὶ οἱ τῶν 
Φωκέων πελτασταὶ καὶ τῶν ἱππέων Ἡρακλεῶται καὶ Φλειάσιοι ἐπιθέµενοι τοῖς 
ἀπιοῦσιν ἐπέστρεψάν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ κατεδίωξαν πρὸς τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ τῶν 
Βοιωτῶν: ὥστε πολὺ µὲν ἐποίησαν µεῖζόν τε καὶ ἁθροώτερον ἢ πρόσθεν τὸ τῶν 
Βοιωτῶν στράτευµα. 
 
... first of all, there began to withdraw from the Boeotian army those who had 
been providing the market and also some of the baggage carriers and others who 
did not want to fight.  Now the Spartan mercenaries under Hieron, the peltasts 
from Phocis, and the Heraclean and Phliasian cavalry wheeled round behind 
these people, attacked and routed them, and drove them back to the Boeotian 
camp.  The effect was to make the Boeotian army much larger and more closely 
massed than it was before.  
 
Two important points emerge from this description.  Firstly, Xenophon mentions the 
traders who made up the travelling market accompanying the Boeotian army here only 
because, unusually, these traders had become involved in fighting and had had an effect 
on the outcome of the following battle:  Xenophon therefore had to include them in his 
narrative in order to clarify his description of the battle.  Secondly, although Xenophon 
had made no previous reference to this traveling market, and now mentioned it only 
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 See already Pritchett (1991) 413, 432:  Xenophon’s description of Agesilaos’ campaigns in the Corinthia 
in 390 (Hell. 4.5.8) and in Acarnania in 389 (Hell. 4.6.6) showing that Xenophon (and his audience) took it 






incidentally and without any explanation, he still used the definite article when referring 
to it (“τὴν ἀγορὰν,” “the market”), as if his audience was already aware of its presence.  
He could only have referred to the traveling market following the Boeotians in this way if 
such a market was a usual and expected feature of military campaigns, something that he 
and his audience could take for granted as always accompanying Greek armies on land 
campaigns. 
The point that private traders were a usual and expected feature of classical Greek 
army life comes out even more strongly from a passage of Herodotus (3.139.1): 
Καµβύσεω τοῦ Κύρου στρατευοµένου ἐπ’ Αἴγυπτον ἄλλοι τε συχνοὶ ἐς τὴν 
Αἴγυπτον ἀπίκοντο Ἑλλήνων, οἳ µέν, ὡς οἰκός, κατ’ ἐµπορίην στρατευόµενοι, οἳ 
δὲ τινὲς καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς χώρης θεηταί... 
 
When Cambyses, son of Cyrus, invaded Egypt, many Greeks came with the 
army, some to trade, as was natural, and some to see the country itself. 
 
Herodotus here was setting the context for a chance meeting between a young Darius and 
the Samian Syloson, the exiled brother of Polycrates, a meeting which eventually led to 
Darius’ conquest of Samos (3.139-149); Syloson had gone to Egypt as one of the Greek 
sightseers mentioned.  Herodotus, therefore, mentioned traders accompanying an army 
incidentally in this passage, and only so that he could provide context for and clarify the 
following narrative.  But this incidental mention is crucial in that it gives us our only 
explicit generalizing statement from a classical (or later) source that private traders 
usually accompanied armies on campaign.
63
   
It is now standard to state that these private traders who normally followed 
classical Greek armies on land campaigns made an important contribution to the 
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 Because Herodotus was making a general statement (“ὡς οἰκός”) to a Greek audience about military 
campaigns and traders, we can use this passage as providing evidence for a phenomenon characteristic of 





provisioning of those armies, and especially when they were marching or operating in 
hostile territory.
64
  The passage most often cited in support of this view is in a speech by 
the character of Cyrus in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia on the preparations necessary for a 
long march by his army to the city of Thymbrara (Cyr. 6.2.38-39).
65
  But a detailed 
analysis of Cyrus’ speech on the requirements of the long overland march to this city 
shows that he planned for traders to play only a supplementary role in the provisioning of 
that march.  
Cyrus’ army had to journey to Thymbrara in order to confront the forces of the 
King of Assyria and his allies, which were assembling there under the leadership of 
Croesus and readying themselves to fight one final, climactic battle (Cyr. 6.1.25-26, 
6.2.9), in a desperate bid to reverse the series of defeats which they had suffered in the 
great war with Cyrus.
66
  After Cyrus had learned through spies of his enemies’ plans to 
assemble at Thymbrara, he had proposed to his army an immediate advance there, in 
order to leave the enemy coalition as little time as possible to prepare for battle (Cyr. 
6.2.23).  When this proposal was accepted, Cyrus spoke in detail to an assembled 
audience of officers and soldiers on the preparations necessary for the long overland 
march to Thymbrara.    
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 See Tänzer (1912) 25-26, 43-44; Parke (1933) 232 n.1; Anderson (1970) 52; Garlan (1972) 166-167 
([1975] 141); Jones (1987) 48-49; van Wees (2004) 105 and 280 n.15; Rawlings (2007) 224-225.  Lazenby 
([1994] 13) and Krentz ([2007] 163) mention private traders following classical Greek armies beside other 
means of provisioning without discussing the relative importance of traders’ contributions to the 
provisioning of armies.  But see pp.230-231 n.77 below for Knorringa and Pritchett not following the 
orthodox positions on merchants and Greek armies. 
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Cyrus’ first instruction for the march concerned the food supply of the army (Cyr. 
6.2.25-26):  
“νῦν δὲ τἀπιτήδεια δεῖ εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν συσκευάζεσθαι αὐτοῖς τε ἡµῖν καὶ ὁπόσοις 
τετράποσι χρώµεθα µὴ µεῖον ἢ εἲκοσιν ἡµερῶν.  ἐγὼ γὰρ λογιζόµενος εὑρίσκω 
πλέον ἢ πεντεκαίδεκα ἡµερῶν ἐσοµένην ὁδόν, ἐν ᾗ οὐδὲν εὑρήσοµεν τῶν 
ἐπιτηδείων· ἀνεσκεύασται γὰρ τὰ µὲν ὑφ’ ἡµῶν, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεµίων ὅσα 
ἐδύναντο.  [26] συσκευάζεσθαι οὖν χρὴ σῖτον µὲν ἱκανόν· ἄνευ γὰρ τούτου οὔτε 
µάχεσθαι οὒτε ζῆν δυναίµεθ’ ἄν...” 
 
“And now for the march we must get together for ourselves and for the animals 
we use provisions for not less than twenty days; for in reckoning it up, I find that 
there will be more than fifteen days’ journey in which we shall find no provisions 
at all; for everything there has been made away with:  the enemy took all that 
they could, and we have taken the rest.  [26] Accordingly, we must put up and 
carry with us sufficient food; for without this we should be unable either to fight 
or live.” 
 
Since, then, all of the food on this first part of the march had already been carried away, 
Cyrus’ soldiers would be unable to forage during this part of the march:  they therefore 
had to pack up sufficient grain
67
 to live on before they set out for Thymbrara.
68
  Two 
important points emerge from this first order of Cyrus’.  In addition to “οὖν” at 6.2.26, 
Cyrus uses “γὰρ” twice at 6.2.25:  the amount of explanation he has to give to justify the 
soldiers’ carrying of many days’ provisions to secure the army’s grain supply in 
(presumably hostile) territory shows that Cyrus, or rather Xenophon, and his audience 
presupposed that Cyrus’ army would normally depend for its provisions in enemy 
territory on a means of acquisition other than the carrying of supplies from base; and 
therefore that the bringing along of many days’ supplies into hostile territory was an 
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 That σῖτον at 6.2.26 definitely means grain can be seen from Cyr. 6.2.31 where Cyrus gives instructions 
for the ὄψα to carried on the march (i.e., in addition to the σῖτον mentioned here):  see just below with n.70. 
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 Note here the use of the adverb οὖν at the start of 6.2.26:  this shows that this first clause of 6.2.26 
represents the conclusion to be drawn from the analysis at 6.2.25; i.e., that the reason the army will have to 
carry sufficient grain is because all of the previously available food on the march has been carried away 





unusual, extraordinary measure.  The men were to carry a substantial amount of grain 
with them only because the territory they would be marching through on the first fifteen 
or so days of the journey had been previously ravaged; if this land had not been ravaged, 
Cyrus would not have ordered his men to bring so many days’ provisions with them.  It 
was, then, only because Cyrus’ soldiers would not be able to take grain from the 
previously devastated territory that he ordered them to take not less than twenty days’ 
supplies.  In other words, it was presumed here by all parties (Cyrus and his audience, 
Xenophon and his audience) that Cyrus’ army, when operating in enemy territory, could 
normally take its grain from the land (and not from base), i.e., that foraging was the 
normal means of acquisition of supplies for Cyrus’ army in enemy territory.
69
 
As for the other components of the men’s diet, Cyrus ordered the men to carry 
from camp only enough wine to last until they became accustomed to drinking water; 
Cyrus made this provision on the reasoning that the greater part of the march would be 
through land where there would be no wine, and it would be impossible to carry enough 
wine to meet the army’s needs for many days (Cyr. 6.2.26 (cf. 6.2.27-29)).  The men 
were also to leave behind their sleeping-mats, so that they could carry an equal weight of 
provisions; for, as Cyrus explained, an excess of provisions would not be useless (Cyr. 
6.2.30).  And for the army’s opsa for the first part of the march, i.e. for the foodstuffs to 
complement and add flavor to the main grain-based component of the diet, the soldiers 
were to bring along sharp, pungent, and salty foods.
70
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 On foraging as the normal means of supply for Cyrus’ army in enemy territory, see also section ivb. 
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 Cyr. 6.2.31:  “ὄψα δὲ χρή συνεσκευάσθαι ὅσα ἐστὶν ὀξέα καὶ δριµέα καὶ ἁλµυρά...” (“For opsa, we must 





These, then, were the measures ordered by Cyrus for the provisioning of the army 
during the first stage of the march to Thymbrara, when the soldiers would be traveling 
through previously ravaged territory.  When, however, the army came out into country 
that had not been devastated (presumably this means after the first “more than fifteen 
days” of the march had elapsed), Cyrus presumed that it could rely on a different method 
of provisioning (Cyr. 6.2.31): 
“ὅταν δ’ ἐκβαίνωµεν εἰς ἀκέραια, ὅπου ἤδη εἰκὸς ἡµᾶς σῖτον λαµβάνειν, 
χειροµύλας χρὴ αὐτόθεν παρασκευάσασθαι αἷς σιτοποιησόµεθα· τοῦτο γὰρ 
κουφότατον τὼν σιτοποιικῶν ὀργάνων.” 
 
“And when we come out again into a country that has not been ravaged, where 
we are at once likely to find grain again, we must then have hand-mills obtained 
on the spot with which to prepare bread; for these are the lightest of the 
implements used in making bread.” 
 
When they entered previously unravaged territory, then, Cyrus told his officers and 
soldiers, grain would be immediately available there for the taking.  The fact that Cyrus 
here linked the unravaged nature of the territory they would enter to the immediate 
availability of grain for the army in that territory shows clearly that he meant here for his 
soldiers to obtain their grain in this territory through foraging.  That is, whereas, on the 
first part of the journey to Thymbrara, they could not relying on foraging because the 
land they would be marching through had been previously foraged, Cyrus was telling his 
men that the army could obtain grain in this previously undevastated territory through 
foraging.
71
  He did not, therefore, have to issue here a directive for the preparation and 
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 Cf. Garlan (1977) 153 n.5 on Cyr. 6.2.31:  “[e]n territoire ennemi, on ne peut donc s’attendre à vivre sur 





transport of grain supplies, but merely one for the means to process the grain the soldiers 
would find on their way (hence the reference to hand-mills).
72
  
In issuing these orders for his soldiers’ provisioning, Cyrus had thereby taken 
measures to secure the supply of the army’s grain, the main component of its diet, for the 
whole of the march to Thymbrara.  Having focused on the food supply of his soldiers in 
the first half of his speech, Cyrus devoted its second half almost solely to what we might 
call the ‘mechanics’ of the march (Cyr. 6.2.32-38).  In addition to medical supplies, the 
soldiers were to prepare straps, rasps to sharpen their spears, lumber and tools to repair 
the chariots and wagons, tools for road-building.  The officers were to make sure that the 
provisioning arrangements Cyrus set out were adhered to.
73
  Men deprived of the right to 
military service were to clear the way for the wagons.  Men in the army trained as smiths, 
carpenters, and leather-workers were to work in those capacities for hire, rather in the 
ranks.   
Having taken care for the army’s transport, Cyrus’ issued one final instruction for 
the march:  that any merchant who wished to follow the army to sell to it, could do so 
(Cyr. 6.2.38-39): 
“Ἢν δέ τις καὶ ἔµπορος βούλεται ἕπεσθαι πωλεῖν τι βουλόµενος, τῶν µὲν 
προειρηµένων ἡµερῶν τἀπιτήδεια ἔχειν ἤν τι πωλῶν ἁλίσκηται, πάντων 
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 Note that Cyrus at 6.2.25 orders twenty days’ rather than fifteen days’ provisions; the army would 
therefore have some supplies from base even after leaving the previously devastated territory.  The extra 
days’ supplies would function as a provisioning ‘safety net’ if the march took longer than expected for any 
reason, and would also allow it to operate during their first few days in the undevastated territory 
unhindered by supply considerations (cf. chapter 2 section iii, appendix 4 section iii). 
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 Cyr. 6.2.35:  “Τὰ µὲν οὖν εἰς τροφὴν δέοντα οἱ ἡγεµόνες τῶν ὁπλοφόρων ἐξετάζετε τοὺς ὑφ’ ὑµῖν αὐτοῖς· 
οὐ γὰρ δεῖ παριέναι ὅτου ἄν τις τούτων ἐνδέηται· ἡµεῖς γὰρ τούτων ἐνδεεῖς ἐσόµεθα...”  (“As to what is 
needed for the food supply of the army, you officers of the armed soldiers must make inquiry of the men 
under you, for we must not overlook anything of this sort that any one may need; for it is we that shall feel 





στερήσεται· ἐπειδὰν δ’ αὗται παρέλθωσιν αἱ ἡµέραι, πωλήσει ὅπως ἂν βούληται.  
ὅστις δ’ ἄν τῶν ἐµπόρων πλείστην ἀγορὰν παρέχων φαίνηται, οὗτος καὶ παρὰ 
τῶν συµµάχων καὶ παρ’ ἐµοῦ δώρων καὶ τιµῆς τεύξεται.  [39] εἰ δέ τις 
χρηµάτων προσδεῖσθαι νοµίζει εἰς ἐµπολήν, γνωστῆρας ἐµοὶ προσαγαγὼν καὶ 
ἐγγυητὰς ἦ µὴν πορεύεσθαι σὺν τῇ στρατιᾷ, λαµβανέτω ὧν ἡµεῖς ἔχοµεν.” 
 
“And any merchant who wishes to accompany us, seeking to sell something, may 
do so; but if he is caught trying to sell anything within the number of days for 
which the troops are ordered to furnish their own provisions, he shall have all his 
goods confiscated.  But when those days are past, he may sell as he pleases.  And 
the man who seems to offer the largest stock of goods shall receive rewards and 
preferment both from the allies and from myself.  [39] And if any merchant 
thinks he needs more money for the purchase [of supplies], let him bring me 
vouchers [people] for his respectability and identity, and sureties as a pledge that 
he is really going with the army, and he shall receive a certain amount from [the 
funds] we have.” 
 
It is this particular section of Cyrus’ speech that has been cited as evidence by modern 
scholars that private traders contributed on a significant scale to the provisioning of 
classical Greek land campaigns.  But if we consider Cyrus’ instruction on merchants 
within the context of the whole of his speech outlining the requirements for the march to 
Thymbrara, we can see that he foresaw no major role for these merchants in the feeding 
of his army.  As we have seen, Cyrus earlier in his speech had already made detailed 
provision for the army’s grain supply for the whole of the march to Thymbrara:  his 
soldiers were to rely on supplies they carried themselves for the first part of the march 
(Cyr. 6.2.25, 38); and on foraging when they came again into country that had not been 
ravaged (Cyr. 6.2.31) (that is, even for the period during which Cyrus did allow the 
merchants to trade with his soldiers, the soldiers had been directed by Cyrus to obtain 
their grain from another source).  Cyrus, then, was not expecting or relying on the traders 
accompanying his army to make any important contribution to the army’s grain supply; 
rather, the merchants who were to be encouraged to follow the march were to be present 
on the campaign only as, at most, a supplementary source of supply to the grain the 




supplementary role is reflected even in the location of the directive on traders in Cyrus’ 
speech.  It is included right at the end of the speech, almost as an aside; just as traders did 
not form an integral part of the army’s food supply, they were not included as an integral 
part of the first half of the speech discussing the army’s food supply.  It should be noted 
here, too, that, in discussing the traders, Cyrus spoke in indefinites—“if any merchant 
wishes to sell anything”:  there is no specific directive here aimed at securing a specific 
set of provisions or other goods for the army.  Instead, the merchants were to be 
encouraged to follow the army in order to provide a sort of bonus supply to the 
arrangements for acquiring supplies Cyrus had already set out.
74
  
So the ancient discussion that has been most often cited to corroborate the view 
that private traders made a significant contribution to the food supply of Greek armies on 
campaign shows nothing of the sort; rather, as we have seen, the merchants’ role in the 
provisioning of the march to Thymbrara was limited and supplementary—probably 
confined to, at most, the sale of opsa.  This conclusion is important since it removes the 
key textual support for the view ingrained in modern scholarship that traveling merchants 
played a considerable role in the provisioning of classical Greek armies, but it is also 
crucially important for another reason:  because it is drawn from a description that was 
designed to be paradigmatic.  Xenophon’s aim in the Cyropaedia was not to recreate the 
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 van Wees supports the statement that “... classical sources give the impression that private, unorganized 
trade made a vital contribution to keeping armies in supplies” ([2004] 105) by citing Cyr. 6.2.38-39 “where 
private traders are the only source of supply mentioned other than plunder and provisions brought from 
home, and deemed important enough to be offered incentives by the commander” ([2004] 280 n.15).  But 
see introduction section ii for this statement missing a crucial methodological point for the treatment of the 
provisioning of pre-industrial armies: what matters is not (just) the various means of acquisition of 
provisions used by military forces, but their relative importance.  Cyrus, as the ideal general he was (see 
section ii), was concerned to use as many different means of acquisition as possible in the attempt to 
achieve logistical security for his army; relatively speaking, private traders were (much) the least important 





historical reality of the Persian past, but rather to construct a dramatized, didactic 
narrative, in which a fictional Cyrus could be presented as the model of an ideal leader to 
a contemporary Greek audience.
75
  Therefore, as Stadter points out, in so far as one of the 
chief characteristics of Xenophon’s ideal leader was his ability in war, the military 
situations described at length in the narrative of the Cyropaedia form a kind of guide to 
best practice in military organization and planning:   
In so far as a principal facet of Xenophon’s ideal leader was the ability to 
wage war effectively, the military situations of the narrative form a kind of 
handbook of military training, strategy, and tactics.  An unusual economy 
prevails in Xenophon’s account, quite different from the narrative technique of 
Herodotus or Thucydides.  In these historians, repetitive patterns are employed to 
allow the reader to understand the underlying similarities of apparently diverse 
historical events.  Xenophon, working not from history but from invention, 
employs a series of episodes, of which each is independent, and each conveys a 
particular lesson.  The result is a narrative which is simple compared to that of 
the historians, linear rather than interwoven, and requiring much less of the 
reader. 
A short example will clarify my point:  there are several campaigns 
involving marches to a battle area, but only one such journey is described in 
detail, the march to Thymbrara... The purpose of the passage is evidently to set 
forth Xenophon’s ideas of the preparations and formation needed for a long 
march.  The information appears only here; in narrating other campaigns, 
Xenophon treats other problems, such as the use of deception in concealing the 
attack against the Armenians as a hunting expedition (2.4.18-32).
76 
 
Xenophon, then, in a fully elaborated description of what would constitute the 
organization of an ideal long march by a classical Greek army overland, left no room for 
a major part for traders in the provisioning of that march.
77
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 See esp. Stadter (1991).  See also, e.g., Due (2003) 590:  Xenophon, with the Cyropaedia, “wrote a 
dramatized paradigmatic account of the life of an idealized individual who, although belonging to the past, 
is meant to be an inspiration for Xenophon’s contemporaries.”  Cf. Tuplin (1990) 28; Gera (1993) 1-13; 
Christensen (2006) 63. 
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 (1991) 485-486.  Cf. Gera (1993) 72; Due (2003) 595 (commenting on “... Xenophon’s technique of 
transforming one episode from a specific incident into a general description of a pattern.”) 
 
77
 Pritchett, in a discussion of Cyr. 6.2.25-41, states that “[i]n this account, there is virtually no mention of 




Moreover, Xenophon’s idealizing description of Cyrus’ military organization, 
planning, and actual campaigns was derived from Greek norms,
78
 and based not just on 
Xenophon’s knowledge of Spartan practice,
79
 but also (and mainly) on his own very 
broad experience of military life.
80
  It would have made no sense for Xenophon to include 
a recommendation on military organization which had no basis in reality in a work that 
was founded on classical Greek reality and was self-consciously prescribing norms to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
hostile country for the whole of the march from his base to Thymbrara.  Pritchett also notes regarding this 
passage that “H. Knorringa... has collected the passages relating to sutlers, traders who marched with the 
army, and drawn the conclusion that their trade was not extensive, and usually even small.  Their activity, 
as assumed in many of our military handbooks, seems exaggerated” ([1971] 42 n.59).  Knorringa, in the 
pages Pritchett incorrectly cites (the citation should have been [1926] 65-66, instead of [1926] 64-67), was 
making a slightly different point:  that all persons engaged in trade in the Greek world operated on a small 
scale; he does not say anything in these pages on the total contribution made by the traders who 
accompanied classical Greek armies to the regular provisioning of those armies. 
 
78
 See Tuplin (1994) 139:  “... the [Cyropaedia’s] bedrock is actually Greek normality, at least in the sense 
that the principles of leadership which it exemplifies are (Xenophon wishes us to suppose) in no way 
intrinsically inconsistent with ordinary Greek values.” 
 
79




 See esp. Delebecque (1957) 385:  in the Cyropaedia, “Xénophon crée un idéal nouveau, et tout neuf, en 
usant de sa réflexion, de ses souvenirs, de ses lectures, et peut-être des débats auxquels il a pu prendre part 
sur la meilleure forme de gouvernement.”  See also Tatum (1989) 53:  Xenophon’s ideal “... is clearly a 
distillation of the practical experiences he had had and the people he had known.”  Cf. Tuplin (1994) 163 
(although Tuplin’s methodology in this article of comparing the Cyropaedia to Xenophon’s Constitution of 
the Lacedaemonians in order to demonstrate that Xenophon was not solely using Spartan practices in his 
construction of Cyrus’ military practice neglects his own (correct) remarks ([1994] 139) that Spartan 
eccentricities are emphasized in the Lac. Pol., as well as the fact that the Cyropaedia and Lac. Pol. as 
literary works have different aims and intentions; Xenophon would hardly repeat himself in the 
Cyropaedia, and using Cyrus as a mask for Spartan institutions would render the Persian setting entirely 
jejune for his readers.  Even if Tuplin is far too sceptical on Xenophon’s use of Spartan practices for his 
construction of Cyrus’ military practices (and Persian institutions in the Cyropaedia), his article does 
perform the useful service of showing that previous (much older) work was incorrect in taking the 
Cyropaedia to be “a book about Sparta in which Persia is used as a mere disguise” ([1994] 162).).  
Anderson ([1970] 43-45, followed by Harthen [2001] 112) was therefore incorrect to take Cyr. 6.2.25 as 





followed by a Greek audience.
81
  In other words, what was true in Xenophon’s 
description of Cyrus’ army on the march to Thymbrara—that merchants did not play a 




Other passages from the Cyropaedia and other ancient narratives confirm that the 
traveling markets provided by merchants to classical Greek armies never made a 
structurally important contribution to the provisioning of classical Greek armies on 
overland campaigns.  Thus, after his army had captured the camp of the Assyrians after 
the first great battle, Cyrus, addressing his friends and allies, instructed them as to what 
they should do with the money taken from the captured Assyrian treasures (Cyr. 4.5.41-
42): 
“ὑµεῖς δὲ διάδοτε λαβόντες ἱππεῖ µὲν τὸ διπλοῦν, πεζῷ δὲ τὸ ἁπλοῦν, ἵνα ἔχετε, 
ἤν τινος προσδέησθε, καὶ ὅτου ὠνήσεσθε.  [42] τὴν δ’ ἀγορὰν τὴν οὖσαν ἐν τῷ 
στρατοπέδῳ κηρυξάτω µὲν ἤδη, ἔφη, µὴ ἀδικεῖν µηδένα, πωλεῖν δὲ τοὺς 
καπήλους ὅ τι ἔχει ἕκαστος πράσιµον, καὶ ταῦτα διαθεµένους ἄλλα ἄγειν, ὅπως 
οἰκῆται ἡµῖν τὸ στρατόπεδον.” 
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 Put another way, if it really was the case that traders did normally play a major and regular role in the 
provisioning of Greek armies, Xenophon could not have had them make such a minor contribution to the 
supply of Cyrus’ army, since that would have clashed not only with his own experiences, but also with his 
audience’s knowledge of military life. 
 
82
 But the fact that a paradigmatic account of a long march aimed at a Greek audience includes private 
traders confirms the point made above that traders were a usual presence on classical Greek land 
campaigns.  (But compare Cyr. 5.3.34-45 here:  in Xenophon’s idealizing account of the preparations for a 
lightly-equipped army proceeding at a forced march pace (see Cyr. 5.3.27 for the reason for the speed of 
this march), there is no mention of traders; only the most able-bodied men and horses take part in this 
march (the pack-animals and the wagons are left behind (Cyr. 5.3.34-35)).)  Dalby ([1992] 24) comments 
that “Xenophon’s description of the travelling market [at Anab. 1.5.6] suggests that it was something 
unusual in his experience.”  Xenophon’s description of the traveling market at Anab. 1.5.6, however, does 
not suggest that it was something unusual in his experience, but that it was once, exceptionally, the main 
source of grain for the mercenaries (see chapter 4 section ii for full discussion of this point).  Xenophon’s 
offhand mention of the agora accompanying the Boeotian army at the battle of Leuctra and his account of 
Cyrus’ instructions at Cyr. 6.2.38-39 shows that he was well acquainted with traveling markets 
accompanying (Greek) armies; see also chapter 7 section iib for Anab. 5.7.33 showing the same thing. 
Harthen ([2001] 184 (citing Dalby at [2001] 183)) is incorrect to take Cyr. 6.2.38-39 as evidence for 






“And do you take the money and pay it out to the cavalry and infantry in the 
proportion of two to one, in order that you may have all the wherewithal to buy 
whatever you still may need.”  [42] “Further,” he added, “let the herald proclaim 
that no one shall interfere with the market in the camp, but that the traders may 
sell what each of them has for sale and, when they have sold that, get in a new 
stock, that our camp may be supplied.”  
 
The crucial points to realize about this passage is that the captured Assyrian camp had 
been full of food (in addition to treasure) and that, before this order regarding the traders, 
Cyrus had already ordered measures to be taken for the collection and preparation of this 
food for his army, so that his army’s food supply was completely provided for.
83
  
Therefore, although Cyrus was encouraging here the presence of traders in his camp in 
order to further boost supply in the camp, he was not relying upon them to provide any 
important amounts of supplies to his army.  The supplementary character of the traders’ 
expected contribution to the army’s provisioning can be seen in the language of Cyrus’ 
order:  money was to be distributed to the men in order that they might buy whatever they 
might have still needed, i.e. in addition to the abundant amounts of food which had 
already been distributed to them from the Assyrian spoils.
84
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 See Cyr. 4.2.34ff. for Cyrus organizing the captured provisions to be eaten by his army, and Cyr. 4.2.40, 
4.2.47, 4.5.1-2, 4.5.4-5, 4.5.8 (the wine and other supplies here explicitly those captured from the Assyrian 
army) for his army eating these provisions.  See esp. Cyr. 4.5.39 for Cyrus re-organizing the food supply of 
the army (still from the captured Assyrian stores) just before his instruction on the distribution of money 
quoted above.  See, too, Cyr. 4.6.12:  the coin from the Assyrian camp only collected later by the 
Hyrcanians, as directed by Cyrus, after the Medes “τοιαῦτα δὲ ἄλλα ὧν ἐδέοντο ἑαυτοῖς ἐκπληρώσαντες, 
ὡς µηδενὸς ἐνδεόµενοι στρατεύωνται· πάντα γὰρ ἦν πολλά” (“had also supplied themselves with such other 
things as they needed, so that they might continue the campaign in want of nothing; for there was an 
abundance of everything”) (Cyr. 4.6.11).  (In addition to the stores from the Assyrian camp, note that the 
Medes had also captured wagons full of supplies from the fleeing Assyrians and their allies and had sent 
these back to the army (Cyr. 4.6.11)). 
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 See also Cyr. 2.4.32, 6.2.11:  armies already in the field put out a call to traders to come to their camp; 
the fact that the armies were already operating without traders shows that the latter were not meant to be an 





In addition, for the one actual campaign where we do have (two separate) sources 
explicitly mentioning traders accompanying an army—Agesilaos’ campaigns in Asia in 
the years 396 to 394
85
—the narratives of these campaign found in Xenophon’ Hellenica 
and the Oxyrhynchus Historian demonstrate that Agesilaos’ army depended not on the 
traders following it for its food, but on supplies bought at the poleis he used as bases for 
his army (Ephesus and Cyme),
86




Comparative evidence also confirms that traders did not make any significant 
contribution to the food supply of classical Greek armies.  Although traveling merchants 
marketing food were also a constant presence on the overland campaigns mounted by 
other pre-industrial European and near Eastern states, they never played more than a 







 Republican and imperial Roman,
91
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 Xen., Ages. 1.18 (note that the presence of traders can be taken for granted at Ages. 1.20-21); Diod. 
14.79.2:  Agesilaos taking the field in 396 with an army of ten thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry 
“ἠκολούθει δ’ ἀγοραῖος αὐτοῖς ὄχλος καὶ τῆς ἁρπαγῆς χάριν οὐκ ἐλάττων τοῦ προειρηµένου” (“was 
accompanied by a market crowd of no smaller number providing a market and intent upon plunder”). 
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 See Diod. 14.79.3 for Agesilaos being based at Cyme for part of the summer of 396. 
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 Xen., Hell. 3.4.3, 3.4.7, 3.4.16; 3.4.11-12, 21, 4.1.16-17, Hell. Oxy. 21.1, 3, 5 and esp. 22.2.  Although 
there is no mention of members of Agesilaos’ army buying grain in the poleis of Ephesus and Cyme, this is 
because such purchases could be assumed. 
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 See Lenfant (2004) fr. 6b1 (= Nicolaus of Damascus FGrH 90 F 4):  Ctesias commenting that kapeloi 
normally followed the Median King in great numbers (“ἕπονται δ’ οὗτοι πολλοὶ τῷ βασιλέως στρατῷ”) 




 See ps.-Aristot., Oec. 2.2.4, 1350b31-33:  “τούς <τε> τεχνίτας τοὺς ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ αὐτὸς εἶχε καὶ 
τοὺς καπήλους τοὺς µεταβαλλοµένους τι· ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐκ ἦν οὐθενὶ οὐθὲν τούτων ποιεῖν”; “... all the craftsmen 










 land forces, as well as sixteenth century,
95
 
                                                                                                                                                 
[they] enjoyed a complete monopoly.”  But we know from many other sources that Persian armies on 
campaign primarily relied on taxation-in-kind and requisitioning for their provisioning (see Briant [1986] 
34, 37, 39-41, and Rawlinson cited at p.218 n.55 above):  the traders who followed Persian armies on 
campaign must, then, have functioned merely as an appendix to these primary means of acquiring 
provisions.  Cf. again Hdt. 3.139.1:  the traders who were following Cambyses’ campaign were just a 
chance aggregation and did not form an integral part of the army.  The supply requirements of Cambyses’ 
army on the march to Egypt and on campaign there were met by requisitioning, as can be inferred from 
Hdt. 3.25:  Cambyses’ campaign to Ethiopia suffering from a supply crisis because he had neglected to take 
the usual measure of requisitioning supplies (“παρασκευὴν σῖτου”) to take with him.  Cf. Hdt. 7.23.3 on the 
Persian preparations for the provisioning of the workers on the Athos canal in 480:  “ἐνθαῦτα λειµών ἐστι, 
ἵνα σφι ἀγορή τε ἐγίνετο καὶ πρητήριον· σῖτος δέ σφι πολλὸς ἐφοίτα ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης ἀληλεσµένος” (“in a 
meadow nearby the workmen had their meeting-place and market, and grain ready ground was brought 
over in great quantity from Asia”).  Purchases in the market at Athos were therefore to supplement the 
(requisitioned or tax) grain transported from Asia (cf. Stanley [1976] 118, Hammond [1988] 535). 
 
90
 See Arrian, Anab. 6.22.4-5 for a mention of Phoenician merchants accompanying Alexander all the way 
to India and back.  Grain for Alexander’s army was acquired by gifts, requisitioning, purchase at markets 
provided by cities, and, in enemy territory, by foraging (see Engels [1978] 40-41, 72).  The Phoenician 
merchants played no major role in the army’s provisioning and are mentioned only when they take 
advantage of the chance abundance of myrrh and ginger-grass growing in the Gedrosian desert to load up 
their pack-mules with these rare, high value per unit of weight substances. 
 
91
 For Republican forces, see Erdkamp (1998) 119-120:  “... in late Republican wars the presence of... petty 
traders was common and usually accepted... It is clear that sutlers sold food products to the soldiers.  Since 
the soldiers could not always rely on the presence of petty traders and their trade was sometimes even 
prohibited, this selling of food products can never have played a structural role in the army’s food supply.”  
For (late Republican and) imperial Roman armies, see Roth (1999) 101:  “... the contribution of sutlers 
should be considered an appendix to, and not a part of, the regular supply system.” 
 
92
 See Bachrach (2006) 429, 431:  for the first campaigns of Edward I, merchants were banned from selling 
in markets in home territory, and encouraged or ordered to sell to his armies (but never while an army was 
on the march, but always when it was in camp in (royal) territory bordering the theater of operations).  
Even with these measures, however, and the issuance of letters of protection and safe conducts to 
merchants trading with the army, “merchants could not be relied upon to provide sufficient supplies in the 
absence of govenrmental mobilization of resources through the right of purveyance” ([2006] 440). 
 
93
 See Contamine (1972) 324-332:  in the last decades of the fifteenth century, the French state instituted a 
system of acquiring food for its campaigns by levying contributions from communities, which were to be 
transported to its armies by traders; the monarchy and the military administration changed to this mode of 
provisioning since “ils étaient incapables, pour des raisons fondamentales [i.e., the cost of land transport] 
plus encore qu’accidentelles, de transformer la fourniture des armées en une opération commercialement 
rentable.  Il était donc impossible de se fier à la seule ‹‹libre entreprise››; un système de contributions 
obligatoires devait être instauré et maintenu...” ((ibid.) 332). 
 
94
 See Mallett (1974) 139-140:  markets provided by traders and local farmers always being 












campaigns, no European or near Eastern army ever depended on the crowds of private 
traders (following armies) to make a structurally important contribution to its 
provisioning while engaged in mobile operations in hostile territory.
99
  Instead, when 
campaigning in enemy territory, other pre-industrial European (and near Eastern) states 
sourced their grain supplies from a (variable) mixture of foraging, contributions (from 
communities in enemy territory), requisitioning, taxation-in-kind, allied contributions, 
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 See Hale (1985) 160 (on the provisioning of European forces generally in the sixteenth century):  “the 
private sutler, even though his role was restricted by reliance on the great contractors for most of an army’s 
grain, salt fish, cheese, wine and beer, remained ubiquitous, not only topping up these basic, keeping 




 See Parker (2004) 150-151 on the supplementary role of traders in the Spanish army in Flanders in the 
late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  See esp (ibid.) 151:  “[s]ome sutlers did not provide food at all:  
they followed the Army solely to buy booty and the auctioned goods of the dead.” 
 
97
 See Kennett (1967) 123 on the “hordes” of men following French armies in the eighteenth century for the 
sake of trade:  “[p]erhaps the generals regarded them a secondary supply system.”  The fact these traders 
were given short shrift if they got in the way of an army (ibid.) shows that they formed no important part of 
the provisioning of French armies at this time. 
 
98
 See Aksan (1995) 2, 3 for purchases (from traders) playing a supplementary role in the diet of 
eighteenth-century Ottoman (and Russian) soldiers. 
 
99
 Roth ([1999] 100) is incorrect to state that pre-industrial European armies (other than the Romans) relied 
wholly or primarily on the traders or sutlers who followed them.  While pre-industrial European armies 
never relied on the traveling markets which accompanied them for their provisions, pre-modern European 
states did sometimes make bulk wholesale purchases from large-scale merchants as an important means of 
provisioning overland campaigns:  see, e.g., Erdkamp (1995) 172-174 (state purchases for Roman 
Republican forces); Contamine (1972) 124-125 (fourteenth century French armies); Mallett (1974) 139, 
(1984) 140 (Italian states in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries); Contamine (1978) 411 (early sixteenth 
century Holy Roman army); Davies (1964) 235 (sixteenth century English armies); Perjés (1970) 46-48 
(early modern European forces).  It should be noted that private traders (operating on a small scale) did 
sometimes make an important contribution to the provisioning of classical Greek (and later) inland sieges:  





and wholesale purchases from large-scale merchants or private contractors with access to 
large amounts of capital and produce networks spread over large areas.
100
 
 The underlying reason for the minor role of (small) private traders in the supply of 
the main, grain-based component of pre-industrial European and near Eastern armies’ 
diets was down to one basic fact:  the prohibitively expensive cost of transporting 
overland a low-value per unit weight, bulky good such as grain using pre-industrial 
technology.
101
  The costs of carrying grain overland in bulk for long distances were so 
high that only wealthy and powerful states could afford to marshal the transportation 
necessary to execute the task.
102
   Since they were unable to make a profit from selling 
grain to soldiers on campaign, the large crowds of sutlers which accompanied overland 
campaigns in other periods did so to sell high-value per unit of weight foods (such as 
cheese, eggs, and fresh meat), and to purchase booty at low prices.  Unable to break free 
from the “brute fact” of the high costs of overland transport of grain (before the advent of 
railways and motorized transport), traders following classical Greek campaigns did the 
same.
103
  The ‘market mobs’ that accompanied classical Greek armies in hostile (and 
friendly) territory played no major role in feeding them, then:  for their grain, the major 
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 See Erdkamp (1998) 12-18 for discussion and references (cf. the previous note for state wholesale 
purchases of grain). 
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 See here, e.g., Clark and Haswell (1970) 179-199; Braudel (1972) 576-579; Morley (1996) 67-68; 
Erdkamp (2005) 200-201; and esp. Bresson (2008a) 87-88 for the theoretical basis for calculation of the 
cost of land transport.  See also the conclusion to this chapter, and chapter 7 section iv. 
 
102
 See here esp. Hopkins (1983) 105; Finley (1999) 126.  See also the conclusion to this chapter. 
 
103
 See chapter 7 section iv for a full discussion of the functioning of the traveling markets that 





component of their diet, classical Greek soldiers on overland campaigns relied on 
supplies brought from home, on markets provided by poleis in friendly territory, and, as I 
shall demonstrate in the next section, on foraging when they operated in enemy territory. 
 
b. Foraging 
Unless there were extraordinary circumstances, classical Greek armies acquired 
their provisions in hostile territory through foraging.
104
  As discussed above, Cyrus’ 
orders for the preparations for the (ideal) march to Thymbrara assumed that his army 
would (normally) supply themselves through foraging (Xen., Cyr. 6.2.25-26, 6.2.31).  In 
fact, throughout the narrative of the Cyropaedia, foraging is taken for granted as the 
(sole) means of provisioning for operations undertaken in enemy territory by Cyrus’ 
army.  So, as part of an attempt to persuade Cyaxares to allow the Persians to mount an 
expedition, Cyrus tells the Median king that “ἔπειτα νῦν µὲν σὺ ἡµᾶς τρέφεις πολλὰ 
δαπανῶν, ἢν δ’ ἐκστρατευσώµεθα, θρεψόµεθα ἐκ τῆς πολεµίας” (“you support us now at 
great expense; whereas, if we take the field, we shall get our support from the enemy’s 
country”) (Cyr. 3.3.16).
105
  In a later invasion of Assyria, Cyrus kept an Assyrian rebel 
with him as he marched “... ὁδῶν φραστῆρα καὶ ὑδάτων καὶ χιλοῦ καὶ σίτου, ὡς εἴη ἐν 
ἀφθονωτάτοις στρατοπεδεύεσθαι” (“to give him information in regard to roads and water, 
fodder and provisions, so that they might be able to camp where things were most 
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 See already, e.g., Gomme, HCT i.16; Cruickshank (1954) 75; van Wees (2004) 105-106 (though note 
that this conflicts with his view (see p.224 n.64 above) that traveling markets constituted a major source of 
supplies for classical Greek armies on campaign). 
 
105
 Cf. Cyr. 3.3.23:  when Cyrus’ army did invade Assyria, it shifted its camp from time to time, and kept 
provisions supplied in abundance and ravaged the country (“καὶ ἔχοντες ἄφθονα τἀπιτήδεια καὶ δῃοῦντες 





abundant”) (Cyr. 5.4.40).  Encamped in Assyrian territory, Cyrus made constant inquiry 
of those whom he thought likely to know 
τὴν χώραν ὁπόθεν ἂν ὡς πλεῖστα ὠφελοῖτο τὸ στράτευµα, ἐξῆγεν ἀεὶ ἐις 
προνοµάς, ἅµα µὲν ὅπως ὅτι πλεῖστα λαµβάνοι τῇ στρατιᾷ τἀπιτήδεια, ἅµα δ’ 
ὅπως µᾶλλον ὑγιαίνοιεν καὶ ἰσχύοιεν διαπονούµενοι ταῖς πορείαις, ἅµα δ’ ὅπως ἐν 
ταῖς ἀγωγαῖς τὰς τάξεις ὑποµιµνήσκοιντο. 
  
... about the country from what parts of it the army might profit as much as 
possible, and kept leading his men out on foraging expeditions; this he did partly 
that he might get supplies for the army in as great abundance as possible; partly 
that they might become inured to labour through these expeditions and might 
thus be in better health and strength, and partly that by such marches they might 
be enabled to keep their respective positions in mind. (Cyr. 6.1.24) 
 
The point is that in each of these episodes in which Xenophon is self-consciously setting 
out for a Greek audience paradigmatic presentations of the organization of military 
campaigns in enemy territory (paradigms drawn from classical Greek norms and 
practices),
106
 foraging is the sole means for Cyrus’ army of acquiring provisions.
107
 
 Xenophon also assumes in generalizing discussions of warfare in other works, 
too, that armies invading enemy territory would subsist there on the provisions they 
obtained through foraging.  In the Poroi, it is taken for granted that an army invading 
Attica would bring along no supplies, but would attempt to provision itself through 
foraging (this would lead to problems for the invading force if it attempted to operate in 
the mining district) (4.47).
108
  Socrates in the Oeconomicus also assumes armies 
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 See the discussion in the previous section. 
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 See also esp. Cyr. 5.4.25 (part of a proposal by Cyrus to the Assyrian king regarding the mutual 
protection of farmland):  “εἰς δὲ τὴν τοῦ καρποῦ κοµιδήν, ἐὰν µὲν πόλεµος ᾖ, ὁ ἐπιρατῶν οἶµαι 
καρπώσεται...” (“... as to the harvesting of crops, if there is war, the victor, I suppose, will do the reaping”).  
Cf. Cyr. 5.4.21-23 (foraging for supplies taken for granted in a campaign in enemy territory).  
108
 Cf. Poroi 4.45:  if a fortress was constructed on the highest point of Besa between Anaphylstos and 
Thorikos, “εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔλθοιεν πλείους πολέµιοι, δῆλον ὅτι εἰ µὲν σῖτον ἢ οἶνον ἢ πρόβατα ἔξω εὕροιεν, 
ἀφέλοιντ’ ἄν ταῦτα” (“in case enemies came in force, it is clear that they would seize any grain or wine or 
livestock they found outside”) (but the silver ore they would find would be useless to them, just being 





operating in hostile territory would aim to supply themselves from the crops of their 
enemies.
109
  These assumptions were not limited to Xenophon.  In a discussion of the 
military force of his ideal politeia, Socrates in Plato’s Republic tells his interlocutor that 
his soldiers would not burn their enemies’ houses or devastate their farmland but only 
take their annual harvest (470A-B).
110
  It is assumed throughout Aeneas Tacticus, too, 
that invading land forces would forage for their provisions.
111
 
Xenophon’s, Plato’s, and Aeneas’ discussions all assumed that the armies in 
question would have tactical superiority, a prerequisite for military forces aiming to 
engage in foraging.
112
  This was a valid assumption for most invading classical Greek 
armies:  even if their invasions were expected, armies operating in hostile territory would 
be larger than any forces sent out by the invaded polis against them until that polis 
decided (if it eventually did so) to send out a force to engage the invaders in battle; until 
that point, the invading army would be tactically stronger and could therefore forage 
safely.
113
  Two exceptions to the rule prove that Greek invading armies were normally 
sufficiently tactically strong to be able to depend on foraging for their provisions.  In 
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 See Oec. 5.7, and esp. Oec. 5.13: men engaged in farming, if they have been deprived of their harvests 
by successive invading armies, “... ἄν µὴ θεὸς ἀποκωλύῃ, δύνανται ἰόντες εἰς τὰς τῶν ἀποκωλυόντων 
λαµβάνειν ἀφ’ ὧν θρέψονται” (“are able to attack the territory of the men who are keeping them out of their 
own, and take what they need to support themselves—unless some god prevents them”). 
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 “ἐµοὶ µὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τούτων µηδέτερα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐπέτειον καρπὸν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.”  
(“Well, I think they’ll avoid both practices, I said, and only take away the annual harvest.”) 
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 See 7.1, 8.1, 10.3. 
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 See the discussion at Erdkamp (1998) 123-130. 
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454/3 (?), an Athenian army (accompanied by allied forces from Boeotia and Phocis) 
marched to Pharsalus in Thessaly in aid of a Thessalian exile.  But the Athenians and 
their allies had to retire from Thessaly because of lack of supplies before they had 
achieved their objective; although they had controlled the land around their camp, they 
could not go beyond its immediate vicinity because of the Thessalian cavalry operating 
against them (Thucy. 1.111.1).
114
  A Theban force operating in Thessaly in 368 also 
suffered from lack of provision because attacks from the Thessalian cavalry prevented it 
from foraging (Diod. 15.71.4-5).  But the Thessalians were unique (on the classical Greek 
mainland) for their strength and numbers in cavalry; usually, classical Greek armies 




The Peloponnesian forces that invaded Attica in 431, 430, 428, 427, and 425 
enjoyed (almost) complete tactical superiority as they devastated the Athenian 
countryside.
116
  Despite the Peloponnesians’ overwhelming tactical strength, most 
scholars discussing these invasions believe that the Peloponnesians did not subsist 
(mainly) from foraging during their invasions, but used any provisions they acquired 
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 “καὶ τῆς µὲν γῆς ἐκράτουν ὅσα µὴ προιόντες πολὺ ἐκ τῶν ὅπλων (οἱ γὰρ ἱππῆς τῶν Θεσσαλῶν εἶργον).”  
See Gomme, HCT i.324 ad loc.:  “that is to say, their [i.e., the Athenians’] hoplite force was superior, and 
had it been in any country but Thessaly (or entirely mountainous country such as Aitolia) could have 
marched where it would or have settled down to a regular siege; but in Thessaly, the enemy cavalry were 
able to confine it more or less to camp, and therefore to prevent it getting supplies.” 
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 Cf. p.248 n.135, however, for Athenian cavalry being able to limit plundering sorties near the astu of 
Athens during the Archidamian War. 
 
116
 I should note here for the following discussion that the forces invading Athenian territory during the 
Archidamian War probably also included contingents from Megara, Locris, Boeotia, Phocis, and Anactoria 






through foraging as (at most) a supplement to the supplies they had brought with them to 
Attica from the Peloponnese.
117
  This view is based, firstly, on the Spartan order to their 
allies before the first invasion of Attica in 431:  “... στρατιὰν παρασκευάζεσθαι ταῖς 
πόλεσι τά τε ἐπιτήδεια οἷα εἰκὸς ἐπὶ ἔξοδον ἔκδηµον ἔχειν, ὡς ἐσβαλοῦντες ἐς τὴν 
Ἀττικὴν” (“... to the cities in the Peloponnese and the alliance outside it that the cities 
were to get ready an army and the provisions needed for an expedition away from home, 
in order to invade Attica”) (Thucy. 2.10.1).  The second basis for the view that the 
invaders subsisted (mainly) on the food they brought along is a number of Thucydidean 
passages that state that the Peloponnesians remained in Attica during their invasions only 
so long as provisions were available to them:  Thucydides states that the Peloponnesians 
remained in Attica in 431 “ὅσου εἶχον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια” (“as long as they had provisions 
available”) (2.23.3);
118
 that they retired from Attica in 428 “ἐµµείναντες δὲ χρόνον οὗ 
εἶχον τὰ σιτία” (“after staying the time during which they had food available”) (3.1.3); in 
427, the invaders left off ravaging the Athenian chora as “καὶ ἐπελελοίπει ὁ σῖτος” (“they 
began to run short of provisions”) (3.26.4). 
But that the Peloponnesian invasions of Attica during the Archidamian War did 
mainly rely on foraging for their food supply can be demonstrated by an analysis of other 
passages from Thucydides, and from consideration of the institutional organization of 
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 See Cruickshank (1954) 64-66; Gomme, HCT ii.12-13; Jackson (1969) 13; Anderson (1970) 58; Connor 
(1984) 53 n.2; Rhodes (1988) 189 (but see below n.121); Hornblower, CT i.249; Foxhall (1993) 139; 
Lazenby (1994) 11; Hanson (1998) 35 (cf. 118, 127); Hanson (2000) 33-34; Harthen (2001) 108-110; 
Lazenby (2004) 49. 
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 The second invasion of Attica (in 430) was the longest at forty days (Thucy. 2.57.2); the fifth and final 
invasion in 425 the shortest at fifteen days (4.6.2).  The invasions in 431, 428, and 427 lasted between 






classical Greek poleis.  Thus, in 425, the Peloponnesians under the leadership of Agis 
invaded Attica before the grain was ripe (Thucy. 4.2.1).  Since they had invaded when the 
corn was still green (and thus inedible), Thucydides reports that most of their troops were 
short of provisions;
119
 this was the main reason why this invasion was the shortest of the 
Peloponnesian attacks on Attica in the Archidamian War, lasting only fifteen days 
(Thucy. 4.6.2).  This passage shows, then, that the Peloponnesians aimed (throughout the 
Archidamian War) to acquire most of their provisions through foraging:  without access 
to this source of supplies, their invasion of Attica had be to curtailed—in contrast to the 
previous invasions which, because they had entered Attica at the time when the grain was 
growing ripe (Thucy. 2.19.1, 3.1.1),
120
 were able to subsist (primarily) on foraging.
121
 
In addition, previous discussions taking the view that the Peloponnesians did not 
subsist primarily on foraging during the Archidamian War have taken the verb “εἶχον” at 
2.23.3 and 3.1.3 to mean that the invaders only left Attica when they ran out of the 
provisions they had with them from their home poleis.
122
  But other passages from 
Thucydides show that it is unnecessary to take εἶχον at 2.23.3 and 3.1.3 in this way.  For 
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 4.6.1:  “ἅµα δὲ πρῲ ἐσβαλόντες καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἔτι χλωροῦ ὄντος ἐσπάνιζον τροφῆς τοῖς πολλοῖς...”  See 
Classen/Steup iv.9:  τοῖς πολλοῖς here is to be associated with τροφῆς, and not ἐσπάνιζον. 
 
120
 Cf. Thucy. 2.71.1 with 2.79.1:  the Peloponnesians invading Plataea in 429 when the grain was ripe (and  
the Athenians marching overland against the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans at just the same time). 
 
121
 Cf. Pritchett (1971) 38-39; Harvey (1986) 207; Rhodes (1998) 211 (contradicting his earlier statements 
on this subject (see n.117 above)).  See esp. Thorne (2001) 235 n.28 on Thucy. 4.6:  [t]his does not imply 
that the Spartans arrived with enough rations for fifteen days.  They must have captured some stored 
supplies in Attica, regardless of the state of the harvest.”  But note that 4.6.1 does demonstrate that some 
few men had brought enough provisions for the campaign. 
 
122
 See, e.g., Crawley’s translations of 2.23.3:  the Peloponnesians staying “as long as their provisions 





instance, at 7.78.7, where Thucydides was describing the desperate retreat of the 
Athenian forces from Syracuse, he wrote that “καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκέτι ὁµοίως εἶχον· οὐ 
γὰρ ἔτι ἀποχωρεῖν οἷον τ’ ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων” (“and they no longer had provisions as 
before, for by reason of the enemy’s cavalry it was no longer possible to leave the main 
body”).  The explanatory γὰρ clause here shows that the Athenians and their allies could 
not acquire provisions because the actions of the Syracusan cavalry precluded them from 
foraging.  Thus, εἶχον should not be taken at 7.78.7 to refer to any supplies which the 
Athenians and their allies might have brought with them,
123
 but to refer to the fact that 
there were no longer provisions available to them.  A passage from Nicias’ letter to 
Athens from Syracuse describing the strategic situation facing the Athenian forces in 
Sicily at the end of the summer of 414 confirms the point that εἶχον should not 
necessarily be taken (at 2.23.3 and 3.1.3) to refer to supplies brought from home:  Nicias 
wrote to the Athenians that “εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρήσοµέν τι καὶ βραχὺ τῆς τηρήσεως, τὰ 
ἐπιτήδεια οὐχ ἕξοµεν, παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων πόλιν χαλεπῶς καὶ νῦν ἐσκοµιζόµενοι” (“... for if 
we relax our vigilance ever so little, we shall not have our supplies, which are even now 
with difficulty brought past their city and into our camp”) (Thucy. 7.13.1).  Again, εἶχον 
here refers to the possible availability of provisions (and not (obviously) to the possession 
of provisions brought on campaign by a force).  These two passages show that εἶχον at 
2.23.3 and at 3.1.3 can, and should, be taken to mean something like ‘as long as there 
were provisions available to them’ (which may have included the supplies the 
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 Note also that although the Athenians and  their allies did bring (very) small amounts of supplies from 
their camp before the march (7.75.5, 7.77.6), they were relying on foraging for their provisions before the 





Peloponnesians brought with them, but also, and much more importantly, will have 
included provisions in Attica available through foraging). 
Thirdly, in the absence of any opportunity to provision by means of contributions 
(from communities in enemy territory), requisitioning, taxation-in-kind, allied 
contributions, or wholesale purchases from large-scale merchants or private contractors, 
it would have been impossible for Peloponnesian (and Boeotian) poleis to prepare 
substantial supply-trains.  It has often been thought that the Spartans had a centralized 
supply system in the classical period,
124
 but there is no strong evidence for this view.  
Xen., Hell. 4.5.4 is the passage most frequently cited as supposedly showing that the 
Spartan state centrally organized the provisioning of its armies:
125
  Xenophon narrates 
here that, in 390, Agesilaos sent some fire-pots to a detachment of his army encamped on 
a high ridge above Loutraki on an unseasonably cold and rainy summer’s night, “τῶν γὰρ 
τῇ µόρᾳ φερόντων τὰ σιτία οὐδενὸς πῦρ εἰσενεγκόντος” (“since no one among those who 
carried provisions for the regiment had brought fire”).  But the men carrying provisions 
for the Spartan mora here were presumably helots simply carrying out the same task that 
personal slave attendants usually did for hoplites in classical Greek armies.
126
  In 396, 
Agesilaos promised to lead an expedition to Asia if the allies gave him a force of thirty 
Spartiates, two thousand neodamodeis, and six thousand allied troops (Xen., Hell. 3.4.2); 
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 See Anderson (1970) 45; Hodkinson (2000) 196-197; Harthen (2001) 110-116; van Wees (2004) 105; 
Lee (2006) 494.  Cf. Lipka (2002) 190-191. 
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 See Hodkinson, Lipka, and Lee cited in last note. 
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when Agesilaos offered to lead the campaign, “διδόασί τε οἱ Λακεδαιµόνιοι ὅσαπερ ᾔτησε 
καὶ ἑξαµήνου σῖτον” (“the Lakedaimonians give him everything he asked for as well as 
grain for six months”) (Xen., Hell. 3.4.3).
127
  But “σῖτον” could have been referring here, 
as it sometimes did in the Peloponnese in this period, to monetary pay for the forces to be 
led by Agesilaos;
128
 and, in any case, a special grant for an overseas campaign to Asia 
Minor cannot be used as evidence for the normal provisioning of overland campaigns 
mounted by the Spartans.  In addition, Xen., Cyr. 6.2.25ff. has also sometimes been used 
as evidence for a Spartan centralized commissariat;
129
 but, as noted above in section iva, 
the account of Cyrus’ military organization in the Cyropaedia should not be taken merely 
as a mirror of Spartan practice.  Finally, Xenophon’s Constitution of the Lacedaemonians 
offers positive evidence that Spartan armies were not usually accompanied by a supply-
train.  At Lac. Pol. 11.2, Xenophon mentions that the baggage-train usually 
accompanying Spartan armies had all the tools that an army might need, but he does not 
mention provisions in connection with it.
130
  Moreover, the fact that at Lac. Pol. 13.1 
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 Cited by Lipka (see n.124 above). 
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 See chapter 5 section iv on Thucy. 5.47.6. 
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 See Anderson and Harthen (see p.231 n.80 above). 
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 Cf. Tuplin (1994) 147.  In this passage, Xenophon states that the ephors proclaim before each expedition 
which year-groups are to serve as horsemen and hoplites, and then those which are to serve as “καὶ τοῖς 
χειροτέχναις· ὥστε ὅσοισπερ ἐπὶ πόλεως χρῶνται ἄνθρωποι, πάντων τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς οἱ 
Λακεδαιµόνιοι εὐποροῦσι· καὶ ὅσων δὲ ὀργάνων ἡ στρατιὰ κοινῇ δεηθείη ἄν, ἅπαντα τὰ µὲν ἁµάξῃ 
προστέτακται παρέχειν, τὰ δὲ ὑποζυγίῳ” (“as artisans (cheirotechnai).  As a result the Lacedaemonians on 
campaign have an abundance of all the things which people normally use in the city.  And so all the 
equipment the army as a whole might need is ordered to be supplied:  some on wagons, some on baggage-
animals”).  Xenophon states at Lac. Pol. 13.4 that whenever the king (of Sparta) sacrifices on campaign, 
among those present as the sacrifices are the commanders of the baggage-train (“στρατοῦ σκευοφορικοῦ 
ἄρχοντες”).  Lipka ([2002] 216), in discussing this passage, states that the Spartan baggage-train consisted 
of equipment and food; but this directly contradicts the evidence of Lac. Pol. 11.2 and the other passages he 




Xenophon specifically singles out the king and the homoioi who are his messmates as 
being fed at public expense on campaign implies strongly that they were the only part of 
the army to have been supplied in this way.
131
 
Finally, in any case, it would have been impossible for a supply-train 
accompanying the Peloponnesians during their invasions of Attica to provision them for 
the thirty to forty days they normally spent ravaging the Athenian countryside.  Since not 
all food for the animals constituting any supply-train could have been obtained on the 
march through foraging, the amount of provisions, and the transport for those provisions, 
“[i]n a logarithmically rising curse... would rise with the number of days the army would 
have to carry food.”
132
  Because of this, “[i]n order for the army train to remain within the 
limits of tactical and logistical manageability, the army could take along provisions only 
for a limited period – maximally 15 days, but usually less – and then only on the 
condition that the soldiers [or, more precisely, their slave attendants] would carry a 
significant portion of their provisions.”
133
  Taking these considerations into mind, and the 
length of the march from the various points of the Peloponnese (and the home states of 
other allies) to Attica, it becomes clear that the supplies brought by the forces invading 
Athenian territory would have been sufficient to feed them for just their first few days’ 
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 For the king and his homoioi messmates being fed at public expense (and not all the king’s retainers), 
see Lipka (2002) 216 ad loc. (contra Hodkinson [2000] 197). 
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 See Erdkamp (1998) 20. 
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operations, and would have functioned mainly to secure their supply while they 
established themselves in Attica in the first days of the campaign.
134
 
 The Peloponnesian (and Boeotian) forces invading the Athenian countryside 
during the Archidamian War, then, depended primarily on foraging for their provisions, 
and not on an accompanying supply-train.
135
  (The fact that classical Greek forces could 
rely on foraging in enemy territory was another reason why they took so few supplies on 
campaign.)
136
  It was only in exceptional circumstances, in fact—when armies which had 
been expecting a quick battle had been unexpectedly forced to remain immobile in the 
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 Engels (1978) is normally cited by scholars discussing the viability of supply-trains accompanying 
classical Greek land campaigns:  see, e.g., the works cited at pp.194-195 n.6 above; Thorne (2001) 234-235 
and n.27; Rawlings (2007) 75.  But, although Engels’ work was groundbreaking, it is marred by several 
methodological errors which render its conclusions unsafe.  Firstly, because Engels misunderstood the 
process of making bread, and because he used the U.S. Army RDA for 19-year-olds as the benchmark for 
the necessary caloric consumption of Macedonian soldiers, he overestimated the required daily grain 
requirements of the men on Alexander’s campaigns by a factor of two (see p.607 n.67).  Secondly, he 
overestimated the grain and fodder requirements of the draught animals on Alexander’s marches because 
he incorrectly used consumption figures for (much larger) modern mules and horses in his reconstruction 
(see Erdkamp [1998] 73 n.93; Roth [1999] 62-67, 198); he did not realize that ancient mules, horses, and 
camels could survive on much less than the recommendations of modern military manuals during a 
campaign if needed (Hammond [1980] 257; Roth [1999] 62)); he did not realize that draught animals could 
be fed through grazing and/or requisitioned food during marches (Hammond [1980] 257; Erdkamp [1998] 
20).  Thirdly, Engels greatly underestimated the carrying capacity (Roth [1999] 203, 205-212, 222; Badian 
[1979] 54-55) and endurance (Badian [1979] 54-55) of mules, horses, and camels (Badian [1979] 54-55).  
Finally, Engels mistakenly discounted the use of wagons by Alexander’s force to transport grain (Devine 
[1979] 23-24; Hammond [1980] 256-257). 
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 It has been frequently stated in recent scholarship that Peloponnesian attempts to forage in Athenian 
territory during their invasions were (greatly) hampered by Athenian cavalry attacks issuing from the astu 
from Athens:  see esp. Ober (1985), Spence (1990); cf. Hanson (1998) 122-128; Rawlings (2007) 136-137.  
But the effectiveness of the Athenian cavalry in preventing the Peloponnesians from foraging has been 
greatly overstated.  In the first invasion, the Athenian cavalry were routed by the (Boeotian, Locrian, and 
Phocian) cavalry accompanying the Peloponnesian forces at Rheitoi (Thucy. 2.19.1) and at Phrygia (Thucy. 
2.22.2).  In subsequent campaigns, while Athenian cavalry sorties could hamper the light-armed troops of 
the Peloponnesian from plundering property near to the astu of Athens (Thucy. 3.1.2), they were powerless 
to prevent the main body of the Peloponnesian forces from foraging in and ravaging the countryside further 
away from the city.  See also on this question Xen., Mag. Eq. 4.17, 7.8-9:  the usefulness of cavalry is in 
attacking any stragglers or any small forces detached from the main body of an attacking enemy army, but 
not the main body of the army itself. 
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field in the presence of nearby enemy forces
137
—that classical Greek states sent out 
supply-trains to forces operating in the field.  Supply-trains were sent to the Greek forces 
encamped at Plataea in 479 (Hdt. 9.39.2, 9.50), but this was to supply a Greek force at 
Plataea which was many times larger than usual, and had been forced to remain immobile 
in a “position on the northern slopes of Kithairon, with the enemy in possession of 
Boeotia, [which] allowed them no supplies on the spot, and the country immediately 
behind them, Attica, had been denuded.”
138
  In addition, Plataea was the culminating 
battle of a Panhellenic war for survival, and the effort against the Persians would have 
mobilized resources (from a range of states) not normally available for classical Greek 
wars.
139
  In 457, the Athenians sent out a supply-train to a force that had been in the field 
an unusually long time, guarding the passes at Mount Geraneia (to prevent Peloponnesian 
forces from returning from Phocis to their home poleis), before proceeding to Tanagra 
(where the Peloponnesians had diverted to on learning of the Athenian position at 
Geraneia), and remaining encamped there (in the presence of the Peloponnesians) after a 
battle.
140
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 See Anderson (1970) 7-8 and n.18, 53-54. 
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 Gomme, HCT i.16; cf. van Wees (2004) 280 n.11.  See Hdt. 8.50, 8.142.3 for the two Athenian harvests 
prior to the battle of Plataea having been lost to Persian foraging and ravaging. 
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 See Cruickshank (1954) 63-64 for this point. 
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 Diod. 11.80.2-4; see esp. 11.80.3:  “µετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις κοµιζοµένης ἀγορᾶς πολλῆς ἐκ τῆς 
Ἀττικῆς, οἱ Θετταλοὶ κρίναντες ἐπιθέσθαι ταύτῃ καὶ αὐτῆς ὥρας δειπνοποιησάµενοι νυκτὸς ἀπήντων τοῖς 
κοµίζουσι τὰς ἀγοράς” (“[a]fter this, when a large supply-train was on its way from Attica for the 
Athenians, the Thessalians [who had secretly defected from the Athenian side] decided to attack it, and 





The fact the supply convoys sent to these forces both failed to get through to the 
armies which they had been equipped to provision points up another reason—in addition 
to the basic fact that classical Greek states did not usually have the resources or the 
means to support land forces in the field with substantial supply-trains
141
 (note that 
supply lines to classical Greek armies are never attested)
142
—why supply-trains were 
only exceptionally sent to classical Greek forces in the field:   since classical Greek 
armies moved rapidly on very narrow fronts, fronts proportionately very small to the 
distance any supply-train (or supply-line) would have to cover to reach the armies they 
were designed to provision, and the armies could not offer any protection to the supply-
trains attempting to reach them (over country that had not been pacified), supply-trains 
(or supply lines) were extremely vulnerable to enemy attacks.
143
  But this problem—
which faced all pre-industrial armies—could be and was solved by other pre-modern 
European states:  in order to secure the possession of recently invaded territory, and the 
safety of supply-trains and supply lines to the invading force as it advanced, a whole 
series of fortified magazines could be constructed between the operational base and the 
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 It should be noted here that Derkylidas, on setting up his magazine at Atarneus (see section iiib above), 
made no attempt to establish supply lines from this depot to his forces operating in the field. 
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 See esp. Harari (2000) 325:  “[w]hile modern invasion armies usually advance on a broad front, so that 
the continuous front-line serves as a hard crust shielding the rear of the army and enabling supply lines to 
function in relative safety, a fourteenth-century invading army often plunged into enemy territory like a 
stone into a pool of water, and could not offer any protection to vehicles moving in its wake.  Under such 
conditions, even the shortest supply lines could hardly function.”  Cf. Perjés (1970) 42; van Creveld (1977) 








  Xenophon, in fact, had seen both the problem and the solution:  after 
invading Assyria for the second time, Cyrus had told his assembled officers and allies 
that, in order to continue the war in (the hostile territory of) Assyria, they had to get 
possession of as many as possible of the Assyrians’ forts and build for themselves as 
many as they could full of provisions (Xen., Cyr. 6.1.15), for 
“νῦν δ’ οὐδὲν διαφέροµεν τῶν ἐν τῷ πελάγει πλεόντων· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι πλέουσι 
µέν ἀεί, τὸ δὲ πεπλευσµένον οὐδὲν οἰκειότερον τοῦ ἀπλεύστου καταλείπουσιν.  ἐὰν 
δὲ φρούρια ἡµῖν γένηται, ταῦτα δὴ τοῖς µὲν πολεµίοις ἀλλοτριώσει τὴν χώραν, 
ἡµῖν δ’ ὑπ’ εὐδίαν µᾶλλον πάντ’ ἔσται.” 
 
“as we are, we are not at all different from those who sail the seas:  they keep on 
sailing continually, but they leave the waters over which they have sailed no 
more their own than those over which they have not sailed.  But if we get 
fortresses, these will alienate the country from the enemy while everything will 
be smooth sailing for us.” (Xen., Cyr. 6.1.16) 
 
But no classical Greek state had the resources to maintain the provisioning of a chain of 
land garrisons in enemy territory.  Relying (almost) solely on foraging, their armies had 
to remain constantly on the move in hostile territory, like sailors on the deep and open 





 Classical Greek land campaigns usually were brief affairs that took place in 
summer and devastated enemy territory.
146
  The strategy of ravaging (to the exclusion of 
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 See Roth (1999) 284-285, Lynn (1993b), Howard (1976) 71 for examples (from the first, seventeenth, 
and eighteenth centuries A.D., respectively). 
 
145
 See Erdkamp (1998) 22.  The noun “πελάγει” used by Xenophon at Cyr. 6.1.16 denotes the deep, wide, 
open sea.  See, finally, van Wees (2004) 107:  “low levels of state organisation and limited central control 
of resources meant that most cities, most of the time, were forced to rely on rudimentary, largely private 
and informal, supply systems which seriously constrained their armies’ striking power.” 
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all other strategies) was so common that “it was institutionalized in the clauses of farm 
leases and peace treaties” in the classical period.
147
  Archidamus, speaking on the 
prospect of war with the Athenians before a Spartiate assembly in 432/1, assumed the 
devastation of Athenian territory as the sole strategic option available to a Peloponnesian 
force invading Attica (Thucy. 1.81.1, 1.81.6, 1.82.3-5).  The reason devastation of enemy 
territory, carried out over the course of a couple of weeks, was normally the sole strategic 
option available to classical Greek armies was because the adoption of any strategy that 
required armies to remain immobile or involved them in protracted operations in enemy 
territory necessitated a means of acquiring provisions other than foraging,
148
 since land 
forces dependent on foraging for their supplies would quickly have consumed all of the 
resources in the area surrounding their base of operations and therefore had to be 
constantly on the move.
149
  Classical Greek states did sometime undertake sieges of 
inland poleis, but very rarely, with small forces, and then only of nearby, neighboring 
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 Hanson (2005) 39; see already Westlake (1945) 80 for the point.  See, e.g., Thucy. 5.23.1-2, 5.47.3-4 for 
ravaging accepted as an integral part of land warfare in peace treaties; Hanson (2005) 333 n.7 for a farm 
lease attesting the same phenomenon. 
 
148
 See Harari (2000) esp. 329-333.  Rawlings ([2007[ 224-225) is patently incorrect to state that the 
monetarization of war in the fifth century allowed classical Greek armies to stay in the field for protracted 




 See chapter 2 section iic.  Incidentally, a failure to realize this basic fact—that the short-term, raiding 
nature of hoplite warfare was determined by the economic and institutional structures of archaic and 
classical Greek poleis—marks a very serious error undermining the many discussions of Greek warfare 
which would attribute the characteristics of classical Greek land warfare mainly or solely to ‘culture’ (see, 





poleis—to which supplies could be easily transported not only from the besieging state 
but also from nearby poleis friendly to the besieging state.
150
   
The contrast between the brief duration and small scale of classical Greek land 
campaigns with the lengthy, large-scale maritime sieges undertaken by Athens in the fifth 
century, and the naval operations of the Ionian War—launched on a massive scale, for 
years at a time, and taking place hundreds of kilometers from the home poleis of the 
combatants—is almost complete.  The amphibious and naval operations of classical 
Greek states which projected power on a massive scale far from home were made 
possible by the presence of marketing structures and commercial supply mechanisms in 
the eastern (and western) Mediterranean that enabled private traders to provision 
continuous sea-borne supply lines.
151
  In contrast, the brief, small-scale raiding nature of 
classical Greek land warfare attests a world in which there was a lack of developed 
commercial networks for the overland transport of grain.  This was because “… [the] 
long-distance transport over land of low value bulk goods such as grain was far too 
expensive for it to become a regular phenomenon.”
152
  This is best illustrated from an 
incident Xenophon reports concerning the Phliasians in 367.  Having been cut off from 
their own land by the Argives and Sicyonians, the Phliasians obtained part of their 
provisions from Corinth by purchase (Hell. 7.2.17).  But when Chares cleared the way 
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 As shown in chapter 2. 
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 Pleket (2008) 182.  Cf., e.g., Temin (2001) 179-180, Erdkamp (2005) 141 (both discussing conditions in 





from Corinth to Phlius and made it safe for transport (Hell. 7.2.22-23), the Corinthians 
officially ordered out all their wagons and pack-animals (“κηρύξαντες τὰ ζεύγη καὶ τὰ 
ὑποζύγια πάντα”), filled them with grain, and sent them to Phlius (Hell. 7.2.23).  The 
point is that, even in Corinth, with its diolkos and which served as an entrepôt for goods 
from the interior of the Peloponnese (Thucy. 1.120.2), the land transport (along a safe 
route) of sufficient grain to fulfill the needs of a neighboring polis required the official 
call-out of all available transport in the city.  Land transport had to be requisitioned 
(even) at Corinth because the private “organization of men and animals to trade and 
transport staples in bulk overland was simply not available.”
153
  None of this should be 
taken to imply, however, that there was not a regular overland trade in the classical Greek 
world of high value per unit of weight goods;
154
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 Hopkins (1983) 104-105; cf. id. (1978b) 46.  One should imagine that the transport of grain from 




 Cf. Erdkamp (2005) 200-201. 
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 See Finkelstein (1935) 328 n.37, Reed (2003) 8 n.8 for references to overland trade and traders; see esp. 
Xen., Poroi 1.7 attesting to much overland trade to Athens in the mid fourth century.  See also, e.g., Roy 
(2000) 335 for a probable trade in herbs from Arcadia in the classical period; and (ibid.) 338 for salt and 
salt-fish imported from the coast to Arcadia in this period, too; and Howe (2008) 55 for overland trade in 





This is not a surprising conclusion,
156
 but it is one that is worth noting, 
nonetheless.  Since the character and practices of classical Greek warfare were 
determined by the economic and institutional framework of classical Greek states,
157
 if 
one were to fully think through the consequences of previous views that traveling 
markets made an important contribution to the provisioning of Greek overland 
campaigns, it would have to be concluded that there was a regular and substantial 
overland trade in grain in the classical Greek world.  But private traders were not a 
structurally important part of the provisioning of classical Greek land campaigns; the 
conclusion stands, then, that in classical Greece, as in the rest of the pre-industrial 
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 See again the works cited at nn.152, 153 above.  For full discussion, see chapter 7 sections iii, iv, but see 
here ps.-Xen., Ath. Pol. 2.6:  “ἔπειτα νόσους τῶν καρπῶν, αἵ ἐκ ∆ίος εἰσιν, οἱ µὲν κατὰ γῆν κράτιστοι 
χαλεπῶς φέρουσιν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ θάλατταν ῥᾳδίως· οὐ γὰρ ἅµα πᾶσα γῆ νοσεῖ, ὥστε ἐκ τῆς εὐθενούσης 
ἀφικνεῖται τοῖς τῆς θαλάττης ἄρχουσιν.”  (“Again, diseases sent by Zeus against the crops affect land 
powers severely, but sea powers hardly at all; the whole earth does not suffer disease at the same time, and 
supplies come in to sea powers from areas that are flourishing.”) 
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Chapter 4:  Military Markets:  Previous Approaches (I)
1 
 
 i. Introduction 
The fact that Greek historians took for granted the markets provided by poleis and 
traders to classical Greek military forces means that these markets are mentioned rarely 
in our literary sources (and then only in exceptional circumstances).2  This state of affairs 
means in turn that we have very little evidence both for the institutional framework of the 
markets in which transactions between traders and soldiers and sailors took place, and for 
the prices charged to soldiers and sailors in them:  only five texts bear (or have been 
commonly thought to bear) on this latter question.  Perhaps because of this scarcity of 
evidence, there has not been much modern work done on the markets provided by poleis 
and traders to classical Greek armies, navies and amphibious forces.  In the limited work 
that has been done, however, a consensus has been reached:  it is now standard to state 
that classical Greek soldiers and sailors frequently or even usually bought food at inflated 
prices in the markets prepared for them, that both the poleis which provided markets to 
and the traders who accompanied soldiers and sailors on campaign exploited them.3  The 
remarks of Hans van Wees can be quoted as characteristic of this point of view:  traders 
accompanying armies were “happy to sell to the troops what they needed, frequently at 
                                                 
1 The term ‘military market’ or ‘military agora’ has no legal or institutional basis, as I will discuss in 
chapter 7 section ii.  I use these terms here simply as convenient shorthand for markets offered by poleis or 
traders to Greek armies and navies. 
 
2 See introduction. 
 
3 See Tänzer (1912) 26, 45; Anderson (1970) 52; Pritchett (1971) 23-24; Finley (1985) 82; Harthen (2001) 
240; van Wees (2004) 105 and n.14; Hanson (2005) 260; Rawlings (2007) 79 n.22, 118, 170; and see the 




exorbitant prices since demand was high and supply limited.”4  My goal in this chapter is 
to examine if the scholarly consensus that classical Greek soldiers and sailors were 
regularly ripped off in the markets provided to them by poleis and traders has any basis in 
the literary sources usually cited to support it.  
  
 ii. The (supposed) exploitation of classical Greek military forces in markets 
provided to them by traders 
Two texts, both from Xenophon’s Anabasis, are usually cited by scholars to 
support the view that traders accompanying classical Greek military forces regularly 
exploited them by charging them high prices for their food.  The first is Anab. 1.5.6:5  the 
soldiers in Cyrus’ army were marching through the desert between Corsote and Pylae 
when their supply of grain gave out; lacking any other means of acquiring new supplies 
of grain, the Greek mercenaries’ only recourse was to what Xenophon calls the Lydian 
agora (that is to say, it was a market run by Lydians) in the non-Greek part of the army.  
As the prices charged for barley- and wheat-flour there were astronomically high,6 the 
                                                 
4 (2004) 105. 
 
5 “τὸ δὲ στράτευµα ὁ σῖτος ἐπέλιπε, καὶ πρίασθαι οὐκ ἦν εἰ µὴ ἐν τῇ Λυδίᾳ ἀγορᾷ ἐν τῷ Κύρου βαρβαρικῷ, 
τὴν καπίθην ἀλεύρων ἢ ἀλφίτων τεττάρων σίγλων.  ὁ σίγλος δύναται ἕπτα ὀβολοὺς καὶ ἡµιωβέλιον 
Ἀττικούς· ἡ δὲ καπίθη δύο χοίνικας Ἀττικὰς ἐχώρει.  κρέα οὖν ἐσθίοντες οἱ στρατιῶται διεγίγνοντο.”  This 
passage has been cited to support the view that traders regularly engaged in profiteering in their 
transactions with members of classical Greek military forces by the following:  Tänzer (1912) 45; Pritchett 
(1971) 23; Marinovic (1988) 168; Harthen (2001) 240; van Wees (2004) 280 n.14; Rawlings (2007) 170. 
 
6 At 15 obols per choenix of wheat- or barley-flour, prices were thirty to fifty times those found at Athens 




Greek soldiers subsisted instead by eating meat (presumably of the baggage-animals that 
died of starvation during this part of the march).7 
The Lydian agora Xenophon mentions at Anab. 1.5.6 was not usually an 
important source of provisions for the Greeks in Cyrus’ army on the march to Cunaxa.  
Although Xenophon rarely explicitly describes the provisioning of the army before 
Cunaxa,8 it can be established with certainty that the army on its march before the battle 
acquired its supplies of grain or grain products in the settlements at which it halted during 
the course of its march.9  The institutional means the army used to acquire its provisions 
                                                 
7 See Anderson (1970) 51:  “[at Anab. 1.5.6] Xenophon does not say where the meat came from; probably 
worn-out and starving pack-animals.”  For this statement, see Anab. 1.5.5:  on the march through the desert 
from Corsote to Pylae, many of the baggage-animals died of hunger, for there was no fodder or, in fact, 
growing thing of any kind to be found.  Subsisting solely by eating meat was rare and unusual for classical 
Greek military forces, a desperate measure only undertaken in the absence of grain or other ‘normal’ foods.  
See, in this respect, the only two other occasions where the Cyreans lived exclusively off meat:  Anab. 
2.1.6-7 (the day after the battle of Cunaxa, in the absence of grain or any other food (see Anab. 1.10.18, 
2.2.3), the Cyreans provided themselves with food as best as they could by slaughtering animals from the 
baggage-train); and Anab. 4.7.17 (in the land of the Chalybes, the Cyreans subsisted on the cattle they had 
taken from the Taochians (Anab. 4.7.14), since their provisions had given out (Anab. 4.7.1:  “καὶ τὰ 
ἐπιτήδεια ἐπέλιπε”) on their arrival in the land of the Taochians (the territory they passed through before 
entering the land of the Chalybes) and they were unable to steal any grain or any other provisions from 
Taochian or Chalybian territory, since both of these peoples kept their provisions stored away in 
strongholds (Anab. 4.7.1, 4.7.17)).  Cf. Lee (2007) 222-223 on the Cyreans’ consumption of meat.  
Krasilnikoff writes that the meat the Greeks subsisted on during the march from Corsote to Pylae was from 
animals purchased in the Lydian market ([1993] 85), and that, in pushing the grain prices so high, the 
Lydians were attempting to make meat the only “possible merchandise” in their market ([1993] 85 n.24); 
he does not offer any evidence or reasoning to support this bizarre notion, and there is no reason to accept 
it. 
 
8 There are only eight references to potential sources of provisions or acts of provisioning in the narrative 
before Cunaxa:  Anab. 1.2.17-18, 1.3.11, 1.3.14, 1.4.19 (the first mention of an actual act of provisioning), 
1.5.4, 1.5.6, 1.5.9, 1.5.10. 
 
9 The key text here is Anab. 1.5.9:  Xenophon, describing the rhythm of Cyrus’ march, states that “τὸ δὲ 
σύµπαν δῆλος ἦν Κῦρος ὡς σπεύδων πᾶσαν τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ οὐ διατρίβων ὅπου µὴ ἐπισιτισµοῦ ἕνεκα ἤ τινος 
ἄλλου ἀναγκαίου ἐκαθέζετο,” “[i]n general, it was clear that Cyrus was in haste throughout the whole 
journey and was making no delays, except where he halted to procure provisions or for some other 
necessary purpose.”  (Cf. also Lee [2007] 174, 219 (cf. Tuplin [1999] 346) on the pattern of marching from 
Sardis to Cunaxa suggesting that the halts on the march were primarily for provisioning.)  See appendix 4 
for a full discussion of the provisioning of the Ten Thousand during the march to Cunaxa and for what 




during its halts differed according to the differing settlement patterns, ecologies and 
relations with Cyrus of the areas through which it passed:10  for most of the march, the 
soldiers purchased their provisions from markets provided by the cities along its route;11 
on those parts of the march outside urbanized regions, however, such as between 
Myriandrus and Thapsacus, and between Thapsacus and Charmande, requisitioning from 
villages became the primary means of provisioning; in some rare cases—only in 
Lycaonia, Tarsus and at Belesys’ palace and paradeisos—did the Greeks obtain their 
food through the pillaging of property in hostile territory.12 
The fact that the Lydian agora did not usually function as an important source of 
supplies for the army is also evidenced by the ways in which Xenophon describes it in the 
course of his narrative of the march to Cunaxa.  Thus, in reporting a speech by an 
anonymous soldier during the army’s stay at Tarsus, Xenophon makes an authorial 
intervention to state that the traveling market was in the barbarian part of the army (“ἡ δ’ 
ἀγορὰ ἦν ἐν τῷ βαρβαρικῷ στρατεύµατι”), doing so in order to point out that a proposal 
in this speech to buy provisions (from the Lydian agora) for a possible return to Greece 
                                                 
10 See Marinovic (1988) 160:  for the provisioning of the mercenaries, “la situation concrète comptait pour 
beaucoup, et en particulier les possibilités du pays traversé par l’armée (facteurs conjoncturels qui n’ont pas 
été pris en compte par ceux qui ont traité du ravitaillement des mercenaires de Cyrus).” 
 
11 This is certain at least for the period after the army left Cyrus’ sphere of control in Asia Minor—before 
this point, there is the slight possibility that the army may have been provisioned from satrapal stores 
belonging to Cyrus:  see appendix 4 for discussion of this point. 
 
12 Exceptionally, Cyrus provided four hundred wagons laden with wheat-flour and wine for the march after 
Pylae, but the Greeks never had the need or opportunity to use these before Cunaxa (Anab. 1.10.18).  See 




without Cyrus was absurd (Anab. 1.3.14).13  The anonymous soldier’s proposal was 
absurd since, if the Greeks had decided to provision themselves through purchase, they 
would have had to have done so in the Lydian agora;14 but this market was in Cyrus’ 
camp, and access to it would therefore depend on good relations with him, which they did 
not enjoy at the time of the speech.15  The anonymous soldier’s proposal to buy 
                                                 
13 The mercenaries had refused at Tarsus to follow Cyrus any further, out of suspicion that he was leading 
them against the King (Anab. 1.3.1-2).  Meetings were held to discuss the Greeks’ future course of action, 
and, at the second of these meetings, a soldier was put up by Clearchus to make apparently sincere—but, in 
fact, deliberately absurd—proposals for returning to Greece, in order to point up the dependence of the 
Greeks upon Cyrus for their continued safety and the impossibility of their returning to Greece without him 
(see Anab. 1.3.13-14 with Anthon [1852] 264, Parke [1933] 30-31, Kelly [1977] 28-30, Hirsch [1985] 24-
25).  As reported by Xenophon, the second proposal made by the anonymous soldier put up by Clearchus 
was that the mercenaries should buy provisions (“τὰ δ’ ἐπιτήδει’ ἀγοράζεσθαι”) for their march (at which 
point Xenophon adds the parenthetical comment that the Lydian agora was in the barbarian part of the 
army).  Note that, in the aftermath of the anonymous soldier’s speech, another (anonymous) soldier stood 
up to to point out the foolishness (“τὴν εὐήθειαν” (Anab. 1.3.16)) of the first speaker and the nonsensicality 
(“φλυαρίας” (Anab. 1.3.18)) of his proposals for returning to Greece without Cyrus (with the result that the 
Greeks were persuaded to remain on good terms with Cyrus (and eventually to join him on his campaign 
(ostensibly) against Abrocomas, the satrap of Phoenicia (Anab. 1.3.20))). 
 
14 All the inhabitants of Tarsus except its tavern-keepers (“οἱ τὰ καπηλεῖα ἔχοντες”) had fled the city at the 
approach of the army (Anab. 1.2.24).  Tavern-keepers (in the classical Greek world, at least) focused on the 
sale of goods other than basic subsistence food products and therefore did not hold large amounts of grain 
or grain products for sale (see references in LSJ s.v., and von Reden [2007] 393-394); the same can almost 
certainly assumed to have been true of the tavern-keepers at Tarsus.  Since (exceptionally) there was no 
market accessible to the Greeks from or in the city of Tarsus (because its inhabitants had fled), when the 
anonymous soldier proposed that the army buy its provisions before setting out on its suggested return to 
Greece, he could be understood immediately by his audience as referring to the Lydian market. 
 
15 See Anab. 1.3.9-11 (cf. 1.3.12, 1.3.16-17).  This is not to imply that Cyrus provided the Lydian market 
(as stated at Harthen [2001] 182, Lee [2007] 90, 100-101), but that access to Cyrus’ camp would be 
impossible for the Greeks if their relations with him were hostile.  There is no reason to think that Cyrus 
provided the traveling market for the army:  the cases of Tissaphernes and the Greek poleis on the Black 
Sea coast cited by Harthen and Lee are not analogous since their institutional relationship to the Cyreans 
was different from that of Cyrus’; Tissaphernes and the poleis on the Euxine were providing markets as 
(respectively) a representative of a friendly state and friendly states, and not as the Greeks’ employers.  In 
addition, it is highly improbable that Cyrus would have allowed the gouging attested at Anab. 1.5.6 to have 
happened if he were in control of the traveling market (note also that the one market at a city on the march 
to Cunaxa described by Xenophon, that at Charmande (Anab. 1.5.10), cannot have been provided by Cyrus, 




provisions from the Lydian agora was therefore futile,16 which implies that the Greeks at 
this point must have been acquiring their provisions from a source other than the 
Lydians.17  But that the Greeks did not usually use the Lydian market for their 
provisioning comes out most strongly at Anab. 1.5.6, when Xenophon is describing the 
shortage that afflicted the Greeks in the desert between Corsote and Pylae once their 
grain had given out:  “... καὶ πρίασθαι οὐκ ἦν εἰ µὴ ἐν τῇ Λυδίᾳ ἀγορᾷ ἐν τῷ Κύρου 
βαρβαρικῷ...”, “and it was not possible to buy anywhere except in the Lydian market in 
the barbarian part of Cyrus’ army.”  The necessary implication from this statement is that 
it was usual during (at least this part of) the march to buy provisions elsewhere than in 
the Lydian agora.18 
That the traders in the Lydian market never played any major role in the supply of 
the Cyreans’ supply of grain or grain-products on the march to Cunaxa is to be expected 
when we realize that the Lydian agora accompanying the march of Cyrus’ army to Pylae 
                                                 
16 Deliberately so, as part of his effort to persuade the Greeks that a return to Greece was not advisable:  see 
again n.13 above and e.g., Anthon (1852) 264; Goodwin and White (1889) 21; Kelly (1977) 154 n.152. 
 
17 The fact that the mercenaries could not buy provisions in Tarsus or in the Lydian agora means that they 
must have been provisioning themselves by another means during their stay in Tarsus.  This other means 
must have been the pillaging of grain and other foods stolen from stores in Tarsus:  see Anab. 1.3.14, 
1.2.26-27 (though the latter passage only refers to plundering by the men under Menon’s command, and 
neither passage refers explicitly to the seizure of provisions, in the absence of any other means of acquiring 
provisions, seizure of supplies was the only alternative open to the Greeks for obtaining supplies). 
 
18 Cf. appendix 4 section i.  At Anab. 1.3.14 and at 1.5.6, Xenophon notes that the Lydian market was in the 
barbarian part of Cyrus’ army; see also Anab. 1.2.17-18 (the only other mention of the traveling market on 
the march to Cunaxa):  incidentally mentioning the market, Xenophon includes it among “the barbarians 
and others,” “τῶν βαρβάρων... τε καὶ ἄλλοις” at a review of Cyrus’ assembled forces at Tyriaeum.  Note 
that, although the Greek part of the army often seems to have camped separately from the non-Greek part 
of the army directly under Cyrus’ control (see Anab. 1.2.26, 1.3.12, 1.5.12, 1.5.15), it is only in the 
exceptional circumstances of the army’s stay at Tarsus that it is raised by Xenophon as a potential problem 
for the provisioning of the mercenaries:  this again suggests that the Lydian agora took a limited role in the 




was a traveling market following an army marching overland.  As demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, in classical Greek and ancient near Eastern armies (and in later and 
better documented pre-industrial European and near Eastern armies, too), traveling 
merchants marketing food never played more than a minor role in the supply of the main, 
grain-based part of armies’ diets on overland campaigns, due to one fundamental fact:  
the prohibitively expensive cost of transporting grain overland using pre-industrial 
technology left no room to private traders for profit in selling grain to soldiers on 
campaign.19  The Lydian traders who made up the traveling market following Cyrus’ 
army on his march to the heart of the Persian Empire20 evidently did not break free from 
the brute fact of the high costs of overland transport of grain and therefore did not assume 
any importance in the provisioning of the army during its march.21  Instead, they must 
have functioned for the army mostly as a supplementary source of provisions—i.e., to 
                                                 
19 See chapter iii section iva for full discussion. 
 
20 Xenophon’s first mention of the traveling market is at Tyriaeum in Phrygia (Anab. 1.2.18) (see above 
n.18):  but his casual, offhand mention of the market at Tyriaeum allows us to infer that it was an assumed 
part of the (barbarian) army at this point in the march upland; this, and the fact that Xenophon specifies at 
Anab. 1.5.6 that the traveling market was Lydian, makes it certain that it had followed the army’s march 
since its starting point of Sardis. 
 
21 Contra all earlier editors of the Anabasis, who took the Lydian agora to be the main source of provisions 
for the Cyreans on the march to Cunaxa:  see, e.g., Vollbrecht (1886) 41, Kelsey and Zenos (1895) 214, 
Mather and Hewitt (1938) 42.  Dillery ([1998] 63 n.26) and Anderson ([1974] 89, 90) also take purchase in 
the Lydian agora to have been the Greeks’ primary method of provisioning.  Dalby’s ([1992] 23-25) 
treatment of the provisioning of the Ten Thousand fails to note that the means the mercenaries used to 
provision themselves differed in relative quantitative importance at different points of their march to and 
from Cunaxa, and also fails to distinguish between the relative quantitative importance of purchases in the 
Lydian market and purchases in cities for the provisioning of the Cyreans on the march to Cunaxa, thus 
implying incorrectly that these were similarly important means of acquiring supplies for the mercenaries 
([1992] 24).  Lee makes the same mistake:  at some points, purchases from local inhabitants at the 
settlements the Cyreans passed by, the Lydian agora, and foraging are mentioned as the main sources of 
the mercenaries’ provisions before Cunaxa without any indication of their relative importance ([2007] 22-
23, 214); at another point, purchases from the Lydian agora and plundering ([2007] 217).  (Cf. also Lee 
[2007] 174 stating that the settlements the mercenaries halted at were their main source of provisions, and 




those purchased, requisitioned, or stolen from the settlements which the army passed—
limiting themselves to keeping small (‘topping up’) amounts of grain (products) while 
primarily trafficking in relatively high value, low bulk foods such as cheese and honey 
which could be used by the mercenaries to add variety to their grain-based diets.22 
                                                 
22 As traveling markets in other ancient, medieval, and early modern armies did.  Descat ([1995a] 101, 107) 
also sees the Lydian agora as a supplementary source of provisions for the army, occasionally used by the 
mercenaries to buy “extras” to complement their grain-based diet.  But Descat takes the Lydian market as 
functioning in this way in order to support a claim that, after the army’s stay at Thapsacus (Anab. 1.4.13), 
Cyrus changed his method of payment to the mercenaries:  instead of, as before, simply paying money to 
the soldiers so that they could buy their food themselves at settlements which they passed by in the course 
of their march, Descat argues that, from Thapsacus, Cyrus began to pay the mercenaries partly in bullion, 
and partly in kind by drawing upon imperial resources in grain stored along the route of the march after 
Thapsacus ([1995] 103-104).  If this claim is correct, then the Lydian market can (for Descat) have played 
no important part in the grain supply of the Cyreans.  Descat’s argument is, however, deeply flawed (see 
already Tuplin [1999] 342-344), for six main reasons.  Firstly, its primary basis is two passages from 
Plutarch which Descat misinterprets.  Plutarch has Cyrus once (Artax. 6.3) telling the Spartans before his 
expedition against the King that, if they join him, he will pay them not by arithmos but by metron, and on 
another occasion (Mor. 173F) that if they join him, of silver and gold there will be not arithmos but 
stathmos.  Descat associates these passages with Cyrus’ (in his interpretation) assumption of the role of 
Great King at Thapsacus (Anab. 1.4.11) and takes them as evidence that, from this point of the march on, 
he was able to provision his soldiers by rations measured out from imperial stores ([1995] 104).  But this is 
obviously not the import of the Plutarchan passages (which refer, incidentally, to promises made before the 
expedition began and should not be associated with events at Thapsacus (Tuplin [1999] 343)); rather, Cyrus 
is promising in these passages that he will give the Spartans unimaginable wealth if they join him (see 
Tuplin [1999] 343-344 and Xen., Hell. 3.2.27 (for a person to have the ability to measure out their wealth 
rather than merely to count it being proverbial of great riches)).  Secondly, Descat mistakenly uses 
Diodorus’ description of Cyrus’ stay at Thapsacus to provide a suitable context for the promises made by 
Cyrus in the Plutarchan passages described above.  At Diod. 14.21.6, Cyrus pleads with the Greeks at 
Thapsacus not to abandon him, “promising, besides other great rewards, that when they came to Babylon, 
he would give every man of them five mnai of silver,” “ἀπαγγελλόµενος ἄλλας τε µεγάλας δωρέας καὶ ὅτι 
παραγενοµένοις αὐτοῖς εἰς Βαβυλῶνα κατ’ ἄνδρα ἕκαστον δώσει πέντε µνᾶς ἀργυρίου.”  Descat took the 
fabulous rewards of the Plutarchan passages and the “ἄλλας τε µεγάλας δωρέας” of the Diodoran passage 
to refer to the same promise and thus as evidence for a changed mode of payment to the Greeks from 
Thapsacus onwards. This cannot be the case, however.  Diodorus used Ephorus for his description of the 
march to Cunaxa, and as Stylianou has cogently demonstrated ([2004] 76, 78, 82-96, esp. 88-91), Ephorus 
closely followed Xenophon’s account in the Anabasis.  Apart from one detail (the double game of 
Syennesis referred to at Diod. 14.20.3, which seems to have come from Ctesias (Bigwood [1983] 349-
350)), Diodorus’ (Ephorus’) account of the march is basically a summary of Xenophon’s, and Diod. 14.21, 
in particular, is simply a very brief summary of Anab. 1.4.6-1.7.1.  Thus, when we read of Cyrus offering at 
Thapsacus five mnai of silver “besides other great rewards” in Diodorus, but only five mnai in silver and 
pay in full until the Greeks arrived back in Ionia in Xenophon (Anab. 1.4.13), we should conclude not that 
Diodorus (Ephorus) was using a source other than Xenophon here, but that he was extrapolating from 
Xenophon’s account—put another way, simply inventing material—as he did elsewhere in his account of 
the march upland on at least two other occasions (see Stylianou [2004] 85-86 on Diod. 14.19.7-9, and 
[2004] 87-88 on 14.20.5).  Diod. 14.21.6, then, offers no valid independent evidence for the pay or 
provisioning of the Cyreans.  Thirdly, and crucially, we can state positively that Cyrus assumed the royal 
prerogatives at Tarsus (see Anab. 1.2.27 with Briant [2002] 301), and not Thapsacus, as Descat has it.  
Fourthly, Descat misinterprets Xenophon’s use of the word ἐπισιτισµός and its derivatives.  He claims the 
use of “ἐπεσιτίσαντο” at Anab. 1.4.19 to describe the army’s provisioning in the villages at the Araxes river 
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The fact that the Lydian market normally took a supplementary role in the 
provisioning of the army explains its behavior as described at Anab. 1.5.6.  The price rise 
in the Lydian market took place because there had been a breakdown in the army’s 
normal means of supply.  In the previous course of the campaign, the soldiers had always 
brought sufficient provisions to cover their relatively short marches from settlement to 
settlement (i.e. from source of supplies to source of supplies).  But the journey from 
Corsote (the last settlement at which they provisioned before Charmande) to Charmande 
was the longest single march on the way to Cunaxa,23 and was through desert terrain 
which was “absolutely bare” of living things and thus offered no opportunity to provision 
                                                                                                                                                 
marks “un changement considérable dans le texte pour le vocabulaire de l’approvisionnement” and this 
“approvisionnement (episitismos)” is new because it is now in the forms of rations taken from places 
belonging to the royal administration ([1995a] 104).  To state that there is a considerable change at 1.4.19 
in the vocabulary Xenophon uses to describe provisioning is misleading, however; this is, in fact, the first 
explicit mention of provisioning in the Anabasis.  Moreover, as Marinovic ([1988] 160) and Tuplin ([2004] 
171) have pointed out, the term “ἐπεσιτίζοµαι” and its derivatives tell us, by themselves, nothing about the 
institutional means by which the Cyreans provisioned themselves at the Araxes river; they simply refer to 
the act of providing food for oneself and tell us nothing without context about the means used to provide 
that food (thus, “ἐπεσιτίζοµαι” and its derivatives can refer in the Anabasis to the stealing or seizing of 
provisions (3.4.18, 4.7.18, 6.2.4, 7.7.1), as well as to the purchase (7.1.7, 7.1.9) and requisitioning of food 
(2.4.5, 2.5.37)).  Without further information on the means used by the army to provision at the Araxes, of 
which there is none at 1.4.19, Descat is therefore incorrect to take this verb as referring to the use of food 
from imperial stores.  Fifthly, Descat fails to deal satisfactorily with the fact that the Cyreans are attested as 
purchasing provisions after their stay at Thapsacus (at Chamande (1.5.10)).  Finally, it is very unlikely that 
there were significant imperial resources in grain stored on the route Cyrus took to Babylonia, since he did 
not take the Royal Road to Cunaxa, but instead took an unusual route down the left bank of the Euphrates 
(Joannès (1995) 173, esp. 182-183; Tuplin [1999] 343; Briant [2002] 628; Tuplin [2004] 171).  The 
reasoning behind Descat’s explanation of the purpose of the Lydian agora does not hold, then; the Lydian 
agora did function as a supplementary source of provisions for the Cyreans, but not for the reasons Descat 
puts forward. 
 
23 See Anab. 1.5.5:  Xenophon states the march from Corsote to Pylae took thirteen days, covering ninety 
parasangs.  There were not, however, thirteen days of straight marching between Corsote and Pylae, but 
more probably 11 (or 12), since in the course of the march through the desert the soldiers halted at the city 
of Charmande (Anab. 1.5.10), which was a day’s march away from Pylae (see Lendle [1995] 48; cf. Lee 
[2007] 24).  Even at 11 days, however, the march from Corsote to Charmande was still two days’ longer 
than the next longest march on the journey to Babylonia (that from Thapsacus to the Araxes (Anab. 1.4.19)) 
and six days’ longer than the next longest after that (see Lee [2007] Table 1, 283-284 for a table 
conveniently listing the lengths and duration of the marches from Sardis to Cunaxa [though the halt at 




through foraging.24  The mercenaries did not bring enough food to cover the 
extraordinarily long and barren march from Corsote to Charmande, their normal means of 
provisioning (purchase or requisitioning from settlements) was unavailable to them, and 
so their grain gave out:  they were therefore forced, if they wanted grain, to take 
desperate recourse to the Lydian market, which they normally used only as a 
supplementary source of provisions, but was now the only source of grain available to 
them.  Since the soldiers’ demand for their basic subsistence food remained strongly 
inelastic, there was now a sudden huge surge in demand for grain in the Lydian market; 
this sudden demand for grain combined with the small (and perfectly inelastic) supply of 
barley- and wheat-flour in the market (where the traders had only limited, ‘topping up’ 
amounts of grain) to produce the famine prices attested at Anab. 1.5.625 (and force the 
men to substitute for grain the unaccustomed but free food of the meat of the dead 
baggage-animals)).26 
 
                                                 
24 Anab. 1.5.5:  “ἐν τούτοις τοῖς σταθµοῖς πολλὰ τῶν ὑποζυγίων ἀπώλετο ὑπὸ λιµοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἦν χόρτος οὐδὲ 
ἄλλο οὐδὲν δένδρον, ἀλλα ψιλὴ ἦν ἅπασα ἡ χώρα...”, “[i]n the course of these stages many of the baggage 
animals died of hunger, for there was no fodder and, in fact, no growing thing of any kind, but the land was 
absolutely bare... ”  The speed of the march from Corsote to Charmande—some thirty-five kilometers a day 
(a forced march pace for Greek armies (cf. the figures given at Krentz [2007] 161)—would have prevented 
the army from gathering any substantial amount of food through foraging, even if there had been any:  see 
appendix 4 section iii for foraging as a provisioning method that required significant amounts of time to 
gather large supplies of food and slowed down marches considerably. 
 
25 The severity of the famine is shown by the fact that wheat and barley products were selling at the same 
price (wheat and wheat products were usually more expensive than barley and barley products (see 
Heichelheim [1935] 885-890 for prices for these grains in the Greek world in the classical and Hellenistic 
periods):  see, e.g., Harper and Wallace (1893) 397, Walpole (1963) 69. 
 
26 The price rise in the desert is, in fact, another indication that the Lydian agora was not the Greeks’ usual 
source of supplies on the march to Cunaxa:  if the Lydians were the usual source of the Greeks’ provisions, 
the mercenaries’ demand for grain from the agora would have remained constant and there would have 




This phenomenon—extraordinarily high prices for grain and other foods 
(accompanied by the consumption of unusual foodstuffs) in armies that had been cut off 
from their normal sources of supplies (and any other source of supply other than 
purchase) in isolated and infertile inland areas—is paralleled, in fact, in several other 
ancient campaigns.  Thus, for example, when Artaxerxes II invaded the land of the 
Cadusians with a huge force, probably in 380,27 expecting to supply his army through the 
usual Achaemenid methods of requisitioning and foraging, but finding that “the country 
which he invaded was rough and hard to travel across... and produced no grains,” the 
army soon found itself in much distress “for no food was to be got in the country or 
imported from outside, and they could only butcher their beasts of burden, so that an 
ass’s head was scarcely to be bought for sixty drachmas.”28  During Caesar’s campaign in 
Spain in 49, his army was cut off from its normal sources of supply by flooding and 
attacks from Spanish infantry,29 so that his soldiers were forced to rely solely on the 
merchants who accompanied the army for their grain, the price of which as a result rose 
                                                 
27 See Manfredini, Orsi and Antelami (1987) 300-301. 
 
28 Plutarch, Artax. 24.1-2:  “ἐµβαλὼν δὲ εἰς χώραν τραχύτητι χαλεπὴν... καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ σπόρου καρπῶν 
ἄγονον... οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐδώδιµον ἦν λαµβάνειν οὐδὲ ἔξωθεν ἐπεισάγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ὑποζύγια µόνον κατέκοπτον, 
ὥστε ὄνου κεφαλὴν µόλις δραχµῶν ἑξήκοντα ὤνιον εἶναι.”  See Manfredini, Orsi and Antelami (1987) 301 
for other ancient sources on the Cadusians’ lack of agriculture and the harshness of their land. 
 
29 Caesar, B. Civ. 1.48.3-5:  the flooding of the rivers Sicoris and Cinga prevented friendly states from 
supplying Caesar’s camp with provisions, the troops he had sent beyond these rivers to forage from 
returning to the camp, and the supplies of food which he had ordered from Gaul and Italy from reaching it.  
The parties Caesar did send out to forage within the confined space the army now found itself in because of 
the flooding (1.48.3) were harassed by the Spanish infantry, who were well acquainted with the country 
(1.48.7).  The scarcity of grain was made worse by the fact that the flooding had occurred just before the 
harvest, a time when grain was scarce in any case, and because, before Caesar’s arrival, L. Afranius had 




to the exceptionally high price of 50 denarii a modius.30  On Marcus Antonius’ retreat 
from Phraata in 36, when his army had run out of grain in the desert and infertile terrain 
and was unable to procure any more through foraging because of the attacks of the 
pursuing Parthian army, famine gripped the army, so that it was said that “one Attic 
choinix of wheat brought fifty drachmas; and loaves of barley bread were sold for their 
weight in silver.”31   
Thus, at Anab. 1.5.6, Xenophon describes an extraordinary price rise in 
extraordinary circumstances in a market serving Greek and non-Greek armies,32 and not a 
phenomenon that we can use to generalize about the normal behavior of markets 
provided by traders to Greek armies.33  This leads me on to my last point about this 
passage:  whatever way we read Anab. 1.5.6, with its description of prices charged in a 
                                                 
30 Caesar, B. Civ. 1.52.1-2. 
 
31 Plutarch, Antonius 45.8:  “... λέγεται δὲ χοῖνιξ Ἀττικὴ πυρῶν πεντήκοντα δραχµῶν ὤνιος γενέσθαι· τοὺς 
δὲ κριθίνους ἄρτους πρὸς ἀργύριον ἱστάντες ἀπεδίδοντο.”  The soldiers of Marcus Antonius were therefore 
reduced to eating unfamiliar foodstuffs (45.9).  Several more examples from later pre-industrial campaigns 
in Europe and the Near East could be added.  Cf., for example, the experiences of the Napoleonic army 
marching to and from Moscow in 1812:  after the army had marched beyond the capabilities of the supply 
trains organized for it, and was unable to rely on its normal method of seizure of civilian food supplies 
because of the Russians’ ‘scorched earth’ strategy and the depths of the Russian winter, prices in the army 
for grain and bread rose to between fifty and one hundred times their normal level (see letters I (pp.140-
141), II (p.142), IV (p.145) and V (pp.147-148) collected by Raeff in Walter [1993]). 
 
32 As noted by Krasilnikoff (1993) 84 and Briant (2002) 628, although neither discusses or explains why 
these circumstances should be considered exceptional.  Descat ([1995a] 104, 107) assumes, on the basis of 
the prices charged at 1.5.6, that the prices in the Lydian agora were always high; but, as I have shown, this 
assumption does not take into account the exceptional circumstances the Cyreans encountered on the march 
between Corsote and Charmande. 
 
33 The fact that Xenophon mentions the price charged for barley- and wheat-flour in the Lydian agora is in 
itself unusual—this is the only price for food mentioned in either the Anabasis or the Hellenica—and 
should alert us to the fact he is describing an unusual set of circumstances here.  Note that, in general, food 
prices are mentioned in ancient sources rarely and almost always in extraordinary circumstances.  See 
Erdkamp (2005) 147:  “[m]any of the prices mentioned in our sources are either a product of governmental 




desert, at a point nineteen hundred and thirty-five kilometers and four and a half months 
away from Sardis,34 by Lydian traders to an army comprising primarily non-Greeks and 
led by a pretender to the Persian throne, it can hardly be used to construct a picture of 
normal relations between Greek armies and Greek merchants.  It should be noted again in 
this regard that Xenophon notes at Anab. 1.5.6 (after doing so already at 1.2.18 and 
1.3.14) that the Lydians were in the barbarian part of the army.  This passage, in sum, 
tells us nothing about how markets following classical Greek armies on campaign 
normally behaved. 
 
The second passage used to support the view that Greek soldiers and sailors were 
usually charged high prices by the traders accompanying them on campaign is also from 
the Anabasis (3.2.21):35   
τὰ δὲ ἐπιτήδεια πότερον ὠνεῖσθαι κρεῖττον ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἧς οὗτοι 
παρεῖχον µικρὰ µέτρα πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου, µηδὲ τοῦτο ἔτι ἔχοντας, ἢ αὐτοὺς 
λαµβάνειν, ἤνπερ κρατῶµεν, µέτρῳ χρωµένους ὁπόσῳ ἂν ἕκαστος βούληται; 
 
[a]nd as for provisions, is it the better plan to buy from the market which 
these [Persians] have provided—small measures for large prices, when we have 
no money left either—or to appropriate for ourselves, in case we are victorious, 
and to use as large a measure as each one of us pleases?   
 
These words come from a speech given by Xenophon at the river Zapatas to encourage 
the soldiers of the Ten Thousand the night after the Persian satrap Tissaphernes had had 
several of their generals and lochagoi treacherously killed.  Xenophon is referring in this 
part of his speech to an agreement made after the battle of Cunaxa between Tissaphernes 
                                                 
34 Calculated using the figures Xenophon gives us for the numbers of parasangs and stathmoi traveled.  On 
the probable, but not certain, reliability of these figures, see Tuplin (1997) 404-417. 
 





and Clearchus, whereby the Greeks were permitted to take food and drink from the 
country when the Persians did not provide a market, but when the Persians did provide a 
market, they were then to obtain their provisions by purchase (from this market) (Anab. 
2.3.26-27). 
Before this passage can be interpreted properly, it must be put back into its 
immediate narrative context.  After the murder of the generals, the Greeks were, as 
Xenophon tells us, despondent about their situation for several reasons (Anab. 3.1.2):  
they were in the middle of the Persian Empire and surrounded by hostile cities and tribes 
on all sides; nobody would provide them with a market for provisions any longer; they no 
longer had any guide to show them the long way home; there were impassable rivers on 
their homeward route; and they had been abandoned by the barbarians who had 
accompanied them on the march from Sardis, leaving them without a single horseman.  
Given this situation, Xenophon decided that the army’s only hope of salvation was to 
fight its way back to Greece.  Xenophon attempted to persuade three different audiences 
in three different ways of the validity of this decision.36  Firstly, he addressed the 
lochagoi of Proxenus (one of the generals who had been killed by Tissaphernes and the 
man who had invited Xenophon to take part in Cyrus’ expedition against the King).  
Xenophon used three main arguments to persuade Proxenus’ lochagoi of the case for the 
army fighting its way back to Greece (Anab. 3.1.15-25):  the army had no hope of mercy 
at the hands of the King; the Greeks were tougher than the Persians; and if they were to 
fight, they would have a much better chance of gaining provisions than they ever had 
under the agreement with Tissaphernes.  For if they fought, they would be able to get 
                                                 




their hands on, among other things, the abundant provisions (“ἄφθονα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια” 
(Anab. 3.1.18)) the King and his followers possessed; whereas, previously, under the 
truce, the soldiers “had no share in these good things, unless we bought them; I knew 
there were but few of us who still had money wherewith to buy; and I knew that our oaths 
restrained us from getting provisions in any other way than by purchase.”37  Secondly, 
Xenophon spoke to the assembled generals and lochagoi of the Greeks (Anab. 3.1.35-45) 
and persuaded them to elect new generals and lochagoi to show themselves brave and 
stout-hearted to the soldiers, and also to speak to the soldiers to encourage them and to 
lift them out of their dejection.  (There is no mention of provisions or the market 
provided by the Persians in this speech.)   
Xenophon, having been elected general, then addressed the assembled soldiers 
(Anab. 3.2.8-32), after two other senior generals, Cheirisophus and Cleanor, had spoken 
briefly to them:  Cheirisophus to emphasize the treachery of the Persians and to 
encourage the army to die a glorious death rather than submit to them (Anab. 3.2.2-3); 
and Cleanor to reinforce these points (and especially that they should not trust the 
Persians again) (Anab. 3.2.4-6).38  Xenophon built on these speeches,39 encouraging the 
soldiers in a lengthy address, the main part of which was devoted to persuading the 
                                                 
37 Anab. 3.1.20:  “...ὅτι τῶν µὲν ἀγαθῶν τούτων οὐδενος ἡµῖν µετείη, εἰ µὴ πριαίµεθα, ὅτου δ’ ὠνησόµεθα 
ᾔδειν ἔτι ὀλίγους ἔχοντας, ἄλλως δέ πως πορίζεσθαι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἢ ὠνουµένους <τοὺς> ὅρκους ᾔδη 
κατέχοντας ἡµας.” 
 
38 Hirsch (1985) 31. 
 




soldiers that their present situation was much better than it seemed.40  He spoke to all the 
concerns of the army outlined at Anab. 3.1.2 (as well as the fact that Ariaeus had betrayed 
them, a concern raised (and dismissed) by Cheirisophus at Anab. 3.2.2) and addressed 
each of them in turn, using a series of antitheses to extol the present situation of the 
Greeks by contrasting it with the situation they were formerly in—i.e., the seemingly 
better length of time after Cunaxa when they had had the King’s men as guides and allies 
(at least in name)—all in an attempt to minimize the seriousness of the soldiers’ worries 
and to persuade them to fight. 
The fact was, though, that the soldiers’ concerns were all legitimate and 
Xenophon was speaking in an extraordinarily difficult situation; in addition, the Persians 
were continually attempting to “corrupt the soldiers” after the murder of their leaders 
(Anab. 3.3.5), so that some of the soldiers may have been thinking of coming to some sort 
of an arrangement with the Persians.41  In his desperate effort to assuage the soldiers’ 
concerns, to boost their morale and (ultimately) to persuade them not to come to terms 
with the Persians, Xenophon therefore had to make several assertions that can be shown 
from the surrounding narrative and other considerations to have been demonstrably false.  
So, for example, he told the men, using a series of questionable rationalizations, that the 
Persians’ advantage in cavalry was no advantage at all (Anab. 3.2.18-19)—but soon after 
the speech the Ten Thousand suffered serious losses at the hands of Persian cavalry, so 
                                                 
40 See Hirsch (1985) 30-31:  the speeches of Cheirisophus, Cleanor, and Xenophon thus work together to 
achieve the goal of persuading the soldiers to fight the Persians rather than surrender to them. 
 
41 Hirsch (1985) 31:  even after the speech, when the army as a body had decided to follow the generals’ 




that Xenophon decided to cobble together a makeshift cavalry unit (Anab. 3.3.19-20).42  
Later in the speech, he told the army that the King would do anything to have the Greeks 
leave Persia (Anab. 3.2.23-24).  This statement was based on the reasoning that the King 
would do the same for the Mysians who, although in no way better men than the Greeks, 
had shown themselves to be much stronger to the Persians by living in many and large 
prosperous poleis in the King’s territory.  But Mysia was a region lacking in poleis, large 
and prosperous or otherwise, at the turn of the fifth century.43  Simply put, Xenophon was 
fabricating arguments to persuade the mercenaries to follow their leaders’ advice.44 
Even if, then, the one valid argument that Xenophon did make in his speech—that 
not having Tissaphernes anymore as a guide was, in fact, an advantage, as, from this 
point on, the army would be able to use captured guides who would know that they 
would pay with their lives if they did not provide correct directions (Anab. 3.2.20)45—
came just before his claim that the Persians were charging high prices for small measures, 
it has to be remembered that this claim comes in a speech full of hyperbole and 
fabrication (and that another demonstrably false assertion—that the mercenaries would 
                                                 
42 See Rood (2004) 314, Hirsch (1985) 31 and n.54 for this point.  See already Anab. 2.4.6:  Clearchus 
pointing out the serious problems a lack of cavalry posed for the Greeks. 
 
43 See Tuplin (2004) 179. 
 
44 Tuplin (2004) 179:  Xenophon in this part of the speech engaging in “rhetorical overstatement.” 
 
45 The use of captured prisoners as guides on the march from the King’s country to Trapezus: Anab. 3.5.15-
17; 4.1.21; 4.1.22-25 (a captured local who would not give information murdered in front of another local, 
who then did provide directions); 4.2.5; 4.2.23; 4.5.1; 4.6.1-3.  Cf. 4.7.19-20 (and 27):  a guide provided by 
the ruler of the territory around the city of Gymnias stating that the army might kill him if he did not lead 




have no difficulty crossing rivers on their way home—followed directly after it).46  We 
should remember, too, that the claim of cheating in the market also comes after two 
speeches that had emphasized the treachery of the Persians, and that Xenophon had 
started his speech by focusing on the perjury and faithlessness of the Persians, so that the 
assertion that the Persians were cheating the Greeks in the market they provided to them 
comes in the context of a rhetorically charged and (deliberately) biased portrayal of the 
prior arrangements between the Ten Thousand and the Persians.  If one compares 
Xenophon’s first speech (Anab. 3.1.20), to Proxenus’ lochagoi, a more measured and 
grounded speech given to an audience of men of greater rank and experience than the 
massed assembly of soldiers, Xenophon states there that there were few men in the army 
who had money to buy in the market provided to them, and makes no mention of 
cheating; at Anab. 3.2.21, in the greater heat of the later speech to the assembled soldiers, 
the men have no money left to buy provisions, and they have been cheated in the market.  
In short, Xenophon’s claim that high prices were charged for small measures in the 
market provided by the Persians should not be removed from its immediate context of 
deliberate distortions, dubious rationalizations, and descriptions of Persian treachery:  it 
cannot be taken as a neutral presentation (and therefore as evidence) of conditions in the 
market provided by the Persians after Cunaxa.47 
                                                 
46 See Anab. 3.5.7 for the perplexity of the Greeks on the first occasion after Xenophon’s speech that they 
faced a deep river on the march out of the King’s country (the generals eventually decided not to attempt to 
cross the river:  Anab. 3.5.12-13, 3.5.17).  See Anab. 4.3.3-7, 4.8.1-3 for the Greeks’ later difficulties in 
crossing rivers on the march to Trapezus.  The consideration that rivers would prove a major difficulty for 
the Greeks’ attempt to return home is raised before Xenophon’s speech several times in speeches made 
after Cunaxa:  Anab. 2.1.11, 2.4.6, 2.5.9, 2.5.18. 
 
47 See Rood (2004) 314 on this speech:  “... even claims that Xenophon himself makes in his speeches are 
determined by the needs of the immediate audience and cannot automatically be extrapolated from their 
context within the Anabasis.”  See also Hirsch ([1985] 31), who examines this speech for attitudes to non-
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 One final point.  Xenophon at Anab. 3.2.8-32 was describing conditions in a 
market provided by a Persian, Tissaphernes, who is consistently presented elsewhere in 
the Anabasis as acting dishonestly and treacherously in his relations with the Greeks,48 at 
a point when the mercenaries were “not less than 10,000 stades away from Greece.”49   
Anab. 3.2.21, just as Anab. 1.5.6, then, cannot be used as evidence for normal practices in 
the markets provided by traders to classical Greek military forces.    
   
iii. The (supposed) exploitation of classical Greek military forces in markets 
provided to them by poleis 
So the two passages from the Anabasis that have been taken by historians to show 
that traders accompanying classical Greek armies and navies on campaign usually 
exploited them show, in fact, nothing of the sort. 50  Two more passages have been used 
                                                                                                                                                 
Greeks:  “[i]n sum, this assembly is a dramatic high point.  Speeches are delivered which aim at the 
adoption of a particular policy, and the critical decision to resist is made.  The content of these speeches 
must be viewed both in their immediate context and in relation to what follows.  It is a procedural error to 
excerpt antibarbarian statements from these speeches and to maintain that they represent the considered 
opinion of Xenophon, or of all fourth-century Greeks, concerning the trustworthiness of non-Greeks.” 
 
48 See Hirsch (1985) 22-27:  Tissaphernes is presented by Xenophon in the Anabasis as a “monster of 
treachery.” 
 
49 See Anab. 3.1.2:  “ἀπεῖχον δὲ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐ µεῖον ἢ µύρια στάδια.”  The Greeks were (using 
Xenophon’s figures (see p.268 n.34)) five and a half months and four thousand and fifteen kilometers 
distant from Sardis at this point. 
 
50 Parke ([1933] 232) and Harthen ([2001] 200) also take ps.-Aristot., Oec. 2.2.23d, 1350b5-15 (the same 
anecdote is found at Polyaenus, Strateg. 3.10.10) as evidence for high prices being charged by traders in 
markets in classical Greek military camps.  In this anecdote, Timotheus, besieging Samos in 366, found 
that his camp was becoming short of provisions because of the many foreigners (“πολλοὶ ξένοι”) who were 
arriving into his camp and buying provisions in the market there (the identity of these foreigners is unclear, 
but it seems that they were probably mercenaries coming to Samos in the hope of enlistment in Timotheus’ 
army (see Parke [1933] 108-109)).  To counteract this, he gave orders forbidding the sale of milled grain, 
wine or oil in measures less than a medimnos of grain or a metretes of wine or oil.  Accordingly, the 
taxiarchs and the lochagoi of the army bought supplies in bulk and issued them to the men, while the 
incomers, without a retail market for daily necessities, brought their own provisions and sold any surplus 
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by scholars to support the related point that Greek poleis regularly exploited military 
forces in the markets that they provided to them.  The first of these is also from the 
Anabasis.   
 In the early summer of 400, when the Ten Thousand were encamped outside the 
polis of Cotyora, Xenophon described to the men two incidents that had recently taken 
place in their parabasis along the southern coast of the Black Sea in order to demonstrate 
to them their increasing lawlessness and the problems this would cause for the rest of 
their march.51  The second incident Xenophon described in this speech was a riot in 
which a crowd of men from the army attacked some agoranomoi on account of their 
(allegedly) outrageous treatment of the soldiers; in the ensuing disorder, some 
Cerasuntian ambassadors, as well as some of the soldiers, came to fear for their lives and 
fled from the army (Anab. 5.7.21-26).  Based on Xenophon’s description of the treatment 
of the agoranomoi, J. K. Anderson stated that: 
[w]hen a market was provided by a friendly city instead of by travelling 
merchants, regulations were likely to be made by magistrates for the benefit of 
the sellers rather than by the general to protect the soldiers, as when the Ten 
Thousand reached Cerasus on the Black Sea.  Here the officials [he means of the 
city of Cerasus, as the preceding sentence shows] narrowly escaped stoning at the 
hands of the soldiers, who thought themselves cheated, and the generals were 
unable to intervene.52 
                                                                                                                                                 
on their departure, so that the original soldiers alone consumed the grain, wine and oil in the market, thus 
alleviating the shortage.  In other words, there is no mention at any point in ps.-Aristotle (or Polyaenus’ 
account) of a rise in prices or profiteering by merchants in Timotheus’ camp, but only of a lack of 
provisions (“τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων... σπάνις”) there. 
 
51 Anab. 5.7.5-33. 
 
52 (1970) 52.  Stanley ([1976] 122) follows Anderson in taking Anab. 5.7.21-29 as evidence that the 
agoranomoi of friendly cities generally permitted the traders of their poleis to profiteer in the markets 
provided by their poleis to passing military forces.  Cf. Perlman (1976/1977) 264:  in a description of the 
relations between the Cyreans and Greek poleis of the southern Black Sea coast, citing Anab. 5.7.21-29 as 
evidence for the statement that “when he had to pay extortionate prices for the food provided by the city’s 





Anderson’s statement here was based on the understanding that the agoranomoi 
mentioned at 5.7.21-29 were Cerasuntian and administering a market established for the 
Cyreans by the city of Cerasus just outside or near that city.  But, as I demonstrate in 
chapter seven,53 a close reading of Xenophon’s speech at Cotyora shows that the 
disturbance caused by the alleged wrongdoing of these agoranomoi took place just 
outside Cotyora, not Cerasus; that the agoranomoi were not Cerasuntians, but, in fact, 
Cyreans, members of the Ten Thousand and chosen by the Ten Thousand; and that 
therefore the inference made by Anderson from Anab. 5.7.21-29 regarding the usual 
workings of markets provided by Greek cities to passing armies is invalid.  Anab. 5.7.21-
29, rather than providing evidence that poleis normally ripped off soldiers in markets, 
presents us, on the contrary, with our only attested instance of agoranomoi within a 
classical (or Hellenistic) Greek army, and, in the men’s reactions to the perceived 
injustice of the agoranomoi, an indication that Greek soldiers expected, naturally enough, 
that the market officials they appointed would ensure that exchanges in the markets 
accompanying their campaigns would be transacted fairly. 
 
The second passage cited by scholars54 as evidence for the claim that poleis 
regularly gouged Greek armies and navies is ps.-Aristotle, Oeconomica 2.2.7, 1347a32-
                                                                                                                                                 
 
53 See section iib. 
 
54 Pritchett (1971) 23-24 (followed by Marinovic [1988] 168 and Dalby [1992] 25 n.66), Casson (1995) 




1347b2:55  the authorities at Lampsacus, expecting a large number of triremes to arrive at 
their city,56 probably at some point in the late fifth or early fourth century,57 ordered the 
people working in the agora (“τοῖς ἀγοραίοις”) to raise their prices for barley-flour (from 
four to six drachmas for a medimnos), oil (from 3 drachmas a chous to four drachmas 
three obols), wine and the other items (“καὶ τῶν ἄλλων”) by fifty per cent.  When the 
trireme crews eventually arrived and bought food and wine from the traders in the agora, 
the latter got the original price for the goods they sold, and the polis took the rest, i.e. the 
fifty per cent extra profit, and so had plenty of money.  
                                                 
55 “Λαµψακηνοὶ δὲ προσδοκίµων οὐσῶν τριήρων πολλῶν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὄντος µεδίµνου τῶν ἀλφίτων 
τετραδράχµου, προσέταξαν τοῖς ἀγοραίοις πωλεῖν ἑξάδραχµον, καὶ τοὺ ἐλαίου τὸν χοᾶ ὄντα δραχµῶν 
<τριῶν>, τεττάρων καὶ τριωβόλου, τοῦ τε οἴνου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. τὴν µὲν οὖν ἀρχαίαν τιµὴν 
ἐλάµβανεν ὁ ἰδιώτης, τὸ δὲ πλέον ἡ πόλις, καὶ ἐυπόρησε χρηµάτων.” 
 
56 G. C. Armstrong in the Loeb edition ([1935] 537) translates “Λαµψακηνοὶ δὲ προσδοκίµων οὐσῶν τριηρῶν 
πολλῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς...” as follows:  “[o]n one occasion the people of Lampsacus were expecting to be 
attacked by a large fleet of triremes.”  But, as Cracco Ruggini ([1967] 14-15 n.168) points out, πρὸς αὐτοὺς 
does not necessarily have the sense of “against,” and the anecdote would make no sense if it were an enemy 
fleet approaching Lampsacus (since if the fleet were hostile, it would not be admitted into the agora of the 
city or provided with a temporary agora outside the city). 
 
57 This episode has been conventionally dated to 409 (see, e.g., van Groningen ([1933] 83) and Cracco 
Ruggini ([1967] 15), following earlier commentators) on the basis of a notice at Xen., Hell. 1.2.15 referring 
to 50 Athenian triremes spending the winter of that year at Lampsacus.  None of the reasons usually cited 
by commentators for this date stand up to scrutiny, however.  Firstly, a date of 409 is based on the 
assumption that the triremes mentioned by pseudo-Aristotle are Athenian but there is no evidence for this:  
the Greek simply says “τριηρῶν πολλῶν.”  Secondly, the price of barley-flour, at 4 drachmas a medimnos, 
has been thought to be unusually high and a product of military actions around the Hellespont from 411-
409.  But we simply do not have the evidence to say whether this price for barley-flour was unusually high 
or not.  There are only three other prices for barley-flour in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, and all 
are from Athens (see Heichelheim [1935] 887-888 (although a price for alphita cannot be reconstructed 
from Aristoph., Wasps 300ff., contra Heichelheim (ibid.)):  two of these are for 2 drachmas a medimnos but 
come from an unreliably late ‘wandering anecdote’ about philosophers (Socrates and Diogenes 
respectively) emphasizing the necessity and ease of a simple life (Plut., Mor. 470F, Diog. Laert. 6.35); the 
other figure, for 4 drachmas a medimnos, comes from a sacrificial calendar of the Marathonian tetrapolis 
setting out prices to be paid for deme sacrifices c. 350 (IG II2 1358.45, 50 (see Loomis [1998] 83-84 n.22 
for the date)), and therefore may not reflect market prices for barley-flour. In sum, we are in no position to 
judge whether or not a price of four drachmas for alphita in a polis other than Athens in the late fifth or 
early fourth century was expensive.  Finally, it is only an assumption that the three years of fighting around 




 At first sight, this passage seems to support the view that Greek cities regularly 
took advantage of passing military forces in the markets they provided to them.  The very 
fact that it is included in the second book of the Oeconomica, however, argues very 
strongly against this view.  The description of the actions of the Lampsacenes is just one 
of seventy-seven anecdotes in this section of the Oeconomica, all of which describe 
special financial ‘stratagems’ designed to make money for states (or their agents) at times 
of financial crisis:58  each of the anecdotes describes attempts by either monarchs, tyrants, 
mercenary captains, satraps, agents of Alexander or, in nineteen cases, poleis to cheat 
other people out of money or to force people to give up money or, as in this case, both.59  
In sum, the actions described in the second book of the Oeconomica are all “mesures 
exceptionelles prises dans des circonstances tout à fait speciales,”60 and tell us nothing of 
the financial practices of poleis in normal circumstances. 
 Moreover, although the author of the Oeconomica makes no explicit judgment on 
any of the actions included in its second book, it is, as Sitta von Reden has written, “the 
ethical boundary of the polis which the people of the Aristotelian stories transgress.”61  
Thus, poleis in the Oeconomica, just like generals and tyrants, manipulate coinage and 
                                                 
58 von Reden (1997) 175.  The work was probably written in the first quarter of the third century:  see 
Aperghis (2004) 129-135. 
 
59 Finley (1970) 316. 
 
60 von Groningen (1933) 57 (sic).  See also Gauthier (1991) 63 on the use of the anecdotes from the 
Oeconomica as evidence for institution or common practices in the classical Greek world:  “[m]ais, sur le 
fond, il faut avouer que les deux exemples transmis par l’Économique font figure d’exception.  Ce sont des 
stratagèmes de circonstance, réputés ingénieux, destinés à pallier une pénurie d’argent.” 
 




credit instruments “to manipulate the wealth of their [citizens]”:62 they also, amongst 
other things, sell sacred lands (at Byzantium, 2.2.3a, 1346b15-20), or material that has 
been gathered for a major religious festival (at Antissa, 2.2.6,1347a25-31); change 
citizenship laws or validate the standing of loans that had been illegally made to non-
citizens63 (both at Byzantium, 2.2.3b, d, 1346b27-29, 1347a1-3); and exploit the 
conventions of international relations (the Chalcedonians, 2.2.10, 1347b20-30)64—all in 
order to fill empty city treasuries.  Every one of these actions was “morally 
incompatible”65 with normal classical Greek approaches to polis finances.   
Placed back into their proper generic context, then, the actions of the 
Lampsacenes can be seen as exceptional.  Far from showing that poleis routinely ripped 
off passing soldiers and sailors, the fact that the money-making ruse of the Lampsacenes 
was included in the second book of the Oeconomica strongly implies that such acts were 
regarded as unethical and that it was exceptional practice for Greek poleis to take 
advantage of friendly military forces in the markets they provided to them.  It should be 
noted, too, in conclusion, that the price fixed by the Lampsacenes apparently did not rise 
despite the influx of sailors; in other words, the arrival of many triremes at Lampsacus, 
carrying thousands of men, did not drive up prices in the market there. 
 
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
 
63 See Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977) 305 n.6, 306 n.9 for explication of the Byzantines’ actions here. 
 
64 The Chalcedonians, owing money to a large number of mercenaries they were employing, exploited the 
right of reprisal (σῦλον). 
 




iv. The (supposed) evidence of Thucydides for profiteering in markets provided by 
traders and poleis to classical Greek military forces 
Finally, W. K. Pritchett also cited Thucydides 6.22 as evidence that soldiers and 
sailors on campaign were charged higher prices than usual for their food by poleis and 
traders.66  Pritchett stated that “a special rate [of pay] obtained [at Potidaea, as it did] later 
for those dispatched to Syracuse,” since “... as we are explicitly told about the expedition 
to Syracuse, trophe [sic] was going to be difficult to obtain and a higher rate [of pay] was 
in order [at Potidaea].”67  He later develops this point by asserting that the supposedly 
higher rate of pay “given on protracted overseas campaigns at Potidaea and Syracuse 
must reflect, in part, unusual conditions in procuring food when abroad.”68  By “unusual 
conditions,” Pritchett meant inflated prices in markets offered to soldiers and sailors, as 
can be seen by the references he cited to support his point:  Xen., Anab. 1.5.6; 3.2.21; and 
ps.-Aristotle, Oec. 2.2.7 1347a32-1347b2.69  Pritchett continued, “[s]uch conditions are 
implied in the speech of Nikias (Thucydides 6.22) in which he states that it will not be 
every city which can receive the expedition and continues:  τά τε ἄλλα ὅσον δυνατὸν 
                                                 
66 Pritchett (1971) 16, 23.  He is followed by Markle (1985) 277; Marinovic (1988) 168; Dalby (1992) 25 
n.66; and Rawlings (2007) 118, 170. 
 
67 (1971) 16. 
 
68 (1971) 23. 
 
69 (1971) 23-24 (at [1971] 23, Pritchett has Anab. 3.2.2 and [Aristotle] Oec. 2.2.7.1347a; that he is, 





ἑτοιµάσασθαι καὶ µὴ ἐπὶ ἑτέροις γίγνεσθαι, µάλιστα δὲ χρήµατα αὐτόθεν ὡς πλεῖστα 
ἔχειν.”70   
But Pritchett misread 6.22.  In this part of his speech to the assembly on the 
παρασκευή required for the Sicilian expedition, Nicias requested that the expedition bring 
its own grain from Athens in holkades, together with bakers requisitioned from the mills 
there, in order that, if the expedition was detained (on its voyage to and around Sicily) by 
bad weather, it might have provisions, “for it is not every city that will be able to receive 
a force as large as ours,” “(πολλὴ γὰρ οὖσα οὐ πάσης ἔσται πόλεως ὑποδέξασθαι).”  That 
is, Nicias did see a potential problem for the provisioning of the expedition because of its 
size (only on its voyage to and around Sicily, however)71—but he requested the dispatch 
of supply ships with the expedition to solve this problem, not money.     
Moreover, consideration of Nicias’ speech to the assembly as an entirety shows 
conclusively that he did not consider inflated prices in markets a possible difficulty for 
the expedition to Sicily.  At 6.22, Nicias outlines the special requirements in men and 
materiel necessary to meet the particular strengths of the Sicilian Greeks, which he had 
described at 6.20.3-4.  Thus, to counteract the hoplites of the Sicilian poleis, the 
Athenians would need to bring hoplites in large numbers; to neutralize the Sicilians’ 
superiority in cavalry, they would need to bring many archers and slingers.  The request 
for supply ships was one of two measures Nicias demanded to meet the Syracusan poleis’ 
                                                 
70 (1971) 23.  See also Cook (1990) 76 who states of the Sicilian expedition (without citing any ancient 
evidence) that “the Athenians were also concerned about the availability of provisions [for the expedition], 
and thus by implication about their cost.” 
 




advantage over the expedition from Athens in grain supplies:72  the other was for a great 
superiority in triremes, to provide security for the ships carrying grain to the expedition 
from nearby friendly states once it had established itself in Sicily (a request, incidentally, 
that demonstrates that Nicias took for granted the availability of provisions for the 
expedition once it had begun operations in Sicily).  Nicias’ final demand is that quoted by 
Pritchett above:  “[w]e must also provide ourselves with everything else as far as we can, 
so as not to be dependent on others”—and to counter the other major resource of the 
Sicilian Greeks (especially Selinus and Syracuse) he had mentioned at 6.20.4—“and 
above all we must take with us from home as much money as possible, as the sums talked 
of as ready at Egesta are readier, you may be sure, in talk than in any other way.”73  
Nicias thus explicitly and markedly separated off the problem of the required money for 
the force from his proposed solutions to the problems of acquiring sufficient grain for the 
force by including the issue of money under τά τε ἄλλα—all those other things apart 
from men, ships, and grain that the expedition would need to achieve success in Sicily.  
At 6.22, in other words, there is no connection made between availability or resources of 
grain and money (just as there is not in Nicias’ description of the resources of the Sicilian 
Greeks at 6.20.3-4):  they are treated as separate problems, to be dealt with in different 
ways.  There is therefore no evidence in Nicias’ speech that he considered unusually high 
prices in the markets in which the Athenians would be buying their provisions as a 
potential difficulty for the expedition to Sicily, and no suggestion in his demands that a 
                                                 
72 See chapter i section i for the rest of this paragraph. 
 
73 Crawley’s translation.  The Egestaeans had promised money for the expedition on its arrival in Sicily 
(6.6.2, 6.8.1-2), but Nicias had already voiced his suspicions about their ability to provide this money in his 




higher rate of pay would be necessary for the members of the expedition to make 
allowance for the problem of unusually high prices during the campaign.   
As for Potidaea, Pritchett also believed that an especially high rate of pay was 
given to the Athenian forces on campaign there and that this could be explained (by 
“reasonable inference”74 from the conditions on the expedition to Syracuse) by the high 
prices charged to Athenian soldiers and sailors for their food during the siege.  As I have 
just demonstrated, however, there is no evidence that the Athenian forces on the 
expedition to Sicily had to pay inflated prices for their food.  There is also no evidence 
that the Athenian forces at Potidaea received an especially high rate of pay.   
Pritchett’s view on this matter was based on C. F. Smith’s commentary on Thucy. 
3.17.3-4, which questioned the authenticity of this passage:75 
In section 3, after the sent. καὶ τὰ χρήµατα τοῦτο µάλιστα ὑπανήλωσε 
µετὰ Ποτειδαίας, the absence of any mention of the 4,000 hoplites and 3,000 
cavalry of Hagnon and Cleopompus (ii.58), can be explained only on a rather 
improbable assumption, unless the chapter be ascribed to an interpolator.  It must 
be assumed that the 4,000 hoplites were not δίδραχµοι, but received less pay, and 
that in explanation of the great expenses occasioned by Potidaea especial stress 
was laid upon the high pay of two of the armies fitted out for the recapture of the 
city. 
 
Following Smith’s line of reasoning here, Pritchett agreed that one could explain the lack 
of mention of the force under Hagnon and Cleopompus at Thucy. 3.17.3-4 and thus take 
this passage as genuine only by assuming that Hagnon’s and Cleopompus’s force was not 
paid at the same unusually high rate that the forces participating in the blockade of 
                                                 
74 (1971) 16. 
 
75 Quoted at Pritchett (1971) 15-16 (as Pritchett notes there, Smith’s comments are, for the most part, a 
translation of Steup’s commentary).  Note that the section of 3.17 after the clause in Greek quoted by Smith 




Potidaea were.76  Pritchett attributed this special rate of pay given to the hoplites 
participating in the siege of Potidaea to the difficulty of obtaining food there, i.e. to the 
high food prices being charged in the market in the Athenian camp at Potidaea.77  There 
is, however, another, much simpler explanation for the absence of a mention of Hagnon’s 
and Cleopompus’s force in Thucydides’ accounting of the expenses of the Potidaea 
campaign at 3.17.4:  the fact that it took only a minimal part in the operations at Potidaea 
and therefore did not contribute in any significant way to the huge expense of the siege of 
that city.  A brief overview of the campaign will establish this. 
At 3.17.3-4, Thucydides narrates that: 
καὶ τὰ χρήµατα τοῦτο µάλιστα ὑπανήλωσε µετὰ Ποτειδαίας. [4] τήν τε γὰρ 
Ποτείδαιαν δίδραχµοι ὁπλῖται ἐφρούρουν (αὑτῷ γὰρ καὶ ὑπηρέτῃ δραχµὴν 
ἐλάµβανε τῆς ἡµέρας), τρισχίλιοι µὲν οἱ πρῶτοι, ὧν οὐκ ἐλάσσους 
διεπολιόρκησαν, ἑξακόσιοι δὲ καὶ χίλιοι µετὰ Φορµίωνος, οἳ προαπῆλθον: νῆές τε 
αἱ πᾶσαι τὸν αὐτὸν µισθὸν ἔφερον, τὰ µὲν οὖν χρήµατα οὕτως ὑπανηλώθη τὸ 
πρῶτον, καὶ νῆες τοσαῦται δὴ πλεῖσται ἐπληρώθησαν.  
 
it was this [i.e. the great number of Athenian triremes on active service 
mentioned at 3.17.2], with Potidaea, that most exhausted her revenues—[4] 
Potidaea being blockaded by a force of hoplites (each drawing two drachmas a 
day, one for himself and another for his slave-attendant), which amounted to 
three thousand at first, and was kept at this number down to the end of the siege; 
beside sixteen hundred with Phormio who went away before it was over.78 
  
                                                 
76 (1971) 16.  For a cogent defense of the authenticity of Thucy. 3.17.4 and its placement at 3.17.4, based 
on an analysis of the passage’s function within the surrounding narrative context, see Kallet-Marx (1993) 
130-134, 150-151; cf. Hornblower, CT i.400-401. 
 
77 Pritchett did not actually state this in so many words, but that this is what he meant is clear from his 
discussion at (1971) 16, 23-24:  see again pp.281-282 above. 
 




The first three thousand hoplites, together with many allies of the Athenians, were 
sent to Potidaea in the summer of 432 (Thucy. 1.61.4 (cf. Thucy. 1.57.6, 1.61.1)).79  They 
succeeded in building a wall which shut off Potidaea from the rest of the Chalcidide, but 
were not enough in number both to garrison this first wall and simultaneously build 
another wall on the Pallene peninsula in order to completely enclose Potidaea with siege-
works (Thucy. 1.64.1).  Hence, later in the same summer, sixteen hundred hoplites, under 
the generalship of Phormio, were sent from Athens, who, after arriving at the Pallene 
peninsula and ravaging some of the country there (Thucy. 1.64.2), completed the wall 
shutting off Potidaea from the rest of the peninsula (Thucy. 1.64.3).  From this point on, 
Potidaea was fully under a siege “which was prosecuted vigorously on both sides of it as 
well as by sea, where a fleet blockaded it.”80  All of the ships blockading Potidaea drew 
the same pay, according to Thucydides (Thucy. 3.17.4), as the hoplites manning the 
siege-works—i.e., one drachma per day.81 
 When the investment of Potidaea was complete, Phormio took his troops and 
ravaged Chalcidide and Bottiaea (and captured some cities in these regions) (Thucy. 
1.65.3).  In the summer of 431, Thucydides narrates that Phormio joined forces with 
Perdiccas against the Chalcidians (Thucy. 2.29.6).  At 2.31.2, however, when Thucydides 
                                                 
79 Hornblower (CT i.402; cf. CT i.290)) has some unnecessary doubts, which he ultimately resolves 
himself, about Thucydides’ statement that the original three thousand men stayed throughout the siege. 
 
80 1.64.3:  “καὶ οὕτως ἤδη κατὰ κράτος ἡ Ποτείδαια ἀµφοτέρωθεν ἐπολιορκεῖτο καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ναυσὶν 
ἅµα ἐφορµούσαις.” 
 
81 3.17.3:  “νῆές τε αἱ πᾶσαι τὸν αὐτὸν µισθὸν ἔφερον.”  Commentators are unanimous in taking νῆές as 
metonymy for the sailors on the ships (see Loomis [1998] 39 n.28).  The ships mentioned at 3.17.4 should 
be taken to include both those that blockaded Potidaea as well as all of those mentioned by Thucydides at 




is enumerating the forces of the Athenians in the field in the autumn of 431, he only lists 
three thousand hoplites at Potidaea, which must be the original force of three thousand 
sent in 432 (Thucy. 1.61.4);82 while, at 2.58.2, describing the situation at Potidaea in the 
summer of 430, and particularly the effects of the plague among the Athenian forces 
stationed there, Thucydides states that Phormio and his sixteen hundred men were no 
longer in the Chalcidide and thus had escaped the plague.  We should therefore most 
probably assume, then,83 that Phormio and his men returned to Athens soon after the 
campaign in the summer of 431 described at 2.29.6 (and this is why Thucydides states at 
3.17.4 that they went away before the siege was over), and that Thucydides mentioned 
them at 2.58.2 only to distinguish them from the men exposed to the plague at Potidaea.84  
For in the summer of 430, Hagnon and Cleopompus had been sent from Athens with a 
force of four thousand hoplites, three hundred cavalry, and one hundred and fifty ships 
(Thucy. 2.56.2, 2.58.1) to Potidaea to help bring a quick end to the siege there (which, by 
this stage, had dragged on for two years).  But they brought the plague from Athens with 
them, so that it even broke out amongst the soldiers of the first expedition (Thucy. 2.58.2) 
(it is at this point that Thucydides mentions that Phormio and his men were no longer in 
the Chalcidide), so that Hagnon had to take his forces back to Athens, having lost one 
thousand and fifty out of his four thousand hoplites, after only forty days of campaigning 
                                                 
82 Gomme, HCT ii.93. 
 
83 Following Rhodes (1988) 215; see also Fantasia at (2003) 351 holding the same view. 
 




(Thucy. 2.58.3).  The original forces stayed on, continuing to man the siege until, finally, 
in the winter of 430/29, the Potidaeans surrendered (Thucy. 2.70). 
 In his description of the failed campaign of Hagnon (and Cleompompus), 
Thucydides twice contrasts their forces with the soldiers of the first expedition whom 
Thucydides specifies as “τοὺς προτέρους στρατιώτας” (2.58.2) and “οἱ δὲ πρότεροι 
στρατιῶται” (2.58.3).  These latter were the soldiers who had been prosecuting the siege 
since 432.85  They eventually spent two and a half years in all at Potidaea.  The fleet 
mentioned at Thucy. 1.64.3 presumably spent the same amount of time blockading 
Potidaea (see again 3.17.4).  Phormio and his men played a key role in completing the 
siege-works around the city and spent at least one year in the general area of operations.86  
If we return to 3.17.4, then, we can now see why Hagnon and Cleopompus’ forces are not 
mentioned there.  Contra Smith and Pritchett, the lack of mention of Hagnon and 
Cleopompus and the forces they commanded at 3.17.4 does not imply “that those who 
participated in the siege were the only ones who were paid at a rate higher than usual.”87  
They are not mentioned by Thucydides, rather, because they played such a very small 
role in the operations at Potidaea—they participated in the siege for only forty out of its 
nine hundred days or so—and therefore the amounts paid to them—in contradistinction to 
the pay given to the first three thousand hoplites sent to Potidaea in 432, the sixteen 
                                                 
85 I take this to be the natural reading of this phrase; Gomme, HCT ii.166 takes it only to be implied.  Cf. 
3.17.4 where the three thousand men sent out from Athens in 432 are referred to as “οἱ πρῶτοι.” 
 
86 See again pp.285-286.  Gomme, HCT ii.165 believed it possible that they could have stayed till the early 
summer of 430. 
 




hundred hoplites sent out under Phormio in that year, and the triremes which completed 
the blockade of the city by sea—contributed very little to the exhaustion of Athenian 
financial resources that is the focus of 3.17, and which the Potidaea campaign played a 
major role in bringing about.88  The fact that the force sent out from Athens in 430 under 
Hagnon and Cleopompus is not included in Thucydides’ reckoning up of the major 
expenses of the siege of Potidaea is therefore in no way an indication that the pay for any 
force employed during the siege was unusually high89 on account of unusually high 
prices in the camp market there90 (and therefore we do not, contra Pritchett and Smith, 
have to postulate these higher prices and pay to ‘save’ the authenticity of 3.17). 91 
                                                 
88 See already Gomme, HCT ii.275 on 3.17.4:  “[e]dd. note that no mention is made of Hagnon’s force of 
4,000 hoplites and 300 cavalry (2.56.2, 2.58.1) that made the unsuccessful attempt to take Poteidaia by 
storm.  This was a short campaign and hardly counted as part of the siege of Poteidaia.”  But detailed 
argumentation for this point has been necessary here since all recent work has followed the later work of 
Pritchett and his assumption that no mention is made of Hagnon’s force at 3.17.4 because it was paid at a 
lower rate than the original forces sent out to Potidaea.  (In addition, Gomme, in his treatment of 3.17.4, 
assumed that the rate of pay for the hoplites there was especially high, though not for the same reason at 
Pritchett:  see n.91 just below.) 
 
89 Gallo (1987) 38:  “il carattere eccezionale della spesa in questione non è determinato della paga in sé, ma 
dall’impiego contemporaneo di un gran numero di uomini e di navi e dalla durata insolita delle operazioni 
militari:  il pagamento di 1 dracma a tanti soldati e marinai per un periodo eccessivamente lungo costituisce 
quindi la causa del dissesto finanziario messo in rilievo da Tucidide.”  See also chapter 5 section ii:  it can 
be demonstrated that the one drachma per hoplite rate was the standard rate of pay for Athenian hoplites in 
the Peloponnesian War before 412 and therefore the mention of this rate at 3.17.4 therefore does not have 
to be explained away as special or unusual. 
 
90 Note that there is a major problem in the logic of Pritchett’s argument that Hagnon’s and Cleopompus’ 
force were paid at a lower rate than the original forces sent out to Potidaea:  there is no reason (and none 
given by Pritchett) why the forces under Hagnon and Cleopompus should not have faced the same 
supposed difficulties in obtaining food at Potidaea, i.e. the same supposedly high prices charged in the 
market for the besiegers, as the original force sent out; therefore, following Pritchett’s logic, the forces sent 
out in the summer of 430 should have been paid at the same rate as the original force to take account of the 
unchanged conditions at Potidaea, and therefore should have been mentioned by Thucydides at 3.17.4 
(where they are not, of course). 
 
91 Cook ([1990] 80) agreed with Pritchett that “there were special hardships and difficulty in obtaining food 
at Potidaia” (although she thought that the rate of pay given for this campaign was not unusually high but 
comparable to that given on other Athenian amphibious expeditions).  Cf. Gomme, HCT ii.275:  the two 




The consensus view, deeply embedded in modern scholarship, that classical 
Greek soldiers and sailors were often or always the victims of profiteering by traders and 
poleis has, then, no ancient evidence to support it.  Previous treatments holding this view 
of military markets have been marked by several methodological errors:  the use of 
passages from literary sources as evidence without considering their immediate narrative 
contexts or the generic demands of the works from which they are taken; the failure to 
remember that both the provisioning of Greek military forces and food prices are 
normally mentioned in ancient literary texts only in extraordinary circumstances; the 
failure to place classical Greek military markets within a comparative context; and, 
finally, the failure to operationalize the view of regular exploitation of Greek military 
forces in markets (i.e., there has been a failure by adherents to this position to ask the 
question of why military markets would have been used by classical Greek states to 
                                                                                                                                                 
experienced by the Athenian forces besieging Potidaea.  The conditions facing the Athenians undertaking 
the siege of Potidaia do seem to have been particularly harsh:  see Pl., Symp. 220a-d and esp. Thucy. 2.70.2 
(the only indication of the hardships of the siege in Thucydides’ description of it):  “οἱ δὲ προσεδέξαντο, 
ὁρῶντες µὲν τῆς στρατιᾶς τὴν ταλαιπωρίαν ἐν χωρίῳ χειµερινῷ, ἀνηλωκυίας δὲ ἤδη τῆς πόλεως δισχίλια 
τάλαντα ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν,” “[the generals] accepted [the proposals of the Potidaeans for surrender], 
seeing the sufferings of the army in so exposed a position; besides which the state had already spent two 
thousand talents upon the siege.”  (Crawley’s translation.)  Note here, however, that the use of “µὲν” and 
“δὲ” here distinguishes between the two different reasons for the Athenian generals’ acceptance of the 
Potidaeans’ proposals:  that is, the fact of the especially harsh conditions facing the men is not related to the 
expense of the siege; on the contrary, it is, in fact, differentiated from the expense of the siege as a reason 
for the Athenians’ acceptance of the Potidaean proposals.  Strauss ([2007] 244), discussing the provisioning 
of classical Greek sieges, states that “[b]esiegers had to feed themselves by raiding the countryside and by 
establishing markets to attract traders.  They weren’t always successful, however, and some besiegers 
suffered shortages of food or water.  Alcibiades... referring to [the siege of] Potidaea, refers to times when 
supplies were abundant and other times when the soldiers were forced to go without food (Pl. Symp. 
219e).”  But Alcibiades at Pl., Symp. 219e-220a does not refer to general shortages of food and difficulties 
in obtaining food for the Athenians and the campaign around Potidaea.  Rather, he states that at some 
points in the campaign, a part of the army (including his and Socrates’ sussitia) was cut off from the main 
base of operations and therefore did not have access to supplies:  “ὁπότ’ ἀγαψκασθείηµεν ἀποληφθέντες 
που, οἷα δὴ ἐπὶ στρατείας, ἀσιτεῖν...,” “whenever we were cut off in some place and were compelled, as 
often in campaigns, to go without food...”  To repeat, there is no reason to think that special hardships or 




provision their forces if those markets were characterized by opportunistic gouging and 
thus allocated provisions extremely inefficiently).  None of these criticisms (or the 
detailed deconstructions of previous views in the body of this chapter) should be taken to 
imply or suggest, however, that there were never high prices in markets provided for 
classical Greek armies and navies.  Rather, my intention in this chapter has been to clear 
the ground for a new examination of the behavior and administration of military markets, 
one that will consider the markets provided for classical Greek military forces within 
their proper context—the conventions and institutions that governed the exchange of 
goods in the classical Greek world, and the conditions of production and distribution in 
that world—taking care to allow for the differing interpretative demands of the available 
ancient literary, epigraphical and numismatic evidence, and using comparative evidence 
on military markets in order to gain insights into how the markets that provisioned ten of 




Chapter 5:  Military Markets:  Previous Approaches (II) 
 
i. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that there was no basis for Pritchett’s 
argument that inflated prices were charged by traders and cities to the soldiers and sailors 
on the Athenian campaigns in Sicily and at Potidaea.  Pritchett made this argument to 
support a larger hypothesis about the rate of pay for Athenian hoplites and sailors in the 
late fifth century, which can be summarized as follows.1  Pritchett noted (correctly) that 
Thucydides used the terms µισθός and τροφή synonymously for payments to soldiers and 
sailors.2  He concluded from this that, in the fifth century at least, µισθός and τροφή were 
meant for the purchase of rations only:  “[j]ust as dikastic pay was for maintenance, so 
the stratiotic pay made to citizens in the fifth century was for purchase of rations.”3  This 
conclusion—or rather, assumption—provided the grounds for the next step in Pritchett’s 
hypothesis:  since dikasts (from 425) received a µισθός for their service of three obols per 
day for their maintenance, soldiers should have needed no more for their daily 
maintenance;4 thus—and this was the climax of the argument—the customary daily rate 
of pay in the late fifth century for Athenian forces, from which men on campaign had to 
                                                 
1 See also Loomis (1998) 56 for a summation of Pritchett’s argument. 
 
2 (1971) 3-6, esp. 4-5 for argument and examples; and see Loomis (1998) 33 n.6 for additional instances in 
Thucydides of µισθός and τροφή referring to the same payment.  See chapter 6 section ix for the reasons for 
the synonymity of µισθός and τροφή in the fifth and fourth centuries. 
 
3 (1971) 6 (Cook ([1990] 78) follows Pritchett expressly on this point).  See Pritchett (1971) 27 (cf. [1971] 
40):  “[i]n military economics, the concept of any pay except for sustenance was primarily a development 
of the period after the Peloponnesian War and of mercenary service.” 
 




buy their food, was three obols.5  To defend these claims, Pritchett had to explain away 
the several mentions in Thucydides of a rate of pay of one drachma a day to Athenian 
soldiers and sailors during the Peloponnesian War—Thucydides records this rate eight 
times, as opposed to just one report of a rate of three obols per day6—since this was an 
amount that was twice what dikasts received in Athens in the same years for their daily 
maintenance.7  Pritchett attempted to do this by asserting that the higher rate of one 
drachma per day was necessary because of the exceptional circumstances of some 
overseas expeditions.8  To repeat myself, there is no evidence for the exceptional 
circumstances he cites in support of his assertion, and, therefore, the claims this assertion 
itself supports, that payments to Athenian military forces in the fifth century were meant 
solely for rations and that those payments were normally three obols per day have no 
foundation in the passages from Thucydides cited by Pritchett.9   
                                                 
5 (1971) 16-17. 
 
6 Loomis (1998) 56. 
 
7 See Loomis (1998) 16-17 for sources for dikast’s pay in Athens in the late fifth century; cf. Rhodes 
(1981) 338-340.  A complicating factor for Pritchett’s argument—and one that he does not mention—is 
that dikast-pay was meant not just for the dikast, but for his family as well.  Cf. Markle (1985) 277, and see 
esp. Aristoph., Wasps 300-301 (cf. 606ff.): out of a pittance a member of the chorus has to get a meal for a 
family of three:  “ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦδέ µε τοῦ µισθαρίου / τρίτον αὐτὸν ἔχειν ἄλφιτα δεῖ καὶ ξύλα κὤψον.” 
 
8 (1971) 23:  “[o]ur study of the vocabulary has shown that, just as members of the juries were given a 
maintenance allowance of two obols a day, revised in 425 B.C. to three, both termed misthos, so the 
misthos introduced, presumably, by Perikles for soldiers must have been primarily for rations and could be 
called trophe or sitos.  The higher stratiotic pay given on protracted overseas campaigns at Poteidaia and 
Syrakuse must reflect, in part, unusual condition in procuring food when abroad.”  Cf. (1971) 24. 
 
9 See below p.319, pp.322-323 for further criticism of Pritchett’s arguments for a three obol (as opposed to 
one drachma) per day per man rate as standard for Athenian sailors and soldiers before 412.  In addition, it 
should be noted that Pritchett seems to contradict himself later in his work, in a section on the amount of 
siteresion given to military forces in “the period after the fifth century,” where he states ([1971] 51) that 
“[t]he instances where an explicit sum of money is proposed for a soldier’s rations are surprisingly few.  
The references to sitos in Thucydides 5.47.6 and to trophe in 8.29 have been shown in the preceding 
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Loomis, in his study of payments to soldiers and sailors in classical Athens, made 
several effective criticisms of Pritchett’s work on pay.10  Loomis agreed with Pritchett 
that µισθός and τροφή were synonymous in Thucydides but came to a different 
conclusion from this observation:  for Loomis, both represented “gross pay,” i.e. ration-
money plus pay.11  Loomis cited three points in support of his conclusion, and against 
Pritchett.  Firstly, he pointed out that there is no affirmative reason why µισθός/τροφή 
should be ration-money alone.12  Secondly, Thucydides’ use of the word µισθός for 
mercenary pay implied that µισθός was for more than just ration-money, since 
mercenaries were unlikely to serve merely for subsistence.  Thirdly, since other payments 
for daily maintenance in Athens ranged from one from to three obols, then µισθός or 
τροφή of one drachma must have covered and exceeded the daily cost of rations.  Against 
Pritchett’s argument that food costs may have been higher in Potidaea or Sicily, Loomis 
argued that:  “[t]hat is possible, but the opposite is at least as likely:  in the countryside, 
                                                                                                                                                 
chapter to have to do with misthos at a time when only one type of payment was made, that for composite 
pay.”  But, as I have demonstrated, Pritchett had argued earlier in his work that these payments of σῖτος and 
τροφή (as well as other payments of τροφή and µισθός in Thucydides) were for the purchase solely of 
rations, and not for rations and pay.  There is, at the very least, confusion here, if not outright self-
contradiction. 
 
10 (1998) 33-36, 55-56. 
 
11 “Gross pay” quoted from (1998) 34. 
 
12 (1998) 34:  “[w]ithout actually saying so, Pritchett seemed to assume that τροφή was the ancestor of 
σιτηρέσιον, i.e., he seemed intuitively to give weight to its narrower meaning of “food” rather than to its 
broader meaning of “means of support,” but this is not necessary and indeed, given the fact that τροφή is 




closer to the source of supply (e.g., in Sicily), food might have been cheaper than in the 
city.”13  
 Kallet, in a study of the usage of µισθός and τροφή in book 8 of Thucydides,14 in 
which she argued that Thucydides used trophe in a restricted sense, “as a kind of 
subcategory of misthos,”15 in order to characterize the “hand-to-mouth existence” of the 
Spartans in book 8,16 countered Loomis’ arguments against Pritchett.17  She accepted 
Loomis’ point about µισθός and mercenary pay as valid, “though it is not clear that, while 
[it is] a reasonable assumption, [it] is a necessary one.”18  As for the point that pay of one 
drachma must have exceeded the daily cost of maintenance, Kallet argued that “we 
                                                 
13 (1998) 35-36.  Loomis does not examine the texts (i.e. 3.17.3-4, 6.22) on which Pritchett’s arguments for 
higher prices are based or the detail of Pritchett’s arguments. 
 
14 (2001) 295-308. 
 
15 (2001) 299; cf. (2001) 300:  “[a]lthough the terms do not always conform to precise distinctions, the 
terminology as used in book 8 (as elsewhere in the History) leans toward a typology in which misthos is a 
term for fuller pay than is suggested by trophe...”  To criticise this point literally, at 8.29.1, τροφή is 
distributed at the rate of one drachma per man per day, as high a rate as µισθός is ever paid at.  And when 
the issue of “full pay” is brought up later in the book, the terms µισθός, µισθοφορά, and τροφή are used 
interchangeably by Thucydides to refer to the same payment(s):  8.45.6 (“ἐντελῆ... τὸν µισθὸν” (only to be 
paid by Tissaphernes on receipt of τροφὴ from the King (8.45.6)), 8.50.3 (“τῆς µισθοφορᾶς... ἐντελοῦς”), 
8.78 (“τροφὴν... ἐντελῆ”), 8.83.3 (“µισθὸν ἐντελῆ”).  There is thus no reason to see τροφή as a form of 
lesser pay than µισθός (cf. Hornblower (CT iii.771) thinking that the distinction made by Kallet between 
these two terms seeming “strained”). 
 
16 (2001) 298. 
 
17 Kallet states ([2001] 296), as a justification for taking up this subject again, that “[t]he very fact that 
Pritchett and Loomis, while agreeing on the synonymity of trophe and misthos, arrive at opposite 
conclusions about their meaning, should alert us to the problematic nature of the evidence of Thucydides, 
and the difficulty of forcing his terminology into strict synonyms with a consistent meaning, whether 
‘ration-money’ or ‘full pay’.”  But this is a non sequitur:  it simply may be the case that either Pritchett’s or 
Loomis’s treatment of this subject is incorrect (or that both are); furthermore, as shown above and below, 
Pritchett’s treatment can be demonstrated to be certainly incorrect, and Loomis’ to be certainly right. 
 




cannot be certain that the procurement of food in the field was not more expensive, 
requiring a higher monetary allotment”19 and that Loomis’ response to Pritchett that food 
should have been in fact cheaper at Potidaea and Syracuse did not seem to her “to carry 
the necessary weight, since one could easily imagine that the market value may have 
increased prices given the necessity of the demand.”20 
Both Loomis and Kallet’s analyses of the price-setting mechanisms in markets 
provided to Athenian military forces are unsophisticated, to say the least, but at this point 
I will set aside detailed discussion of the factors that actually would have determined 
prices in markets provided to classical Greek military forces (e.g. local conditions of 
production and distribution, transport costs, demography, social and political institutions) 
until chapter 7.  What I want to do here is to focus on the fact that, although Loomis 
disagreed with Pritchett’s hypothesis, and Kallet was agnostic, both accepted the logic of 
the fundamental premise of Pritchett’s argument that the prices expected in the markets 
provided for classical Greek sailors and soldiers on campaign could determine the 
amounts paid to soldiers and sailors by their poleis and other employers.21  Other scholars 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
 
20 (2001) 296 n.4:  importantly, her objections to Loomis meant that she could not accept one drachma per 
day as a standard rate of pay for Athenian sailors and soldiers in the Peloponnesian War:  see (2001) 53 and 
below p.332 nn.110-111.  Kallet also argued that Thucydides’ usage of trophe in 1.11 provides an obstacle 
to Loomis’ position that Thucydides consistently used trophe to refer to daily rations plus pay, “for in that 
passage, the analysis of the Trojan expedition, the idea that more than ‘money’ for rations is at issue strains 
reason.”  Since, however, Thucydides is clearly using trophe to refer to food at 1.11, and it is clear from the 
context that he is doing so (as it is at 1.2.2, 1.5.1, 4.6.1, 6.34.4), as it is clear that he is using trophe to refer 
to pay in all the passages that Loomis cites to support his conclusions, there is no confusion at 1.11 and 
thus this passage presents no potential obstacle to Loomis’ conclusions. 
 
21 See also section iv for other instances of this premise underlying Loomis’ treatment of Athenian military 




who have written on the rates of pay given to military forces in the Peloponnesian war 
have worked on or accepted the same premise.22  Amit posited that a rise in Athenian pay 
from three obols before the war to one drachma per day during the war23 may have been 
“explained by the general rise in prices caused by the war, and the need of incentive to 
attract larger number of sailors, including foreigners.”24  Marinovic accepted Pritchett’s 
arguments for rises in pay based on inflated prices for foodstuffs in markets provided to 
soldiers and sailors on campaign,25 and, recently, Rawlings also explicitly followed 
Pritchett in stating that “[h]igher than usual costs for supplies might explain the high rates 
of pay offered on some expeditions.”26   
If the view that classical Greek rates of military pay were determined by the 
prices expected to be found on campaign by sailors and soldiers were correct—unlikely 
                                                 
22 This is also presumably what Gomme was referring to when he wrote that the two drachmas per day 
given at Potidaea was a special rate of pay, and that the one drachma per day given to those embarking on 
the Sicilian expedition (Thucy. 6.31.3) and to the Thracian peltasts hired to fight in Sicily (but who never 
left Athens:  see section ii below) (Thucy. 7.27.2) were special cases:  HCT ii.275-276 (though he refers 
there to the rate of pay given to the soldiers who manned the siege at Potidaea as “special ‘hardship’ 
money,” by which he is probably referring to the conditions in which the men had to serve:  see Thucy. 
2.70.2 and pp.288-289 n.91).  Gomme believed that three obols per day per man was the normal rate of pay 
for Athenian hoplites and sailors in the Peloponnesian war (and before: HCT ii.42) and therefore, like 
Pritchett, had to explain away any rate attested above this as ‘special.’ 
 
23 This is highly unlikely:  see the discussion at section iv below. 
 
24 (1965) 51. 
 
25 (1988) 168. 
 
26 (2007) 118.  Cf. (ibid.) 170:  “it is also possible that, at least on some occasions, higher rates [of pay] 
reflected the expected price of supplies on campaign.”  In addition, all those scholars who have cited 
Pritchett’s work on pay as support for their positions on the normal rates of pay for Athenian military 
forces during the Peloponnesian war may also be taken as implicitly endorsing his view that rates of pay for 
those forces were determined by the prices they found in the markets provided to them by poleis and 
traders:  see, e.g., Étienne and Roesch (1978) 372; Kallet-Marx (1993) 10 n.29, 120 n.30, 133 n.64; Samons 




as this may seem, given that I have demonstrated (contra Pritchett) that there is no 
evidence that this did happen on the Potidaean and Sicilian expeditions—then particular 
rates of pay could tell us about the conditions in markets provided to sailors and soldiers 
campaigning in particular areas of operations.  Working on the same premise as Pritchett, 
Loomis, and Kallet, we might hope to recover data about the robustness and flexibility of 
military markets—and markets in grain (and other foods) generally—in specific regions 
of the classical Greek world in specific periods.  With these potential insights in mind, 
then, I will investigate in this chapter whether there is any basis for the view that classical 
Greek poleis (or other employers of Greek military forces) were motivated by expected 
prices in military markets when they decided how much they were going to pay their 
soldiers and sailors for particular campaigns.  I will first confirm that the one drachma per 
man per day rate attested several times for Athenian military forces during the 
Peloponnesian war (and before) was not a specially high rate of pay set in response to 
high food prices.  I will then show that those passages from Thucydides, Xenophon, 
Demosthenes, and Diodorus Siculus that do provide us with evidence for the factors that 
influenced poleis and other employers of classical Greek military forces in setting rates of 
pay for these forces do not support the position that they were set with expected 
commodity prices in mind.  I will follow this by demonstrating that the presence of 
standardized and conventional rates of pay for Greek armies and navies in ‘mainland’ 
Greece and the eastern Mediterranean generally in the fifth and fourth centuries argues 
very strongly against the idea that military rates of pay fluctuated as a result of changing 
market conditions—demonstrating this will necessitate a thorough investigation of 
Athenian rates of pay before 412.  Finally, I will conclude by considering what the rates 
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of pay given to classical Greek soldiers and sailors can, in fact, tell us about the normal 
behavior of military markets in the Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries. 
 
 ii. The one drachma rate paid to Athenian military forces on campaigns abroad 
and in or around Attica during the Peloponnesian War 
 Again, as I have demonstrated, there is no foundation for Pritchett’s arguments 
that the one drachma rate paid to the soldiers and sailors on the Potidaean campaign, and 
to the trireme crews on the Sicilian expedition, was set by the Athenian state in the 
expectation that these men would find high prices in the markets they shopped in during 
these campaigns.  We can, in fact, go further than this, and adduce explicit evidence from 
Thucydides that the one drachma rate was not paid as a result of special conditions (in 
markets) on campaigns.  Firstly, Thucydides at 3.17.4 states that one drachma per day 
was not only being paid to the hoplites and trireme crews at Potidaea, but to all the 
triremes he had mentioned at 3.17.2,27 one hundred of which were sailing around the 
Peloponnese, and another hundred guarding Attica, Euboea, and Salamis (at the same 
time as the siege of Potidaea).  Since this rate was being paid to ships operating in and 
around Attica, as well as to forces operating around the Peloponnese and at Potidaea, it 
cannot have been determined by the expected exigencies of campaigning abroad.28  
                                                 
27 See again Andrewes, HCT v.97. 
 
28 See already Gallo (1987) 38 n.51 (arguing against Gomme’s view that hoplite pay on the Potidaean 
campaign was paid at a specially high rate as compensation for the “special hardships” of the campaign):  
“[p]artendo dal suo presupposto di un carattere eccezionale della paga di 1 dracma, legata, a suo parere, alle 
particolari condizioni determinate dall’assedio di Potidea, il Gomme, di conseguenza, non riusciva a 
spiegarsi perché tale paga fosse versata, secondo quanto dice Tucidide, ai marinai di tutte le nave ateniesi, e 
finiva perciò per considerare questo elemento come una delle non poche difficoltà offerte dal passo (276):  




Analysis of a second passage from Thucydides can help us to make the same 
point.  In the summer of 413, thirteen hundred Thracian peltasts arrived in Athens in 
order to sail with Demosthenes to Sicily to reinforce the Athenian expedition there 
(7.27.1).  Having reached Athens too late to join with Demosthenes, the Athenians 
decided to send the Thracians home, as they were receiving a drachma per day, and 
therefore to continue paying to employ them seemed too expensive (“πολυτελὲς”) in light 
of the Decelean War (7.27.2).29  As Loomis points out, Thucydides’ use of the imperfect 
(“ἐλάµβανεν”) to describe the Thracians’ receipt of their pay shows that each of them had 
been actually drawing the one drachma per day during their stay in Athens.30  Since the 
peltasts were actually being paid one drachma per day in Athens (and were presumably to 
keep drawing the same rate in Sicily), this rate cannot have been caused by expected high 
prices while campaigning abroad.31   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
29 Thucy. 7.27.2:  “οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ὕστερον ἧκον, διενοοῦντο αὐτοὺς πάλιν ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐς Θρᾴκην 
ἀποπέµπειν.  τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς ∆εκελείας πόλεµον αὐτοὺς πολυτελὲς ἐφαίνετο· δραχµὴν γὰρ τῆς 
ἡµέρας ἕκαστος ἐλάµβανεν” (“[s]ince they had come too late, the Athenians determined to send them back 
to Thrace, from where they had come; to keep them, in view of the Deceleian war, seemed too expensive, 
for each of them was being paid a drachma a day).”  See Hornblower, CT iii.589 (with n.31 below) for the 
translation of the second sentence quoted here. 
 
30 (1998) 44 (contra Marinovic ([1987] 168) who believed they were sent home before receiving any pay in 
Athens). 
 
31 Again, see already Gallo (1987) 40 (explicitly contra Pritchett [1971] 23)—although Gallo was incorrect 
to take Thucy. 7.27.2 to mean that the Athenians were thinking of using them for military operations in the 
Decelean war.  Thucydides at 7.27.2 states, rather, that the Thracian peltasts were considered too expensive 
because of (and not for) the Decelean campaign: see Hornblower’s (CT iii.589, following Classen/Steup ad 
loc.) translation of Thucy. 7.27.2, “τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς ∆εκελείας πόλεµον πολυτελὲς ἐφαίνετο”:  
“‘it seemed too expensive to retain them, in view of the war from Dekeleia’.”  As Hornblower remarks 
(ibid.), “Th. is introducing the Dekeleia theme as the explanation for the financially straitened state in 
which the Athenians now were; he is not stating a contemplated alternative use to which the Thracians 




There is, then, no reason to think that the one drachma rate was paid to Athenian 
military forces to compensate for higher than usual food costs on campaign.32  Therefore 
other factors and motives must have played the determining role in setting rates of pay 
for Athenian forces in the mid to late fifth century.   
 
iii. Reasons attested in contemporary and later sources for changes in rates of 
pay of classical Greek military forces 
To put it succinctly:  it was the funds available to or possessed by Athens and 
other military employers of classical Greek sailors and soldiers that determined how 
much they paid them.  This can be demonstrated by analysis of several passages from 
several different (contemporary and later) authors treating the subject of military pay.   
In the Ionian war, during which tens of thousands of men fought on the Athenian 
and Peloponnesian sides in the eastern Aegean for several years continuously, finding 
pay for those men became a central and determining factor in the outcome of the war.  
This is reflected in the attention given to military pay in the last book of Thucydides, and 
especially to the attention he gives to the subsidies provided by the Persians to the 
Peloponnesians for this purpose:  in particular, the fact that negotiations and disputes 
about rates of pay played a critical role (for Thucydides) in determining the nature of the 
relationship between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians in the first years of the Ionian 
war, and thus critically affected the course of the early years of the war, means that 
                                                 
32 For further discussion and a demonstration that the one drachma per man per day rate was the usual rate 




Thucydides’ narrative of these years gives us an unusually large amount of information 
about the factors that determined rates of pay in the classical Greek world. 
Thus, in the winter of 412/11, Tissaphernes came to Miletus to distribute, as he 
had promised the Peloponnesians previously at Sparta that he would do,33 a month’s pay 
at the rate of an Attic drachma per man per day; for the future, however, he proposed to 
give only three obols until he should ask the King; and if the King so ordered, he would 
give the full drachma (“ἐντελῆ τὴν δραχµήν”) (Thucy. 8.29.1).  Hermocrates the 
Syracusan objected on behalf of the Peloponnesian sailors to this proposed cut in pay, 
and in response to this objection, an agreement was made whereby the sailors would 
receive for the future a little over three obols (rather than three obols) in the future 
(8.29.2).34  These negotiations, then, provide explicit evidence for the reasons behind a 
possible change in a rate of pay to a classical Greek force:  the possible change in pay 
from three obols per day back to one drachma is linked explicitly to the availability of 
money to fund this change or, to put it more precisely, to whether the King wished that 
more funds should be released for pay for the Peloponnesian sailors.  Thus, we have 
explicit evidence for a proposed rate of pay that is contingent on availability of funds, and 
not on commodity prices.  Also, it should be noted that the rate of pay for the sailors rose 
from three obols per day to just over three obols per day not because of any rise in the 
price of grain or other goods, but because of negotiations between a representative of the 
sailors and their employer.  
                                                 
33 Thucy. 8.5.5:  though no rate of pay is specified there, it is likely that the rate agreed at Sparta was one 
drachma per day (Lewis [1977] 88 n.29). 
 
34 See Hornblower, CT iii.836-838 for discussion of the exact amount over three obols the Peloponnesian 




Later, in the same winter of 412/11, the pay for the Peloponnesian triremes was 
cut down from one Attic drachma to three obols, when Alcibiades, having fled from the 
Peloponnesians out of fear for his life, found refuge with Tissaphernes and then decided 
to damage the Peloponnesian cause as much as he could (Thucy. 8.45.1).  Alcibiades did 
this primarily by recommending to Tissaphernes that he lower the rate of pay given to the 
Peloponnesians:  thus, 
... καὶ διδάσκαλος πάντων γιγνόµενος τήν τε µισθοφορὰν ξυνέτεµεν, ἀντὶ 
δραχµῆς Ἀττικῆς ὥστε τριώβολον, καὶ τοῦτο µὴ ξυνεχῶς, δίδοσθαι, λέγειν 
κελεύων τὸν Τισσαφέρνη πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου 
ἐπιστήµονες ὄντες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν, οὐ τοσοῦτον 
πενίᾳ ὅσον ἵνα αὐτῶν µὴ οἱ ναῦται ἐκ περιουσίας ὑβρίζοντες, οἱ µὲν τὰ σώµατα 
χείρω ἔχωσι δαπανῶντες ἐς τοιαῦτα ἀφ’ ὧν ἡ ἀσθένεια ξυµβαίνει, οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς 
ἀπολείπωσιν οὐχ ὑπολιπόντες ἐς ὁµηρείαν τὸν προσοφειλόµενον µισθόν. 
 
... becoming [Tissaphernes’] adviser in everything, [Alcibiades] cut down the pay 
from an Attic drachma to three obols a day, and even this not paid too regularly; 
and told Tissaphernes to say to the Peloponnesians that the Athenians, whose 
maritime experience was of an older date than their own, only gave their men 
three obols, not so much from poverty as to prevent their seamen being corrupted 
by being too well off, and spoiling their fitness by spending money upon 
enervating indulgences, and also paid their crews irregularly in order to have a 
security against their deserting in the arrears which they would leave behind 
them. (8.45.2)35 
 
This passage again gives us explicit evidence for the reasons behind the pay rates 
of Greek sailors in the Peloponnesian War.  Westlake showed that in clauses of the type 
introduced by “οὐ τοσοῦτον... ὅσον,” οὐ τοσοῦτον does not entirely negate what follows; 
rather, the formulation “οὐ τοσοῦτον... ὅσον” emphasizes the second consideration at the 
expense of the first.36  Thus, the poverty of the Athenians (i.e. the lack of funds available 
to them to pay their sailors) is given by Alcibiades as a legitimate reason for the pay rate 
                                                 
35 8.45.2:  ”  I do not take 8.45.2 to be a doublet of 8.29:  see chapter 6 section iii.  See also chapter 6 
section iii for full discussion of the textual problems in this passage, and the evidence it provides for the 
official distribution of pay in late fifth century Athens. 
 




of three obols per day given to their sailors.  If both of the considerations (and especially 
the second)37 that Alcibiades told Tissaphernes to raise when telling the Peloponnesians 
of his decision to give less pay (and that irregularly) are clearly pretexts, presented in a 
“highly tendentious” context,38 that does not mean that we cannot use them as evidence 
for Greek thought on pay in the late fifth century, as although “[i]t is not of course 
necessary that the information supplied here by Alcibiades should be in all respects 
correct... it must [however] be plausible enough for Tissaphernes to be able to base his 
argument on it. ”39  In other words, at Thucy. 8.45.2, a scarcity of funds emerges as a 
reason the Athenians reduced the rate of pay received by their sailors.  
Alcibiades continued in his policy of harming the Peloponnesian cause by 
dismissing the poleis now allied to the Peloponnesians who had come to Tissaphernes to 
ask for money for the war (Thucy. 8.45.4).  Just as with the Peloponnesian fleet, 
                                                 
37 See Loomis (1998) 44 n.47:  “Alcibiades did not want Tissaphernes to say that the Athenians could not 
afford more, since Tissaphernes clearly could—hence the moral motive.”  Cf. Gallo (1987) 43 n.63. 
 
38 Hornblower, CT iii.887. 
 
39 Andrewes, HCT v.99.  Kallet ([2001] 261-262) describes the explanation to be given by Tissaphernes as 
a “sham,” and that this episode confirms Spartan ignorance about naval financing.  But the fact that the 
Spartans needed “an explanation for a certain rate of pay over another and why it should be paid 
irregularly” does not show ignorance:  it is entirely to be expected given that the Peloponnesians and 
Tissaphernes had agreed, shortly before Alcibiades’ machinations, pay terms that were more advantageous 
(see 8.29.1-2, with 8.36.1) than those now offered by Tissaphernes.  And, again contra Kallet, the “sham 
nature of the explanation” (and the impression of Spartan ignorance) is not necessarily confirmed by the 
fact that Alcibiades told Tissaphernes to bribe the trierarchs and generals of the fleet (8.45.3)—many of 
whom had served under the Athenians—so as to get them to accept the reduced rate of pay for their sailors, 
since they would see through the moral explanation.  This move of Alcibiades can be sufficiently—and 
more satisfactorily than Kallet’s attempt—explained by the need to dampen any opposition from the 
leaders of the fleet to the move by Tissaphernes to cut the pay of the sailors, opposition that could have 
been expected otherwise (see already 8.29.1-2, and see also 8.50.3, 8.57.1-2, 8.78, 8.80.1, 8.83.2-8.84.1 for 
dissatisfaction in the Peloponnesian fleet in response to the policy of Tissaphernes as outlined at 8.45.2).  
Cf. the scholia [Mvc2] on 8.45.3:  “ὥστε δόντα χρήµατα αὐτὸν πεῖσαι:  ἔπειθεν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης τὸν 
Τισσαφέρνην δοῦναι χρήµατα τοῖς τριηράρχοις τῶν Πελοποννησίων, ἵνα ξυγχωρήσωσιν αὐτῷ ἀντὶ τῆς 




Alcibiades had to come up with justifications for refusing money to the cities (which had 
recently revolted from Athens):  among other considerations for refusing to give them the 
money, Alcibiades “also pointed out that Tissaphernes was at present carrying on the war 
at his own expense, and had good cause for economy, but that as soon as he received 
remittances from the King he would give them their pay in full, and do what was 
reasonable for the cities.”40  The rate of pay given by Tissaphernes to the Peloponnesians 
is thus linked to frugality on his part (rather than to any sort of notion of price).  This 
provides us with a third instance (in addition to 8.29.1 and 8.45.2) from the last book of 
Thucydides where availability of funds—and no other reason—is given as the reason for 
the establishment of a rate of military pay.  If it is here given only as a pretext, like any 
other reason given as a pretext, it relied on convention, accepted ideas of how the world 
worked, and probability, and therefore can still serve for us as evidence for what Greeks 
thought were the causes for the setting of rates of pay. 
Explicit evidence for Athenian rates of pay being determined by the state of 
public finances comes from Thucydides’ description of Athenian political intrigues in the 
following summer.  After the Athenians on Samos had recalled Alcibiades (Thucy. 
8.81.1), some envoys from the Four Hundred went to Samos to present the case for the 
new dispensation at Athens to the Athenian fleet.  Alcibiades sent the envoys away with 
the following answer:   
... ὅτι τοὺς µὲν πεντακισχιλίους οὐ κωλύοι ἄρχειν, τοὺς µέντοι τετρακοσίους 
ἐκέλευεν ἀπαλλάσσειν αὐτοὺς καὶ καθιστάναι τὴν βουλὴν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, 
τοὺς πεντακόσιους· εἰ δὲ ἐς εὐτέλείαν τι ξυντέτµηται, ὥστε τοὺς στρατευοµένους 
µᾶλλον ἔξειν τροφήν, πάνυ ἐπαινεῖν. 
                                                 
40 8.45.6:  “τόν τε Τισσαφέρνη ἀπέφαινε νῦν µέν, τοῖς ἰδίοις χρήµασι πολεµοῦντα, εἰκότως φειδόµενον, ἢν δέ 






that he did not object to the government of the Five Thousand, but insisted that 
the Four Hundred should be deposed and the Council of Five Hundred reinstated 
in power; and if there had been any curtailment with a view to economy, so the 
soldiers in the field might have better [pay], he quite approved of that. (8.86.6) 
 
A proposed change in a rate of pay is again explicitly linked to the capability of a public 
treasury to fund it, and to a measure that might be taken to provide that money.41 
Evidence for the factors determining rates of pay at Athens in the classical period 
is not confined to Thucydides.  Probably in 403/2, there was a proposal in a speech of 
Lysias42 to cut the the µισθός of the Athenian cavalry from one drachma to four obols.  
There was also in this speech a proposed change in the pay of the two hundred Athenian 
ἱπποτοξόται [mounted archers], with the new figure to be eight obols.  The original 
editors of the papyrus thought the figure for the mounted archers’ original pay to be two 
obols, and that they therefore received a pay increase of six obols.43  Pritchett, Bugh and 
others, assuming that the cavalry were representatives of the richer classes at Athens, and 
the mounted archers members of the poorer classes there, took these two changes in pay 
rates to be evidence of class warfare in Athens affecting a rate of pay, i.e. that political 
conditions (the restored democracy’s resentment of the rich after the rule of the Thirty) 
                                                 
41 Cf. Thucy. 8.65.3 (and [Aris.], Ath. Pol. 29.5):  earlier that summer, those conspiring for the revolution 
had made a proposal that no one ought to receive pay except those who were serving in the war (“ὡς οὔτε 
µισθοφορητέον εἴη ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς στρατευοµένους”).  See also Thucy. 8.97.1 (and [Aris.], Ath. Pol. 33.1):  
the newly restored democracy decided that no one was to receive pay for any office (“καὶ µισθὸν µηδένα 
φέρειν µηδεµῖας ἀρχῆς...”).  As Andrewes notes (HCT v.329), “[t]he original plan (65.3) abolished all pay 
but military, and serving troops must have been paid (cf. Alkibiades at 86.6).”  The availability of military 
pay is considered again solely within the context of public finance and expenditure. 
 
42 Lysias, fr.6 (Against Theozotides), ll.70-75. 
 




determined the changed rates of pay.44  Loomis has argued convincingly, however, that 
the original figure for the pay of the ἱπποτοξόται was two drachmas, and that they 
therefore suffered, just as the cavalry did, a pay cut of a third; he also demonstrated that 
the mounted archers had at least as much status and prestige as the cavalry.45  The 
reduction in pay rates, then, was not a reflection of ideological or class differences, but 
rather almost certainly one of financial crisis at Athens.  The Athenians were in continued 
financial crisis throughout the Ionian War, engaging in desperate measures to produce 
pay for their navy, such as melting down practically everything they could of the 
treasures that were held in the Parthenon to produce silver and gold coinage, and striking 
the first Athenian token coinage.46  This financial crisis lasted through the end of the war 
to the first years of peace and almost certainly provides the proper context in which to 
interpret the calls for reductions in rates of pay found in the fragment of Lysias. 
Just over fifty years later, in 351, Demosthenes attempted to persuade the 
Athenian assembly to send a force of two thousand infantry, two hundred cavalry, and ten 
triremes to the northern Aegean against Philip, who had recently won a series of victories 
against the Athenians.  Against any potential objections to the cost of this force, 
Demosthenes proposed that the Athenians provide it with σιτηρέσιον (i.e. ration-money) 
only, two obols per day per man for the infantry and the sailors, and one drachma per day 
for the cavalry (4.28).  Anticipating the objection that providing only σιτηρέσιον for the 
                                                 
44 See Pritchett (1971) 21-32; Bugh (1988) 131-132 n.54 and all bibliography there; Cook (1990) 83. 
 
45 See Loomis (1995), (1998) 45-46. 
 
46 See Samons (2000) 169-170 for a summary of these measures.  See esp. Lewis (1986) 74-75, Harris 




force would be an insufficient inducement for his proposed force, Demosthenes stated 
that “...προσποριεῖ τὰ λοίπ’ αὐτὸ τὸ στράτευµ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ πολέµου... ὥστε ἔχειν µισθXν 
ἐντελῆ,” “the force itself will provide the rest out of the war [i.e. from the sale of booty], 
so as to make up their full pay...” (4.29). 
A number of interesting points arise from this speech.  For the first (and only) 
time, we find price playing a role in a payment to a military force:  Demosthenes presents 
the figure of two obols per day as sufficient for the daily sustenance of the infantry and 
the naval crews.47  Although Demosthenes was trying here to play down the expense of 
the standing force he proposed for the war against Philip, his figures would have had to 
have seemed plausible, and he would have had to have composed his speech with the 
expectation that some hundreds or thousands of Athenians, who were broadly 
representative of the citizen body as a whole, could think his plan conceivable:  we 
should therefore take the figure of two obols as enough for the daily subsistence expenses 
of a soldier or sailor on campaign as broadly accurate.48  But it is important to note that 
                                                 
47 Cf. Markle (1985) 277. 
 
48 Contra Cook (1990) 83:  “[i]t seems evident that 2 obols was insufficient even as a ration allowance, and 
both Demosthenes and his audience knew it.”  Cook comes to this mistaken conclusion for four reasons.  
Firstly, and most importantly, she mistranslates part of 4.29, “εἰ δέ τις οἴεται µικρὰν ἀφορµὴν εἶναι, 
σιτηρέσιον τοῖς στρατευοµένοις ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔγνωκεν...,” as “[a]nd if anyone should think that too 
little as a σιτηρέσιον... [he is wrong].”  But ἀφορµὴν should be translated here as “inducement” (see LSJ, 
‘ἀµορφή,’ 2) and therefore the Loeb translation, rather than Cook’s, should be followed:  “[i]f anyone 
imagines that ration-money for the men on active service is only a small provision to start with, he is 
wrong...”  The emphasis is on the σιτηρέσιον as an inducement to serve, as is confirmed by the following 
clause, where Demosthenes proposes that the σιτηρέσιον will be supplemented, so as to make full pay for 
the force, by plunder.  Secondly, Cook mistakenly takes the pay rates referred to at Thucy. 5.47.6 and Xen., 
Hell. 5.2.21 as solely for ration-money (see p.335 and n.120):  since these were over four obols, her 
mistake leads her to conclude that two obols must have been too little for ration-money.  Thirdly, she 
misunderstands Thucy. 8.45.2 to mean that Athenian sailors only got three obols on campaign as 
subsistence money ([1990] 82), and another three obols to make up their full pay when arrived back in 
Athens; since three obols is more than two, again the mistaken conclusion that two obols must have been 
insufficient for daily subsistence.  But it is anachronistic to distinguish between ration-money and pay in 
412/11 (see Loomis [1998] 59 and chapter 6 section viii) and Athenian sailors received all of their pay 
while on campaign (see chapter 6 for demonstration of this point and for full discussion of Thucy. 8.45.2).  
  
308 
Demosthenes, in proposing an amount for σιτηρέσιον, makes no provision for changes in 
that figure based on changes in the prices of provisions in the prospective military 
theater:  clearly, then, the figure which Demosthenes gives is based only on a general 
idea of how much the sailors’ and soldiers’ daily provisioning would cost, and on the 
assumption that there would not be dramatic changes in the market prices of basic foods 
on the campaign. 
 Dem. 4.28-29 also shows that it was generally expected that Athenian soldiers and 
sailors in the middle of the fourth century would get some amount of µισθός in addition 
to their σιτηρέσιον, so as to make up their µισθὸς ἐντελής, their full pay.49  Since µισθός 
proper was normally treated as equivalent to µισθὸς ἐντελής (except when, as here, 
financial contingencies forced orators or generals to distinguish between the two, in order 
to focus on providing at least the bare subsistence payment of σιτηρέσιον),50 this means 
                                                                                                                                                 
Fourthly, she misunderstands dikast pay as providing subsistence pay for the recipient only, rather than for 
his family (see p.292 n.7 above); since dikast pay was (after 425) three obols, this again influences her 
conclusion that two obols per day per man was insufficient for daily subsistence.  Cf. in this regard [Dem.] 
50.23 (see chapter 6 section vii for the context of this passage): Apollodorus, explaining why there was 
more desertion from his trireme after a campaign in particularly harsh conditions off Thrace ([Dem] 50.21-
22), stating that “... τῶν ἀρχαίων ναυτῶν ταλαιπωρουµένων µὲν πολλά, ὠφελουµένων δὲ βραχέα, ὅσα ἐγὼ 
δυναίµην ἑκάστῳ δανειζόµενος ἐπαρκέσαι πρὸς ᾧ πρότερον εἶχον παρ’ ἐµοῦ, ἐπεὶ ὅ γε στρατηγὸς οὐδὲ τὸ ἐφ’ 
ἡµέραν αὐτοῖς τροφὴν διαρκῆ ἐδίδου”; “the original rowers [from Athens] had borne many hardships and 
profited little—merely what I was able to borrow and give to each man in addition to what they had had 
from me before, since the general did not supply enough even for their daily subsistence” (“τροφὴν” is used 
here in its most basic sense of “subsistence,” and not as a term denoting a payment).  As Ballin notes 
([1978] 145), this passage does not mean that the general (Timomachus) “was not paying regular siteresion, 
but rather that the siteresion was itself insufficient to cover the sailors’ daily needs (τροφή).”  The context 
of the passage suggests strongly that it was not high food prices which meant that the men could not 
purchase their daily subsistence from their σιτηρέσιον, but that Timomachus was providing too little 
σιτηρέσιον to cover the normal expenses of subsistence (unfortunately, Apollodorus does not provide a 
figure for the monetary amount of σιτηρέσιον Timomachus provided). 
 
49 See also the discussion of Dem. 4 at chapter 6 section v. 
 




that, in the middle of the fourth century, one part of the µισθός payment to soldiers and 
sailors was determined by general ideas about subsistence prices, but the other part of it 
was determined by factors that had nothing to do with the market prices of commodities.  
Thus µισθός, taken as a whole, was only (very) partially determined by thinking on 
prices.51  Here, in Demosthenes’ First Philippic, it was the state of Athenian public 
finances that was the determining factor in the (non-)payment of µισθός for his planned 
standing army:  the force to be sent against Philip could not be exceedingly large because 
the Athenians could afford neither the µισθός nor the τροφή for such a force;52 and the 
wish not to burden the Athenian treasury is the fundamental motivation for Demosthenes’ 
proposal that µισθός for his moderately sized standing force would be provided from 
plunder.53 
In contrast to Demosthenes’ Athenians, other military employers in the Greek 
world (and neighboring areas) in the fourth century (occasionally) had abundant financial 
resources:  these resources together with a strong demand for mercenaries sometimes led 
                                                 
51 Cf. appendix 5 section iii on Hellenistic military pay and ration-allowances. 
 
52 4.23:  “οὐ τοίνυν ὑπέρογκον αὐτήν (οὐ γὰρ ἔστι µισθὸς οὐδὲ τροφή)...” 
 
53 More generally, Demosthenes’ speech is indicative of the financial troubles that hindered Athenian 
military campaigns throughout the middle of the fourth century, and which are mentioned often in a variety 
of sources (see Gabrielsen [1994] 117, Cook [1990] 83 for examples).  In all of Demosthenes’ complaints 
about the lack of funding for Athenian overseas expeditions, Isocrates’ praise of Timotheus for his self-
financing of campaigns, and the anecdotes found in the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica and Polyaenus’ 
Strategica on Timotheus’ and other Athenian generals’ stratagems to come up with money to pay their 
forces, the issue at hand is always the availability of funds to provide pay for military forces.  It is the 
availability of money for pay that keeps forces together, and it is the lack of money for pay that endangers 
the success of campaigns.  Rises or falls in basic food prices, and consequent increases or decreases in pay 
rates, are never mentioned, however, in the (relatively) abundant ancient discussions of the pay of Athenian 




to (substantial) rises in rates of pay for military service.54  In 377/6, Acoris, the king of 
the Egyptians, collected a large mercenary force for his revolt against the King by 
offering high pay to those who enrolled in his army (“µεγάλους γὰρ µισθοὺς τοῖς 
ὑπακούουσι προτιθέις”) (Diod. 15.29.1). During the Sacred War of 355-347, the Phocians 
also amassed a large number of mercenaries by offering higher than usual rates of pay.  
The increased pay rates offered by the Phocians were made possible by their seizure of 
Delphi and its sacred offerings (see esp. Diod. 16.56.5-6, Isoc. 5.54):  the money from 
Delphi allowed them to raise the current rate of pay for their mercenaries first by one 
half55—and then, in 353/2, after a crushing defeat at the hands of the forces of Philip and 
the Thessalians, allowed their new commander, Phayllus to begin again to recruit 
mercenaries, this time by offering double the usual amount of pay (“διπλασιάσας τοὺς 
εἰωθότας µισθοὺς”) (Diod. 16.36.1). 
Using predatory seizures of property to fund rapid recruitment of large amounts of 
mercenaries by offering higher than usual rates of pay was a measure more normally 
                                                 
54 For demand as a factor affecting rates of pay for classical Greek military forces, see Marinovic (1988) 
172, Rawlings (2007) 169, Burrer (2008) 81. 
 
55 Diodorus reports two occasions on which the Phocians recruited many mercenaries for campaigns against 
the Boeotians by raising their pay by a half:  16.25.1 ((355/4) with the Phocian’s own money and a sum of 
fifteen talents received from Archidamus (16.24.2), Philomelus, the Phocian general, began to assemble a 
large force of mercenaries by raising the current rate of pay by one half (“ἀναβιβάσας τοὺς µισθοὺς καὶ 
ποιήσας ἡµιολίους”)); 16.30.1 ((354/3) using the sacred dedications at Delphi, Philomelus raised the pay he 
was offering by one half again (“ὑποστησαµένου δ’ αὐτοῦ τοῖς ξένοις µισθοὺς ἡµιολίους”) and, in this way, 
gathered many mercenaries who were attracted by the high rates of pay).  Diodorus perpetrates several 
doublets in his account of the Third Sacred War; it appears very likely, given the similarity of his 
descriptions of the context of the two pay raises, that this is one of them.  It should be noted also that 
Diodorus contradicts himself at 16.30.1, since at 16.28.2 and 16.56.5 he writes that Philomelus kept his 
hands off the sacred dedications at Delphi:  despite this contradiction, it is clear from Diodorus’ account 
(esp. 16.56.5-6) and Isocrates’ brief description of the Sacred War that the Phocians’ spending on military 




associated in the Greek world with tyrants, and especially Dionysius I of Syracuse.56  
Dionysius I several times during his rule of Syracuse57 raised rates of pay to assemble 
mercenaries quickly:  besieged in the citadel of Syracuse in 404, he promised mercenaries 
from Campania any price they should ask for the duration of the siege (“ὡµολόγησεν 
αὐτοῖς δώσειν χρήµατα ὅσα ἂν αἰτήσωσιν εἰς τὴν πολιορκίαν”) (Diod. 14.8.6); in 398, he 
was able to recruit many mercenaries for his war against the Carthaginians by promising 
high pay (“µισθοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπαγγελλόµενος”) (Diod. 14.44.2); in 396, in the midst of the 
war with the Carthaginians and desperate for military help, he sent men with large 
amounts of money to recruit mercenaries in the Peloponnese, ordering them to pay 
whatever rates they had to in order to assemble as many mercenaries as possible (“ἔπεµψε 
δὲ καὶ ξενολόγους εἰς Πελοπόννησον µετὰ πολλῶν χρηµάτων, ἐντειλάµενος ὡς πλείστους 
ἀθροίζειν στρατιώτας µὴ φειδοµένους τῶν µισθῶν”) (Diod. 14.62.1).  Dionysius raised 
the funds necessary for his wars and the high rates of pay he paid to mercenaries to fight 
for him in those wars by a series of exceptional financial expedients:  plundering temples, 
imposing extraordinarily high taxes, extorting money, and manipulating coinage.58 
                                                 
56 But cf. Xen., Hell. 7.4.33:  in 364, the Arcadian League using the sacred treasures at Olympia to maintain 
their regular army. 
 
57 And even before:  see Diod. 13.93.2:  in 406, before his tyranny, Dionysius paid what was owing to 
Dexippus’ mercenaries at Gela and double pay to the Syracusans under him by confiscating the possessions 
of the wealthiest Geloans.  In the same year, having been appointed general with supreme power, Dionysius 
proposed a decree that the pay of the mercenaries hired by the Syracusans be doubled (Diod. 13.95.1). 
 
58 See Parke (1933) 72 for discussion and references to the relevant ancient sources; see also Morris (2001) 
75 and van Wees (2004) 238 (cf. Marinovic [1988] 172).  Cf. Polyaenus, Strateg. 6.1.2-7:  various financial 
stratagems employed by Jason of Pherae to find pay for his mercenaries; and Xen., Hell. 6.4.30:  Jason 
suspected of having designs on the sacred treasures at Delphi.  Cf. also Xen., Hiero 4.11:  tyrants often 





The need to win and maintain the allegiance of mercenaries also motivated (some) 
military employers to raise rates of pay.  Hippocrates (in 492) gave his Ergetine 
mercenaries the largest share of the booty and greater pay (“µισθοὺς µείζονας”) on 
campaign to win their favor as part of a ruse to eventually capture their city (Polyaenus, 
Strateg. 5.6).  At Tarsus in 401, the Greeks of Cyrus’ army suspected (correctly) that they 
were being led against the King and asked for more pay because of this (Xen., Anab. 
1.3.21):  Cyrus, in order to head off the desertion of the men, promised a pay rise of fifty 
per cent, from one daric to one daric and a half per month (ibid.).  Xenophon noted that 
Jason of Pherae rewarded the best and bravest of his mercenaries by special gifts and by 
doubling, trebling, and quadrupling their pay (Xen., Hell. 6.1.6).  Finally, Xenophon’s 
paradigmatic military leader,59 Cyrus, sends to the King of India to ask for funds so that 
he can pay generous wages (“ὅπως ἔχω καὶ µισθὸν ἀφθόνως διδόναι οἷς ἂν δέῃ”) and 
reward those of his soldiers who deserve it (Cyr. 3.2.28, cf. 3.2.29-30); after the battle of 
Sardis, he wins the allegiance of the Egyptians by promising them favors, and especially 
that, as long as the war continues, he will give them larger pay than they were now 
receiving (“µισθὸν µὲν ὑµῖν δοίην ἂν πλείονα ἢ νῦν ἐλαµβάνετε ὅσον ἂν χρόνον πόλεµος 
ᾖ”) (Cyr. 7.1.43).60 
 Competition for military manpower between warring states also played a crucial 
role in determining the rates of pay given to classical Greek sailors and soldiers.61  This 
                                                 
59 See again the discussion at chapter 3 section iva. 
 
60 Cf. Diod. 15.29.1:  Acoris recruiting large amounts of mercenaries not only by offering high rates of pay 
but also by doing favors to many of them. 
 
61 See Gallo (1987) 36, 42-44 for an excellent discussion of the effect competition for (naval) manpower 
between the Athenians and Peloponnesians had on rates of pay for naval service in the Peloponnesian war. 
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factor is first attested in two speeches made twenty years’ before Alcibiades’ and 
Tissaphernes’ machinations.62  In 432/1, the Corinthians, speaking at a meeting of the 
Spartans and their allies, attempted to make the case for war against the Athenians.63  As 
part of their argument, the Corinthians asserted that the Peloponnesians could raise 
enough money by contributions and by loans from Delphi and Olympia to both raise a 
fleet and lure sailors away from the Athenian fleet: 
... ναυτικόν τε, ᾧ ἰσχύουσιν, ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης τε ἑκάστοις οὐσίας 
ἐξαρτυσόµεθα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ∆ελφοῖς καὶ Ὀλυµπίᾳ χρηµάτων· δάνεισµα γὰρ 
ποιησάµενοι ὑπολαβεῖν οἷοί τ’ ἑσµὲν µισθῷ µείζονι τοὺς ξένους αὐτῶν ναυβάτας.  
ὠνητὴ γὰρ ἡ Ἁθηναίων δύναµις µᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία· ηε δὲ ἡµετέρα ἧσσον ἂν τοῦτο 
πάθοι, τοῖς σώµασι τὸ πλέον ἰσχύουσα ἢ τοῖς χρήµασι. 
 
[t]he naval strength which they possess shall be raised by us from our respective 
present resources, and from the moneys at Olympia and Delphi.  A loan from 
these enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay.  For 
Athenian power is bought and not native; while ours will not be exposed to the 
same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money. (Thucy. 1.121.3) 
 
The Peloponnesians having decided on war, the Spartans went to Athens and offered war, 
unless certain concessions were made by the Athenians.  In the assembly discussing the 
Peloponnesians’ demands, Pericles stood up and forcefully argued for accepting war as 
inevitable.  In the course of his speech, he made several arguments for why the Athenians 
could approach any war with the Peloponnesians optimistically, focusing on the 
Peloponnesians’ want of money, and the Athenians’ greater skill in and knowledge of 
naval warfare: 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
62 See Gallo (1987) 36 and n.47; cf., e.g., Morrison et al. (2000) 118, Rawlings (2007) 115-116, 164, 169-
170. 
 




εἴ τε καὶ κινήσαντες τῶν Ὀλυµπίασιν ἢ ∆ελφοῖς χρηµάτων µισθῷ µείζονι 
πειρῷντο ἡµῶν ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς ξένους τῶν ναυτῶν, µὴ ὄντων µὲν ἡµῶν 
ἀντιπάλων ἐσβάντων αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν µετοίκων δεινὸν ἂν ἦν· νῦν δὲ τόδε τε 
ὑπάρχει καί, ὅπερ κράτιστον, κυβερνήτας ἔχοµεν πολίτας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην 
ὑπηρεσίαν πλείους καὶ ἀµείνους ἢ ἅπασα ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς.  καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ κινδύνῳ 
οὐδείς ἂν δέξαιτο τῶν ξένων τήν τε αὐτοῦ φεύγειν καὶ µετὰ τῆς ἥσσονος ἅµα 
ἐλπίδος ὀλίγων ἡµερῶν ἕνεκα µεγάλου µισθοῦ δόσεως ἐκείνοις ξυναγωνίζεσθαι. 
 
[e]ven if they were to touch the moneys at Olympia or Delphi, and try to seduce 
our mercenary sailors by the temptation of higher pay, that would only be a 
serious danger if we could not still be a match for them, by embarking our own 
citizens and metics.  But in fact by this means we are always a match for them; 
and best of all, we have better and more helmsmen and hyperesia than all the rest 
of Hellas.  And to say nothing of the danger of such a step, none of our foreign 
sailors would consent to become an outlaw from his country, and to take service 
with them and their hopes, for the sake of a few days’ high pay. (Thucy. 1.143.1-
2) 
 
Two crucial points emerge from these two passages.64  Firstly, the proposed rates of pay 
are explicitly determined by competition, i.e. by how much the enemy is paying to its 
sailors.  Secondly, this competition can only take place if both sides have similar 
resources in money:  without the treasures of Olympia and Delphi, there is simply no way 
in which the Peloponnesians can compete in the naval sphere with the Athenians; on the 
obverse, the huge surpluses of cash the Athenians possess and the yearly revenues they 
receive mean that they possess an almost insuperable advantage in the new warfare. 
 The same factors—competition between states in warfare, and the availability of 
reserves of money to finance increases in rates of pay—surfaced in 408, in the midst of 
the Ionian War.65  Lysander, having been sent out as admiral to the eastern Aegean by the 
Spartans (Xen., Hell. 1.5.1), went up, with ambassadors from his home polis, to Sardis to 
                                                 
64 Both of which should be read in the light of Thucydides’ reflections in the Archaeology on the necessity 
of reserves of money for the new trireme-based warfare of the fifth century (and especially 1.19 on the 
different approaches taken by Athens and Sparta to ruling over others), and Pericles’ description of the 
limited Peloponnesian capabilities in the new warfare, especially their lack of reserves of money and 
revenues as compared to the Athenians (Thucy. 1.141-142). 
 




discuss the war with Cyrus, who had arrived recently in Asia Minor to rule over all the 
peoples on the coast and with orders from the King to support the Spartans in the war 
(Xen., Hell. 1.5.3).  Cyrus promised Lysander and the ambassadors that he would do 
everything in his power to support the Peloponnesians, and especially financially (Xen., 
Hell. 1.5.3).  In response to this, the ambassadors thanked him, and “urged him to make 
the wage of each sailor an Attic drachma a day, explaining that if this were made the rate, 
the sailors of the Athenian fleet would desert their ships, and hence he would spend less 
money.”66  Cyrus agreed that the plan was a good one, but that he could not deviate from 
the King’s instructions, and that the original agreement stated that the King should give 
thirty mnai per month to each ship (or three obols per day to each sailor) (Xen., Hell. 
1.5.5).  Lysander let the matter drop; but later, after dinner, when Cyrus asked him how 
he could gratify Lysander the most—expecting Lysander to ask for a private gift—
Lysander replied, “[b]y adding an obol to the pay of each sailor.”67  Cyrus granted the 
request, and from this point on, the rate of pay on the Peloponnesian side was four obols 
per day; Cyrus also settled the arrears of pay and gave the sailors a month’s pay in 
advance, with the result that the Peloponnesian sailors became much more eager for the 
war (Xen., Hell. 1.5.7).  The Athenians, in contrast, were despondent when they heard of 
Cyrus’ actions (Xen., Hell. 1.5.8). 
 Here again, competition and availability of funds—Cyrus told the Spartans that he 
had brought with him five hundred talents for the war and, if this proved insufficient, he 
                                                 
66 Xen., Hell. 1.5.4:  “... καὶ ἐκέλευον αὐτὸν τάξαι τῷ ναύτῃ δραχµὴν Ἀττικήν, διδάσκοντες ὅτι, ἂν οὗτος ὁ 
µισθὸς γένηται, οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦται ἀπολείψουσι τὰς ναῦς, καὶ µείω χρήµατα ἀναλώσει.” 
 




would use his own funds, that he would even go so far as to break up his throne of silver 
and gold if he had to (Xen., Hell. 1.5.3)—are described by a contemporary author as the 
sole determinants in setting (higher) pay rates.  The Athenians at this time were still 
paying three obols per day to their sailors (Plut., Alc. 35.5) and the extra obol paid from 
this point on to the sailors on the Peloponnesian side was added with the goal of 
encouraging desertion from the Athenian navy.  In addition to the initial reasoning of the 
Spartan ambassadors to Cyrus, that such a measure, taken together with the settlement of 
arrears of pay and the advance of pay, was considered effective can be seen from the 
contrasting reactions of the Peloponnesian sailors and the Athenians when hearing of 
Cyrus’ actions.68   
Competition for men (made possible by the availability of funds) as a factor in 
setting rates of pay for sailors was not a factor limited to the Peloponnesian War.  In a 
speech of 359 describing actions that took place in 362, Apollodorus—who was serving 
as the trierarch of an Athenian ship participating in some actions in the northern 
Aegean—recounted the factors that caused men from his ship to desert to the navies of 
other cities.  Since the men had received no µισθός except for two months, and saw that 
there were no funds to provide µισθός for the near future ([Dem.] 50.14-15), many of the 
men deserted Apollodorus’ trireme, some to the mainland to undertake military service 
there, and others to the ships of the Thasians and Maronites, the latter “won over by the 
promise of high pay and receiving substantial sums in advance.”69  In fact, Apollodorus 
                                                 
68 According to Plut. Lys. 4.7, most of the Athenian sailors did, in fact, defect to the Peloponnesians for the 
extra obol, but Plutarch is exaggerating here:  see Krentz (1989) 136. 
 
69 [Dem.] 50.14:  “µισθῷ µεγάλῳ πεισθέντες καὶ ἀργύριον πολὺ προλαβόντες...”  Cf. Gabrielsen (1994) 122 
and Thucy. 7.13.2:  according to the letter of Nicias back to the Athenians, those foreigners who had joined 
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lamented, since he had gone out of his way to hire especially good rowers, they were 
especially likely to desert as “trusting in their skill as able rowers, they went off wherever 
they were likely to again take the most money...”70  There were thus two causes for 
desertions from Apollodorus’ ship and to other cities:  firstly, the known lack of money 
available to pay the men; and secondly, the promise of higher rates of pay elsewhere.  
Writing four years later on the dire military situation of the Athenians, Isocrates also 
focused on the effect higher rates of pay offered by other military employers had on the 
forces employed by the Athenians: 
πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον οὐχ ἡµᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀσκοῦµεν, ἀλλ’ ἀνθρώπους τοὺς µὲν ἀπόλιδας 
τοὺς δ’ αὐτοµόλους τοὺς δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων κακουργιῶν συνερρυηκόας, οἷς ὁπόταν 
τις διδῷ πλείω µισθόν, µέτ’ ἐκείνων ἐφ’ ἡµᾶς ἀκολουθήσουσιν. 
 
we do not train ourselves for war but employ instead vagabonds, deserters, and 
fugitives who have thronged together here in consequence of other 
misdemeanors, who, whenever others offer them higher pay, will follow their 
leaderships against us. (8.44) 
 
Isocrates’ presentation here of the Athenians’ military situation is tendentious and 
exaggerated;71 but he was exaggerating the Athenian dependence on mercenaries; the 
factor he adduced as potentially leading the mercenaries to desert had to seem plausible 
to his audience, or else his argument would have had no force. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Sicilian expedition voluntarily in the hope of making money were the most prone of those in the fleet to 
desertion and the hiring of slaves in their stead.  See p.348 n.151 for further discussion of Thucy. 7.13.2. 
 
70 [Dem.] 50.16:  “οἱ δ’ ἐµοὶ ναῦται πιστεύοντες αὑτοῖς ἐπὶ τῷ δύνασθαι ἐλαύνειν, ὅπου ἤµελλον ἀργύριον 
πάλιν πλεῖστον λήψεσθαι, ἐνταῦθ’ ἀπῇσαν...” 
 
71 The reference to Athenian mercenary forces taking service with another employer here is almost 
certainly inspired by the Athenian general Chares’ actions in the same year when he enlisted the forces 
serving under him in the service of Artabazus in order to save the Athenians expense:  see, e.g., Diod. 




Competition between states for military manpower did not always result in rises 
in rates of military pay for classical Greek soldiers and sailors.  As we have seen, in the 
winter of 412/11, Tissaphernes cut the pay of the Peloponnesian sailors from one 
drachma to three obols per day (Thucy. 8.45.2).  As Gallo points out,72 Tissaphernes 
could only cut the pay of the Peloponnesians because the Athenians had recently done the 
same.  Because of the Athenian reduction, Tissaphernes could reduce the rate of pay he 
gave to the Peloponnesians without the danger of desertion to the Athenians because of 
their offering a more attractive and competitive rate of pay.  Because of the continued 
financial difficulties of the Athenians in these years and their consequent inability to pay 
any more than three obols per day to their sailors, the Persians were able to keep paying 
the same low rate until Lysander’s intervention with Cyrus.  And, in general, because, in 
the fourth century, no Greek state possessed the massive (annual) imperial revenues 
which the fifth-century Athenian state did before 413/412, there were generally lower 
rates of military offered and paid in the fourth century:  in the absence of competitors that 
had the financial resources to pay consistently high rates, no Greek state had to pay (on a 
consistent basis) rates of pay as high of those of the fifth century to recruit men into 




                                                 
72 (1987) 42-43. 
 
73 Cf. van Wees (2004) 237-239, Gallo (1987) 45-46.  See chapter vi section vi for the generally lower rates 




iv. Standard and conventional rates of pay for classical Greek military forces 
As I have indicated, there has been much controversy on whether one drachma 
per man per day was, in fact, the usual rate of pay for Athenian soldiers and sailors in the 
fifth century.  It is the only rate of pay mentioned by Thucydides for Athenian forces 
before the winter of 412/11, but Pritchett has argued that “Thucydides’ practice seems to 
have been to record the rate when it was exceptional.”74  This is incorrect:  it was 
exceptional for Thucydides to mention rates of pay, but he did not mention them only 
when they were exceptional.  At 3.17, Thucydides includes an unusual amount of 
financial detail “for a significant purpose:  he is using it to explain why there was a 
special financial drain on Athens.”75  The rate of pay of the hoplites, their attendants, and 
the sailors manning the ships is mentioned explicitly at 3.17.4 not because it is unusual, 
but because it is a detail that helps to explain the vast expenses that the Athenians had to 
meet in the annual campaigning in the early years of the war—and the later measures 
needed to meet these expenses.76  At 6.31.3, in his description of the expedition before it 
set sail for Sicily, Thucydides tells us, amongst other things, that each sailor received a 
drachma per day for the expedition; in addition, the thranitai (those rowers manning the 
top bank of each trireme) and the hyperesia of each trireme received bonuses from the 
trierarchs (6.31.3).  As with the description of the rates of pay at Potidaea, Thucydides 
does not mention the rate of pay here because it was unusual (i.e. unusually high), but 
                                                 
74 (1971) 24. 
 
75 Kallet-Marx (1993) 133.  Cf. Gallo (1987) 37-38. 
 




rather as one of a number of details included to emphasize the money spent on this 
particular campaign, and especially to support his statement regarding the Sicilian 
expedition that “this armament that first sailed out was by far the most costly and 
splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a single city up to that time.”77  
Thucydides’ mention of the rate of pay for the Athenian sailors also allowed him to 
mention the bonuses given to the thranitai and hyperesia of each trireme and thus to 
bring out the massive private expenditures on the preparation of the expedition.78  There 
is also nothing in Thucydides’ narrative to suggest that the one drachma rate given to the 
Thracian mercenaries in 413 was unusual.  Thucydides does tell us that the Thracian 
peltasts were considered too expensive because of the Decelean war; but the point of his 
comment is that, in light of the great financial stresses the occupation of Decelea and the 
heavy expenses of the fighting in Sicily were causing—bringing Athens to a major 
financial crisis for the first time in the Peloponnesian war—the Athenians could now not 
afford any unnecessary expense.79   
 Other evidence from Thucydides implies strongly that the one drachma rate was 
the standard Athenian military rate of pay before 412.  At the beginning of the spring of 
415, representatives of the polis of Egesta came to Athens, bringing sixty talents of 
                                                 
77 6.31.1:  “παρασκευὴ γὰρ αὕτη ἡ πρώτη ἐκπλεύσασα µιᾶς πόλεως δυνάµει Ἑλληνικῇ πολυτελεστάτη δὴ 
καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν ἐς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο.”  See Gallo (1987) 39-40, Kallet (2001) 53.  Cf. 
6.31.5:  “πολλὰ τάλαντα” left the city with the expedition. 
 
78 Note that the rate of pay for the infantry and cavalry forces of the expedition is not mentioned by 
Thucydides:  since these were not commanded by private individuals carrying out liturgies, they would 
have received pay only from the state.  See also p.348 n.151 on Thucy. 7.13.2 for discussion of the rate of 
pay attested for the Sicilian expedition. 
 




uncoined silver for sixty ships, which they were to ask the Athenians to send for their war 
against Selinus and Syracuse (6.8.1):  bringing sixty talents for sixty ships meant that, 
assuming two hundred men per trireme,80 the Egestaeans assumed that the pay rate for 
Athenian sailors was one drachma per day, “which rather suggests that it was known as 
normal...”81   
In addition, at 8.45.2, as we have seen, Thucydides narrates that Alcibiades cut 
down the pay of the Peloponnesian sailors from one drachma to three obols a day, telling 
Tissaphernes to justify this to the Peloponnesians on the grounds that the Athenians were 
only paying their sailors three obols a day.  In the second, what we might call ‘moral,’ 
consideration that Alcibiades raises at 8.45.2, it is strongly implied that the Athenians had 
formerly paid more than three obols to their sailors, but had ceased doing so because of 
the deterioration of conditions in the fleet the higher rate had led to.  It is almost certain 
that this reduction was a recent measure, given the evidence for Athenian pay rates of one 
drachma per day in 415 and 413 (and before), and, given the many indications of serious 
financial crisis at Athens in the years 413 and 412,82 that it was linked to the recent severe 
                                                 
80 On the legitimacy of this assumption, see appendix 2. 
 
81 Andrewes, HCT v.97.  Cf., e.g., Hornblower, CT iii.316. 
 
82 See esp. Gallo (1987) 43 and n.63, with Thucy. 7.27-7.29.1 (and esp. 7.28.4:  the decision in the fall of 
413 to replace the imperial tribute with a five per cent tax on seaborne trade), 8.1.3 (cuts in public 
expenditure (see also chapter 6 section v for discussion of 8.1)), 8.15.1 (the decision to use for the war the 
emergency fund of one thousand talents).  See also Blamire (2001) 115 for epigraphical evidence for 
financial pressures at Athens in 413/412:  “[e]lectrum had occasionally been disbursed during the 
quadrennium 418/7-415/4 (IG I3 370, lines 13-14, 57-58, 64-65), but in 413/12 the Treasurers of Athena 
paid out the enormous sum of 61,697 [Kyzikene] staters (IG I3 372, line 4), the equivalent of 250+T and a 
sure indication that stocks of silver were now rapidly running out...”  See also Samons ([2000] 256) on the 
allied revolts of 412 also contributing heavily to the financial crisis at Athens.  Cf. Thucy. 8.76.6:  in the 
summer of 411, the Athenians at Samos deciding to go their own way from the Athenians at home, since 




deterioriation in Athenian state finances.  Pritchett, however, as part of his hypothesis that 
the standard rate of pay for Athenian sailors and soldiers in the Peloponnesian war was 
three obols per day, took 8.45.2 as providing information for the “customary” practice of 
the Athenians with regard to pay:83  the support for this view relied on taking “ἐκ πλέονος 
χρόνου” from the phrase “ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου ἐπιστήµονες ὄντες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ 
τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν” to refer to “διδόασιν” rather than “ἐπιστήµονες ὄντες.”84  
Taking this passage in addition to the arguments described (and proven incorrect) above, 
he concluded that the standard rate of pay for Athenian soldiers and sailors in the 
Peloponnesian was three obols per day per man.85  Yet it is clear that the temporal 
expression is referring to the Athenians’ maritime experience and not the pay rate:86 the 
Athenians’ longer knowledge of naval matters meant that they had experience of the 
deleterious effects of high rates of pay on ships’ crews.  Pritchett and those others who 
have taken “ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου” to go with “διδόασιν” have missed the fact that “πλέονος” 
                                                 
83 (1971) 17:  “[i]n 8.45.2, Alkibiades is reported to have persuaded Tissaphernes to reduce the misthos of 
the Peloponnesian sailors from one drachme [sic] to three obols a day, excusing the analogy to the 
Athenian custom.” 
 
84 Cf. (1971) 5, 24. Marinovic (1988) 167-168 and Markle (1985) 276 follow Pritchett expressly on this 
point:  see Markle (1985) 276:  “Thucydides (8.45.2) represents Alcibiades as claiming that the Athenians 
‘for a considerable time... have paid three obols to their own sailors’ in order to persuade Tissaphernes to 
reduce the pay of the Peloponnesians, and I think that it is unlikely that Alcibiades would lie about 
Athenian misthos since the rate would have been generally known:  had he done so, he would have been 
offering the satrap an ineffective argument.”  Dover (HCT iv.293) and Andrewes (HCT v.97-98), despite 
coming to different conclusions than Pritchett on the standard Athenian rate of pay before 412 (see below 
p.331 n.110), also took “ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου” to be going with “διδόασιν.” 
 
85 (1971) 24.  Gomme (HCT ii.275-276) also took 8.45.2 to be evidence for the standard rate of pay of three 
obols per day. 
 




(in this instance)87 is a comparative:  it does not mean a “considerable” or “long,”88 but 
rather a “longer” amount of time.89  Translated correctly, it makes no sense when taken 
with “διδόασιν:”  Alcibiades would be telling Tissaphernes to tell the Peloponnesians that 
the Athenians were paying three obols per day for a longer time than the Peloponnesians 
were; this obviously does not fit with the facts that Tissaphernes was paying the 
Peloponnesians by this stage, that he had just cut their pay from one drachma to three 
obols, and that he had to bribe the trierarchs and generals to accept the new rate of three 
obols.  Thucy. 8.45.2 does not, then, indicate that the Athenians had been paying three 
obols per man per day to their sailors for a considerable time before the winter of 412/11; 
rather, it strongly implies again that the Athenians had been used to paying their men a 
higher rate than three obols until forced to reduce the rate of pay due to financial 
exigencies.   
Earlier in the same winter, Tissaphernes came to Miletus to distribute, as he had 
promised the Peloponnesians previously at Sparta that he would do (Thucy. 8.5.5),90 a 
month’s pay at the rate of an Attic drachma per man per day; for the future, though, he 
proposed to give only three obols until he should ask the King; and if the King so 
                                                 
87 At Thucy. 8.88, “ἐκ πλείονος” on its own does mean “long” (Alcibiades had “long” been aware that 
Tissaphernes had no intention of bringing the Phoenician ships to the Aegean).  But see Thucy. 1.118.2 [τὸ 
πλέον τοῦ χρόνου] and 5.15.2 [περὶ τοῦ πλείονος χρόνου] for similar usage to 8.45.2, i.e. a form of πλέων 
with χρόνου meaning “longer.” 
 
88 Pritchett ([1971] 24) translated “ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου” as “for a long time.” 
 
89 See also Tucker (1892) 193, Morrison et al. (2000) 119, Hornblower, CT iii.887-888 for taking πλέονος 
in this way, and also the last cited for examples of other modern commentators doing so. 
 





ordered, he would give the full drachma (“ἐντελῆ τὴν δραχµήν”) (Thucy. 8.29.1).  The 
phrasing of Tissaphernes’ offer gives the “strong impression that a ‘full drachma’ was the 
pay normally expected.”91  But why was this rate expected?  As Thucy. 8.45.2 (and Xen., 
Hell. 1.5.1-8) demonstrate, the rates of pay offered by the Peloponnesians—made 
possible by Persian financial support—were determined by competition with the pay 
rates offered by the Athenians.  This means that the pay rates offered and promised by 
Tissaphernes had to match the Athenian rate for naval service of one drachma per man 
per day, in order to enable the Peloponnesians to compete with the Athenians for 
manpower for their triremes:92  it should be noted in this respect that Tissaphernes 
distributed and offered to pay for the future one Attic drachma per day. 
 Moreover, at Thucy. 8.45.6, Alcibiades promised that the Peloponnesian sailors 
would get their full pay (“ἐντελῆ... τὸν µισθὸν”) as soon as funds arrived down from the 
King.93  Three obols per day was, then, not considered as full pay by either it payer or its 
payees, implying strongly that an (Attic) drachma per day was expected by the 
Peloponnesian sailors and their officers as a standard rate of pay (as would the fact that 
Alcibiades felt the need for bribery of the trierarchs and generals of the Peloponnesian 
fleet in order to get them to accept the dubious reasoning for the reduction in pay to three 
obols per day per man).  The Peloponnesian sailors continued to complain that they were 
                                                 
91 Gabrielsen (1994) 112; cf. Jordan (1975) 115. 
 
92 See esp. Andrewes, HCT v.97:  “[s]imilarly it is more likely that Tissaphernes first offered the standard 
Athenian rate (at 29, 45.6), then reduced it when the Athenian rate dropped to 3 ob., than that he began by 
offering double the standard rate.  That the Athenian rate did drop to 3 ob. after 413 is likely in itself, and 
confirmed by Plu. Alc. 35.5, and the argument of Lysandros at X. HG i.5.4.” 
 




not receiving their full pay of one drachma per day throughout the winter of 412/11 
(Thucy. 8.50.3) and the summer of 411 (Thucy. 8.78, 8.83.2-3).94  Even in 407, the 
Spartans could still propose a rate of pay of one Attic drachma per man per day to Cyrus 
for the sailors of the Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean (Xen., Hell. 1.5.4).  The strong 
implication from the continued requests for an Attic drachma per day is that this rate had 
been established before 412 as a standard rate for Greek sailors in the eastern 
Mediterranean:  it can only have been established as such by the payment practices of the 
state that had launched many more campaigns and fleets—and had complete control of 
the seas—in the years before 412—Athens.    
 Epigraphical evidence suggests that a drachma per man per day was also the rate 
paid by the Athenian state prior to the Peloponnesian war.  On the thirteenth day of the 
first prytany of 433/2, the treasurers of Athena disbursed at least 26 talents to the generals 
commanding a first squadron of ten ships setting out for Corcyra (IG I3 364.12 with 
Thucy. 1.45.1); twenty-fours days later,95 they disbursed at least another 50 talents for a 
second squadron of twenty ships sent out to Corcyra to reinforce the first ten ships (IG I3 
364.23 with Thucy. 1.50.5, 1.51.1).  Each of the sums mentioned here are (restored) 
minima—alternative (and equally plausible) restorations give much larger amounts in 
each case96—although they are almost certainly the total amount spent on the Corcyran 
                                                 
94 See appendix 6. 
 
95 This date is restored, but almost certain:  see Gomme, HCT i.196-197. 
 
96 See the remarks of Lewis at IG I3, p.334 on, respectively, ll.12 and 23 of IG I3 364:  “... sed etiam 6]6 T. 




expedition.97  The Athenians, then, at the one drachma per day rate, dispatched (at least) 
the equivalent of two and a half months’ pay with each squadron—or, at the three obol 
per day rate, (at least) five months’ pay (assuming two hundred men per trireme in each 
case).98  The squadrons sailed from Athens at some point after funds were disbursed for 
them on July 10 and August 3, respectively:99 they could be expected by the Athenians to 
return by the end of October at the latest—both because battle with the Corinthians was 
imminent100 and because the end of October marked the end of the normal (safe) sailing 
season for triremes.101  The Athenians, then, almost certainly expected the ships to be 
away for no more than two and half to three months, and not for five months (and into the 
winter):  the one drachma per day per man pay rate therefore makes much better sense 
than a three obol rate does of IG I3 364.12, 23.102 
                                                 
97 Although fifth century inscribed records of Athenian expenditures only record payments from “sacral” 
sources (Samons [2000] 48, 78-80, App.3), it is clear that the treasury of Athena served as the primary, if 
not exclusive, source of funding for major Athenian overseas expeditions before c. 428/7 ((ibid.) 158 and 
n.198; cf. (ibid.) 80, 152-153, 162, 193-194, 240 and n.106):  further payments for the squadrons sailing to 
Corcyra can almost certainly be excluded, then (see also Blamire [2001] 102 for this conclusion). 
 
98 See again appendix 2 for the legitimacy of this assumption.  It should be noted here that the sums 
recorded at IG I3 364.12, 23 do not represent aggregated expenditures for the expedition, but only 
individual payments made by the treasurers of Athena on each date.  These figures therefore cannot be used 
to reconstruct the duration of the ships’ absence from Athens (contra, e.g., Pritchett [1971] 9 and n.25, 
Loomis [1998] 39 and n.27), but only for the Athenians’ estimate of how long the ships might be away 
from Athens. 
 
99 See again Gomme, HCT i.196-197 for these dates. 
 
100 See Gomme, HCT i.197 citing Thucy. 1.31.1-2. 
 
101 Meiggs (1972) 259.  This latter point cannot admit of complete certainty, but it was very rare (at this 
date) for sizeable fleets of triremes to sail or operate in winter (see chapter 1 section i), and it is therefore 
most improbable that the Athenians would have foreseen the two squadrons operating into the winter. 
 
102 See Gallo (1987) 45 and n.69:  one drachma rates likely before the war on account of the huge financial 
reserves present at Athens then.  Note finally that Pritchett comments ([1971] 9 and n.25) of the 
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 Almost a decade before, the Athenians fought a major war to put down a Samian 
revolt (Thucy. 1.115.2-117), and the inscription recording the yearly aggregates of the 
disbursements of the treasurers of Athena for this war is extant (if very fragmentary) (IG 
I3 363).103  Four figures are recorded:  yearly totals of 128+ talents, 368+ talents, and 
908+ talents (these yearly totals reflecting the disbursements of three different boards of 
treasurers of Athena in three different Panathenaic years),104 and a total figure for the 
expenditures on the operations at Samos of 1,400+ talents (IG I3 363.5, 12, 17, 19 
respectively).  I will focus solely on the first payment here to show that it supports a rate 
of one drachma per man per day for men employed by the Athenian state for military 
service.   
Thucydides narrates that, in the sixth year of the truce between the Athenians and 
the Spartans and their allies after the first Peloponnesian war, i.e. in 441/0, forty Athenian 
triremes sailed to Samos, in response to Milesian appeals (after these had been defeated 
in a war with the Samians) and representations from some private individuals from 
Samos (who wished to change the constitution of their polis) (1.115.2).  The forty 
Athenian triremes on their arrival at Samos set up a democracy there, took hostages from 
the Samians and lodged them in Lemnos, and then returned home, having left a garrison 
on the island (1.115.3).  The Samians then revolted, having first taken several measures 
                                                                                                                                                 
disbursements recorded for the Corcyra expedition that “...we may be wrong in attributing the entire sum to 
misthos, although no one has offered any suggestions in this direction.”  Since the two squadrons were not 
engaging (or expected to be engaging) in any sort of special operations, however, there is no reason to think 
that any (major) expenditures other than pay had to be made for them. 
 
103 Fornara demonstrated that the payments recorded in IG I3 363 were all for the operations at Samos:  
(1979) 9-12. 
 




to secure their position for a revolt and for an expedition against Miletus (the Byzantines 
joined the revolt with them) (1.115.4-5).  As soon as the Athenians heard the news, they 
sailed with sixty ships against Samos (1.116.1).  These were subsequently reinforced by 
another forty triremes from Athens (and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos), after which 
the Athenians established a blockade of the city (1.116.3) (and Pericles then sailed with 
sixty ships of the blockading squadron to Caunus and Caria to prevent the suspected 
approach of a Phoenician fleet to help the Samians (1.116.4)).  After some (Athenian) 
reverses, the blockade was re-established after the return of the triremes under Pericles, 
after which again another sixty triremes arrived from Athens (and a further thirty from 
Chios and Lesbos) (1.117.1-2).  The Samians eventually capitulated after a siege of eight 
months (the Byzantines surrendered, too) (1.117.3). 
The first yearly sum of disbursements of 128+ talents can be safely associated 
with the forty ships that sailed to Samos and installed the democracy there.  This can be 
demonstrated by some simple arithmetic.  Working from Thucydides’ narrative, we can 
be sure that the sixty ships sent to Samos on the news of the revolt certainly remained at 
the island during the establishment and continuation of the first blockade there, or took 
part in the operations further south under Pericles; that they certainly remained at Samos 
during the re-establishment of the blockade; and that they certainly remained there for the 
duration of the successful eight month siege (see again 1.117.2:  the sixty triremes from 
Athens are described by Thucydides as reinforcements and not replacements (the verb 
used is “προσεβοήθησαν”)).  If any part of the sum of 128+ talents disbursed for the first 
year of the operations at Samos were paid out for these sixty ships, then the second yearly 
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sum of 368+ talents cannot work.105  For the sixty ships first dispatched to suppress the 
revolt were present for the duration of the siege—which went on into a third 
(Panathenaic) year, as the third annual sum of 908+ talents recorded at IG I3 363.17 
shows.  Therefore, if any part of the first annual sum of 128+ talents were paid out to 
these sixty ships, they would have had to have been present for the whole of the second 
year of the siege.  In this case, even at three obols per man per day, disbursements for 
these ships would have amounted to 360 talents (30 talents per trireme x 12 months).  But 
these sixty ships were joined by a further forty ships from Athens at some point; 
Thucydides’ narrative of the revolt is compressed, but it is clear that (almost certainly) 
much less than a year passed before these forty ships were sent out to Samos.  Again, 
even at three obols per man per day, only one months’ disbursement for the forty ships—
and there must have spent more than one month at Samos in the year after the first sixty 
ships were sent out—would have come to 20 talents.  In addition, it is probable that the 
final reinforcements of sixty ships from Athens arrived at Samos less than a year after the 
sixty ships had sailed out, which would have required again more transfers from the 
treasury of Athena.  In sum, if the sixty ships which sailed out to Samos on the news of 
the revolt there had received any payments from the first annual sum of disbursements 
from the treasury of Athena for the expedition, the second annual sum would have had to 
have been much larger than just under 370 talents.106 
                                                 
105 It should be noted here that, in the case of the 128+ and 368+ talents yearly totals, it is certain from the 
inscription that the restored total sum has to be less than 130 and 370 talents respectively. 
 
106 The point made at p.396 n.27 above should be re-emphasized here:  the treasury of Athena served as the 
primary, if not exclusive, source of funding for major Athenian overseas expeditions in this period; any 





The first sum of 128+ talents is, then, the only payment that can be safely 
associated with a discrete set of operations by Athenian triremes in the Samian war:107  
i.e., the expenses incurred by the squadron of forty triremes which imposed a democracy 
on Samos.108  This conclusion is completely consistent with Thucydides’ narrative:  there 
was a definite and large gap in time between the Athenian installation of the democracy 
on Samos and the second Athenian dispatch of triremes (filled in by the Samian 
preparations for revolt and the expedition against Samos).  And a rate of one talent per 
man per day makes much better sense of the 128+ talents than a rate of three obols per 
man per day.  It would mean that the forty triremes were away for 3⅓ months rather than 
6½ months, and the shorter period seems a much better fit with their actions (sailing to 
Samos (no more than a week’s journey in normal conditions), setting up the democracy, 
                                                 
107 Fornara demonstrated that the expenditures for the Samian operations recorded in IG I3 363 extended 
over three Panathenaic years (see two previous notes), but his dating of these years as 442/1, 441/0, and 
440/39 (see [1979] 12-18) clashes with the evidence of Thucydides (1.115.2) and the (Atthidographic) 
scholium on Aristoph., Wasps 283—which both date the initial operations to 441/0—and therefore should 
be rejected.  In addition, as Meritt pointed out ([1984] 132 n.22), Fornara also failed to take account of the 
fact that the sums paid out for the war by the treasury of Athena were debited when they were given to the 
generals, and not when they were spent:  thus, the 368+ talents spent in the second year of the war may also 
have covered expenses in the third year—which presents an insuperable problem for Fornara’s chronology, 
which uses the expenditures recorded in IG I3 363 to estimate time spent in the field ([1979] 12-14).  No 
scholar subsequent to Fornara has been able, however, to come up with a convincing framework that would 
bring into agreement the evidence of Thucydides (and the Aristophanic scholiast) that the operations at 
Samos began in 441/0 and Fornara’s demonstration that the treasurers of Athena paid out sums in three 
different Panathenaic years:  Lewis’ position ([1992b] 502; cf. ML, p.150; IG I3, p.333) that the first 
payment for Samos was in the conciliar year of 441/0, and the second in 440/39 before the Panathenaea, 
with the third also in 440/39, but after the Panathenaea, is not plausible.  Meritt’s [1984] attempt to re-argue 
the position that IG I3 363 records separate accounts for Byzantium and Samos over the years 441/0 and 
440/39 does not work for the same reasons that his original arguments, demolished by Fornara, do not 
work; and also because, as Bridges showed ([1980] 187-188), IG I3 48 is not an annual list of Athenian 
strategoi and therefore cannot aid in dating the conclusion of the war with Samos.  It is therefore 
impossible, as of the present time, to associate the expenditures recorded at IG I3 363.12, 17 with certainty 
to any particular phase of the operations at Samos. 
 
108 The special measures taken for the siege against Samos (see chapter 2 section iic above) (obviously) did 
not have to be taken for the forty ships sent out to install the democracy:  again, then, there is no reason to 




taking hostages and placing them on Lemnos, leaving a garrison, and returning home 
again).  We should take it, then, that the Athenians engaged in the operations at Samos in 
the late 440s were paid at the rate of one drachma per man per day.109 
One drachma per man per day was therefore the standard Athenian military rate 
of pay for at least thirty years before 412.110  There is no evidence to suggest (or reason to 
                                                 
109 Fornara ([1979] 12-14) used the expenditures for the expedition against Samos attested at IG I3 363 
together with the ship figures provided by Thucydides, and a rate of one drachma per man per day (= one 
talent per trireme per month), to calculate the duration of the Athenian operations at Samos.  Since Fornara 
simply assumed the one drachma per day rate, his linkage between this rate and the duration of the 
Athenian operations is circular, and thus his argument cannot be used as a means to employ the 
expenditures on the expedition as evidence that one drachma per day per man was the going rate for 
Athenian sailors at this time:  see Loomis (1998) 38-39 for the argument and references. 
 
110 That the one drachma per man per day rate was the standard rate during the Peloponnesian war has 
already been argued for, most effectively by Gallo ([1987] 36-45) (especially) and Loomis ([1998] chapter 
2 (esp. 55-56), 266-269); the treatment of the Thucydidean mentions of rates of pay here owes much to 
Gallo’s discussion.  Also arguing for the one drachma rate as normal for Athenian forces in the fifth 
century (before 412):  Dover, HCT iv.293 (ad Thucy. 6.31.3) and Andrewes, HCT v.97-98 (ad Thucy. 
8.45.2 ) (but see p.322 n.84 above for an important problem with Dover’s and Andrewes’ treatments, and 
chapter 6 section v for another major problem for Andrewes’ treatment); Cook (1990) 80-82 (but see 
chapter 4 section iv, chapter 6 section v, and p.291 n.3, p.307 n.48 for problems with her discussion of this 
problem); Hornblower, CT iii.887-888 (ad Thucy. 8.45.2) (with Hornblower, CT i.402 (ad Thucy. 3.17.4) 
(following Dovers and Andrewes but curiously stating that the “Dover/Andrewes view is accepted by 
Pritchett, GSW i.14ff.”) and Hornblower, CT iii.386 (ad Thucy. 6.31.3)).  See, in addition, Tänzer (1912) 73 
(without argumentation for his view); Jones (1952) 16 n.33 and (1957) 32, 142 n.54 (without 
argumentation); Amit (1965) 51-52 (but stating incorrectly there that one drachma was the rate during most 
of the Peloponnesian war, but it was three obols before and after the war); see also Rhodes (1981) 306 (ad 
[Arist.], Ath. Pol. 24.3) contra Pritchett, “more probably a higher rate was normal until after the Sicilian 
expedition”) and (1994) 192 (contra Pritchett, Rhodes “inclined to think that 1 drachma was normal until 
after the Sicilian expedition”) (without argumentation in either case); Morrison et al. (2000) 119 (though 
they state at [2000] 118 that this was a high rate in 415); van Wees (2004) 238 (though he curiously cites 
Pritchett’s discussion of pay rates in the footnote supporting his statement that one drachma was the 
standard Athenian rate ([2004] 316 n.30)).  See also the discussion of Gauthier (1966) at p.334 n.119 below  
(See also pp.337-339 below for why the rate attested at Thucy. 5.47.6 (three Aiginetan obols per day per 
man) cannot be used as evidence for usual Athenian pay rates.)  Older views that three obols was the 
standard rate for Athenian forces during the Peloponnesian war can now be rejected:  see, e.g., in addition 
to Pritchett and Gomme, Böckh (1886) 344 and Schultheß (1932) col. 2085 (without any argumentation); 
see also Markle (1985) 276 (following Pritchett).  See esp. Gallo (1987) 37 n.41 in this regard:  “[n]ei casi 
menzionati da Tucidide, infatti, ricorre, sino al 412, sempre e solo la paga di 1 dracma:  il presupposto di un 
carattere speciale di tale importo costringe perciò a considerali tutti come delle eccezioni rispetto a una 
presunta regola di cui, in realtà, non vi sono attestazioni.”  This means that reconstructions of Athenian 
annual naval budgets (see, e.g., French [1972] 5 and n.12 and Unz [1985] 24 n.13) and calculations of fifth 
century Athenian fleet costs (see, e.g., Finley [1983] 49, 51; Hölkeskamp [1997] 531 (cf. Wallace [1974] 
41, expressly following Pritchett for a three obol rate, and using this rate to check the reliability of 
Herodotus’ account of Themistocles’ bribery of Adeimantos at Artemision (Hdt. 8.4-6))) which used the 
three obol per man per day rate now have no basis.  Finally, the agnosticism avowed by many recent 
authors (even after Gallo’s and Loomis’ discussions) as to whether three obols or one drachma was the 
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think) that one drachma was a higher rate of pay offered only to some ranks or members 
of ships’ crews, with some rowers receiving less (i.e., three obols a day):111 higher rates 
of pay were restricted to officers in infantry forces and cavalry (both in Athenian and 
other classical Greek military forces);112 non-officer members of Athenian infantry forces 
received the same pay as sailors employed by the Athenians.113  The fact that Athenian 
                                                                                                                                                 
usual rate of pay for Athenian forces before 412 should now be rejected, too:  see Gabrielsen (1994) 111 
(neither the 3 obol nor 1 dr. rate view can be rejected); Samons (2000) 89 n.27 (cf. [2000] 93, 207, 208, 
306) (hesitation, caused by Pritchett’s arguments (see [2000] 208 n.170 citing Pritchett for uncertainty over 
rates of naval and hoplite pay at Athens in the fifth century), over whether the normal rate of Athenian pay 
before 412 was three obols or one drachma (but see [2000] 235 n.87:  one drachma rate “probable” at the 
time of the Sicilian expedition)); Kallet (2001) 53 and n.115 (not coming down on one side or other of the 
three obol vs. one drachma debate (but stating that “a drachma for ordinary sailors was high”)) (see also 
next note); Olson (2002) 122 (ad Ar., Ach. 161-162) (hesitation on whether one drachma was the standard 
rate of pay in Athens in the 420s); Raaflaub (2007) 99 and Gabrielsen (2007) 258 (not choosing definitively 
between three obols and one drachma). 
 
111 Contra Kallet (2001) 53 (“daily rates of pay likely fluctuated in accordance with the situation and the 
rank of the crew”) and 53 n.115 (there was in fifth century Athens no “standard wage independent of rank 
and status”).  Cf. Rawlings (2007) 115-116.  See also Jordan (1975) 113-115 distinguishing between a 
normal rate of 1 drachma per day for the nautai and 3 obols a day for the hyperesia of a ship; this view, 
however, is based on a misreading of Thucy. 6.31.3 (which does not suggest, contra Jordan [1975] 113, that 
the hyperesia received less than a drachma per day:  see Loomis [1998] 56 n.100) and a misunderstanding 
of the term hyperesia (which did not, contra Jordan [1975] 240-263, consist of slaves and freedmen:  see 
Morrison [1984] passim, and esp. 49, 50, 52; see Gallo (1987) 39 and n.54, 45 and n. 69 for other criticisms 
of Jordan’s arguments; cf. Gabrielsen [1994] 248 n. 2 for other work contradicting Jordan on this point).  
Contra Kallet and Rawling, Thucy. 6.31.3 does not represent evidence for different rates of pay for 
different sections of trireme crews, but simply the common practice of the payment of inducements by 
trierarchs to attract better quality crews: see Gabrielsen (1994) 121-122 for discussion and examples.  
Rosivach’s contention ([1985] 52-53) that the one drachma rate was for ‘year-round’ sailors while the three 
obol rate was for ‘seasonal’ sailors misses the points that the two rates are never simultaneously attested, 
and that the three obol rate is explicitly described as being caused by financial difficulties; in addition, he 
can cite no evidence to substantiate his notion.  (See also pp.347-348 n.151 for further refutation of 
Rosivach.) Most importantly for the question of equal pay for trireme crew members, it should be noted 
that all calculations in the classical period of pay for trireme crews proceed on the basis of equal pay for 
each of the two hundred crew members:  see appendix 2. 
 
112 See last note fin. on the pay of trireme crews; see Burrer’s discussion at (2008) 79-80 for infantry forces. 
 
113 Other rates of pay mentioned at Athens in the fifth century are either exaggerations and/or do not 
certainly refer to military rates of pay.  The rate of pay mentioned at Aristoph., Ach. 159-163 (produced at 
the Lenaea of 425) of 2 drachmas per day per man to be paid by the Athenians to some Thracian peltasts is 
clearly a comic exaggeration (Olson [2002] 121).  The rates of two obols per man per day (apparently for 
rowing (MacDowell [1971] 285 ad loc.)) mentioned at Aristoph., Wasps 1187-1189 (produced at the 
Lenaea of 422) refers to theoric and not military service, and may be again comic (under-)exaggeration.  
The figure of four obols mentioned at IG I3 93.32, an inscription concerned with preparations for the 
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military pay remained unchanged for at least thirty years (and changed in 412 only 
because of financial emergency) does not make sense in a world where pay rates 
responded to changes in commodity prices in local markets.114  Although prices for the 
basic grains of wheat and barley were generally stable year on year over the course of the 
fifth and fourth centuries in the Greek world,115 fluctuations in the prices of these grains 
normally occurred over the course of a harvest cycle; and there were also frequently 
localized spikes in grain prices in particular areas caused by disruptions to the production 
and/or distribution of grain specific to those areas.116  If Athenian military rates of pay 
were determined by food prices, then, they could not have taken on the standardized 
character they did, in fact, take.117 
 
Customary rates of pay were known in other parts of the late fifth and early fourth 
century Greek world.  They can be demonstrated for the Peloponnese from a treaty 
between Athens and three Peloponnesian states during the Peloponnesian war, an 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sicilian expedition, may be referring to a rate of pay, but certainty on this point is impossible: see Gallo 
(1987) 39 and n.54, Loomis (1998) 43 (contra Kallet [2001] 188-189). 
 
114 Note also in this regard that the pay rate of three obols attested for the sailors of the Athenian navy in the 
winter of 412/11 seems still to have been their rate of pay in 407 (see pp.302-304, pp.314-316 above):  i.e., 
it appears that this rate remained unchanged for five years (at least:  we have no evidence for Athenian rates 
of naval pay after 407 again until 351 (Dem. 4.28)). 
 
115 The (very) limited evidence for this statement (Heichelheim (1935) 887-889, Markle (1985) 293-294) is 
restricted to the Aegean. 
 
116 See chapter 7 section v. 
 
117 This provides the final proof that Pritchett was incorrect to attribute the one drachma rate attested for 
Athenian operations before 412 to expected high food prices in the markets to be provided to Athenian 




agreement reached by the member states of the Peloponnesian League in 383, and 
numismatic evidence.  In 420, Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis agreed a treaty in which 
each agreed to provide military assistance to the other states.118  The clause on pay for the 
military force of any of these states that might come to the help of another reads as 
follows (Thucy. 5.47.6):   
τοῖς δὲ βοηθοῦσιν ἡ πόλις ἡ πέµπουσα παρεχέτω µέχρι µὲν τριάκοντα ἡµερῶν 
σῖτον ἐπὴν ἔλθωσιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἐπαγγείλασαν βοηθεῖν, καὶ ἀπιοῦσι κατὰ 
ταὐτά· ἢν δὲ πλέονα βούλωνται χρόνον τῇ στρατιᾷ χρῆσθαι, ἡ πόλις ἡ 
µεταπεµψαµένη διδότω σῖτον, τῷ µὲν ὁπλιτῃ καὶ ψιλῷ καὶ τοξότῃ τρεῖς ὀβολοὺς 
Αἰγιναίους τῆς ἡµέρας ἑκάστης, τῷ δ’ ἱππεῖ δραχµὴν Αἰγιναίαν. 
 
the relieving troops shall be maintained by the city sending them for thirty days 
from their arrival in the city that has required them, and upon their return in the 
same way; if their services be desired for a longer period the city that sent for 
them shall maintain them, at a rate of three Aiginetan obols per day for a hoplite, 
archer, or light-armed soldier, and an Aiginetan drachma for a cavalryman.119 
 
                                                 
118 Thucy. 5.47.1-12.  A very fragmentary of the Athenian inscribed copy of the treaty exists (IG I3 83):  the 
few discrepancies between Thucydides’ text and the text of the inscription can be easily explained (see 
Hornblower, CT iii.109-111, 114, 116). 
 
119 The Attic equivalent of three Aiginetan obols was 4.325 obols:  Loomis (1998) 41-42 and n.35.  This 
fact causes an insuperable problem for a hypothesis advanced by Gauthier on Athenian pay based on 
Thucy. 5.47.6.  Gauthier ([1966] 75-76), taking three Aiginetan obols to be worth four Athenian obols, 
believed that the four Athenian obols of this treaty marked a return to an earlier Athenian military pay rate 
of four obols per day.  Gauthier’s evidence and arguments for the earlier pay rate were: firstly, a passage in 
Plutarch (Per. 27) stating that Pericles sent out 60 triremes each year, on which citizens served for eight 
months while receiving pay; secondly, evidence from Thucydides that these citizens received a drachma 
per day; he argued from these data that the pay rate for the sailors on Pericles’ ships was therefore four 
obols per day per year (=one drachma per day per eight months), and it must have been the same for 
hoplites.  Gauthier argues that the pay rate was then raised to one drachma per day per year but after the 
Athenians found out, in the siege of Potidaea, that paying one drachma per day for the whole year was 
draining their resources very quickly, they went back (i.e. in this treaty) to paying four obols per day, but 
this time in actuality, rather than by paying their forces one drachma per day for eight months.  But, in 
addition to the fact that evaluating three Aiginetan obols as 4.325 Athenian obols means Gauthier’s 
numbers do not work, the historical accuracy of the Plutarchan passage is very doubtful (see Gabrielsen 
[1994] 111 and n.13), and there is no support in Thucydides for pay being limited to eight months a year.  
In addition, the four obol per day thesis cannot support the weight of the evidence for a rate of one drachma 
per day paid by the Segestans and the Athenians in 415 and by the Athenians in 413 (Gauthier’s attempts to 
do so ([1966] 76 are feeble).  Gauthier is also incorrect to think that the pay rate mentioned in 5.47.6 was 
determined solely by Athenian thinking:  see just below.  In general, Gauthier’s hypothesis is simply 




(The σῖτος of this treaty should be taken as simply referring to an ordinary 
payment for service—i.e. not merely pay for rations—since there is no evidence of 
military payments solely of rations existed in the late fifth century, despite the arguments 
of Pritchett and Griffith.)120  In 383, some ambassadors came from Acanthus and 
Apollonia to Sparta to address the Spartans and their allies (Xen., Hell. 5.2.11ff.).  The 
ambassadors had come to complain that the Chalcidian federation, led by Olynthus, had 
been expanding and absorbing many neighboring cities:  it was now threatening Acanthus 
and Apollonia, and the envoys had come to enlist Peloponnesian help against their larger 
neighbor.  The decision was taken by the Spartans and their allies to send out the full 
force of the Peloponnesian League, nominally ten thousand men, each state furnishing an 
appropriate contingent (Xen., Hell. 5.2.20).  A proposal was added, however, that “any 
polis which so desired should be allowed to give money instead of men, three Aiginetan 
obols per day for each man, while if any state normally furnished cavalry, pay equal to 
that of four hoplites should be given for each horseman...”121   
The fact that the three Aiginetan obols to be paid to hoplites in this proposal is the 
same rate paid to hoplites in the treaty agreed between the Athenians, Argives, 
Mantineans, and Eleans in 420 (though the rate for cavalry given in Xenophon is twice as 
much) strongly suggests that this rate of pay was standard for Peloponnesian infantry 
forces in the fifth and early fourth centuries.  The conclusion that the fact that the two 
                                                 
120 See chapter 2 section ii for Pritchett, and chapter 6 section vi for Griffith. 
 
121 Xen., Hell. 5.2.21:  “... ἀργύριον τε ἀντ’ ἀνδρῶν ἐξεῖναι διδόναι τῇ βουλοµένῃ τῶν πόλεων, τριώβολον 
Αἰγιναῖον κατὰ ἄνδρα, ἱππέας τε εἴ τις παρέχοι, ἀντὶ τεττάρων ὁπλιτῶν τὸν µισθὸν τῷ ἱππεῖ δίδοσθαι.”  
See Figueira (1981) 82:  since the Aiginetan standard was predominant amongst the Peloponnesian allies of 
Sparta, the financial dealings of the league would be facilitated by the “mutual convertibility” of triobols on 




rates of pay mentioned in these passages are the same is not the result of simple 
coincidence, but, on the contrary, is an indication of a customary rate of pay for 
Peloponnesian infantry service at this time gains strength from two considerations.  
Firstly, the fact that the triobol (on the Aeginetan standard) was the predominant 
denomination of the Arcadian federal coinage of the fifth century “strongly suggests that 
this was not a coinage designed for the purposes of retail trade, but rather for large 
numbers of payments at a standard rate...”122  Thucy. 5.47.6 suggests strongly that these 
large numbers of payments at a standard rate were very probably military payments.123  
Secondly, the treaty the Athenians made with the Argives, Eleans and Mantineans in 420 
establishing the four poleis as allies—and rates of pay for allied expeditions—was made 
to last one hundred years.124  The fact that a rate of pay could be included in such a treaty 
(no provision was made in the treaty for adjustment to the rate of pay to reflect changed 
circumstances) makes most sense if it were a static, customary rate; it does not make 
sense in a world where military rates of pay responded to fluctuations in the prices of 
basic subsistence foods. 
 
                                                 
122 Kraay (1976) 98. 
 
123 Kraay (1976) 98:  “... it is probably not a coincidence that the treaty made in 420 between the Athenians 
and a number of Peloponnesian powers (including the Mantineans from Arcadia) the daily pay of an 
infantry-man is stipulated as three Aiginetan obols (Thuc. 5.47).”  See also Carradice and Price (1988) 77.  
Cf. Lewis (1992a) 105 (though his statement that Thuc. v.47.6 demonstrates that a triobol on the Aeginetan 
standard was “a normal Peloponnesian soldier’s ration allowance” is imprecise and incorrect); Hornblower, 
CT iii.115. 
 





 At this point, I want to digress briefly to consider two related arguments W. T. 
Loomis made concerning the reasons for the rates of pay found at Thucy. 5.47.6 and 
Xen., Hell. 5.2.21. Loomis, in his examination of Athenian military pay, concluded that 
the σῖτος payment at Thucy. 5.47.6 was for “gross pay”; since, however, a σῖτος payment 
of (the equivalent of) 4.325 Attic obols was lower than the one drachma per day rate 
attested for earlier Athenian military forces, he thought the rate of three Aiginetan obols 
needed explanation.  He thus advanced the possibility “that the lower figure than (than 1 
dr. p.d.) reflects lower labor and living costs in the more rural Peloponnese, where 
locally-produced food was more likely to be available.”125  He used this rationale again as 
an objection against Pritchett’s argument that 3 obols per day was the standard rate for 
Athenian forces in the later fifth century:  “a rate well in excess of 3 ob. p.d. is supported 
by the alliance of 420:  it is hard to see how the equivalent of 4.325 ob. p.d. could be the 
standard rate in the rural Peloponnese if 3 ob. were the standard in urban Athens.”126  
Loomis, in other words, was assuming that the rate of pay recorded for Athenian infantry 
forces at Thucy. 5.47.6 could have been determined by the prices expected to be charged 
for food in markets in areas of military operations. 
 Yet a careful reading of the rest of the treaty between the Athenians and the 
Peloponnesian states demonstrates that such an assumption is not warranted.  Firstly, at 
5.47.3, it is agreed that, if an enemy should invade the land of the Athenians, the Argives, 
Eleans and Mantineans would bring aid to Athens.  Thus, the treaty foresees military 
                                                 
125 (1998) 42. 
 




actions outside the ‘rural’ Peloponnese and in ‘urban’ Athens.  Secondly, at 5.47.7, the 
treaty states: 
Ἡ δὲ πόλις ἡ µεταπεµψαµένη τὴν στρατιὰν τὴν ἡγεµονίαν ἐχέτω, ὅταν ἐν τῇ 
αὐτῆς ὁ πόλεµος ᾖ.  ἢν δέ ποι δόξῃ ἁπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι κοινῇ στρατεύεσθαι, τὸ 
ἴσον τῆς ἡγεµονίας µετεῖναι ἁπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν. 
 
The city sending for the troops shall have the command when the war is in its 
own country; but in case of the cities resolving upon a joint expedition 
[anywhere] the command shall be equally divided among all the cities. 
 
Thus, the treaty allows for military operations not just in the Peloponnese, but also in 
Attica, and wherever else the four states might decide jointly to wage war.  Therefore, 
although the treaty was directed against the Spartans (see Thucy. 5.42-46), there is no 
way in which, in drawing up the articles of the treaty, prices (current or expected) in the 
Peloponnese could have been the sole determining factor when the Athenians agreed 
upon the rates of pay for any potential military campaign. 
 Moreover, Loomis’ position on the pay rates in this treaty assumes that the 
Athenians were the polis that set these rates.  There is no reason to assume this, but there 
are positive reasons to think such an assumption false.  As Andrewes has pointed out, 
considering the three Aiginetan obols in this treaty to be a reduction in pay for Athenian 
forces used to a standard rate of one drachma per day per man ignores the fact that “this 
was a figure agreed between four states by no means equal in wealth and need not follow 
the Athenian standard rate...”127  In addition, the fact that the rates of pay were expressed 
in the Aiginetan standard suggests strongly that they were the result of a compromise 
                                                 




between the four states, and that the rates followed Peloponnesian norms:128  this 
consideration gains strength from the fact that Elis, Mantinea, and Argos were all coining 
at this time on the Aiginetan standard.  If, therefore, as seems most probable, the rate of 
pay of three Aiginetan obols per day was the result of an agreement between the four 
states that signed up to the treaty, and not solely an Athenian decision, then there is no 
reason to assume from the fact that the rate of pay found in this treaty is lower than the 
previously attested Athenian rate of one drachma per day per man that expectations 
regarding prices to be found on any campaign to be waged by these four states formed 
any part of the decision to set the pay at three Aiginetan obols. 
Commenting on Xen., Hell. 5.2.21, Loomis (again taking the three Aiginetan 
obols (= 4.325 Athenian obols) to be “gross pay”) stated:  “[w]e have no direct evidence 
as to what Athenian military pay rates were at this time, but their gross pay should have 
been higher than the 4.325 obols that was established in the more rural Peloponnese, 
where living costs were presumably lower.”129  Loomis made the same mistake here as he 
did in his treatment of Thucy. 5.47.6.  Living costs—i.e. food prices—in the Peloponnese 
cannot have formed any part of the allies’ considerations when they set the rate of pay to 
be given to the substitute soldiers, since the campaign for which the pay was given was 
planned (and fought:  see Xen., Hell. 5.2.23ff., 5.2.37ff., 5.3.1ff.) against Olynthus, a city 
in the northern Aegean.  This passage therefore does not provide any support for the 
                                                 
128 See Gallo (1987) 38.  The fact that the three Aiginetan per day per man rate was customary in the fifth 
century Peloponnese gives support to the view that the Athenians were not the sole or primary movers in 
setting the pay rates found in the treaty of 420. 
 




assumption that food prices (in the Peloponnese or elsewhere) determined military pay 
rates. 
   
Conventional rates of pay were not confined to particular states or leagues in 
‘mainland’ Greece, but could range across large parts of the Greek world, as the rates 
paid and offered to the mercenaries of the Ten Thousand in the years following the 
Peloponnesian war demonstrate.  The Ten Thousand received pay—or offers of pay—
from a number of employers, Greek and non-Greek; the evidence their experiences 
provide for pay rates for mercenaries in the eastern Mediterranean at the turn of the 
fourth century has been summarized by Roy:130 
It seems quite clear that a standard rate of pay prevailed in Ionia and the 
Hellespontine and Thraceward regions, standard in amount and in the formula for 
various ranks.  All employers or prospective employers in the Anabasis offered 
one daric or cyzicene per month, and Xenophon appears to treat the daric and 
cyzicene as equivalents. 
 
Cyrus paid the mercenaries one daric a month (approximately five obols per day) in the 
early part of 401 for a campaign that started in Sardis and was ostensibly directed against 
the Pisidians (Xen., Anab. 1.3.21); two years later, Thibron the Spartan offered (and 
eventually paid) a daric a month to the remnants of the Ten Thousand he hired for a 
campaign against Tissaphernes in western Asia Minor (Xen., Anab. 7.6.1).  At Cotyora, 
in the summer of 400, Timasion the Dardanian promised the men a cyzicene stater a 
month to serve under him in the Troad (Xen., Anab. 5.6.23); Seuthes promised the same 
for a campaign in Thrace in the winter of 400/399 (Xen., Anab. 7.2.36).  The fact that the 
same rate of pay was given or offered by four different (actual and potential) employers 
                                                 




in three different parts of the Mediterranean in different seasons over the course of two 
years (spring 401-spring 399) shows that it was a conventional rate of pay for mercenary 
service in the eastern Mediterranean at this time (and that this rate of pay was not 
determined by the price of commodities).   
There is also another consideration arising from the mercenaries’ experiences 
under Cyrus and Seuthes that demonstrates conclusively that the rates of pay offered to 
the Cyreans were not determined by food prices.  The Cyreans, for the most part, 
obtained their provisions from markets provided to them along their march to Cunaxa.131  
Although the men received pay—or were supposed to receive pay—from Cyrus during 
the entirety of their service under him, the mercenaries provisioned themselves through 
non-market means at certain points on their journey to Babylonia, when markets were 
unavailable, or when circumstances permitted the foraging or pillaging of food:  thus, the 
men requisitioned provisions at the villages of Parysatis, and at the villages on the Araxes 
and Mascas Rivers, and foraged and pillaged for food in Lycaonia and at Belesys’ 
estate.132  This is to say the men were still provided with µισθός, even when they were not 
(or could not) use that µισθός to purchase food:  given this fact, expected food prices 
cannot have been an important factor in the pay rates set for the mercenaries under Cyrus. 
 This point comes out clearly, too, in the terms of service the remnants of the Ten 
Thousand agreed with Seuthes.  Seuthes proposed the following:  pay of a Cyzicene 
                                                 
131 At no point did they receive rations in kind from Cyrus:  see appendix 4 section i. 
 
132 See appendix 4 section i.  Note also that Cyrus had prepared four hundred wagons full of wheat-flour 
and wine, which were to be distributed to the Greeks in the case of serious provisioning difficulties (Xen., 
Anab. 1.10.18 with appendix 4 sections ii, iii):  there was very probably no expectation that the Greeks 




stater a month; food and drink to be obtained by foraging from the country (“ἐκ τῆς 
χώρας”); and any plunder taken was to be given to Seuthes who would sell it to provide 
the men’s µισθός (Xen., Anab. 7.3.10).  The issue of pay—and the rate of pay—for the 
mercenaries are completely separated from their provisioning.  This is confirmed by the 
fact that the men were able to subsist during the winter despite the fact that Seuthes was 
slow in paying them and never actually paid the rate he originally promised.  It is clear 
that commodity market prices had no influence on the pay rates offered by Seuthes. 
The Cyreans’ arrangements with Cyrus and Seuthes were, in fact, similar to the 
pay arrangements of every campaign in which military employers paid classical Greek 
soldiers to operate in hostile territory.  As I have demonstrated,133 the primary means of 
provisioning for classical Greek overland campaigns in enemy territory was foraging; 
purchase (from traveling merchants) played a limited, supplementary role.  But although 
purchase played a minimal role in the classical Greek expeditions into enemy land, the 
men on those expeditions still continued to receive (and/or expected to receive) pay from 
their employers.  This disconnect between the pay of classical Greek armies and the 
means they used to acquire their food demonstrates that there was never any important 
connection between their rates of pay and the prices found for basic subsistence foods in 
the areas they fought in.134 
 
 
                                                 
133 See chapter 3 section iv. 
 
134 See p.672 n.42 for an excellent Hellenistic example of the disconnect between the pay of Greek armies 





 Rates of pay for Athenian and other Greek sailors and soldiers were 
fundamentally determined by one main factor:  the financial resources possessed by (or 
available to) the Greek state (or non-Greek king or ruler) that employed them.135  Military 
pay is always discussed in contemporary historians and orators (and even comedians)136 
within the context of public finance, the expenses military employers had to incur, or the 
reductions in expenditure they had to make.  Simply put, all other things being equal, and 
with due regard to convention, military employers in the classical Greek world paid their 
forces what they could:137 when the financial situation of military employers changed, the 
rates of pay they gave or offered to sailors and soldiers changed.  A second crucial factor 
influencing military pay rates was competition.  Competition for manpower between 
warring states sometimes led classical Greek states to set military pay (or to propose 
setting it) at higher rates in order to recruit more manpower (more quickly) than their 
enemies and/or to encourage desertions from enemy forces.138  The third important factor 
influencing military pay rates (for mercenaries) was demand:  higher rates of pay were 
sometimes offered or given both to rapidly recruit mercenaries and to retain their loyalty 
                                                 
135 In contrast, the economic prosperity of states did not have, as has been commonly thought, any direct or 
important effect on the setting of military pay rates (contra Pritchett [1971] 23, Marinovic [1988] 172, 
Rawlings [2007] 170, Burrer [2008] 81). 
 
136 See below chapter 6 section ii. 
 
137 The machinations of Tissaphernes are the exception that proves the rule. 
 
138 Conversely, in the case of Tissaphernes, the lack of competition meant that he could reduce rates of pay 




once in service.139  But these second and third factors were functions of the first:  there 
had to be funds available in order to finance the higher rates of pay motivated by 
competition and demand for military manpower.140 
Rates of pay for classical Greek sailors and soldiers were not determined by, nor 
did they change in reaction to, the (expected) prices found on military campaigns for 
grain or any other basic commodities (such as wine or oil).  Prices for basic subsistence 
foods (or for any other good) are never attested as a factor in the setting of rates of 
military pay.141  In addition to the absence of evidence for commodity prices affecting 
rates of pay, three other phenomena evidenced for the classical Greek world prove that 
(expected) prices did not affect pay rates.  Firstly, the fact that rates of pay were affected 
by competition between states demonstrates that there could have been no important 
linkage between these pay rates and food prices.142  Secondly, the standard and 
                                                 
139 Loomis ([1998] 258) also considers the supply and demand of manpower to have had an effect on 
Athenian military pay rates.  Specifically, remarking on the fact that pay rates for Athenian military forces 
and dikasts remained static in the fourth century, while pay rates for certain public officeholders, allowance 
recipients, and public construction workers increased over the period, sometimes dramatically, Loomis 
explained the static nature of military (and dikastic) pay rates as having been caused by supply “evidently” 
exceeding state demand for military and dikastic service.  But, as Osborne points out ([2000b] 186-187), 
Loomis’ reasoning does not work because of his failure to consider two important factors:  firstly, the fact 
that competition for manpower with states elsewhere in the Greek world will have affected wage rates at 
Athens; secondly, the moral and other pressures on Athenian citizens to fight, which did not apply, for 
example, to slaves working in Eleusis. 
 
140 Cf. Gallo (1987) 44-46, and esp. (ibid.) 44 (in the context of a discussion of the effect competition for 
manpower had on rates of pay in the Peloponnesian war):  “[i]l ruolo determinante svolto dalle disponibilità 
finanzarie nelle guerre (il ‹‹ denaro nerbo della guerra ›› di Machiavelli) è mostrato in maniera 
estremamente significativa proprio dall’incidenza del misthos nella vicissitudini belliche in questione.”  
 
141 In fact, prices (either for food or for anything else) are never mentioned in any ancient discussion 
(contemporary or not) of classical Greek military pay (with the exception of Dem. 4.28-29 (see section iii)). 
 
142 Even if one state/military employer was paying rate determined by food prices, the second competing 




customary rates of military pay attested in many parts of the Greek world in the late fifth 
and early fourth centuries could not have existed in a world where pay rates were 
changed by employers to respond to changes in food prices:  if basic commodity prices 
did remain remarkably stable over these two centuries, there still would have been price 
fluctuations (at least for grain) over the course of a normal harvest cycle, sudden 
significant increases in prices in response to harvest (or distribution) shocks, and, not 
least, differences in commodity prices by region; we see none of these fluctuations 
reflected in changes in classical Greek military pay rates.143  Finally, the fact that military 
pay was not intrinsically linked to provisioning—i.e. the fact that pay was still expected 
to be distributed to military forces even when means of obtaining provisions other than 
markets were available and utilized—demonstrates clearly that classical Greek military 
rates of pay were not determined by prices.144 
 There is an element of stating the obvious to all of this,145 but given that the two 
major works (Pritchett’s, Loomis’) of the last fifty years on the pay of classical Greek 
                                                 
143 Consider the last consideration (regional differences in commodity prices):  there is no allowance for 
this in, e.g., the pay rates offered to the Cyreans as they marched from western Asia Minor to Babylonia 
and eventually back again to western Asia Minor, or to the crews of the Athenian and Peloponnesian navies 
who operated all over the eastern Aegean in the last decade of the Peloponnesian War. 
 
144 See also in this regard the fact that, as Dem. 4.28-29 shows, only part of the µισθὸς ἐντελής paid to 
Athenian forces in the middle of the fourth century was determined by (general) ideas of the money needed 
for soldiers’ and sailors’ subsistence. 
 
145 Note, however, that in other times and places in the pre-industrial military history of Europe, pay rates 
were changed to reflect the prices at which soldiers had to buy their subsistence:  see, e.g., Parker (2004) 
133 (“... the reaction of the English parliament to the grave subsistence crisis of 1649:  the soldiers of the 
New Model Army received a wage supplement while grain prices were high”); Mallett (1974) 137 
(comparing the military rates of pay offered by competing fourteenth and fifteenth century Italian states) 
(“[t]here were sometimes local variations depending on the cost of living and forage, but on the whole it 
seems clear that the more a state had progressed towards creating a standing army the lower the rates of pay 




sailors and soldiers have held to the view that military pay rates were (or could have 
been) determined by the prices expected to be found in markets provided to military 
forces on campaign, and that this view continues to be found in discussions of the pay 
rates of classical (and Hellenistic) military forces, it has been necessary to refute it, since 
doing so also proves incorrect the assumption underlying it:  i.e., if rates of pay were 
determined by the prices found by classical Greek sailors and soldiers on campaign, then 
particular rates of pay could tell us about the conditions in markets provided to sailors 
and soldiers on particular campaigns.  Since I have demonstrated that military rates of 
pay were not motivated by (changes in) food prices, however, it follows that these rates 
of pay cannot be taken as evidence for conditions in particular markets provided to 
soldiers and sailors.146  This is not to deny that price increases (or decreases) ever 
occurred in markets provided to military forces by traders or cities,147 but it is to deny 
that pay rates responded to them.     
The evidence we possess for classical Greek military pay rates, then, can tell us 
nothing about the behavior of markets in specific regions during specific military 
campaigns.148  But it can allow us to draw one positive inference about the general 
                                                 
146 This demonstration also means we cannot, as Pritchett did, use assumptions regarding prices on 
campaigns to aid in reconstructions of specific military rates of pay. 
 
147 See chapter 7 section v, and also appendix 6 section iii on the experiences of the Carthaginian 
mercenaries in Sicily in the later years of the first Punic war. 
 
148 The evidence for standard and conventional rates of military pay in the Greek world is particularly 
decisive in proving that military pay rates did not respond to specific market conditions.  Cf., in this regard, 
e.g., Parker (2004) 133:  although there were violent fluctuations in the cost of basic subsistence foods and 
a general rise in the cost of living during Spanish campaigns in the Netherlands in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries (there was a four-fold rise in food prices), the basic wage of the Spanish infantry 
soldier remained unchanged for one hundred years (from 1534 to 1634) (although there was an eighty per 
cent increase in their salaries in real terms); Temin (2001) 172:  “[n]ominal wages stayed constant for many 
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workings of markets provided to sailors and soldiers in the classical Greek world.  
Although military pay rates were never changed in response to food prices, there is no 
evidence that high food prices led to logistical (and therefore tactical or strategic) 
difficulties for the members of any classical Greek army, navy, or amphibious expedition 
because of their inability to fund purchases of food from their pay.  For once, the 
argument from silence has some weight here:  if high prices had been responsible for the 
tactical or strategic problems of a military expedition, we could have expected to hear of 
it because of the (unusual) effect it would have had on the outcome of a campaign.149  
But, while we do hear about military and logistical difficulties connected to the failure to 
pay military forces,150 we only once hear of a connection between such difficulties and an 
inability to purchase food from military pay because of high market prices:  at Xen., 
Anab. 1.5.6 (see again chapter 4 section ii).  This passage is the exception that proves the 
rule that classical Greek military pay must have been normally (more than) sufficient for 
subsistence.151  If military pay was (almost) always sufficient for subsistence, then one 
                                                                                                                                                 
years at a time in the market economy of early modern England, even though the price of grain fluctuated 
widely...” 
 
149 See introduction section iv. 
 
150 See, e.g., Thucy. 8.57.1, 8.78, 8.83.3; Hell. Oxy. 19.2; [Dem.] 49.15; [Dem.] 50.23, 53-56; ps.-Arist., 
Oec. 2.2.23b, 1350a31-1350b4. 
 
151 That classical Greek military pay must have been more than sufficient for subsistence can be shown 
from other considerations, too.  Firstly, as Dem. 4.28-29 and [Dem.] 50 show (see chapter 6 section vii), 
payments for Athenian military and naval forces in the middle of the fourth century comprised one 
payment for subsistence, and one payment for pay.  Secondly, the one drachma rate paid to Athenian 
soldiers and sailors in (and before) the Peloponnesian War until 412 and to Peloponnesian sailors at the 
start of the Ionian war must have included at least three obols more than the daily cost of subsistence, since, 
when the pay given to the Athenian and Peloponnesian forces was reduced to three obols per day in 412, 
the sailors on each side were able to survive.  This arguments gains support from Alcibiades’ 
recommendation to Tissaphernes to justify his pay cut with the argument that any pay more than obols 
would lead to a superfluity of money among the sailors and thus give them opportunity to spend on things 
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can conclude from our evidence for the lack of response of military pay rates to changes 
in food prices in the classical period, and from their often unchanging and customary 














                                                                                                                                                 
that would damage their physical conditions (i.e. on goods other than those necessary for their physical 
subsistence).  Again (see above p.303), this point was clearly and merely a pretext, but it was still one that 
had to have a ring of plausibility to be offered to the Peloponnesian soldiers and their officers.  
Interestingly, similar arguments were made almost fifty years later, when one Athenian trierarch (Polycles) 
accused another (Apollodorus) of corrupting the sailors under his charge by paying them more than 
subsistence rates:  see [Dem.] 50.35-36; and for a full discussion of this passage and the speech as a whole, 
chapter 6 section vii.  See also Thucy. 7.13.2:  those men who were not citizens of Athens had signed up for 
naval service on the Sicilian expedition voluntarily “οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ µεγάλου µισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες καὶ 
οἰόµενοι χρηµατιεῖσθαι µᾶλλον ἢ µαχεῖσθαι,” “were in the first place stirred by the prospects of high pay 
and thought that they were going to make money rather than fight.”  These rowers obviously did not expect 
that their high pay would be consumed solely by their purchases of provisions, but that the rate of one 
drachma per day per man would allow them to profit from their service.  (It should be noted that Thucy. 
7.13.2 does not show that the one drachma per day per man rate paid for the Sicilian expedition was a 
comparatively (or particularly) high rate of pay, but that it was a high rate of pay in absolute terms.)  All 
this is obvious from the fact that changes in military rates of pay are linked explicitly to the availability (or 
scarcity) of funds to finance them, but it still bears repeating, in the light of the arguments of Pritchett, 
Loomis, and others.  Finally, it should be noted that the length of military campaigns in the classical Greek 
world separated trireme crew members and other members of overseas expeditions (especially) from 
agriculture and other occupations:  this had the result that their labor costs were not externalized (by 
agriculture or any other occupation), and thus their pay had to cover (at least) their full subsistence costs 
(contra the muddled arguments of Rosivach [1985] (though he does not use the term ‘externalization of 
labor,’ this is the basic concept underlying his argument)) (see Erdkamp [2005] 84-87 for definition and 
discussion of the concept of the externalization of labor costs).   
  
349 
Chapter 6:  The Disbursement of State Pay to Classical Greek Sailors 
and Soldiers 
 
 i. Introduction 
In order to determine how prices for grain (and other foods) were set in the 
markets provided to classical Greek soldiers and sailors by traders and poleis, it is 
necessary to quantify the demand in those markets, i.e. the number of soldiers and/or 
sailors who were purchasing grain and their purchasing power.  I have treated the 
question of the sizes of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces in previous 
chapters and in appendix 2.  In this chapter, I will focus on the question of the 
disbursement of pay to classical Greek sailors and soldiers since, in order to determine 
their purchasing power, one has to determine how much money they had to spend in 
those markets.  This necessarily brings up the question of pay:  how much soldiers and 
sailors received, the nature of what they received, and how regularly they received this. 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that Athenian sailors—or, to be more 
precise, those men who served on-board classical Athenian triremes, who were as likely 
to be slaves or foreigners as Athenian citizens
1
—received one drachma per man per day 
for at least thirty years before ca. 412, that from ca. 412 to 407 (at least) they received 
three obols per day, and that in 351 they could be expected to receive at least two obols a 
day.
2
  It is agreed by (almost) all scholars writing on the subject that classical Athenian 
                                                 
1
 See again p.131 n.32; again, for the sake of brevity, I will sometimes use ‘Athenian sailors’ or ‘Athenian 
rowers’ as shorthand for the men serving on-board Athenian triremes, in contexts where no ambiguity or 
uncertainty will result from this usage. 
 
2
 See again Dem. 4.29:  Demosthenes proposing pay for Athenian sailors of two obols σιτηρέσιον plus “τὰ 




sailors received these fluctuating amounts of pay in two parts:  the first half while on 
campaign, and the second half, the balance of their pay (an amount equaling the amount 
of the second half of their pay multiplied by as many days as they had spent on 
campaign), on their return to Athens.
3
  (It is also generally agreed by scholars holding the 
view that Athenian sailors received their pay in two installments that the aim of this 
supposed method of payment was to prevent desertion during campaigns.)
4
  The term 
µισθὸς ἐντελής—found throughout fifth- and fourth-century literature in a variety of 
genres (history, comedy, oratory, rhetorical treatises), and later in Arrian and Plutarch—
has been taken by adherents to the consensus view on the disbursement of Athenian naval 
pay to denote this supposed method of payment in installments to rowers on-board 
Athenian triremes:  i.e., the phrase µισθὸς ἐντελής has been taken to denote the ‘full pay’ 
of Athenian sailors, comprising both the first payment distributed to them on campaign 
and the second given to them on their arrival back in Athens after service abroad; for the 
                                                 
3
 Morrison and Williams (1968) 258-259 is most often cited by those adhering to the communis opinio on 
this subject:  see Dreizehnter (1981) 275; Sommerstein (1981) 217 (ad Aristoph., Knights 1366-67); Cook 
(1990) 80, 82; Gabrielsen (1994) 113, 122-123; Morrison et al. (2000) 119-120, 122; Olson (2002) 216 (ad 
Aristoph., Ach. 547).  See also Stahl (1875-1889) vol.4 (2) 85-86; Rogers (1930) 190-191; Berneker (1969) 
1351; French (1972) 5 n.12; Casson (1994) 70; Ducrey (1999) 216; Burrer (2008) (the most recent 
summary discussion of classical and Hellenistic military pay) 90 n.68 maintaining this view.  This view of 
the Athenian state’s method of disbursement of naval pay has now been as enshrined as orthodoxy in the 
recently published Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare:  see Gabrielsen (2007) 258.  It is also 
found in popularizing treatments of classical Greek warfare:  see Fields (2008) 38.  Pritchett ([1971] 17 and 
n.52, 24-25) and Andrewes (HCT v.98-99) dissent from the scholarly orthodoxy on this topic, but their 
disagreements with the standard interpretation are based on inaccuracies in interpretation of Thucy. 8.45.2 
(see below pp.378-379 n.73, p.428 and n.174, and p.381 n.79, pp.382-383 respectively); cf. also p.354 n.10, 
p.377 n.72 on Ballin’s (1978) discussion of this topic, and p.369 n.57 on Lapini (2002) 67 n.19.  Loomis 
([1998] 60) is agnostic on the subject (he incorrectly reports Pritchett, however, as concluding that part of 
pay for Athenian military forces was normally withheld until the end of a campaign).  Griffith ([1935]) also 
believed that classical Greek soldiers and sailors received their pay in two installments, but at the beginning 
and the end of each month on campaign, rather than during a campaign and at the end of a campaign, as the 
prevailing view has it:  see section ix below for detailed refutation of Griffith’s position. 
 
4




currently standard interpretation of this phrase, it was the payment of the second half of 
the seamen’s pay that meant that, so to speak, Athenian sailors’ µισθός was ἐντελής. 
 This interpretation of the term µισθὸς ἐντελής is based primarily on two passages 
(although, as indicated above, the term appears in several other contexts):  Aristoph., 
Knights 1366-67 and Thucy. 8.45.2.  In addition, some scholars have also cited a passage 
from Polyaenus’ Strategica (3.9.51) in support of the standard view, based on the Knights 
and Thucydides passages, that Athenian forces received some of their pay up front, and 
the balance at the end of a campaign.
5
  Finally, a passage from the Demosthenic corpus—
[Dem.] 50.18, in which Apollodorus, an Athenian trierarch, told an Athenian jury in 359 
that he hired, while on campaign in the northern Aegean, some rowers “ἐντελοµίσθους”—
has been taken both as confirmation of the scholarly consensus concerning “µισθὸς 
ἐντελής,” and as evidence that the ‘two installment’ system of payments to sailors on-
board Athenian triremes continued into the fourth century.
6
 
In this chapter I will examine each of these passages independently from one 
another, and all the other passages in which the term µισθὸς ἐντελής is used to describe 
military (and naval) pay, considering each within its immediate narrative context and 
within the genre of the work in which it is located, in order to investigate whether any 
contemporary or later source provides positive evidence for a standard Athenian 
administrative procedure of disbursement of naval pay in two installments with the 
                                                 
5
 Gabrielsen (1994) 250 n.17; Cook (1990) 80.  See also pp.381-382 below on Classen’s use of this passage 
in his attempt to restore the text of Thucy. 8.45.2. 
 
6





second coming at the end of a campaign (or for such a procedure outside Athens).
7
  I 
hope to demonstrate that not only is there no unambiguous, positive evidence to support 
the standard interpretation of the term µισθὸς ἐντελής, but that a detailed and 
contextualized analysis of the four passages commonly cited to support the ‘two 
installment’ thesis, and others that include attestations of the term, as well as some 
epigraphical evidence for the disbursement of pay to Athenian triremes, shows that the 
standard interpretation is incorrect.  I will show instead that the term µισθὸς ἐντελής 
should be taken to mean in Aristophanes and Thucydides complete (or full) payment—
while on campaign—of a rate of pay previously promised to sailors and soldiers.  I will 
also show that the term µισθὸς ἐντελής continued to take this meaning throughout the 
early and middle part of the fourth century (i.e., it could still simply refer to the full 
amount of µισθός that men serving on an expedition expected to be paid during their 
service), but that, starting in the middle of the fourth century, the term in certain contexts 
took on a slightly modified meaning to reflect changes in the methods of disbursement of 
naval pay (and military pay generally) at Athens (and elsewhere).  Thus, in some 
discussions and descriptions of military and naval pay in mid-fourth century Athens (and 
elsewhere), a sailor’s and soldier’s expected full remuneration (µισθὸς ἐντελής) for 
service comprised µισθός (‘pay as such’) together with his τροφή (in the limited and new 
sense of ‘ration-money’ only).  (It should be immediately made clear here, however, that 
                                                 
7
 Although no scholar who has written advancing or supporting the communis opinio has advanced any 
hypothesis of how this method of disbursing pay to Athenian sailors in two installments might have worked 
operationally (see p.377 n.71 and section viii below for more on this point), the use of words such as, e.g., 
“system” (Morrison and Williams [1968] 259), “policy” (Cook [1990] 80), and “practice” (Gabrielsen 
[1994] 113) imply that there is, underlying the consensus view, an assumption that there were permanent 
administrative procedures put in place by the Athenian state to disburse naval pay in two installments to the 




although µισθὸς ἐντελής did therefore come to denote in certain mid-fourth century 
contexts the sum of two payments for (military or naval) service, it never, at any point, 
came to mean or imply the disbursement by the Athenian state of naval pay in two equal 
installments, one on active service abroad, and one on return to the Piraeus.) 
Having done this, I will then demonstrate that classical Athenian sailors and 
members of other classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces expected to 
receive their pay in advance and each month (in lump sums of monthly pay), and that 
they never expected to receive this pay in kind (confirming the conclusions of chapter 2 
section iic).  
 
ii. ‘µισθὸν... ’ντελῆ’ at Aristoph., Knights 1366-67 
At Knights 1366-67 (produced at the Lenaea of 424), the newly reinvigorated and 
rehabilitated Demos promises, as one of his policies for the future, that the rowers of 
Athenian triremes will from now on get their complete pay when they come into port:  
“πρῶτον µέν, ὁπόσοι ναῦς ἐλαύνουσιν µακράς, / καταγοµένοις τὸν µισθὸν ἀποδώσω 
’ντελῆ,” “[f]irst of all, to all who row long ships I will give their full pay when they come 
into port.”  Morrison and Coates stated that the implication from this promise of Demos’ 
is that “seamen had a balance of pay due to them when they reached port, but did not 
always get it.”
8
  Andrewes believed that Demos’ promise “shows that in the 420s Athens 
withheld part of the sailors’ pay till the expedition came home (and the sailor might not 
get it all then)...”
9
  Sommerstein, in his commentary on these lines, stated, explicitly 
                                                 
8
 (1968) 258-259. 
 
9
 HCT v.98. 
  
354 
following Morrison and Coates, that “this passage, with Thucy. 8.45.2, shows that part of 
an Athenian naval oarsman’s pay was withheld from him until the end of an expedition...  
The implication here is that even on return to the Peiraeus men might find it difficult to 
secure payment of their accumulated arrears.”
10
  Rogers inferred from Thucy. 8.45.2 that 
Athenian sailors received their pay in two equal installments (half on campaign, half on 
arrival home), and found this inference confirmed in this passage from Knights.
11
  Each 
of these scholars, whether establishing or citing the now conventional interpretation of 
µισθὸς ἐντελής, then, took these lines in Knights to be referring to (the failure of) a 
regular Athenian policy of withholding part of sailors’ pay till the end of an expedition.
12
  
The question I want to answer here is whether there is any positive reason for this 
inference. 
As a first step to answering this question, it should be noted immediately that the 
adjective ἐντελής (“’ντελῆ”) at Knights 1366-67 can tell us nothing by itself of the 
methods of payment employed by the polis of Athens in the 420s.  ἐντελής is the regular 







                                                                                                                                                 
 
10
 (1981) 217.  See also Ballin (1978) 134 citing Morrison and Coates’ interpretation of this passage in his 
discussion of the meaning of µισθὸς ἐντελής in [Dem.] 50. 
 
11
 See Rogers (1930) 190-191.  See below pp.365-368 for detailed refutation of Rogers’ position). 
 
12
 As Knights 1366-67 refer only to those rowing Athenian triremes, I will be referring to the pay of 
“Athenian rowers,” and not “sailors,” throughout the next two sections of this chapter. 
 
13
 Note that µισθὸς ἐντελής is never attested as referring to public or ‘civilian’ pay. 
 
14
 See, e.g., IG I
3
 34.21-22 (ca. 425) (see p.361 and n.37 below for this date), IG I
3
 60.4, 7 (ca. 430) 
referring to the payment of tribute in full. 
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or provided in full;
16
 or for state military equipment
17





  Thus, the use of ’ντελῆ at Knights 1366-67 simply informs us that Demos 
promises to provide pay “in full,” or their “complete pay,” to the rowers on-board 
Athenian triremes when they arrive back in Athens.  What Demos’ promise does allow us 
to infer is the following only:  that on at least one or two recent occasions (i.e. before 
(roughly) the first month of 424 when the play was performed), Athenian oarsmen who 
had been on active service abroad had not received the complete pay due to them by the 
time of their arrival back in Athens.
20
  The use of ἐντελής by itself, however, implies 
nothing about the reason(s) why the rowers had not received their complete pay; i.e., the 
adjective by itself cannot tell us whether the crews’ failure to receive their complete pay 





 101.30 (a decree concerning the Neapolitans in Thrace, 410/9); [Dem.] 35.11. 
 
16
 See LSJ A ad loc. 
 
17





 See, e.g., IG I
3
 1456.5-6 ([Athenian magistrates’ accounts on the temple of Aphaea on Aegina, ca. 431-
404]):  ἴκρια περὶ τὸ ἕ- / δος ἐντελῆ, θρόνος :Ι: 
 
19
 Note that outside the use of the term µισθὸς ἐντελής to describe naval (and military) pay, the adjective 
ἐντελής is not found again in Aristophanes, Thucydides (with the exception of the passage noted at n.17 
above), Xenophon (with the exception of Oec. 20.21 where it is used to refer to the expenses of a 
household (“δαπάνας... ἐντελεῖς ἐκ τῶν οἴκων”)), Lysias, Isocrates or Demosthenes (and that it is not found 
at all in Herodotus, Antiphon, or Andocides). 
 
20
 Cf. MacDowell (1995) 104.  Demos’ proposal on pay is one of three policies he is going to adopt for the 
future.  The second (1369-1371) is that no hoplite will be allowed to have his name transferred from the list 
for military service by improper influence, and the third (1373, 1375-1380) is that pretentious adolescents 
who are accustomed to chatter in the agora will no longer be allowed to enter it.  As MacDowell comments 





was the result of a failure in a standard Athenian administrative procedure (due to, e.g., 
administrative incompetence or corruption) so that the expected second half of the 
rowers’ µισθός could not be paid to them on their return to Athens;  or simply the result 
of exceptional circumstances,
21
 such as extraordinary financial pressures, so that there 
was no money available at Athens to pay the rowers the second installment of their pay 
on their disembarkation at Athens; or, and this alternative is no less plausible than the 
first two (if we consider Knights 1366-67 by itself), that extraordinary financial pressures 
at Athens and/or exceptional circumstances experienced while on campaign had meant 
that the rowers, rather than receiving their µισθός in full and regularly while on 
campaign, had, contrary to (in this hypothetical alternative) normal practice, received 
only part of their pay on campaign, so that the µισθός owed to them on their return to 
Athens was arrears of pay which they had expected to be paid to them during their 
service abroad.
22
   
The point that the phrase “µισθὸν... ’ντελῆ” at Knights 1366-67 can tell us 
nothing, when considered on its own, about why µισθός had not been paid, or why it was 
to be paid generally, to Demos’ rowers is (if obvious) an important one.  It means that the 
burden of proof is on those scholars who would see in these lines evidence of a regular 
                                                 
21
 Loomis (1998) 60. 
 
22
 Griffith ([1935] 272) takes Aristophanes at Knights 1366-67 to mean “‘to the sailors, when they come 
ashore, I will pay their full pay’—i.e. without deductions or delays.”  This may sound like the second 
position described in the text above, but Griffith understands the reference to µισθὸς ἐντελής in a different 
sense to the one offered above:  he takes it here to be alluding to the payment of the second of two distinct 
payments to Athenian sailors, the first payment being called σιταρχία (or σιτηρέσιον).  But there is no basis 
for this view in the lines from Knights, and it comes from a schema for the disbursement of payments to 
soldiers and sailors in the late fifth and early fourth centuries that, as I will demonstrate below, is without 




Athenian policy of withholding half of rowers’ µισθός till their return to the Piraeus at the 
end of a campaign.  If we read these two lines without thinking of any other passage 
(such as Thucy. 8.45.2 or Polyaenus, Strateg. 3.9.51), there is nothing in these lines, in 
themselves, that indicates such a system of payment in installments.
23
  But before 
proceeding to an examination of the Thucydides and Polyaenus passages, to see whether 
they offer support to the consensus interpretation of these lines, I want to consider other 
evidence—some internal to Knights, but most external to the comedy—that suggests that 
the arrears in pay implied in Knights 1366-67 could have been the product of exceptional 
financial pressures in the mid 420s at Athens.  
 There are three other short passages from Knights that show a concern for pay:  at 
555, the chorus refers in a prayer to the things that please Poseidon—amongst other 
things, these include “µισθοφόροι τριήρεις”;24 at 1065-66, Demos asks the Sausage-Seller 
and Paphlagon how his rowers are going to get their pay;
25
 and at 1078-79, Demos again 
asks where pay will be found for his rowers, and the Sausage-Seller replies that he’ll 
provide it, and within three days.
26
  All three of these passages, and the last especially, 
                                                 
23
 One could say, of course, that such a system of (dual) payment is taken for granted in these lines, but, 
again, this does not provide support for the standard view since, as I have just established, the burden of 
producing positive evidence is on those who hold the consensus view; anyway, in the lack of explicit 
evidence either way from this passage, one could just as easily argue that, e.g., difficulties in disbursing pay 
on campaign due to current and extraordinary financial pressures are being taken for granted here. 
 
24
 This should be taken as referring to Poseidon’s concern that triremes should be promptly and fully paid, 
rather than referring to triremes bringing money to Athens to provide (public and military) pay (the two 
possible interpretations of this phrase raised by Sommerstein at [1981] 174). 
 
25
 “... σὺ δ’ ἀναγίγνωσκε, τοῖς ναύταισί µου / ὅπως ὁ µισθὸς πρῶτον ἀποδοθήσεται.” 
 
26
 “[∆η.] τούτοις ὁ µισθὸς τοῖς ἀλωπεκίοισι ποῦ; 
[Αλ.] ἐγὼ ποριῶ, καὶ τοῦτον ἡµερῶν τριῶν.” 
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suggest strongly that the problem of unpaid µισθός to Athenian rowers had been a recent, 
pressing problem at Athens.  Again, this does not provide positive proof that the failure to 
pay µισθὸς ἐντελής at 1366-67 refers certainly to a failure of the Athenian state to pay a 
pre-arranged second half of µισθός (supposedly) paid at this time to rowers on Athenian 
triremes on disembarkation, or to an inability to pay µισθός regularly and completely on 
campaign.  But the fact that unpaid naval µισθός is referred to on at least three occasions 
in the Knights as a problem (i.e., at 1065-66, 1078-79, 1366-67)—in other words, the fact 
that unpaid µισθός is presented in the Knights as an issue that needs to be rectified—
implies very strongly that the the µισθός owed to the rowers on their return to the Piraeus 
at Knights 1366-67 is not the result of a standard administrative procedure at Athens, but 
the result of extraordinary circumstances.
27
 
In addition, it should be noted here that Knights 1065-66 and 1078-79 refer 
simply to µισθός, without any indication that a second (half) payment is specifically 
owed.  This would seem to favor the interpretation that the µισθός owed in these 
passages—and at 1366-67—refers simply to accumulated unpaid µισθός that had been 
expected to be disbursed regularly and punctually on campaign.  Let me explain what I 
mean by this:  if the sailors’ expected pay had not been forthcoming on campaign, and 
thus (some) random amount of pay had built up in arrears, then one would expect any 
reference to the owed sums (of pay) to be simply to pay; but if a specific, officially fixed 
                                                                                                                                                 
The reference to fox-cubs is explained at 1075-76; in the supposed oracle given by Apollo to the Sausage-
Seller, he likens Athenian sailors to fox-cubs because they eat grapes in vineyards (i.e. they forage for food 
while on campaign). 
 
27
 Although, again, these extraordinary circumstances could either be factors leading to difficulties in 
paying rowers on active service abroad, or to difficulties in finding funds in Athens to pay rowers on their 




payment had not been made at its officially fixed time, we might expect a specific 
reference to such a payment at 1065-66 and 1078-79.
28
  The related points I am making 
here are (again) that the burden of proof is on those scholars who would see µισθὸς 
ἐντελής as referring to two specific payments, and that these two short passages from the 
Knights do not offer any positive support for the conventional interpretation of the term 
but, if anything, tend to undermine it. 
 
 iii. Financial pressures at Athens in the mid 420s and the disbursement of naval 
pay at Knights 1366-67  
Cook, defending the hypothesis that Knights 1366-67 implied that Athenian 
seamen’s µισθός was normally disbursed in two payments, with one withheld to their 
return home to Athens, stated that Knights “was performed in 424 B.C., before the 
Sicilian disaster, so that withholding part of the µισθός was not in fact an austerity 
measure”—i.e., her point was that Knights 1366-67 do not refer simply to a failure to pay 
µισθός to sailors on campaign due to financial pressures.29  But there is, in fact, much 
evidence that the expenditures made in the first years of the Peloponnesian war had 
resulted in major strains on the finances of the Athenian state by the mid 420s, i.e. in the 
years directly before the first staging of Knights.
30
  In 428, the Athenians raised for the 
first time an eisphora on themselves, which raised two hundred talents, and sent out at 
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 Cook (1990) 80. 
 
30




the same time “money-collecting ships” to collect a levy, over and above the expected 
tribute, on the poleis of the empire, explicitly for the purpose of helping to meet the 
expenses of the siege of Mytilene (Thucy. 3.19.1);
31
 Thucydides has it that earlier that 
year the Mytilenians had given Athenian financial exhaustion as one of their reasons for 
revolting (3.13.3).  Measures to raise extra money for the Mytilene siege had become 
necessary since, by the year 428/7, the Athenians had already spent much of the monetary 
reserve which had lain on the Acropolis before the war (Thuc. 2.13.3-5), as the “Logistai 
inscription” (IG I
3
 369) makes clear:  this inscription shows that “[w]hile the Athenians 
had probably spent between 600 and 1,370 talents from Athena’s purse in each year 
between 432/1 and 429/8, in the following years expenditures from this source ranged 
only between 100 and 261 talents.”
32
  This suggests that the Athenians realized that the 
reserves of the treasury of Athena, the primary source of funding for the first years of 
war,
33
 would not be able to sustain the continuing and necessary military and naval 
expenditures for the war:
34
  thus, from 428/7 onwards, the annual tribute, supplemented 
                                                 
31
 Thucydides mentions ‘money- (or silver)-collecting ships,’ ‘νῆες ἀργυρολόγοι’ on four occasions (2.69.1 
[winter of 430/29], 3.19.1, 4.50.1 [winter of 425/4], 4.75.1 [summer of 424] (the latter two passages refer to 
the same expedition)), but 3.19.1 is the only instance where he explicitly tells us the aim of their dispatch 
(i.e. to raise money for the siege of Mytilene).  Kallet-Marx ([1993] 160-164) has shown that the old 
view—that the dispatch of these ships was to be connected with tribute reassessments—was based on 
circular argumentation and has little to recommend it.  Unfortunately, since it is impossible to tell, in the 
absence of other evidence, whether these money-collecting expeditions were also sent out before the 
Peloponnesian war, it is also impossible to tell whether the expeditions of 430/29 and 425/4 were (as the 
expedition of 428/7 was) responses to financial pressures, or just part of the normal procedures of the 




 Samons (2000) 194 (see n.92 there for references). 
 
33
 Blamire (2001) 109. 
 
34




by extraordinary measures to increase income, such as the eisphora and the extraordinary 
levy on subject cities, became the primary source of funding for the war.
35
  The now 
heightened importance of the tribute for the funding of the war is evidenced in three 
important inscriptions from the 420s.
36
  The so-called “Kleonymos Decree” (IG I
3
 68), 
passed in the second prytany of 426/5, mandated the appointment, in the poleis of the 
empire, of eklogeis who were to be responsible for the collection of tribute in their cities; 
in an amendment to the decree, supplementary measures to further tighten control of 
tribute collection were proposed “[:]όπος δὲ ἄρι[στα καὶ ῥρᾶ]ιστα οἴσοσι Ἀθενα- / [ῖοι 
τ]ὸν πόλεµ[ον...],” “in order that the Athenians may bear the war most easily and 
effectively” (ll.28-29).  This decree was followed a couple of years later by the “Kleinias 
Decree” (IG I
3
 34) of ca. 425/424,
37
 which tightened up the process of dispatch and 
delivery of the tribute to Athens.  Most importantly, the tribute reassessment decree (the 
“Thoudippos decree,” IG I
3
 71) of late 425 (in Posideon, the month before Knights was 
staged), which proposed a large increase in the tribute assessed on the poleis of the 
empire, and tribute to be assessed on poleis that had never paid tribute or had not paid it 
for a long time, explicitly cited the war as creating a need for extra income (ll.44-46):
38
 
                                                 
35
 Samons (2000) 194, 209-211, Blamire (2001) 110. 
 
36
 Cf. again Morris (2001) 41. 
 
37
 The conventional date for this decree is the early 440s but, as Samons ([2000] 189 with n.86) points out, 
it “should... be placed after Thoudippos’ reassessment of 425/4, since the latter institutes the practice of 
allies bringing the ‘cow and panoply’ to Athens that Kleinias’ proposal simply assumes (line 42).”  I do not 
agree with Samons ([2000] 189, 192-193] that Kleinias’ proposal superseded that of Kleonymus; instead, I 
take them to be complementary, agreeing in this with H. B. Mattingly ap. Samons [2000] 192-193 n.88; 
Rhodes (2007b) p.2 (of handout) (I am grateful to Dr. Errietta Bissa for this last reference). 
 
38




“[the Generals are to see to] the cities bringing in [their tribute as soon as the Council 




All of these measures show that the state of polis finances—to be more precise, 
their ability to meet the expenses of the war—was a matter of serious concern to the 
Athenians in the mid 420s:
40
  the reserve on the Acropolis was clearly no longer 
sufficient by itself to fund the war at the current rate of military and naval expenditures, 
therefore action was taken to secure and increase the annual tribute income which was 
now the main source of funding for the war, to be supplemented as needed by 
extraordinary sources of income.
41
  None of this is to suggest that the treasury of Athena 
                                                 
39
 “:όπος δὲ ἂν τὸµ φόρον] ἀπά- / [γ]οσιν [:]αι πόλες [ἐπιµελέσθον :οι στρατηγοὶ εὐθὺ]ςB :ότ[αν χσυµτάχσει 
:ε βολὲ τ]ὲBν τάχσι- / [ν τD] φόB[ρ]ο :ίνα Eι [τDι δέµοι ἀργύριον :ικανὸν ἐς τὸµ] πBόλ[εµον]...”  The Greek is 
obviously heavily restored, but the meaning seems clear.  See also ll.21-22, 46-48 of this inscription for the 
linkage between amounts of tribute and funding for the war; and ll.16-17 explicitly stating that the tribute 
has become too little. 
 
40
 Kallet-Marx ([1993] 164-170, 192-194) concludes from the fact that the tribute reassessment decree is 
not mentioned in Thucydides or Aristophanes that its effects were limited, and that it (and the erection of 
the stele carrying the inscription) functioned mostly as propaganda.  But, as has been pointed out (Engels 
[1997] 233-234, Samons [2000] 211 n.184), whatever about the effects of the decree, the very fact of the 
reassessment shows that the Athenians were seriously worried about finances just before the staging of 
Knights.  See also Osborne (2000a) 92:  “... Athenians were certainly worried about the cost of the 
Peloponnesian War in the middle of the 420s..., the extraordinary re-assessments of the 420s were certainly 
a serious exercise and not merely a piece of propaganda either for Athenian or allied consumption... There 
was no blanket percentage increase for everyone; individual allies were clearly reassessed independently, 
although the criteria on which that re-assessment was based may have changed in the same way for 
everyone.”  Kallet-Marx’s attempt to minimize the importance of the reassessment decree is part of a larger 




 In addition to the eisphora and the levy on the allies in 428/7, there is also attested the introduction soon 
after 431 of the epidosis, a voluntary payment by Athenian citizens of money to the polis in times of need:  
see Plut., Alc. 10.1 with Engels (1997) 234-235.  Osborne ([2000a] 92) also cites IG I
3
 61, with its 
reference to Hellespontophylakes [the decree was published in 424, but the reference to these officials dates 
to 426] and Athenian collection of taxes at the Hellespont, and IG I
3
 1453 (420s?), mandating the use of 
Athenian coins, weights and measures in the cities of the arche, as demonstrating that “it is clear that 
financially the burdens of empire on the allies increased significantly in the Arkhidamian War;” i.e. that the 
Athenians increased the financial burden of the allies as part of their attempts to finance the extraordinary 
military efforts of the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war. 
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(or that of the Other Gods) was empty (or nearly so) in the mid 420s;
42
 but it is to say that 
existing sources of military and naval funding at Athens were experiencing 
unprecedented stresses at this time.  Cook was therefore incorrect:  there were serious 
financial pressures and strains at Athens before and at the same time as the first 
production of the Knights which could have led to difficulties in the full and punctual 
disbursement of pay to Athenian sailors on campaign.
43
  This means that the withholding 
of the Athenian rowers’ pay referred to at Knights 1366-67 could have been, to use 
Cook’s words, “an austerity measure” (i.e. the result of extraordinary financial pressures 
leading to a failure to distribute the rowers’ pay fully and punctually on campaign), and 
not a normal administrative measure.  Again, demonstrating this is not a positive proof 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
42
 Cf. Gomme, HCT iii.687-689, Blamire (2001) 112. 
 
43
 Kallet-Marx ([1993] esp. 187-200) argues that there was no financial crisis in Athens in the 420s but, at 
most, only a perception of one.  She argues that the decrees concerning tribute passed in the 420s show that 
there was a growing difficulty in collecting tribute in the late 430s and 420s, and not that there were any 
financial strains at Athens.  Her main reason for this unorthodox view is the inference from the 
establishment of cleruchies (rather than the imposition of tribute) at Potidaea and Mytilene, after the 
reduction of both cities in the early years of the war, that there was a “move away from tribute as a means 
of extracting revenue” at this time ([1993] 149; cf. 189).  But, as Hornblower ([1994] 335) points out, 
throughout the history of the Athenian empire, “[t]he imposition of a cleruchy... was... regularly viewed at 
Athens as an alternative to tribute or at least led to massive reductions in tribute;” thus, the settlement of 
cleruchies at Potidaea and Mytilene was a continuation of established practice and tells us nothing of how 
the mechanism of tribute collection was working in these years.  In fact, as argued above, the increased 
emphasis on tribute and its collection can, and should, be precisely and fully explained by the depletion of 
the reserves of the Treasuries of Athena and the Other Gods in the early years of the War.  Kallet-Marx 
([1993] 194-198) also discounts the “Logistai inscription” as evidence for financial difficulties on the 
grounds that the borrowing attested there simply represents normal practice.  But this view of IG I
3
 369 
fails to take account of, and is disproved by, the huge decreases in borrowing from the gods after 429/8.  
See Samons (2000) 194, 209-211 for effective criticisms of Kallet-Marx’s positions on these issues; cf. 
Engels (1997) 233-235.  Finally, Kallet-Marx’s ([1993] 198-202) attempts to ‘make up for’ the supposed 
decline in the amounts of tribute received at Athens in the early years of the War by stressing the amount of 
other revenues received from the Empire:  but these revenues would have remained, at best, constant during 
the war, or, much more probably, would have decreased (Engels [1997] 234) and therefore do not offer a 
convincing answer to the question of how Athens’ military expenditures were met in the years after 429/8, 




that the standard interpretation of µισθὸς ἐντελής is incorrect,44 but it does show again 
that there is no positive reason to take the measure on pay referred to at Knights 1366-67 
as referring to an ‘installment system’ of naval pay at Athens.  In fact, demonstrating that 
there were financial problems at Athens in the mid-420s means that the measure on pay 
referred to in these lines should probably not be taken as reflective of standard late fifth 
century Athenian naval payment practice.  In addition, refutation of Cook’s view that the 
measure referred to at Knights 1366-67 could not have been the product of exceptional 
circumstances also shows that the alternative explanation of µισθὸς ἐντελής I have 
alluded to, and hope to prove as correct below, i.e. that the term refers to the promised or 
expected disbursement of sailors’ (and soldiers’) complete pay while on campaign, is in 
no way contradicted by Knights 1366-67. 
 
 iv. The meaning of µισθς ντελς in Book 8 of Thucydides  
Thus, Aristophanes’ Knights offers no positive support for the ‘two installment’ 
interpretation of µισθὸς ἐντελής, and tends even to undermine it.  The question becomes 
then:  does Thucydides 8.45.2 offer the proof that the standard interpretation fails to gain 
from Aristophanes?  Before answering this question, it will be necessary to examine 
briefly just why Thucy. 8.45.2 has been introduced into the question of the correct 
interpretation of µισθὸς ἐντελής, since, although this passage, together with Knights 
1366-67, has been cited as the primary ancient source in every substantive modern 
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 Again, though, these lines could also be referring to “an austerity measure” resulting from financial 





discussion of the meaning of µισθὸς ἐντελής, Thucydides never actually uses the phrase 
µισθὸς ἐντελής at 8.45.2,45 which reads as follows: 
... καὶ διδάσκαλος πάντων γιγνόµενος τήν τε µισθοφορὰν ξυνέτεµεν, ἀντὶ 
δραχµῆς Ἀττικῆς ὥστε τριώβολον, καὶ τοῦτο µὴ ξυνεχῶς, δίδοσθαι, λέγειν 
κελεύων τὸν Τισσαφέρνη πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου 
ἐπιστήµονες ὄντες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν, οὐ τοσοῦτον 
πενίᾳ ὅσον ἵνα αὐτῶν µὴ οἱ ναῦται ἐκ περιουσίας ὑβρίζοντες, οἱ µὲν τὰ σώµατα 
χείρω ἔχωσι δαπανῶντες ἐς τοιαῦτα ἀφ’ ὧν ἡ ἀσθένεια ξυµβαίνει, οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς 
ἀπολείπωσιν οὐχ ὑπολιπόντες ἐς ὁµηρείαν τὸν προσοφειλόµενον µισθόν.46 
 
[Alcibiades] cut down the pay [of the Peloponnesian sailors] from an Attic 
drachma to three obols a day, and even this not paid too regularly; and told 
Tissaphernes to say to the Peloponnesians that the Athenians, whose maritime 
experience was of an older date than their own, only gave their men three obols, 
not so much from poverty as to prevent their seamen being corrupted by being 
too well off, and spoiling their fitness by spending money upon enervating 
indulgences, and also paid their crews irregularly in order to have a security 
against their deserting in the arrears which they would leave behind them. 
 
The connection between Thucy. 8.45.2 and Ar., Knights 1366-67 was made for 
the first time in B. B. Rogers’ 1930 edition of the Knights.
47
  Rogers thought that it was 
permissible to infer from the Thucydidean passage that sailors on-board Athenian 
triremes received half of their pay “at the time,” the other half “being retained by the 
State until the completion of the voyage.”
48
  But there is nothing in 8.45.2 to support such 
                                                 
45
 See section v below for detailed discussion of the text of Thucy. 8.45.2. 
 
46
 All manuscripts except B omit ἀπολείπωσιν οὐχ, and give ἀπολιπόντες for ὑπολιπόντες.  Morrison and 
Williams ([1968] 273) reject both ὑπολιπόντες and ἀπολιπόντες, proposing οὐχ ὑποµένοντες, but they offer 
no reason for doing so, and there is, in fact, no reason to do so (see Andrewes, HCT v.99).  See also 
Hornblower, CT iii.888 ad loc.:  “[t]he insertion of οὐχ is justified not only by its presence in ‘B’, the 
Vatican MS, but by Valla’s tr. ‘dum partem stipendii sibi debitam non relinquerent’.” 
 
47
 For the first time as far as I can tell, that is.  The Knights passage is not mentioned in any of the major 
nineteenth-century German commentaries’ (Böhme [1856], Krüger [1858-61], Poppo-Stahl, Classen-Steup) 
discussions of Thucy. 8.45.2, nor in Goodhart’s (1893) discussion of this passage.  Rogers ([1930] 191) 
notes, in fact, that his interpretation was “not the usual interpretation either of the present passage [i.e. the 
Knights passage] or of the chapter in Thucydides; but the usual interpretation is by any universal consent 
unsatisfactory.”  (Rogers never specifies what this usual interpretation was.) 
 
48
 (1930) 191. 
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It was by analogy to this Athenian custom that Alcibiades, having persuaded 
Tissaphernes to reduce the pay of the Peloponnesian sailors from a drachma to 
three obols a day, excused the reduction to the sailors by declaring that 
Tissaphernes could not afford to pay more out of his private resources, but that 
when supplies came down from the Great [sic] King ἐντελῆ αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν 
τὸν µισθὸν, meaning, I suppose, that they would then receive the other three 





Rogers’ interpretation of 8.45.6 is absolutely incorrect.  Alcibiades in this passage 
is referring, in fact, to an earlier commitment of Tissaphernes’: earlier that winter, at 
Miletus, Tissaphernes had distributed a month’s pay, of an Attic drachma per man per 
day, to each of the Peloponnesian sailors; “in future, however, he was resolved not to 
give more than three obols, until he had consulted the King when, if the King should so 
order, he would give, he said, the full drachma [ἐντελῆ τὴν δραχµήν]”51 (Thucy. 
8.29.1).
52
  That Alcibiades at 8.45.6 is definitely referring back to 8.29.1 can be seen 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
49
 (Ibid.)  The text of 8.45.6 is as follows:  “τόν τε Τισσαφέρνη ἀπέφαινε νῦν µέν, τοῖς ἰδίοις χρήµασι 
πολεµοῦντα, εἰκότως φειδόµενον, ἢν δέ ποτε τροφὴ καταβῄ παρὰ βασιλέως, ἐντελῆ αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν τὸν 
µισθὸν καὶ τὰς πόλεις τὰ εἰκότα ὠφελήσειν”; “[h]e [i.e. Alcibiades] also pointed out that Tissaphernes was 
at present carrying on the war at his own expense, and had good cause for economy, but that as soon as he 




 See also Marinovic (1988) 166 with n.54 below. 
 
51
 “τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐβούλετο τριώβολον διδόναι, ἕως ἂν βασιλέα ἐπέρηται· ἢν δὲ κελεύῃ, ἔφη δώσειν 
ἐντελῆ τὴν δραχµήν.” 
 
52
 Some scholars (see esp. Gallo [1987] 42 n.61) have argued that 8.45.2 is a doublet of 8.29.1, but 
Andrewes (HCT v.96-97), Rood ([1998] 264-265), and Hornblower (CT iii.853, 884, 886, 887) have 
successfully demonstrated that the two reductions in pay are, in fact, not identical (cf. Kallet [2001] 260-
261).  Thucy. 8.36.1, with its statement that the Peloponnesians were still getting sufficient pay, is the key 
evidence against the doublet theory (note that Holzapfel ([1893] 46), writing in support of the doublet 
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from the linkage between Tissaphernes’ frugality, the assent of the King and the adjective 
ἐντελής.53  What Alcibiades is saying at 8.45.6, therefore, is that, although Tissaphernes 
was now maintaining the war from his own resources and was thus sparing with his 
money (i.e. he was now paying the men at the three obol per day rate:  see 8.45.2), if 
money were to come down from the King (“ἢν δέ ποτε τροφὴ καταβῇ παρὰ βασιλέως”), 
then Tissaphernes would pay the (expected and standard) full pay of an Attic drachma per 
man per day.  Two important conclusions emerge from this passage:  firstly, Tissaphernes 
could now be described as “frugal” or “sparing” (“φειδόµενον”) when paying three 
obols—this must be referring to the fact that he had reduced the Peloponnesians’ pay at 
8.45.2, and not simply changed its means of disbursement; secondly, and more 
importantly, ἐντελῆ... µισθὸν at 8.45.6 (since it refers back to 8.29.1) refers to the 
payment of an expected rate of pay (in this case, one drachma per day per man) disbursed 
in full during a campaign (and not one made in installments).
54
   
That Rogers’ interpretation of 8.45.6 was wrong can also be shown by its lack of 
internal coherence.  Alcibiades’ promise on behalf of Tissaphernes to pay the sailors in 
                                                                                                                                                 
thesis and realizing that 8.36.1 contradicted it, had to reject this passage, on no other grounds than the very 
unsatisfactory one that it told against the doublet theory (cf. Kallet [2001] 256 n.91)). 
 
53
 See Andrewes, HCT v.100, Rood (1998) 265 n.50; and esp. Goodhart (1893) 66 ad 8.45.6:  “he [i.e., 
Tissaphernes] would pay them the full drachma instead of the three obols.” 
 
54
 Gabrielsen’s ([1994] 112) comments on 8.29.1 are relevant for 8.45.6, too:  “there is a strong impression 
that ‘a full drachma’ was the pay normally expected.”  (See also chapter 5 section iv on 8.45.6.)  Marinovic 
([1988] 166) writes that Thucydides at 8.45.6 “oppose la trophè et le misthos entélès que Tissapherne ne 
promet de payer que s’il reçoit du Roi la trophè...”  But there is no opposition here (Marinovic is here 
influenced by, and supporting, Griffith’s view of the meaning of the term µισθὸς ἐντελής (on the lack of 
validity of which, see section ix below)); the linkage with 8.29.1 shows, rather, that the τροφή Tissaphernes 
might receive from the King is simply money that he could use to pay the soldiers their full drachma a day 




full is not linked to the completion of any voyage or campaign (and no such completed 
voyage or campaign could have been foreseen until, at the earliest, the following 
summer) but to the arrival of money from the King.  The failure to pay the soldiers in 
full, then, is explained to the cities of Asia Minor and the sailors as a financial expedient, 
as a necessary reduction of pay in response to financial pressures, and not as a change in 
the way Tissaphernes was to pay the men, from payment in full during a campaign to 
payment in installments.  There is also no linkage made at 8.45.6 between full pay and 
the accumulation of any arrears due to the failure to pay the Peloponnesian sailors an 
expected second installment of pay; in fact, no such linkage could have been made since 
Tissaphernes’ alteration to the pay arrangements of the Peloponnesians (at 8.45.2) had 
just taken place.  So again, the words “ἐντελῆ αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν τὸν µισθὸν” at 8.45.6 
have nothing to do with payment of µισθός to sailors in installments. 
Morrison and Coates, who are most frequently cited as establishing the standard 
interpretation of µισθὸς ἐντελής, by their linking of Thucy. 8.45.2 and Aristoph., Knights 
1366-67,
55
 also refer, as Rogers, to Thucy. 8.29.1 and 8.45.6 (but only obliquely) to 
justify this linkage.
56
  Before quoting 8.45.2, and after referencing Knights 1366-67, they 
refer to 8.29.1 (“Thucydides tells how Tissaphernes in 412/11 paid the Spartan fleet at the 
rate of a drachma a day for one month, but said that in future he could only give 3 obols 
(half a drachma) until the Persian king authorized the full drachma”).  After quoting 
8.45.2, they state that “[Alcibiades] explained that the men could have their pay in full 
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 See, e.g., Sommerstein (1981) 217, Gabrielsen (1994) 217 n.50. 
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later on,” and that this passage (i.e. 8.45.2) “shows that the inference from the Knights 
was correct and that Athenian seamen only received three obols on service and were 
entitled to the balance of their pay when they reached their home port.”  Although they 
provide no reference for Alcibiades’ statement regarding “their pay in full later on,” this 
can only be a reference to 8.45.6 (since Alcibiades makes no explicit statement regarding 
the sailors’ pay between 8.45.2 and 8.45.6, and 8.45.6 is the only passage in Thucydides 
where Alcibiades speaks of pay in full); but, as I have just shown, discussing Rogers’ 
treatment of this passage, using Thucy. 8.45.6 in this way is to misunderstand the import 
of that passage; thus, just as with Rogers’ treatment of this question, there is no basis for 
Morrison and Coates’ view that Athenian sailors received half of their pay on campaign, 
and half on their return to Athens.
57
  
So far in this section, then, I hope to have demonstrated that the linkage between 
Thucy. 8.45.2 and Aristoph., Knights 1366-67 made by previous scholars was based on a 
misinterpretation of Thucy. 8.45.6; and that Thucy. 8.45.2, taken on its own, cannot help 
us to explicate the meaning of the term µισθὸς ἐντελής, since, as I have noted, 
Thucydides does not even use the term µισθὸς ἐντελής at 8.45.2.  Thucydides does, 
however, employ the term (or variations thereon) on five occasions in book 8.  In the rest 
of this section, I will show that he used this term in book 8 consistently (and in a way that 
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 See n.46 above for Morrison and Coates also incorrectly emending Thucy. 8.45.2 as part of their 
interpretation of that passage.  Lapini ([2002] 67 n.19), disagreeing with Cook’s ([1990] 80) view that 
8.45.2 refers to an Athenian policy of dividing sailors’ pay into installments, writes “a me non sembra 
affatto che <<dimezzare la paga>> possa significare, in questo contesto, darne metà subito e metà dopo; 
l’espediente di legare a sè i marinai, credo, non andrà cercato nella rateazione concordata della paga, ma 
nell’irregolarità stessa dei versimenti: è chiaro che un marinaio in credito di arretrati resterà nell’armata 
finchè non avrà ricevuto il suo.”  Having made this—to my mind, correct—statement, however, Lapini then 
puzzlingly endorses Morrison and Coates’ interpretation of 8.45.2—i.e. the same that Cook (without citing 
Morrison and Coates) adopts—without any indication as to why he diffentiates between these two solutions 




can be easily explicated) to mean a sailor’s complete pay to be (or expected to be) 
disbursed while on campaign.  
 To begin:  as I have demonstrated in my discussion of Rogers’ (mis)interpretation 
of Knights 1366-67, “ἐντελῆ... µισθὸν” at 8.45.6 means an expected µισθός paid in full 
during a campaign; the rate of the “ἐντελῆ... µισθὸν” here—as can be seen from the 
connection of this passage to 8.29.1 and the mention there of “ἐντελῆ τὴν δραχµήν”—is 
one drachma per man per day; this is contrasted to a reduced rate of pay of three obols 
(see 8.45.2).  “ἐντελῆ... µισθὸν” at 8.45.6 does not refer to the disbursement of a withheld 
second payment.  The same arguments I used to interpret 8.45.6 hold for the mention of 
“µισθοφορὰ ἐντελής” at 8.50.3.58  Here, Astyochus, the Peloponnesian nauarchos, in the 
winter of 412/11, was supposedly attaching himself to Tissaphernes for his own private 
gain, “δι’ ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τῆς µισθοφορᾶς οὐκ ἐντελοῦς οὔσης µαλακωτέρος ἀνθήπτετο,” 
“on account of which he did not object more strongly against the pay not being given in 
full” (8.50.3).  Here again, the fact that “τῆς µισθοφορᾶς” is “οὐκ ἐντελοῦς οὔσης” cannot 
be referring to the lack of a payment of a second and final installment of µισθός, since no 
voyage or campaign has been completed by the Peloponnesians (nor could any be 
foreseen to be completed until the following summer) that would necessitate such a 
payment.   
Furthermore, it is evident that the parenthetical remark on the sailors’ pay not 
being paid in full refers to the cut in pay described at 8.45.2.  This can be said to be so for 
two reasons.  Firstly, and more importantly, the remark comes in the analepsis which 
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 There is no significance in the use of µισθοφορά here rather than µισθός:  Thucydides uses the two words 




starts at 8.45.1 and ends at 8.57.1, and thus not very long after the reduction in pay 
described at 8.45.2-3 and commented on at 8.45.6; this is the only controversy about pay 
referred to before 8.50.3 in the analepsis and thus must be the controversy referred to at 
8.50.3.
59
  Secondly, Astyochus comes from Miletus to meet Tissaphernes (8.50.2-3):  this 
means that, at this point of the analepsis, 8.41.1 of the main narrative (when Astyochus 
sailed from Miletus to Caunus) has not been reached yet;
60
 and this, in turn, means that 
not much time (it is impossible to be any more precise than this) has passed since 8.36.1, 
when Astyochus arrived to take command of the fleet at Miletus, and when Thucydides 
tells us that the Peloponnesian camp there was well supplied, since pay was being given 
sufficiently (“µισθὸς ἐδίδοτο ἀρκούντως”), large amounts of plunder from Iasus were still 
in the hands of the soldiers, and the Milesians were zealously co-operating with the 
Peloponnesians.  Such a relatively short amount of time (between 8.36.1, when pay was 
being given sufficiently, and 8.41.1) would leave very little time for arrears to have built 
up from a failure to pay the troops regularly:  this supports the argument that the 
reference to the failure of Tissaphernes to pay the Peloponnesian sailors in full at 8.50.3 
must be to his decision to cease paying the troops at the expected rate of a drachma per 
man per day, just as it is at 8.46.5.
61
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 Note that Astyochus is described as acting “µαλακωτέρος” about the pay.  Andrewes (HCT v.119) 
compares 8.29.2 and the description of Therimenes (Astyochus’ predecessor) there as being “µαλακὸς” 
about the pay of the sailors; as Andrewes states (ibid.), “‘softness’ about pay has not so far been attributed 
to Astyochos, but it is easily supplied in the context of 8.45.2-3.” 
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 See Andrewes, HCT v.117. 
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 At 8.46.5, Thucydides tells us that Tissaphernes, in so far as it was possible to conjecture from what he 
was doing, was inclined to follow Alcibiades’ advice to wear down both the Athenians and the 
Peloponnesians (8.46.2-4), since, among other things, he was furnishing pay wretchedly to the 
Peloponnesians (“τήν τε τροφὴν κακῶς ἐπόριζε τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις...”).  As Andrewes notes (HCT v.104), 
Thucydides must have envisaged this process as starting after Astyochus’ arrival in Miletus, and so there 
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So far, then, analysis of 8.29.1, 8.45.6, and 8.50.3 has shown a consistency in 
Thucydides’ use of µισθὸς ἐντελής (or variations thereon):  the term in each of these 
passages refers to the disbursement of complete pay (of one drachma per day per man) to 
(Peloponnesian) sailors while on campaign and not, as the conventional scholarly view 
holds, to the distribution of pay in two installments.  I will continue the analysis to see if 
the same meaning holds for the final two mentions of µισθὸς ἐντελής in Thucydides. 
Near the end of the winter of 412/11, Tissaphernes, afraid that his policy of 
providing pay wretchedly to the Peloponnesian fleet with the purpose of weakening it 
(see 8.46.2-5) had worked so well that the Peloponnesians, because of their lack of 
money, would be forced to plunder his territory in order to gain funds to support 
themselves, conferred with the Peloponnesians, distributed pay (“τροφήν”) to them, and 
concluded a treaty with them (8.57.1-2) in which he agreed to provide pay for the 
Peloponnesian triremes then present until the arrival of the King’s ships (8.58.5).
62
   
But after, and despite, his promise in this treaty, Tissaphernes reverted to his former 
ways, paying the Peloponnesian sailors badly; and Thucydides reports that, later in the 
summer of 411, the Peloponnesian sailors, based at Miletos, were angry with the Persian 
because, among other things, “...τροφὴν ὅτι οὐ ξυνεχῶς οὐδ’ ἐντελῆ διδοὺς κακοῖ τὸ 
ναυτικόν,” “he was doing harm to the fleet by not giving it pay regularly or in full” 
                                                                                                                                                 
would not have been much time, by this point of the narrative, for the policy to show its effects; but there is 
no inconsistency in Thucydides’ account, since his analysis here is looking further forward than the date its 
place in the narrative assigns to it (cf. Andrewes (ibid.); and see Hornblower, CT iii.891 ad 8.46.5:  
Andrewes is right on the analysis looking further forward, “except that Th. does not ‘assign’ it to a date at 
all; it floats free.”). 
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  After a failed attempt at a decisive battle with the Athenians, when the 
Peloponnesians did not come out to meet their enemies (8.79.1-8.80.1), the 
Peloponnesians remained perplexed, because they did not know from what source they 
could get money (“χρήµατα”) to maintain so many ships, “ἄλλος τε καὶ Τισσαφέρνους 
κακῶς διδόντος,” “especially since Tissaphernes provided it wretchedly” (8.80.1; cf. 
8.46.5).
64
  The Peloponnesians’ distrust of Tissaphernes was compounded when they 
learned that Alcibiades had gone to the satrap in an attempt to gain his support for the 
Athenians (8.81-82, esp. 82.2).  This added to the growing anger in the fleet because of 
Tissaphernes’ much increased slackness in giving them their pay (“πολλῷ ἐς τὴν 
µισθοδοσίαν τὸν Τισσαφέρνη ἀρρωστότερον γενόµενον”) after their failure to go out and 
meet the Athenians in battle (8.83.2).  Thus, the Peloponnesian sailors—and not just the 
common men, but the officers, too—gathered in groups and began to reckon up how “ὡς 
οὔτε µισθὸν ἐντελῆ πώποτε λάβοιεν τό τε διδόµενον βραχὺ καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ξυνεχῶς,” “they 
                                                 
63 See Hornblower, CT iii.891-892, 982:  this statement is part of a passage full of “wild exaggeration.”  
Even if there is exaggeration at 8.78, however, this has no effect on my argument, because the literal truth 
of 8.78 is not important for the meaning of µισθὸς ἐντελής, but merely Thucydides’ usage of the term here 
and its evidence for what he employs this term to denote.  Also:  Cook ([1990] 80 n.41) comments, in the 
course of a discussion concluding that pay was given to Athenian sailors in two installments with the 
second coming on their arrival home, as follows on 8.78.1:  “Tissaphernes was not even paying the τροφή 
either regularly nor [sic] in full, and was thus damaging the navy (κακοῖ τὸ ναυτικόν).  Presumably the navy 
would not be so affected were only µισθός withheld.”  But, as Cook herself notes ([1990] 78-79), 
Thucydides uses τροφή and µισθός synonymously throughout his work, and he is doing the same here:  see 
chapter 5 section i n.15.  Cook’s statement that Thucydides is using τροφή—only in this instance—to refer 
solely to ration-money rather than pay as a whole is anachronistic, contradicts her own statements on the 
vocabulary of pay in the fifth century (see [1990] 78-79, 80), and is based on (as well supports) her 
incorrect view that Thucy. 8.45.2 refers to the payment of µισθός in two installments.  See also chapter v 
section i and section ix below. 
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 They thus decide to send some ships to Pharnabazus, who was inviting them to come to him and “... 




had never yet received their pay in full; that what they did receive was short, and even 





 This last passage is crucial for the proper interpretation of the term µισθὸς 
ἐντελής.  8.83.3 shows explicitly that, for Thucydides, a failure to pay µισθὸς ἐντελής is 
simply a failure to pay men an expected amount of µισθός in full (i.e. to leave men short) 
of the full µισθός they were expecting to be paid while on campaign.  When µισθός is not 
given ἐντελής, it can be described as βραχύ(ς).  The one explicit Thucydidean description 
of µισθὸς ἐντελής at 8.83.3 is therefore consistent with and confirms my analysis of the 
term as it is used at 8.45.6 and 8.50.3 (as well as at 8.29.1).  The term is not technical and 
does not refer to a regular administrative financial procedure.  Furthermore, and crucially, 
both 8.83.2 and 8.78—by presenting Tissaphernes’ failure to pay in full or regularly as 
two related but separate grievances—make it clear that a failure to pay µισθὸς ἐντελής is 
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 I have translated βραχὺ here as “short” rather than use Crawley’s “small in quantity” to emphasize the 
fact that the Peloponnesian sailors’ failure to receive full pay means that they were being left short of pay.  
This does not mean, however, that there is any difference in meaning between the translations; each 
conveys that the sailors have received an amount less than the full pay they had expected to receive. 
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 Andrewes (HCT v.278), commenting on 8.78, stated that “the degree of repetition, and even verbal echo, 
between these chapters [8.78 and 8.83.3] is disquieting...”  But, in fact, the level of repetition and verbal 
echo is limited to two subjects:  firstly, the crews’ complaints about their µισθός, which had, in fact, 
continued to be a problem between 8.78 and 8.83.3; and secondly, their wish for a decisive naval battle so 
that the campaign could come to an end (8.78: διαναυµαχεῖν; 8.83.2: διαναυµαχήσει) and they would no 
longer have to endure the conditions they were serving in.  Since the crews’ lack of pay and poor 
conditions of service had both continued to be problems between 8.78 and 8.83, the repetition of these 
concerns in both passages should not be considered problematic.  Also, in addition to the limited number of 
similarities between 8.78 and 8.83, there are important differences between the two passages:  the crews, in 
addition to the wish for a decisive battle, come up with another option at 8.83.3, not present at 8.78, that 
would stop their threats to desert:  the plan to enter the service of Pharnabazus in order to get pay.  
Moreover, the complaints against Astyochus in 8.78 and 8.83.3 are not quite the same:  in the first passage, 
there is detailed criticism of his decision not to fight; in the second, there is criticism solely of his putting 
up with the whims of Tissaphernes.  Thus, there is not such a significant amount of repetition between 
these two chapters so as to cause any worries that Thucydides is simply repeating himself here (and again, 
even if there were, my arguments above would not be affected since the main goal of this section is to 
establish Thucydidean usage, i.e. what he means by µισθὸς ἐντελής, and any repetition of his, in fact, adds 




distinct from a failure to distribute µισθός regularly, i.e. ξυνεχῶς; that is, the payment of 
µισθὸς ἐντελής has nothing to do with the withholding of pay.  That this is so is 
confirmed by the analysis above of the term at 8.45.6 and 8.50.3:  again, in both of these 
instances, the references to Tissaphernes’ failure to pay the sailors in full were made 
shortly after Tissaphernes’ reduction of pay for the Peloponnesian sailors had come into 
effect, and thus sufficient time could not have passed for the sailors to realize, if 
Tissaphernes had also adopted a policy of distributing pay irregularly,
67
 that he had done 
so; thus, the references to problems about pay at 8.45.6 and 8.50.3 refer solely to 
Tissaphernes’ failure to distribute the sailors’ pay in full; again, in both of these passages, 
µισθὸς ἐντελής is separate from, so to speak, µισθὸς (διδόµενος) οὐ ξυνεχῶς. 
It should also be noted that µισθὸς ἐντελής is discussed or mentioned in 
Thucydides only in the context of Tissaphernes’ machinations regarding the pay of the 
Peloponnesian sailors, i.e. in the contexts of a reduction in pay or Tissaphernes paying 
the sailors ‘badly’ (see 8.46.5, 8.78, 8.80.1),
68
 i.e. in the midst of justifications for or 
reproaches over Tissaphernes’ failure to pay the men properly.  When µισθός or τροφή in 
Thucydides is mentioned or distributed in usual circumstances (i.e. when the payment or 
availability of µισθός or τροφή is not the focus of arguments or recriminations:  see, e.g., 
6.31.3, 5; 8.5.5), each noun is used alone and without a qualifier.  Thus, µισθὸς ἐντελής is 
a term that is used by Thucydides in specific circumstances when he is describing or 
referring to the complete amount of µισθός that should have been paid or was expected to 
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 As he had, in fact, done, as can be seen from 8.78 and 8.83.3, and earlier at 8.57.1-2. 
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have been paid to the Peloponnesian sailors, but had not been for some reason.  It is not a 
technical term for an administrative procedure:  it is no more a technical term for an 
administrative mechanism than the words ‘complete pay’ would be when used to describe 
any claim by hired workers for the whole of their pay if they had been left short by an 
employer.  
That µισθὸς ἐντελής is not a technical term, and simply means ‘complete or full 
pay,’ can be further seen from 8.84.1, where Thucydides describes disputes arising out of  
the complaints of the sailors on the Peloponnesian side that they had not been paid in full.  
Thucydides describes the Syracusan and Thurian sailors as being the most bold in 
demanding their pay—simply “τὸν µισθὸν”—from Astyochus.  The reference to µισθός 
alone here (when we have just learned that the sailors had not received µισθὸς ἐντελής) 
shows that it is the fact that µισθός is owed to the sailors—i.e. to paraphrase 8.83.2, that 
they have been left short of µισθός—that means they had not received µισθὸς ἐντελής, 
and nothing more.
69
  Again, there is no special technical or administrative term in 
question here.  Regarding unpaid µισθός, it is only the narrative context that determines 
whether Thucydides uses µισθός or µισθὸς ἐντελής to describe it, and not the existence of 
any official state procedure on payments.
70
  To illustrate what I mean to say here using 
the example from the end of the last paragraph:  if hired workers in any other situation 
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 At 8.85.3, Thucydides tells us that Tissaphernes had always been in dispute with Hermocrates the 
Syracusan regarding the distribution of the men’s pay:  “περὶ τοῦ µισθοῦ τῆς ἀποδόσεως.”  We hear of 
disputes between Tissaphernes and Hermocrates earlier in the narrative at 8.29.2 and 8.45.3—in both cases, 
when Tissaphernes was attempting to reduce the sailors’ pay from one drachma (i.e. their full pay) to three 
obols.  Thus, here, too, although the connection is not as strong as at 8.83.2 and 8.84.1, there is an 
equivalency made between unpaid µισθός and µισθὸς ἐντελής. 
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 See pp.358-359 above for a similar point on the usage of these terms in Aristophanes’ Knights, and p.389 




were left short of pay by an employer—so that they had not received their ‘full pay’—
they could also remonstrate regarding ‘the pay’ owed to them without any confusion as to 
what they meant. 
To conclude this section, then, examination of Thucy. 8.45.2, and of the passages 
in book 8 of Thucydides in which the term µισθὸς ἐντελής is used, show that these 
passages no more prove the standard ‘installment’ interpretation of this term than 
Aristoph., Knights 1366-67 do.
71
  In fact, as I have shown, an analysis of Thucy. 8.29.1, 
8.45.6, 8.50.3, 8.78, and 8.83.3, along with 8.45.2, demonstrates that, in Thucydides, and 
in contradiction of the conventional interpretation of the term, µισθὸς ἐντελής means 
‘complete or full pay,’ i.e. payment in full of a rate of pay previously promised to men on 
campaign.
72
  Having established this and shown earlier that there is no reason to link 
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 Note, in addition, that those scholars who advance or cite the ‘two installment’ view of µισθὸς ἐντελής 
have failed to operationalize their position, i.e. they have not thought through how such a system of 
payments might have worked, or how such a system coheres with our other evidence on pay from 
Thucydides.  Note in this regard esp. Thucy. 8.1.1-4:  the Athenians were in despair after the destruction of 
the Sicilian expedition because the treasury seemed to be empty; but if the rowers (at least) on the Sicilian 
expedition had had half of their pay kept back till the end of that campaign, there should have been no view 
at Athens that the treasury was empty after the expedition, since most of the rowers did not make it back to 
Athens, and their second installment of µισθός would have remained unpaid in the treasury at Athens.  
Also, at Thucy. 8.53.2-8.54.2, and at 8.76.3-6, the Athenians consider themselves to have no money in their 
treasury.  But, again, if there had been a fund of withheld µισθός at Athens waiting for the sailors at Samos 
to return from their campaign in the eastern Aegean—a fund that at this stage would have amounted to 
hundreds, if not thousands, of talents—surely it should have played some part in the discussions and 
urgings described in these two passages.  The lack of such a fund cannot be explained away, on the 
‘installment’ thesis, by a financial crisis at Athens, since the ‘installment’ view of µισθὸς ἐντελής is based 
on 8.45.2; i.e., on the ‘two payments’ interpretation of  µισθὸς ἐντελής, the Athenian practice of only 
paying their men half their µισθός on campaign was current when the considerations on the finances of 
Athens at 8.53.2-8.54.2 and 8.76.3-6 were being raised.  Thus, the ‘installment’ interpretation can be found 
to be inconsistent with other mentions of pay and money in the narrative of book 8 of Thucydides. 
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 Ballin ([1978] 134) states that the passages in book 8 of Thucydides mentioning µισθὸς ἐντελής “all refer 
to pay that had been originally been promised but then not paid in full.”  But as his discussion of the term 
before this statement shows, Ballin means here a second payment that had been promised to be paid at the 
end of a term of service but then was not paid.  As I have shown, book 8 of Thucydides shows that the term 
µισθὸς ἐντελής does not refer to a procedure of disbursing military and naval pay in installments; Ballin’s 




Thucy. 8.45.2 and Knights 1366-67, and also taking into consideration my earlier 
discussion of this and other passages discussing µισθός in Knights, it is now safe to 
conclude that the passage from Knights and its mention of “µισθὸν ’ντελῆ” does not 
describe a regular Athenian state practice of withholding part of rowers’ pay until the end 
of a campaign, but rather refers to the building up of arrears of naval pay on campaign 
due to exceptional, contingent circumstances.
73
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 Cf. already Neil (1909) 178 ad Knights 1366-67.  Pritchett dismissed on two occasions the prevailing 
‘two installment’ view of the arrangements used by the Athenian state to disburse naval pay.  Firstly, he 
noted that Morrison and Williams cited Thucydides “as evidence for ‘full pay’ of the Athenians at one 
drachme (sic), one half of which was withheld, but the Greek does not establish this:  ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ 
πλέονος χρόνου ἐπιστήµονες ὄντες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν” ([1971] 17 n.52).  
Secondly, having cited Polyaenus, Strateg. 3.9.51 and Aristoph., Knights 1366-67, Pritchett continued:  
“[s]imilarly, in Book 8 of Thucydides, Tissaphernes is twice spoken of as withholding money.  In the first 
case (45.2), the word used is misthos, in the second (8.78.1) trophe.  These three passages have sometimes 
been cited as supporting a theory that the soldier was given half of his money for maintenance and the other 
half as misthos, the latter being paid when he reached port.  What the passages [from Aristophanes and 
Thucydides] show, rather, is that although the sailor had subsisted in the meantime, not all of the money for 
his trophe or misthos had been forthcoming” ([1971] 24-25).  Pritchett cited the works of Rogers (1930), 
Morrison and Williams (1968), and Berneker (1969); cf. Pritchett (1971) 14 and n.41, where he quotes 
Rogers, and Morrison and Williams, for the standard view in a discussion of rates of military pay paid by 
the Athenian state in the fifth century (in fact, Pritchett’s summation of the views of these scholars is a 
slight misrepresentation:  none of the works cited here explicitly state that the first three obols paid on 
campaign were for subsistence, and the second at the end of the expedition for µισθός).  To start with 
Pritchett’s second dismissal, his last statement in this passage was the correct inference to take from the 
Aristophanes and Thucydides passages he cited, as my analysis of these passages has demonstrated (but 
note that Pritchett was mistaken to cite only two passages from book 8 of Thucydides as speaking of 
Tissaphernes paying the Peloponnesians irregularly:  he should have also noted 8.29.1, 8.45.6, 8.50.3, and 
8.83.2-3).  But Pritchett was right for the wrong reasons.  Pritchett had to reject the ‘two installment’ thesis 
because this thesis conflicted with his views on Athenian military pay in the late fifth century (or, to be 
more precise, the Peloponnesian war, since all the figures he discusses for his argument come from 
Thucydides’ narrative of events therein).  Pritchett believed that Athenian military and naval pay during the 
Peloponnesian war was three obols (rather than a drachma), and was paid for rations only; any attested 
rates of Athenian military and naval pay higher than three obols could be explained for Pritchett by the 
Athenians paying more to men serving in military theaters where prices for food were extraordinarily high 
(see again chapter 4 section iv, chapter 5 section i, ii, and iv for this and what follows).  The view, then, 
that Athenian sailors normally received pay of one drachma, half of this on campaign, and half on their 
return home, therefore had to be rejected by Pritchett (although he provided no arguments as grounds for its 
rejection) as part of his general argument that the customary pay for men participating in Athenian military 
expeditions was three obols a day, and not one drachma.  But Pritchett’s arguments for his view that the 
normal pay for Athenian sailors and soldiers was three obols were, as I have demonstrated at length, 
baseless and wholly incorrect, and thus his dismissal of the ‘two installment’ thesis part of a general 
schema of Athenian military pay that must be dismissed itself.  This can be seen most clearly in his 
treatment of Thucy. 8.45.2, a key passage for Pritchett’s argument, since he believed that the phrase “ὡς 
Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου ἐπιστήµονες ὄντες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν” there 
provided “information about a practice [i.e. the payment of three obols] which was customary” ([1971] 17).  
The rejection of Morrison and Coates—i.e., their view that 8.45.2 provided evidence for a rate of pay of 
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One final point on Thucydides’ use of µισθὸς ἐντελής in book 8.  The fact that 
Thucydides could use this term to describe disputes over Persian payments made to 
Peloponnesian sailors demonstrates that there was nothing specifically Athenian or 
‘official’ about the term.  This is not to say that the uses of the term in book 8 of 
Thucydides tell us nothing about Athenian usage and practice:  it was, after all, an 
analogy to current Athenian practice that Alcibiades told Tissaphernes to use to justify 
his reduction of the Peloponnesian crews’ pay from one drachma to three obols.    
  
v. The text of Thucy. 8.45.2 
Before continuing in order to discuss fourth century and later usage of µισθὸς 
ἐντελής, I want to digress here briefly to discuss the text of Thucy. 8.45.2, in order to 
establish definitively that it offers no support to the position that naval µισθός was usually 
paid by the fifth century Athenian state to its trireme crews in two installments.  The 
Greek of Thucy. 8.45.2, as we have it, reads again as follows: 
... καὶ διδάσκαλος πάντων γιγνόµενος τήν τε µισθοφορὰν ξυνέτεµεν, ἀντὶ 
δραχµῆς Ἀττικῆς ὥστε τριώβολον, καὶ τοῦτο µὴ ξυνεχῶς, δίδοσθαι, λέγειν 
κελεύων τὸν Τισσαφέρνη πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου 
ἐπιστήµονες ὄντες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν, οὐ τοσοῦτον 
πενίᾳ ὅσον ἵνα αὐτῶν µὴ οἱ ναῦται ἐκ περιουσίας ὑβρίζοντες, οἱ µὲν τὰ σώµατα 
                                                                                                                                                 
one drachma a day (even if half of this was withheld till the end of the expedition in question)—noted 
above was in support of this interpretation of this passage.  But Pritchett’s interpretation of this clause of 
Thucy. 8.45.2 was based on a misreading—again, “ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου” does not qualify the payment of 
three obols—and was therefore incorrect, and thus any rejection of Morrison and Coates based on this 
interpretation, in the lack of other argumentation for that rejection, is incorrect (and simply stating that the 
Greek of 8.45.2 does not establish Morrison and Coates’ view is correct but:  firstly, Pritchett’s statement 
here was based on his own misinterpretation of the Greek of this passage; and secondly, many scholars 
have thought that the Greek of 8.45.2 did establish the ‘two installment’ view, so that a thorough analysis 
of the language of 8.45.2 is necessary to refute it (see next section)).  (Finally, it should be noted that 




χείρω ἔχωσι δαπανῶντες ἐς τοιαῦτα ἀφ’ ὧν ἡ ἀσθένεια ξυµβαίνει, οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς 
ἀπολείπωσιν οὐχ ὑπολιπόντες ἐς ὁµηρείαν τὸν προσοφειλόµενον µισθόν.74 
 
The problem with the text can be summarized briefly.  At the start of 8.45.2, 
Thucydides states that Alcibiades cut down the pay of the Peloponnesian sailors to three 
obols, and even this was not to be paid too regularly (καὶ τοῦτο µὴ ξυνεχῶς).  As the text 
has it, the justification he tells Tissaphernes to provide to the Peloponnesians for these 
measures is that the Athenians, longer experienced in naval matters,
75
 give three obols to 
their men (τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν) for reasons explained in the following clause.  
But some words are clearly missing in the the text of the following clause since in it “the 
words ἵνα µὴ οἱ µὲν τὰ σώµατα κ.τ.λ. clearly refer to the pay being at the lower rate of 3 
obols (and to this clause only ἐκ περιουσίας ὑβρίζοντες properly applies), whereas οἱ δὲ 
τὰς ναῦς (µὴ) ἀπολείπωσιν as clearly refers only to the irregularity of the pay.”76  As 
Andrewes put it, “[t]he notion of withholding part of the sailors’ pay, highly relevant for 
Alkibiades’ advice to Tissaphernes (καὶ τοῦτο µὴ ξυνεχῶς) but not present in the clause 
ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι, κ.τ.λ., has thus crept into the clause by the time it ends.”77  There must 
therefore be a lacuna in the sentence after τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν.78  The 
                                                 
74
 See already n.46 above on Morrison and Williams’ reading of the text. 
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 Again:  the temporal expression “ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου” at 8.45.2 is to be taken with “ἐπιστήµονες ὄντες”:  
see pp.322-323 below. 
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 Goodhart (1893) 65. 
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 HCT v.98. 
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question of how this lacuna should be filled is obviously an important one for the proper 
interpretation of Thucy. 8.45.2 as a whole. 
 Stahl proposed that the words “καὶ τοῦτ’ οὐ ξυνεχῶς vel similia” had fallen out of 
the sentence;
79
 Goodhart suggested that οὐ ξυνεχῶς had fallen out of the text.80  Classen, 
while acknowledging that his own (or any) restoration could not admit of complete 
certainty,
81
 believed it more probable that a second verbal clause should have come after 
τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν, rather than just καὶ τοῦτ’ οὐ ξυνεχῶς; the reason for this 
view was his belief that the Athenian practice of paying their sailors irregularly would 
only be described in general terms with the words οὐ ξυνεχῶς, and that, instead, a more 
specific second verbal clause was needed here.  Offering Polyaenus, Strateg. 3.9.51 as a 
possible parallel,
82
 he suggested “καὶ τούτου ἀεὶ µέρος τι κατέχουσιν” for the lacuna after 
διδόασιν.  There are two major problems with this suggested reading.  Firstly, as I will 
demonstrate (see pp.390-393 below), this passage from Polyaenus does not offer 
evidence for usual Athenian practice, since it is clearly describing an exceptional measure 
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 (1875-1889) vol. 4 (2) 85.  (But see Hornblower, CT iii.887:  “Hude, OCT, and Alberti print the text as it 
stands, and merely register Stahl’s suggestion.”  Merely printing the text as it stands, however, fails to 
address the problem pointed out by Stahl, Goodhart, and Andrewes, that the Athenians’ reduction of naval 
pay to three obols would not prevent their sailors deserting, but paying them irregularly would do so; thus, 
the argument for supplementing the passage stands.)  Andrewes (HCT v. 98) stated that filling the lacuna at 
8.45.2 in this way “would produce a logical sentence, though it would not clear up the contradiction 
between ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου and οὐ τοσοῦτον πενίᾳ.”  As I have discussed earlier (see again pp.322-323), 
however, it is clear that the temporal expression is referring to the Athenians’ maritime experience and not 
the pay given to their soldiers, and thus there is no contradiction between the two expressions that needs to 
be cleared up. 
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 (1875-1882) (vol. 3) 182-183 (and for this and what follows). 
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(which may not even have concerned an Athenian force), and therefore should not be 
brought forward as a parallel to explicate Thucy. 8.45.2.  Secondly, there is no reason to 
posit a second, more specific clause after διδόασιν.  Alcibiades, having introduced the 
decrease in pay and the plan to disburse the reduced pay irregularly at the start of the 
sentence, is now urging Tissaphernes to give the explanation for those measures.  The 
emphasis in this latter half of the sentence is therefore not on the measures themselves, 
but on the explanations to be given for them; and since they have been mentioned before 
and are being merely recapitulated here, the earlier description of the measures did not 
need to be fully reproduced again at this point by Thucydides.
83
  Thus, τριώβολον τοῖς 
ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν is not more specific than the earlier ὥστε τριώβολον... δίδοσθαι, and 
there is no reason why the lacuna after διδόασιν should have included anything more 
specific than the earlier καὶ τοῦτο µὴ ξυνεχῶς, and, in fact, good reason why it may have 
included something less specific:  thus, οὐ ξυνεχῶς is both a possible and, on the parallel 
with ὥστε τριώβολον... δίδοσθαι, a very likely restoration here. 
 Andrewes, as noted above, referenced Knights 1366-67 in his discussion of the 
textual problems of Thucy. 8.45.2, inferring from that passage that the Athenian state in 
the 420s normally withheld pay from expeditions until they returned to Athens.  He also 
believed that the temporal expression ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου at 8.45.2 referred to the Athenian 
method of paying their sailors, and not to their experience of naval affairs.  On these two 
grounds, Andrewes posited that the supplement to 8.45.2 should read as follows:
84
  “the 
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Athenians from their long experience of naval matters <withhold part of the pay, and 
now> give their men three obols, not so much because of their (present) poverty as...”    
But, as I have shown above, the Aristophanic passage, by itself, offers no positive 
evidence for such a practice; and ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου at 8.45.2 does not refer to their 
payment of sailors, i.e. 8.45.2 does not state that the Athenians had paid their sailors three 
obols per day for a long time.  Thus, there are no grounds for Andrewes’ proposed 
supplement, and there is no reason to take 8.45.2 as referring to a regular Athenian 
procedure of withholding pay from their sailors.   
Neither Classen’s nor Andrewes’ alternative suggestions to οὐ ξυνεχῶς for the 
lacuna after τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν works, then; and if one solely limits oneself 
to a consideration of the internal architecture of Thucy. 8.45.2, οὐ ξυνεχῶς suggests itself 
as both a possible and the most probable supplement.  That οὐ ξυνεχῶς should be restored 
at 8.45.2 is made certain by Thucydides’ description of the continuing controversy over 
pay between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians.  As I have shown above, the policy of 
Alcibiades, followed by Tissaphernes, of paying the Peloponnesian sailors three obols, 
instead of a drachma, was recognized by all parties as a failure to give the Peloponnesian 
fleet its µισθὸς ἐντελής.  In addition, Tissaphernes continued to follow Alcibiades’ advice 
in full, by not only failing to pay the rowers their complete µισθός, but also by paying it 
irregularly, too (8.78:  οὐ ξυνεχῶς; 8.83.3:  καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ξυνεχῶς).  This was the point of 
the latter part of the analogy to Athenian practice that Alcibiades told Tissaphernes to 
give to the Peloponnesians as a pretext for paying their rowers less and irregularly:
85
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sailors paid irregularly would not desert, since they would lose the pay owed to them, i.e. 
owed money that ought to have been paid to them earlier.  Tissaphernes’ later actions—in 
not paying the Peloponnesians in full and paying them irregularly—thus confirm the 
results of my examination of the text of 8.45.2:  οὐ ξυνεχῶς needs to be added after 
τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν in the latter part of 8.45.2, both for the passage to make 
sense on its own terms, and for it to be consistent with the later narrative of book 8.
86
 
Thus, when Alcibiades told Tissaphernes at 8.45.2 to cut down the Peloponnesian sailors’ 
pay, and also told him to disburse the reduced pay irregularly, advising him to justify this 
to the Peloponnesians by analogy with Athenian practice, what he meant by this was not 
that the Athenians regularly withheld part of their sailors’ pay till their disembarkation on 
their return to Athens, but that the Athenians did not always pay the complete amount of 
their rowers’ pay on time, in order that some pay would be owed to the sailors, and thus 
left behind as a pledge, thus discouraging them from deserting.  Again, Thucy. 8.45.2 
does not provide any support for the view that the Athenian state paid its sailors in the 
late fifth century in two installments.
87
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 As noted above, Classen stated that no supplement to 8.45.2 could admit of complete certainty (see also 
Steup [1966] viii.259 making the same point).   Notwithstanding this, I hope to have shown in my analysis 
of the text of 8.45.2 above, and by placement of 8.45.2 in the wider context of Thucydides’ treatment of 
pay in book 8, that the supplement οὐ ξυνεχῶς is the safest, and an almost definitively certain, supplement 
to 8.45.2.  (In any case, the arguments I have made in the preceding section regarding the proper 
interpretation of the term µισθὸς ἐντελής in book 8 of Thucydides remain valid, regardless of whether my 
argument concerning the insertion of οὐ ξυνεχῶς at 8.45.2 stands or not.) 
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 In the final analysis, it is, in fact, remarkable that Thucy. 8.45.2 has ever been used to support the 
hypothesis that pay was distributed to Athenian sailors in installments.  The strangeness of the ‘installment’ 
interpretation can be seen most clearly in treatments of this chapter by scholars who have taken no part in 
the ‘µισθὸς ἐντελής’ controversy.  To take the most significant recent discussions of 8.45.2, Hornblower 
(CT iii.887-888), Kallet ([2001] 261, 302), and Rood ([1998] 264-265) have all taken it to be 
uncontroversial that the chapter tells us that Alcibiades cut down the pay of the sailors to three obols, and 
paid that amount irregularly; i.e. these scholars have not even raised the ‘installment’ thesis as an 
alternative interpretation of the text.  See also in this regard Andrewes, HCT v.98:  “[s]ome, including 
Morrison and Williams (258-9), have concluded that the regular Athenian practice was to pay 3 ob. a day in 
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vi. The meaning of µισθς ντελς in the (first half of the) fourth century 
That the term µισθὸς ἐντελής did not refer to an official Athenian policy, practice 
or custom of paying its sailors in installments, but simply referred to the full amount of 
pay that (all) classical Greek sailors (and soldiers) were promised and thus expected to be 
paid on campaign is confirmed by fourth century usage and later ancient descriptions of 
fourth century contexts.   
After the Greeks in Cyrus’ army on the march upland found out at Thapsacus the 
real aim of their march (i.e., the King), they demanded extra money from Cyrus in return 
for their efforts (Xen., Anab. 1.4.11-12).  Cyrus promised every man five mnai in silver 
when they reached Babylon and “... τὸν µισθὸν ἐντελῆ µέχρι ἂν καταστήσῃ τοὺς 
Ἕλληνας εἰς Ἰωνίαν πάλιν,” “full pay until he brought the Greeks back to Ionia again” 
(Xen., Anab. 1.4.13).  Since the Greeks were not demanding a raise in pay, but rather a 
special donative as a reward for marching against the King,
88
 we are dealing here with a 
special measure; Cyrus’ offer of pay in full implies that Greek mercenaries were 
customarily paid less
89
 or not at all
90
 for the return march after a campaign 
(unfortunately, there is no other evidence to clarify this point).  Importantly for our 
                                                                                                                                                 
the field and other 3 ob. on return home; but that will not help here, for Alkibiades is urging Tissaphernes 
both to keep the total down to 3 ob. a day and to pay that irregularly”; and cf. of earlier treatments, e.g., 
Steup (1966) viii.105, 286-287. 
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 After having learned that they were marching against the King, “καὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν ἰέναι, ἐὰν µή τις αὐτοῖς 
χρήµατα διδῷ...,” “[the Greeks] refused to go on unless they were given money,” as the men had been who 
had made the journey upland with Cyrus to see his dying father (and not fight in battle) (Xen., Anab. 
1.4.12; cf. 1.1.2). 
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understanding of the term µισθὸς ἐντελής, Cyrus’ promise was to pay his Greek soldiers 
in full “until” (“µέχρι”) they reached Ionia again—that is, the mercenaries were to receive 
“τὸν µισθὸν ἐντελῆ” while they were still on campaign; thus, “τὸν µισθὸν ἐντελῆ” in this 
case cannot refer to an arrangement to pay the Greeks part of their pay on campaign, and 
part on their return home.  Why did Cyrus promise ‘pay in full’ here, then, and not simply 
‘pay’ for the duration of the return march?  Firstly, the promise of full pay must have 
been made as a special (and specially munificent) incentive to encourage the Greek 
mercenaries to remain with him on the march.  Secondly, the promise of ‘µισθὸς ἐντελής’ 
was made because the Greeks did not receive µισθός from Cyrus for more than three 
months from the start of the march from Sardis (Xen., Anab. 1.2.11); because of this 
history, Cyrus had to specify that he would pay in full in order to bolster his offer 
encouraging the Greeks to march on with him against the King. 
“τὸν µισθὸν ἐντελῆ,” then, at Xen. Anab. 1.4.13 refers to µισθός paid in full, on 
campaign, on time (and not delayed in any way).  This is consistent with the meaning of 
the term found already in Thucydides and Aristophanes, and this consistency is 
significant in itself.  Let me elaborate.  Marinovic, in her discussion of the meaning of 
µισθὸς ἐντελής, states that the passage from the Anabasis “n’apporte rien de nouveau sur 
ce point.”
91
  But Xenophon’s description of a promise of pay in full made as a special 
incentive by a Persian satrap to a group of Greek mercenaries drawn from all over the 
Greek world does tell us something, by telling us ‘nothing new’ about the usage of µισθὸς 
ἐντελής in the classical period:  the fact that this term could be used in such a context—
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 (1988) 166.  She is incorrect in stating that the soldiers, in their demand for money, “exigent une 
augmentation de paye” (ibid.):  as noted above, they were demanding a special donative for marching 




without any effort on Xenophon’s part to explain its meaning—implies very strongly that 
the term did not refer to a special administrative procedure governing naval pay at 
Athens, but could refer to any promise or expectation of µισθός being paid in full and 
without delay to classical Greek military forces, whether by Athenians or Persians or to 
sailors or soldiers. 
This inference is confirmed by Isocrates’ use of the term in his portrayal of the 
campaign of the Cyreans and its aftermath.  Employing their experiences to encourage 
Philip II to mount an invasion of Asia, Isocrates narrates that the King, despite his victory 
at Cunaxa, was still so afraid of the Greeks and felt such lack of confidence in his own 
forces  
ὥστε προκαλεσάµενος Κλέαρχον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἡγεµόνας εἰς λόγον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ 
τούτοις µὲν ὑπισχνούµενος µεγάλας δωρεὰς δώσειν, τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις στρατιώταις 
ἐντελῆ τὸν µισθὸν ἀποδοὺς ἀποπέµψειν... 
 
that he invited Clearchus and the other captains to a parley, promising to give 
them great gifts and to pay their soldiers their wages in full and to give them safe 
convoy home... (5.91)   
 
Isocrates’ description here obviously conflates Cyrus’ offer (made at Thapsacus 
on the Euphrates) with Tissaphernes’ betrayal of Clearchus and other Greek generals and 
captains after the battle of Cunaxa (see Xen., Anab. 2.5.24-31) in order to present a 
tendentiously misleading picture of the King’s attitude after the battle.  But the literal 
truth of Isocrates’ presentation is irrelevant here:  what is relevant and important is that 
he also, writing in 346, could use “ἐντελῆ τὸν µισθὸν” of an offer made by the King to 
Greek forces without having to specify or expand on its meaning:  again, the phrase is 
referring simply to a promise made to pay soldiers in full and punctually while they were 
still on campaign (as can be seen by the fact that the King’s promise to pay the Greeks in 
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full was made together with a promise to escort them back to Greece).
92
  In other words, 
there was nothing specific to the disbursement of Athenian state naval pay about µισθὸς 
ἐντελής. 
 But µισθὸς ἐντελής also continued to be used to describe the disbursement of their 
complete pay during service to Athenian forces in the fourth century.  In a eulogy of his 
pupil Timotheus’ career, Isocrates made the argument that none of Timotheus’ enemies 
could find a better general at finding resources in the field for his soldiers:  
συνίσασι γὰρ αὐτῷ κατὰ µὲν ἀρχὰς τῶν πολέµων διὰ τὸ µηδὲν παρὰ τῆς πόλεως 
λαµβάνειν εἰς τὰς ἐσχάτας ἐνδείας καθιστάµενον, ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τοῦτο τὰ 
πράγµατα περιιστάναι δυνάµενον, ὥστε καὶ τῶν πολεµίων περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ τοῖς 
στρατιώταις ἐντελεῖς ἀποδιδόναι τοὺς µισθοὺς. 
 
For they know that at the beginning of his campaigns, owing to the fact that he 
received nothing from Athens, he found himself in great extremities, but that, 
even with this handicap, he was able to bring his fortunes round to the point 





 “ἐντελεῖς... τοὺς µισθούς” means “simplement un traitement 
entièrement payé”; one should add, to be precise, paid fully while on campaign.  Griffith 
noted that the phrase ‘µισθὸς ἐντελής’ is found in this passage “with no special meaning 
apparently.”
94
  These statements are exactly right, and confirm the point I made above, 
but this time in a specifically Athenian context:  µισθὸς ἐντελής had no special ‘official’ 
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 Ballin ([1978] 134) states of this passage that “the Persian king offered to pay off Klearchos’ troops and 
send them home; i.e. pay the arrears Klearchos owed them”; and took the passage to mean that the Cyreans 
had part of their pay kept back by Clearchus.  This is incorrect.  Clearchus was never the paymaster of the 
mercenaries and so could not have owed them arrears of pay.  The King’s supposed offer was a special 
bonus designed to encourage the Greeks to acquiesce to the plan of the King (cf. above on Cyrus’ offer of 
full pay to the mercenaries at Thapsacus). 
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meaning at Athens (or elsewhere), and could be used to describe the pay of any force, 
Athenian or otherwise, that was promised or expected to be paid in full on campaign.  
This fact is confirmed by another passage from this speech, when Isocrates describes the 
achievements of Timotheus at Samos:  without receiving any money from the Athenians 
or any of the allies, Timotheus captured Samos after a siege of ten months with a force of 
eight thousand peltasts and thirty triremes, “καὶ τούτοις ἅπασιν ἐκ τῆς πολεµίας τὸν 
µισθὸν ἀπέδωκε,” “and he distributed µισθός to all these forces from the spoils of war” 
(15.111).  Once more here,
95
 one sees that it is only the context that determines whether 
µισθός or µισθὸς ἐντελής is used by Isocrates to describe the pay given by Timotheus to 
his troops:  in the passage describing in detail the campaign at Samos, µισθός is used 
alone; in the more elaborate passage summarizing Timotheus’ campaigns as a whole (of 
which the Samian campaign was, of course, part) µισθὸς ἐντελής is used to point up 
Timotheus’ achievements in providing pay in full to his soldiers in the absence of help 
from his polis.  Again, there is no special meaning given to µισθὸς ἐντελής at Athens; the 
term had the same general meaning there as elsewhere.
96
  
One later passage, unnoted in previous discussions of the meaning of µισθὸς 
ἐντελής, confirms this ‘general’ usage of the term.  In 356/5, during the warring between 
the Syracusan tyrants, Dionysius II proposed terms of surrender to Dion, on the 
acceptance of which he hoped to retire without fighting into Italy:  he sent to Dion 
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 A fragment of Lysias contains another (probably) fourth-century mention of complete pay (fr. 346, l.14):  
“τηµ µισθ<οφορίαν ... ασαν εBνBτBεBληB.”  But the lack of context caused by the extremely lacunose nature of 




offering to surrender to him the acropolis (of Syracuse), his weapons, and his 
mercenaries, “καὶ πέντε µηνῶν ἐντελῆ τούτοις µισθόν,” “with five months’ full pay for 
these...”
97
  Here again, just as in Xenophon and Isocrates, and the earlier sources I have 
examined, this passage with its mention of complete pay for soldiers simply means that 
the mercenaries would be paid for five months at the full rate they had previously been 
promised by Dionysius, i.e. that they would be not left short of pay they had been 
expecting from Dionysius, so that they would not be potentially mutinous or desperate for 
money when Dion took the city completely from Dionysius’ power.  There is no thought 
here of a part of the mercenaries’ pay being distributed to them at the end of their service; 
rather, their pay was to be distributed before their service under Dion began. 
 
Finally, as noted above, one other description of a fourth-century context from a 
Second Sophistic author has been used to support the idea that Athenian naval forces 
received their pay in two installments.  The passage in question is Polyaenus, Strateg. 
3.9.51: 
Ἰφικράτης ἦρξε τοῦ πλείστου στρατεύµατος πεζοῦ καὶ ναυτικοῦ ἐν τῇ δόσει τοῦ 
µισθοῦ καθ’ ἕκαστον µῆνα ὑφαιρῶν τὸ τέταρτον µέρος, ὥσπερ ἐνέχυρον ἑκάστου 
κατέχων, ἵνα µὴ λίποιεν τὸ στρατόπεδον.  οὕτως ἄρα καὶ πολλοὺς εἶχεν ἀεὶ τοὺς 
στρατευοµένους καὶ εὐπόρους, τὸ τέταρτον τοὺ µισθοῦ φυλαττόµενον ἔχοντας.  
 
Iphicrates commanded a large army including land and naval forces.  He held 
back a quarter of their pay each month, as a pledge for each, so they would not 
desert the army.  In this way he always had many wealthy soldiers, who had a 




The stratagem is undated, and there is no indication of the location of the 
campaign during which Iphicrates held back a quarter of the pay of his men.  
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Consequently, there is no certainty that this anecdote refers to Athenian forces under 
Iphicrates’ command:  during his long and varied career, Iphikrates did command land 
and naval forces for the Athenian state in the Chersonese (389-387), at Corcyra (373-
372), at Amphipolis and in Thrace generally (367-364);
98
 but he also commanded 
mercenary land and naval forces in Egypt (374) and Thrace (364), too
99
 (even 
commanding land and naval forces against the Athenian state on one occasion in 364).
100
  
The ruse described by Polyaenus in this passage—and cited as providing evidence for the 
payment practices of the Athenian state—may therefore not be referring to an Athenian 
campaign at all. 
 But the crucial point about this passage, with its description of Iphicrates’ 
retention of a part of his forces’ pay, is that it is a description of a stratagem located in a 
collection of stratagems:  the measure undertaken by Iphicrates which is described at 
Strateg. 3.9.51, then, has something exceptional about it, something that marked it out as 
unusually clever and to be taken note of by future generals.  Iphicrates’ ruse concerning 
his men’s pay—even if it was an action taken while he was in command of Athenian 
forces (which, again, is not certain)—therefore cannot be taken as reflective of common 
or standard practice at Athens.  A look at some other ruses concerning money in 
Polyaenus’ collection of Iphicratean stratagems illustrates this point.  At 3.9.30, 
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 See again Parke (1933) 105-106 (with Diod. 15.42-43, Polyaenus, Strateg. 3.9.38), 127, respectively.  In 
addition, Iphicrates may have commanded land and naval forces together during his time as a mercenary 








Iphicrates persuades the Athenians—who are short of money—to demolish or sell the 
parts of buildings overhanging public roads, so that the owners of the buildings 
contributed a great deal of money to prevent their structures from being mutilated and 
becoming unsound.  At 3.9.35, Polyaenus writes that if Iphicrates could not pay his 
soldiers, he led them to uninhabited places and coasts, so that they would spend as little 
as possible; on the other hand, if he had plenty of money, he led them to wealthy cities 
and places, where they spend their money quickly and be eager for action.  Finally, at 
3.9.59, when Iphicrates was once short of money for pay, and his angry soldiers 
demanded an assembly, he found men who could speak Persian, dressed them in Persian 
clothing, and commanded them to appear before the assembly of soldiers and to tell it, in 
Persian, that they had been ordered to tell the assembly that the men bringing money 
were near.  (Iphicrates’ soldiers, deceived, dissolved the assembly.)  
Placed in its proper context, then, the point that ought to be drawn from the 
location of Iphicrates’ retention of pay—which, again, may not even have been an action 
taken during an Athenian campaign—among the stratagems collected by Polyaenus is 
that his retention of a quarter of his men’s pay was not typical of Athenian practice (even 
in the case that the pay was withheld from men serving on a campaign waged by the 
Athenian state); on the contrary, it should be considered as an exceptional and unusual 
measure, just as all the other ruses of Iphicrates described by Polyaenus were.
101
  
Polyaenus’ description of Iphicrates’ measure cannot be taken as a recounting of a usual, 
regular feature of Athenian military/naval financial administration, then; rather, 
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Polyaenus includes it in his work because it shows a particular resourcefulness and 
astuteness on the part of Iphicrates, and because it reinforces the picture emerging from 
the rest of his collection of Iphicrates’ stratagems of a general who was especially 
attentive to his men and to discipline in the forces he led (and thus of a general who could 
provide a good exemplum for military leadership).
102
 
 So, far from supporting the commonly held view that, in the fifth and fourth 
centuries, half of the pay of Athenian naval forces was usually retained by the 
commander or the state till the end of a campaign, to be paid then, Polyaenus, Strateg. 
3.9.51 demonstrates the opposite:  that retaining part of military forces’ pay was an 
exceptional and extraordinary measure, and one contrary to normal practice (at least in 
the first half of the fourth century).  
 
To conclude this section, then, I made two related points in its first part:  I 
confirmed that, for the first half of the fourth century as well for the fifth, the 
conventional view that µισθὸς ἐντελής refers to an Athenian policy or custom of paying 
their sailors in two installments, with the second withheld till their return to Athens, is 
incorrect—rather the phrase simply refers to the complete amount of µισθός that men 
were expecting to be paid while on campaign; and secondly, that µισθὸς ἐντελής could be 
used to refer to the complete pay expected by all sailors and soldiers from all military 
employers in the Greek world in the early and mid fourth century.
103
  And having 
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established that it was expected, or at least aspired to, that classical Greek sailors and 
soldiers on campaign in the late fifth and first half of the fourth century would receive the 
full µισθός they had been promised before their term of service, one can see now why 
Iphicrates’ idea to hold back a part of his men’s pay until the end of a campaign was 
included by Polyaenus in his collection of stratagems:  it was an exceptional measure, an 
unusual financial ruse worth recording. 
 
vii. The modification of the meaning of µισθς ντελς in the middle of the fourth 
century 
 In response to straitened public finances, however, the methods of disbursement 
of military and naval pay at Athens (and elsewhere) in the mid-fourth century did 
sometimes differ from those of the fifth:  in this period, µισθὸς ἐντελής did sometimes 
come to mean, in certain contexts, the sum of two payments—although it should be 
immediately noted that payment of µισθὸς ἐντελής to Athenian sailors (and soldiers) (and 
Peloponnesian sailors) never came to denote the payment of half their µισθός on active 
service and half on their return home.  The evidence for these modified pay practices in 
the mid-fourth century come from two speeches from the Demosthenic corpus, the First 
Philippic and Against Polycles, and a passage from Arrian’s Anabasis.  Although the 
First Philippic has played almost no role in the controversy over the meaning of µισθὸς 
ἐντελής,104 and the Against Polycles only a minor one,105 since each speech offers a 
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considerable amount of evidence for Athenian methods and terminology of naval 
payment in the mid-fourth century, I will analyze both speeches in detail to demonstrate 
once more that the scholarly consensus reached regarding the meaning of µισθὸς ἐντελής 
has no foundation, and to establish the proper interpretation of what this term meant at 
Athens in the mid-fourth century.  I will also devote some time to an analysis of the 
passage of Arrian’s Anabasis noted above, to show that µισθὸς ἐντελής was used in 
exactly the same way in the Peloponnese of the late 330s as it was in the Athens of the 
late 360s and 350s.  Investigating each of the attestations of µισθὸς ἐντελής and its 
derivatives in these works will thus contribute to the wider goal of this chapter:  to 
establish the amounts of money classical Greek sailors and soldiers had to spend in the 
markets provided to them. 
 
In the First Philippic (Dem. 4), given in 351, Demosthenes proposed two 
measures to guard against sudden attacks by Philip on poleis and regions in the northern 
Aegean friendly to Athens (4.16-17):  firstly, the preparation of fifty triremes (4.16-17); 
and secondly, the dispatch of an Athenian force to the north-east Aegean to carry on a 
campaign of continuous harassment against Philip there (4.19).  Demosthenes also 
outlined the scale and composition of the force he considered appropriate for this second 
task, and, in addition, how the members of the proposed force were to be paid (4.19-
22).
106
  He proposed for the planned campaign of harassment an infantry force of two 
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thousand men (of which five hundred had to be Athenians, the rest being mercenaries), a 
cavalry force of two hundred horse (with cavalry transports besides), and a fleet of ten 
triremes (4.21-22).
107
  Demosthenes told his audience he proposed a force of this size for 
two reasons:  firstly, because the Athenians could not provide a force that could match 
Philip in pitched battle, so that it was necessary to engage in raiding of his territory to 
begin with (4.23); thus, the force to be sent out could not be excessively large (nor 
altogether too small), and this also because (this being the second reason for its proposed 
size) there was neither the pay or the maintenance available for an excessively large force 
at Athens:  “οὐ γὰρ ἔστι µισθὸς οὐδὲ τροφή” (4.23).  There is in this passage, then, a 
distinction, which is never found in fifth century texts, made between µισθός and 
τροφή.108   
 This distinction between µισθός and τροφή is found again at 4.28-29, in a passage 
that helps to confirm and clarify the distinction made between the two terms at 4.23.  At 
4.28-29, as part of his goal of emphasizing the feasibility of his plan to attack Philip on 
his home ground, Demosthenes describes the cost of the proposed force
109
—I will quote 
the passage in full because of its importance: 
χρήµατα τοίνυν· ἔστι µὲν ἡ τροφή, σιτηρέσιον µόνον, τῇ δυνάµει ταύτῃ τάλαντ’ 
ἐνενήκοντα καὶ µικρόν τι πρός, δέκα µὲν ναυσὶ ταχείαις τεττεράκοντα τάλαντα, 
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εἴκοσιν εἰς τὴν ναῦν µναῖ τοῦ µηνὸς ἑκάστου, στρατιώταις δὲ δισχιλίοις τοσαῦθ’ 
ἕτερα, ἵνα δέκα τοῦ µηνὸς ὁ στρατιώτης δραχµὰς σιτηρέσιον λαµβάνῃ τοῦ µηνός, 
δώδεκα τάλαντα.  εἰ δέ τις οἴεται µικρὰν ἀφορµὴν εἶναι, σιτηρέσιον τοῖς 
στρατευοµένοις ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔγνωκεν· ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶδα σαφῶς ὅτι, τοῦτ’ ἂν 
γένηται, προσποριεῖ τὰ λοίπ’ αὐτὸ τὸ στράτευµ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ πολέµου, οὐδένα τῶν 
Ἑλλήνων ἀδικοῦν οὐδὲ τῶν συµµάχων, ὥστ’ ἔχειν µισθὸν ἐντελῆ. 
 
As to the cost then:  the trophe, the siteresion only, of this force, comes to rather 
more than ninety talents; for the ten fast ships forty talents, or twenty mnai a ship 
every month; for two thousand men the same amount, that each may receive ten 
drachmas a month siteresion; for the two hundred cavalry twelve talents, if each 
is to receive thirty drachmas a month.  If anyone imagines that siteresion for the 
men on campaign is only a small provision to begin with,
110
 he is wrong; for I 
feel quite sure that if no more than that is forthcoming, the force itself will 
provide the rest out of the war, so as to make up their full pay without injury to 
any Greek or allied community. 
 
“µισθὸν ἐντελῆ” here, then, is the sum of two payments:  σιτηρέσιον (= τροφή 
here) of two obols per day and τὰ λοίπ’ (“the rest”), an unspecified amount of money (per 
day), to be acquired by the force through plundering.
111
  If it is not possible to establish 
the amount of money the phrase “τὰ λοίπ’” refers to,112 it is possible to specify what type 
of payment “τὰ λοίπ’” signifies, by comparing 4.28-29 to 4.23.  Demosthenes, 
throughout the early part of this speech, emphasized that his plans were feasible, that, 
unlike previously proposed Athenian forces of great size that never actually campaigned 
                                                 
110
 See chapter 5 section iii for the translation of this clause. 
 
111
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thinking that τροφή and µισθὸς ἐντελής are synonymous at 4.28-29:  τροφή in this passage means money to 
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Demosthenes had to specify that he meant by τροφή here σιτηρέσιον only implies that he was using τροφή in 
the broader sense of (total) pay earlier in the speech, at 4.19-20, and 22 (see p.395 and n.106, p.396 above); 
the context of these earlier passages also imply that he was using τροφή to mean total pay, since 
Demosthenes is speaking generally in each of the maintenance of his proposed force, and gives no 
indication that he is considering only a restricted part of the force’s remuneration.  Note, too, in this respect 
that the use of τροφή in this wider sense at 4.19-20, 22 comes before Demosthenes’ first use of τροφή in the 




 See Marinovic (1988) 158 and n.70:  the sums of σιτηρέσιον and the amount of “τὰ λοίπ’” at 4.28-29 




because Athens did not have the resources in men or money to field them, the force he 
proposed was capable of action and affordable.  At 4.28-29, in outlining the expense of 
maintaining the force to harass Philip, he limits the state’s expenditures to paying the 
τροφή (= σιτηρέσιον) of the force.  Referring back to 4.23, it will be remembered that one 
of the disadvantages of an exceedingly large force for the campaign Demosthenes 
proposed to mount was that the Athenians would not be in a position to provide either 
µισθός or τροφή for it; the implication being that the Athenians would be able to find 
either or both of these for the smaller force Demosthenes put forward for consideration.  
To return to 4.28-29, then, where Demosthenes specifies how the costs for the payment 
of his planned force of harassment will be met, he proposes that the Athenians provide 
the τροφή (= σιτηρέσιον) for his force; this leaves, from the two components of pay 
mentioned at 4.23, the µισθός of the force that Demosthenes implied at 4.23 would be 
met for his force.  The phrase “τὰ λοίπ’” is, then, a rather loose way of referring to the 
µισθός of the force Demosthenes proposed (the vague (to us) reference possible because 
his audience would obviously be familiar with the methods and vocabulary of Athenian 
naval payments at this time).  Thus, at 4.28-29,  τροφή (= σιτηρέσιον) + µισθός = µισθὸς 
ἐντελής.113 
 Thus, µισθὸς ἐντελής at Dem. 4.28-29 does not refer to a system of paying 
Athenian forces half of their pay on campaign, and half on their return to the Piraeus, but 
again, simply, to the payment of the full amount of pay promised to and expected by 
military forces on campaign.  This last point follows from the fact that Demosthenes 
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proposed that the force would provide its own µισθὸς ἐντελής, by topping up the τροφή 
provided by the state with µισθός provided by itself from the proceeds of plundering 
while on campaign; µισθὸς ἐντελής, therefore, could be proposed as achievable on active 
service in 351, as in the fifth century and other fourth century authors I have already 
discussed, and not on return to Athens after the completion of a campaign.  And although 
Demosthenes’ speech makes clear that it frequently happened at this time that military 
and naval forces sent out on campaign by the Athenian state were paid only σιτηρέσιον, 
his proposed project shows that the provision of µισθὸς ἐντελής was expected to be 
provided on campaign for members of Athenian military expeditions in the middle of the 
fourth century, or, at the very least, was considerd a desideratum. 
 
In the Against Polycles ([Dem.] 50), probably given in 359 and describing events 
that took place from 362-360, Apollodorus sued Polycles for the expenses he had 
incurred in serving beyond his time as trierarch due to Polycles’ failure to present himself 
to take over Apollodorus’ trireme on the expiration of the latter’s term of service.  With 
the focus on the expenditures Apollodorus had had to make during his (appointed) time 
of service and the time thereafter, there is considerable discussion in this speech of the 
pay and other inducements given to the men serving on-board his trireme.  At one point 
(50.18), Apollodorus states that he hired some rowers at Sestus “ἐντελοµίσθους.”  
Scholars who have advanced the thesis that half of Athenian naval pay was normally 
withheld till the end of a campaign have cited this passage in support of their position.  
Thus, Morrison and Williams, commenting on the use of the term “ἐντελοµίσθους” at 
[Dem.] 50.18, stated that Apollodorus was “obliged to hire local men ‘at full pay’” since 
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“[n]aturally it would be no good to them to have half their pay waiting for them at 
Athens.”
114
  Gabrielsen, having noted that as a countermeasure against desertion, “part of 
the pay supplied by the state was frequently withheld until disembarkation,” stated that 
“[i]n such cases the trierarch was compelled to meet his crew’s demand for full pay out of 
his own means.”
115
  A detailed analysis of this speech gives considerable opportunity to 
show that these interpretations of [Dem.] 50.18 are not valid, and that µισθὸς ἐντελής 
(and its related terms) in the Against Polycles has the same meaning that it has in Dem.4:  
i.e. that in this speech also, µισθὸς ἐντελής = µισθὸς + σιτηρέσιον, and that both payments 
could be expected to be paid while on campaign. 
 When Apollodorus was appointed trierarch, the sailors listed for service by their 
demes either did not show up or (in Apollodorus’ presentation of the matter) were 
incompetent; so, having dismissed the conscripted sailors who had shown up on account 
of their incompetence, he then hired the best rowers
116
 possible by giving to each of the 
men he hired large bonuses and advance payments (“δωρειὰς καὶ προδόσεις... µεγάλας”) 
(50.7).  He also hired the best hyperesia he could (ibid.).
117
  Having described these and 
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discussion of pay arrangements for Athenian sailors based mostly on [Dem.] 50, and that there is no 
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[Dem.] 50, it can be taken that Gabrielsen is referring to [Dem.] 50, and, in particular, 50.18. 
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 “ναύτας”:  throughout this speech, ναῦται has the restricted meaning of “rowers”:  see Morrison (1984) 




 This term can refer either to the thirty assistants to the trierarch over and above the oar-crew (i.e. the six 
specialist ‘petty-officers’ (the helmsman, keleustes, pentekontarchos, bow officer, ship’s carpenter, 
auletes), ten deckhands, ten marines (epibatai), and four archers) or, in a more limited sense, to the six 
  
401 
other expenses he had incurred as trierarch (and citizen—he had paid proeisphorai before 
the campaign) prior to the trip (50.8-9), Apollodorus then asked the clerk to read out a 
summary of his expenditures while on campaign.  These, among other things, included 
“τοὺς µισθοὺς” that he had disbursed every month to the hyperesia and epibatai serving 
under him, since he had received from the generals siteresion alone (“σιτηρέσιον µόνον”) 
for the payment of the crew of his trireme, except for a period of two months (only) in a 
term of service of a year and five months, when he had also received “µισθὸν” from the 
generals.
118
  Three things should be noticed immediately here:  firstly, the rowers only 
received µισθός for two months—this can be deduced from the fact that Apollodorus 
specifies only the hyperesia and epibatai on his trireme as receiving µισθός on his 
account every month on campaign, in contrast to the rest of the crew who only received 
µισθός from the money provided by the generals (in addition to the σιτηρέσιον they 
received every month from the money provided by the generals);
119
 secondly, 
Apollodorus had had to meet the expense of the µισθοί of the hyperesia and epibatai 
himself, but the generals had provided σιτηρέσιον for them (and the oarsmen)—thus the 
                                                                                                                                                 
petty-officers and ten deckhands:  see Morrison (1983) 49-56.  Here, at 50.7, the hyperesia may include the 
epibatai; in the rest of the speech, however, the hyperesia and the epibatai on-board Apollodorus’ trireme 
are distinguished as two separate groups, the first comprising the trireme’s petty officers and deckhands:  
see Morrison (1983) 52-53. 
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 50.10:  “καὶ τοὺς µισθοὺς οὕς ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις καὶ τοῖς ἐπιβάταις κατὰ µῆνα ἐδίδουν, παρὰ τῶν 
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ἀργύριον”); these sums are not included the rubric of µισθός or σιτηρέσιον, and must refer, on the one hand, 
to the large bonuses and advance payments that Apollodorus paid to recruit to his rowers, and on the other, 








hyperesia and epibatai had, every month on campaign, received both µισθός and 
σιτηρέσιον; thirdly, µισθός here is something that can be paid and received on campaign 
(and can be expected to be received on campaign), as Apollodorus’ payments of µισθός 
every month to the hyperesia and epibatai, as well as his complaint that the generals had 
only distributed µισθός for two months of the trireme’s seventeen on service,120 make 
clear. 
 After describing the preliminaries to the campaign, and summarizing the expenses 
he had incurred during it, Apollodorus then launched into a description of his time on 
service to demonstrate to the jurors the (alleged) misfortunes and injustices he had 
suffered as trierarch, and the (alleged) misbehavior of Polycles, and also of the generals 
in command of this particular campaign in the northern Aegean.  He started as follows 
(50.11-13): 
τριήρους γὰρ ὁµολογεῖται κατάλυσις εἶναι, πρῶτον µέν, ἐὰν µὴ µισθόν τις διδῷ, 
δεύτερον δέ, ἐὰν εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ µεταξὺ καταπλεύσῃ· ἀπόλειψίς τε γὰρ πλείστη 
γίγνεται, οἵ τε παραµένοντες τῶν ναυτῶν οὐκ ἐθέλουσι πάλιν ἐµβαίνειν, ἐὰν µή 
τις αὐτοῖς ἕτερον ἀργύριον διδῷ, ὥστε τὰ οἰκεῖα διοικήσασθαι.  ἃ ἐµοὶ ἀµφότερα 
συνέβη, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὥστε πολυτελεστέραν µοι γενέσθαι τὴν τριηραρχίαν. 
(12) καὶ γὰρ µισθὸν οὐδένα ἔλαβον παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ὀκτὼ µηνῶν, καὶ 
κατέπλευσα τοὺς πρέσβεις ἄγων διὰ τὸ ἄριστά µοι πλεῖν τὴν ναῦν, καὶ ἐνθένδε 
πάλιν, προσταχθέν µοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήµου Μένωνα τὸν στρατηγὸν ἄγειν εἰς 
Ἑλλήσποντον ἀντὶ Αὐτοκλέους ἀποχειροτονηθέντος, ᾠχόµην ἀναγόµενος διὰ 
τάχους.  καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἀπολιπόντων µὲν ναυτῶν ἑτέρους ἐµισθωσάµην ναύτας, 
δωρειὰς καὶ προδόσεις αὐτοῖς δοὺς µεγάλας, τοῖς δὲ παραµείνασι τῶν ἀρχαίων 
ναυτῶν ἔδωκά τι εἰς διοίκησιν τῶν οἰκείων καταλιπεῖν πρὸς ᾧ πρότερον εἶχον, 
(13) οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὴν παροῦσαν χρείαν, ὡς ἀναγκαία ἦν ἑκάστῳ... 
 
It is admitted that the usefulness of a trireme is done away with, first, if no one 
gives pay (“µισθόν”), and secondly, if she puts into the Piraeus before her 
expedition is finished; for in that case there is a great deal of desertion, and those 
of the rowers who remain are unwilling to embark again, unless someone gives 
them additional money for their household expenses.  Both of these things 
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happened to me, men of the jury, so that my trierarchy became the more costly. 
(12) For I received no pay (“µισθὸν”) from the general for the space of eight 
months, and I sailed home to Piraeus with the ambassadors because my ship was 
the fastest sailor, and again, when I was ordered by the people to take Menon the 
general to the Hellespont to replace Autocles, who had been removed from his 
command, I set sail on short notice from Athens.  In the place of the rowers who 
had deserted I hired others, giving them large bonuses and advance payments, 
and I gave to those of the original rowers who stayed with me something to leave 
behind for the maintenance of their households in addition to what they had 
before; (13) for I was well aware of the need they felt, and how it pressed upon 
each one... 
 
Again in this passage, both at 50.11 and at 50.12, µισθός is described as 
something that is expected to be paid while a trireme is on campaign.  At 50.11, 
Apollodorus is generalizing:  a trireme’s crew can be destroyed by two things:  if its 
oarsmen (Apollodorus speaks only of “ναῦται” throughout this passage) do not receive 
µισθός, or if the ship puts into the Piraeus before the end of an expedition.  That 
Apollodorus means here that a ship’s crew is ruined if it does not receive µισθός while on 
campaign is clarified and confirmed by the start of 50.12, where he states that both of the 
things that are generally known to ruin a trireme’s crew actually happened to him 
(through no fault of his own):  he received no µισθός from the general for eight months, 
and he had to return to the Piraeus before the end of the campaign (thus he had received 
no µισθός for the rowers for eight months while the trireme had been away from the 
Piraeus and Athens—i.e., while the rowers had been on campaign).  Thus, at 50.12, 
Apollodorus speaks as if he should have received µισθός from the general to distribute to 
his rowers while on campaign and, at 50.11, more importantly, speaks as if it could be 
expected by his audience that µισθός would generally be paid on campaign to the 
oarsmen of a trireme (in order to prevent the sort of desertions Apollodorus suffered). 
 There is no mention in this passage of pay being distributed, or any implication 





 (or any mention of an actual or expected second installment of µισθὸς ἐντελής 
to be distributed on their return).  Apollodorus does speak of—expected and real—
desertion on a trireme’s return to the Piraeus; but not because the men had received the 
second installment of their full pay and thus could desert with a substantial amount of 
money.  Rather, desertion could be expected to occur and did occur because the oarsmen 
would not have or had not received µισθός on campaign, but only ration-money 
(σιτηρέσιον:  see above on 50.10), and would not or did not want to re-embark under 
conditions of service which could be expected to be similarly poor.  Moreover, in his 
generalizing description of a trireme’s complement of oarsmen undermined by a lack of 
µισθός and a return to the Piraeus, Apollodorus does not say that they would re-embark if 
they received their owed µισθός, but only if they were to receive additional money to 
manage their household expenses (“ἐὰν µή τις αὐτοῖς ἕτερον ἀργύριον διδῷ, ὥστε τὰ 
οἰκεῖα διοικήσασθαι”) (50.11).122  In reality (as to be expected, on Apollodorus’ 
presentation of things, from common knowledge of naval affairs), having paid out large 
bonuses and advance payments (again:  see 50.7 above) to hire more rowers to replace 
those who had deserted, Apollodorus had to give some money to the original rowers
123
 
for them to leave behind for the maintenance of their households in addition to what they 
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 van Wees ([2004] 220) is therefore incorrect to take [Dem.] 50.11 as showing that Apollodorus thought 
it to be a universal truth that rowers would demand higher wages to stay on-board a trireme if it had put 
into the Piraeus halfway through a campaign:  the demand was for additional money (“ἕτερον ἀργύριον”) for 
their household expenses (and not µισθός).  
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 I.e., those men who had spent the first eight months of Apollodorus’ term of service on-board his 




had had before (“ἔδωκά τι εἰς διοίκησιν τῶν οἰκείων καταλιπεῖν πρὸς ᾧ πρότερον εἶχον”) 
(50.12), since he knew that they were pressed for money (50.13).  Apollodorus was hard-
pressed for money, too, and had to mortgage off his farm in order to borrow three 
thousand drachmas which he distributed among the oarsmen (“διαδοὺς τοῖς ναύταις”) 
(50.13)—both the original and the newly hired rowers—before setting back out from 
Athens, in order to convey the general Menon to the Hellespont (50.12).  This disbursed 
money is again not referred to as µισθός, or as a payment of arrears:  it must be, partly, 
the already mentioned advance payments and bonuses paid to the newly hired rowers; 
and, partly, the special, already mentioned once-off payments to the original oarsmen 
given for the maintenance of their households.
124
 
 Confirmation that this distribution of money to his rowers was not to cover any 
payment of µισθός can be found at 50.14.  After describing the return to Athens, 
Apollodorus takes up the story of the campaign in the north again:  after the trireme had 
come to the Hellespont, and the time of his trierarchy had expired, and no pay had been 
given to the rowers except for two months (“καὶ µισθὸς οὐκ ἀπεδόθη τοῖς στρατιώταις 
ἀλλ’ ἢ δυοῖν µηνοῖν”), and a new general had come without any new trierarchs to take up 
service, many of Apollodorus’ rowers began to desert.
125
  Thus, at the end of the term of 
Apollodorus’ service as trierarch, the rowers had only received two months’ µισθός.  This 
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 Contra Ballin (1978) 120-121. 
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 Two lexical points should be noted here:  first, “τοῖς στρατιώταις” refers to the oarsmen of Apollodorus’ 
trireme (see Morrison [1983] 53) (Ballin [1978] 123 is wrong to take this noun to refer to “the entire 
squadron of fighting men as contrasted with his own specific pleroma”); second, Apollodorus says that 
“πολλοὶ τοῦ πληρώµατος” began to desert—as Morrison ([1983] 53) points out, the noun “πλήρωµα” in this 
speech refers to the ship’s complement of oarsmen, and not to the whole crew of the trireme (Ballin [1978] 





must be the two months’ µισθός given by the generals to Apollodorus to distribute 
referred to at 50.10;
126
 therefore, the rowers had only received µισθός from the money 
provided by the generals, and not from Apollodorus’ personal funds, and so the sums of 
money referred to at 50.12 and 50.13 distributed by Apollodorus to the oarsmen were not 
µισθός.127  (In addition, and confirming the analysis of 50.10 above, note that 
Apollodorus’ lament that the rowers had only received two months’ µισθός during the 
term of his trierarchy, only a brief part of which had been spent at the Piraeus (see 50.12), 
demonstrates that it was expected by him, his rowers, and the assembled dikasts 
addressed at the trial that the rowers ought to have received µισθός while on active 
service.) 
 As I have already alluded to, many of Apollodorus’ oarsmen became discouraged 
with their lack of µισθός,128 and left the ship:  some to military service on the mainland, 
some to the ships of the Thasians and the Maronites, being persuaded by high pay and 
receiving large sums of money in advance (“µισθῷ µεγάλῳ πεισθέντες καὶ ἀργύριον πολὺ 
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 Or, more precisely, given by the general Menon:  see Ballin (1978) 122:  “[s]ince no misthos had been 




 Again, contra Ballin (1978) 120-121. 
 
128
 Cf. here Dem. 4.24-25:  the foreign mercenaries of Athens desert the campaigns for which Athens has 
hired them, and go off to service under Persian satraps, and their general has to follow, “οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν 
µὴ διδόντα µισθόν,” “for it is impossible for him to command if he does not provide µισθός” (4.24).  (Cf. 
here 4.46 for Demosthenes’ attack on the uselessness of sending generals out on campaign with 
“ἀποµίσθων ξένων,” “mercenaries without pay.”)  Demosthenes’ proposed remedy for this was to deprive 
both general and soldiers of excuses to desert by providing them µισθός (“... τὰς προφάσεις ἀφελεῖν καὶ τοῦ 
στρατηγοῦ καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν, µισθὸν πορίσαντας...”) (4.25) and to provide citizen overseers over forces.  
(That Demosthenes is referring here to µισθός as one part of µισθὸς ἐντελής follows from the fact that the 
passages referred to here come just after 4.23-24 and its insistence that the Athenians cannot come up with 
either µισθός or τροφή for large (non-citizen) forces, i.e. after µισθός had been distinguished as one of two 




προλαβόντες”) (50.14).  They deserted also because they saw that Apollodorus’ resources 
were spent, the city was heedless, the allies were in need, and the generals not to be 
trusted.  In fact, as Apollodorus has it, since he had been more ambitious than the other 
trierarchs to man his ship with good rowers, the more desertion there had been from his 
trireme (50.15); for the other trierarchs who had come on campaign had the advantage 
that their oarsmen were conscripted Athenians who had stayed with their triremes in 
order to make sure of their return home to Athens; whereas Apollodorus’ ναῦται, 
“trusting in their skill as able rowers, went off to wherever they might again receive the 
most money, thinking more of their gain for the immediate present than of the danger 
impending over them, if they should ever be caught by me.”
129
  There are three important 
points to be drawn from Apollodorus’ presentation of these events.  Firstly, the only tie 
binding rowers to Athenian triremes on this campaign is residence at Athens.  Second, the 
main factor encouraging desertion from Apollodorus’ trireme is a lack of µισθός—
implying the hired rowers expected to receive µισθός while on campaign.  These two 
observations lead to the third point:  there is no mention here, or any hint of, a second 
installment of µισθός being retained in Athens (to be paid on the triremes’ return there at 
the end of the campaign) in order to discourage the oarsmen from deserting their ships on 
campaign; and this absence of any mention of µισθὸς ἐντελής, in the light of 
Apollodorus’ explicit statements on the rowers’ motivations for remaining with or 
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 50.16:  “οἱ δ’ ἐµοὶ ναῦται πιστεύοντες αὑτοῖς ἐπὶ τῷ δύνασθαι ἐλαύνειν, ὅπου ἤµελλον ἀργύριον πάλιν 
πλεῖστον λήψεσθαι, ἐνταῦθ’ ἀπῇσαν, ἡγούµενοι τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι εὐπορίαν κρείττω εἶναι αὑτοῖς τοῦ 




deserting their ships, implies very strongly that no such second installment was present 
and waiting in Athens.
130
 
 Despite the desertion from Apollodorus’ trireme, and the fact that he had no 
money left, the general Timomachus ordered him to sail to Hieron (on the eastern shore 
of the Bosporus) to convoy grain ships, although the general did not provide pay (“καὶ 
µισθὸν οὐ διδόντος”) for the men on-board Apollodorus’ trireme (50.17).  Apollodorus 
was thus forced to borrow money (50.17), and send Euctemon, his pentekontarch, to 
Lampsacus, giving him money, and letters for friends of Apollodorus’ father (Pasion the 
banker), and ordering him to hire the best rowers he could there (“ναύτας µισθώσασθαι 
ὡς ἂν δύνηται ἀρίστους”) (50.18).  Apollodorus, meanwhile, stayed in Sestus, and 
himself hired more oarsmen, in order to replace those who had deserted, hiring the new 
rowers “ἐντελοµίσθους” (50.18) (I will come back, presently, to the question of how this 
term should be properly understood and translated).  He also gave some money, all he 
had (“ἔδωκά τι, ὅσον εἶχεν”), to the original rowers (“τῶν ἀρχαίων ναυτῶν”) who had 
stayed with him throughout his term of service, and who had residences in Athens (see 
50.11-13) (note again that Apollodorus does not say that he gave them µισθός, but 
(‘irregular’) sums of money to help them get by).  That Apollodorus was not distributing 
µισθός here is confirmed from a later passage in his speech.  After service in particularly 
harsh conditions off the coast of Thrace (50.21-22), there was again desertion from 
Apollodorus’ ship.   For, as Apollodorus said, “the original sailors had borne many 
hardships and profited little—merely what I was able to borrow and give to each man in 
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 Cf. 50.65 in this regard:  among Apollodorus’ expenses for his trierarchy are the sums which the several 




addition to what they had had from me before, since the general did not supply enough 
even for their daily subsistence.”
131
  The money referred to here as borrowed and 
distributed to “τῶν ἀρχαίων ναυτῶν” must be that given at Sestus to them, an 
extraordinary payment to help these rowers subsist on campaign.
132
 
 In addition to all of these considerations, there is no reason to doubt Apollodorus’ 
statement at the start of his speech that he did not give µισθός to the rowers, but only to 
the hyperesia and epibatai, since it was in the interests of the case he was making to 
emphasize any expense he incurred as trierarch, including any µισθός for his rowers.  
And the argument from silence (i.e. the fact that Apollodorus does not state that he 
distributed µισθός to his oarsmen) is valid here since he does mention in his description 
of his trireme’s service when he did distribute µισθός.  In addition to 50.10, and its 
summary of the campaign’s expenses mentioning the distribution of µισθός to the 
hyperesia and epibatai on-board his trireme, Apollodorus mentions two other instances 
when he paid µισθός to men serving on his trireme. When Euctemon, the pentekontarch 
of the trireme, returned from Lampsacus, bringing with him the rowers he had hired 
there, it happened that he fell sick, just as the general gave the word to sail to Hieron 
(50.19).  Since he was seriously ill, Apollodorus gave him his µισθός, adding money for 
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 50.23:  “... τῶν ἀρχαίων ναυτῶν ταλαιπωρουµένων µὲν πολλά, ὠφελουµένων δὲ βραχέα, ὅσα ἐγὼ 
δυναίµην ἑκάστῳ δανειζόµενος ἐπαρκέσαι πρὸς ᾧ πρότερον εἶχον παρ’ ἐµοῦ, ἐπεὶ ὅ γε στρατηγὸς οὐδὲ τὸ ἐφ’ 
ἡµέραν αὐτοῖς τροφὴν διαρκῆ ἐδίδου.”  “τροφὴν” is used here in its most basic sense of “subsistence,” and 
not as a term denoting a payment. 
 
132
 I argue this point at length in order to contradict Ballin ([1978] 134-135), who thought that ἔδωκά τι at 
50.18 may be referring to the payment of a month’s µισθός by Apollodorus to his crew.  Ballin ([1978] 135 
n.1) added in a note:  “[w]e should not overlook the possibility that ἔδωκά τι may merely refer to a small 
bonus given to the remaining nautai as a reward for sticking with A.”  This note is nearer to the truth, but 




the journey, and sent him home:  “τούτῳ µὲν οὖν ἀποδοὺς τὸν µισθὸν καὶ ἐφόδια προσθεὶς 
ἀπέπεµψα οἴκαδε” (50.19).  Euctemon received µισθός from Apollodorus’ personal 
funds,
133
 in addition to the σιτηρέσιον from the generals, because, as pentekontarch, he 
was part of the hyperesia of Apollodorus’ trireme.  Similarly, later on the campaign, 
Poseidippus, Apollodorus’ kybernetes, refused to follow the general’s orders to sail to 
Macedonia, but obeyed Apollodorus’ order to sail to Thasos instead, since, as 
Poseidippus said, “ὅτι τριήραρχός τε ἐγὼ τῆς νεὼς εἴην καὶ ὑπεύθυνος, καὶ τὸν µισθὸν 
παρ’ ἐµοῦ λαµβάνοι,” “[Apollodorus] was the trierarch of the ship, and the one 
responsible, and that he got his µισθός from [him]” (50.50).  Again, Poseidippos, as 
kybernetes and therefore part of the hyperesia, was receiving µισθός from Apollodorus’ 
personal funds, in addition to the σιτηρέσιον he was receiving from the funds provided by 
the generals.  Both of these incidents confirm Apollodorus’ earlier statement at 50.10 that 
he paid µισθός to the hyperesia throughout the term of his service, and that he did not to 
the rowers on his ship. 
 Let me summarize here what I have demonstrated so far in this analysis of [Dem.] 
50.  I have shown that an examination of Apollodorus’ speech till 50.19 demonstrates that 
the hyperesia and epibatai on-board Apollodorus’ trireme were the only members of his 
crew to receive both µισθός (from Apollodorus) and σιτηρέσιον (from public funds) for 
each month while on service:  the original oarsmen, apart from two months, received only 
σιτηρέσιον (from public funds) and no µισθός (although Apollodorus did also give them 
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 At 50.15, Apollodorus’ funds are exhausted; at 50.17, he is ordered to embark for Hieron by 
Timomachus the general although the latter did not give him µισθός for his crew; further, at 50.17, he 
borrows money, to spend on his ship.  In the absence of any receipt of money for µισθός from Timomachus, 
the µισθός given to Euctemon must have come from the funds Apollodorus had borrowed (either at 




money to get by on two occasions); and that, although the original rowers only received 
σιτηρέσιον, it could be expected by them, and by Apollodorus’ audience of assembled 
dikasts, that they ought to receive both µισθός and σιτηρέσιον.  I have also shown that 
there is no indication at any point in the first part of Apollodorus’ speech that there was a 
(second) installment of µισθός withheld at Athens to prevent the men of his trireme (and 
other Athenian triremes on campaign in the northern Aegean) from deserting.  With this 
done, I want to continue now to examine the rest of Apollodorus’ speech, in order to 
establish the meaning of µισθὸς ἐντελής and “ἐντελοµίσθους” in it. 
After Euctemon had reached the Piraeus, and heard that Polycles had been 
appointed as the trierarch appointed to succeed Apollodorus, whose term of service had 
now expired, he took with him Apollodorus’ father-in-law and approached Polycles at the 
deigma (50.24).  Euctemon told Polycles “to join the ship as quickly as possible, since 
large sums were being paid each day [by Apollodorus] in addition to what the general 
gave the ship for σιτηρέσιον.”134  Euctemon then detailed for Polycles what Apollodorus’ 
daily expenditures on the campaign consisted of (50.25): 
... τούς τε µισθοὺς τοὺς τῇ ὑπηρεσίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιβάταις κατὰ µῆνα διδοµένους, 
τοῖς τε ναύταις οὓς αὐτὸς ἐκ τῆς Λαµψάκου ἐµισθώσατο, καὶ τοῖς ὕστερον 
ἐπεµβᾶσιν ἀντὶ τῶν ἀπολιπόντων, ἔτι δὲ ὃ τῶν ἀρχαίων ναυτῶν ἑκάστῳ 
προσέθηκα δεηθέντι, ἐπειδή µοι ὁ χρόνος ἐξῆκε τῆς τριηραρχίας, καὶ τἄλλα ὅσα 
ἦν τὰ καθ’ ἡµέραν ἑκάστην ἀναλισκόµενα εἰς τὴν ναῦν... 
 
... the pay (“τούς τε µισθοὺς”) given each month to the hyperesia and the 
epibatai, both to the rowers [Euctemon] had hired at Lampsacus and to those 
who came on board subsequently to replace those who had deserted, and also of 
the additional sums which I had given to each of the original rowers at their 
request after the term of my trierarchy had expired, and all the rest of the money 
expended upon the ship from day to day.
135
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 50.24:  “... ἐκέλευεν αὐτὸν ὡς τάχιστα ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν ἀποπλεῖν, ὡς τῶν ἀναλωµάτων πολλῶν ὄντων, ἃ 
καθ’ ἡµέραν ἑκάστην πρὸς τῷ παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ σιτηρεσίῳ εἰς τὴν ναῦν διδοµένῳ ἀνηλίσκετο...” 
 
135
 Euctemon would have thoroughly acquainted with these matters as the trireme’s pentekontarch, through 




Thus, three groups were described by Euctemon as receiving both µισθός and σιτηρέσιον 
while on campaign:  the hyperesia and epibatai on-board Apollodorus’ trireme (again:  
see 50.10 again); the rowers hired by Euctemon at Lampsacus (see 50.18-19); and the 
rowers hired by Apollodorus at Sestus.
136
  (And note that these three groups are all 
distinguished from “τῶν ἀρχαίων ναυτῶν” who did not receive µισθός from Apollodorus 
but ‘irregular’ sums of money in order to help them subsist while on campaign.) 
 That this last group of men—the rowers hired by Apollodorus at Sestus—received 
µισθός from Apollodorus, in addition to σιτηρέσιον from the generals, is significant for 
our understanding of µισθὸς ἐντελής and related terms in the mid-fourth century.  
Apollodorus, as I have mentioned above, in describing his activities at Sestus, mentioned 
that he had given as much money as he had to the “original rowers” (i.e. those who had 
stayed with him from the start of the expedition and who had never received µισθός from 
him), and that he had also hired other rowers “ἐντελοµίσθους”137 (50.18);  these new 
rowers are therefore distinguished from and contrasted with “τῶν ἀρχαίων ναυτῶν” by 
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 That the oarsmen hired at Sestus are those mentioned here by Euctemon, and not those hired earlier at 
the Piraeus to replace those who had deserted on the trireme’s return to Athens (50.12), can be proved from 
three considerations:  firstly, and most importantly, those rowers hired on the return to the Piraeus must be 
included among those described at the Hellespont as getting only two months’ µισθός—the money for 
which came from the generals, and not from Apollodorus—thus they cannot be among those groups of men 
listed as receiving µισθός from Apollodorus.  Secondly, the hiring of the oarsmen at 50.25 is listed by 
Euctemon after his hiring of sailors at Lampsacus (this was after Apollodorus’ term had expired:  see 
50.14), and before the distribution of sums of money to the “original sailors” on the expiration of 
Apollodorus’ term of service; that is, we should take it that the oarsmen referred to as “subsequently hired” 
must be the third and last group of men (i.e. after the rowers hired at Lampsacus by Euctemon, and the 
rowers already on the trireme) we hear about in Apollodorus’ description, at 50.18-19, of his experiences 
on the expiry of his term of service as trierarch—the men Apollodorus himself hired at Sestus.  Finally—
and this is almost redundant in light of the foregoing, but anyway—the rowers hired at the Piraeus are 
never described by Apollodorus (or Euctemon) as receiving µισθός from Apollodorus. 
 
137




the fact that they were hired “ἐντελοµίσθους,” “at full pay” (as the Loeb translates).  But 
what was the distinguishing characteristic that made the rowers hired at Sestus 
“ἐντελοµίσθους” and not the men originally hired by Apollodorus?  It was the fact that the 
rowers hired at Sestus, in contrast to the “original rowers,” were paid both σιτηρέσιον and 
µισθός, as 50.25 shows:  i.e., that their receiving both σιτηρέσιον and µισθός meant that 
they could be described as “ἐντελοµίσθους,” as being hired “at full pay.”   
This explanation of the term is consistent with the terminology of payments 
throughout the speech, and with Apollodorus’ (and Euctemon’s) description of their 
disbursements, unlike the explanation offered by those scholars who have advanced the 
‘two installment’ thesis of µισθὸς ἐντελής.  As I have shown repeatedly, there is no 
evidence in this speech that there was a second installment of µισθός waiting in Athens 
for Apollodorus’ “original rowers,” and much evidence to suggest otherwise, so that 
Morrison and Williams’, and Gabrielsen’s, explanations of “ἐντελοµίσθους” have 
absolutely no basis.  Morrison and Williams’ explanation also begs the question of why 
the rowers hired at Sestus could be distinguished from the rowers hired at Athens as 
“ἐντελοµίσθους”?  On their understanding of pay arrangements at Athens at this time, the 
“original rowers” would also have received µισθὸς ἐντελής, albeit on their return to 
Athens; thus, they could be termed, as much as the rowers hired at Sestus, as 
“ἐντελοµίσθους.”138  There is obviously another arrangement at work here that allows the 
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 This objection can also be made against Morrison et al.’s explanation of 50.18 ([2000] 119-120), based 
on the argument that there was a ‘two installment’ system of naval pay at Athens at this time:  “Athenian 
trierarchs, who had to recruit oarsmen abroad to replace deserters had, of course, to offer full pay.”  Again, 
this statement fails to explain why those men hired at Sestus could be distinguished, from the “original 
rowers,” as being paid “at full pay.”  Gabrielsen’s explanation of 50.18 ([1994] 122:  “the expression “fully 
paid oarsmen... probably refers to professional experts who demanded to be recompensed fully and 




rowers hired at Sestus to be termed “ἐντελοµίσθους,” in contrast to the rowers hired 
earlier—namely, the fact that the former received both σιτηρέσιον and µισθός.139 
 That “ἐντελοµίσθους” at 50.18 refers to men who have received both σιτηρέσιον 
and µισθός is confirmed by an exchange between Apollodorus and Polycles at Thasos.  
Polycles had dismissed Euctemon’s plea to him to sail to the north to take over as 
trierarch from Apollodorus (50.25-26), but eventually arrived at Thasos four months after 
Apollodorus’ term as trierarch had expired (50.29).  After repeated demands by 
Apollodorus that Polycles repay him for the expenses he had incurred after his term of 
service had expired (50.29-34), Polycles finally deigned to reply, first mocking 
Apollodorus’ needlessly expensive equipment, and then continuing on to say (50.35): 
τίς ἂν οὖν δύναιτ’... τὴν σὴν µανίαν καὶ πολυτέλειαν ὑποµεῖναι, διεφθαρµένον µὲν 
πλήρωµα καὶ εἰωθὸς ἀργύριον πολὺ προλαµβάνειν καὶ ἀτελείας ἄγειν τῶν 
νοµιζοµένων ἐν τῇ νηὶ λῃτουργιῶν καὶ λοῦσθαι ἐν βαλανείῳ, τρυφῶντας δ’ 
ἐπιβάτας καὶ ὑπηρεσίαν ὑπὸ µισθοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ ἐντελοῦς; 
 
Who could endure your madness and extravagance, a crew of oarsmen corrupted 
and accustomed to receive in advance large sums of money and to enjoy 
exemption of services normally required on board a ship, and able also to make 
use of the baths, and epibatai and a hyperesia rendered luxurious by high wages 
paid in full? 
 
Polycles, then, divides Apollodorus’ supposed irresponsible extravagance regarding the 
crew of the trireme and its remuneration into two parts:  first, the rowers on-board the 
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 Ballin ([1978] 133; cited by Bers [2003] 26 n.41) suggests that at 50.18 and at 50.35, Apollodorus 
means by ‘full pay’ “payment of the wages contracted for at the end of each month,” i.e. not cheating them 
of the balance of pay they had been promised at the end of the month.  But there is no basis for positing a 
system of two payments per month to Apollodorus’ crew.  Ballin is basing this view Griffith’s work on pay 
in the fifth and fourth centuries (cf. Ballin [1978] 114, 115, 203), according to which σιτηρέσιον was paid at 
the start of the month, and µισθός at the end of the month: I show below, however, that Griffith’s position 
has no foundation (see section ix).  Also, Ballin states ([1978] 134) that “[w]hether [Apollodorus] kept his 
promise or not [to provide full pay] is a moot question.”  This is not the case:  50.25 shows that he paid 




trireme who could be characterized as receiving large advances before serving;
140
 and 
second, the hyperesia and epibatai who could be characterized (and distinguished from 
the rowers) as receiving high pay and that “in full.”  But why could the hyperesia and 
epibatai be distinguished from the rowers as receiving “µισθοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ ἐντελοῦς”?  
Again, it must be because—that unlike the vast majority of the rowers who did not 
receive µισθός but only large advance payments and bonuses (see 50.7, 12)—the 
hyperesia and epibatai received, for each month while they were on campaign with 
Apollodorus, σιτηρέσιον and µισθός, in contrast to the (“original”) rowers, who only 
received σιτηρέσιον.  Therefore, at 50.35, just as at 50.18 (and Dem. 4.28-29), µισθός + 
σιτηρέσιον = µισθὸς ἐντελής.  Interestingly, 50.35 plays no part in the work of those who 
would see naval µισθός being paid in two installments by the Athenian state:  this must be 
at least partly because any analysis of 50.35, placed in the larger context of a discussion 
of the other passages in this speech detailing the pay arrangements of the hyperesia and 
epibatai, and the other members of Apollodorus’ trireme, shows that µισθὸς ἐντελής 
refers here to payments made in full while on campaign.  In sum, neither here nor at 
50.18 is there any basis for the claim that [Dem.] 50 provides evidence for a system at 
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 Polycles’ response to Apollodorus was brief and direct, and simplied the pay arrangements on-board 
Apollodorus’ trireme.  Omitting from his attack the rowers whom Euctemon and Apollodorus had hired 
and paid µισθός to did not weaken it: his attack on Apollodorus’ extravagance was served well enough by 
his focus on the advance payments paid to the original rowers (who, most probably, still made up the 
majority of the rowers and thus could be taken to characterize the whole complement of rowers) and the 
full pay paid to the hyperesia and epibatai.  In addition, the µισθός paid to the rowers hired later would 
have only accounted for a minor part of the trireme’s expenses, so that it could be omitted from Polycles’ 
attack without weakening it.  In addition, the expenses Polycles did attack came about before Apollodorus’ 
term of service had expired, and thus any attack on them would not produce awkward (for Polycles) 
counter-accusations regarding the expenses incurred by Apollodorus after the completion of his term of 
service.  In sum, there is no reason to think that Polycles’ failure to mention the µισθός paid by Euctemon 
and Apollodorus to the rowers hired at Lampsacus and Sestus respectively implies that µισθός was not paid 
to these men.  Rather, the rhetorical demands of Polycles’ brief dismissal of Apollodorus’ queries did not 




Athens whereby part of rowers’ µισθός was not paid to them until the end of an 
expedition and the consequent return to Athens.  Μισθὸς ἐντελής here, as in Dem. 4, 
simply refers to the disbursement of an expected payment during a campaign. 
 
 If the considerations raised by Demosthenes and Apollodorus in Dem. 4 and 
[Dem.] 50, respectively, show that it was still thought at Athens in the middle of the 
fourth century that soldiers and sailors ought to get their µισθὸς ἐντελής on campaign 
from polis funds, the plans proposed by Demosthenes and the events on the campaign 
described by Apollodorus demonstrate that the Athenian state sometimes struggled in this 
period to pay µισθὸς ἐντελής to its forces, and that soldiers and sailors regularly had to 
settle for the payment from polis funds of σιτηρέσιον only, with the balance of their pay 
to be made up out of the sale of booty or the personal funds of their leaders on 
campaign.
141
  Thus, by the time of Apollodorus’ trierarchy, simply paying µισθὸς ἐντελής 
could sometimes be enough to attract a skilled hyperesia or rowers to service, whereas, in 
the late fifth century, higher pay or bonus payments had been needed.
142
 
 It is in this context that we should place the final passage referring to µισθὸς 
ἐντελής found in our sources, and one again that has played almost no part in the 
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 See, e.g., Dem. 23.209:  µισθός for the full duration of campaigns regularly not available to the mid-
fourth-century Athenian state. 
 
142
 See Morrison and Williams (1968) 258, Gabrielsen (1994) 123 for sources for this statement.  But see 
Dem. 51.6 for Demosthenes, at some time between 361 and 357, as trierarch hiring the strongest hyperesia 
he could by offering the highest pay.  Obviously, within the general trend of weakened (as compared to the 
fifth century) state finances at Athens in the early to mid-fourth century, there could have been certain 




scholarly discussion of this term.
143
  According to Arrian (Anab. 2.13.4), in 333, as part 
of the opposition to Alexander, Agis, king of Sparta, had gone to the satraps 
Autophradates (and Pharnabazus) to ask for money for the war, and for as many ships 
and men as possible.  In response to his request, 
Ἆγις δὲ παρ’ Αὐτοφραδάτου τάλαντα ἀργυρίου λαβὼν τριάκοντα καὶ τριήρεις 
δέκα, ταύτας µὲν Ἱππίαν ἄξοντα ἀποστέλλει παρὰ τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν αὑτοῦ 
Ἀγησίλαον ἐπὶ Ταίναρον· καὶ παραγγέλλειν ἐκέλευσεν Ἀγησιλάῳ, διδόντα τοῖς 
ναύταις ἐντελῆ τὸν µισθὸν πλεῖν τὴν τάχιστην ἐπὶ Κρήτης, ὡς τὰ ἐκεῖ 
καταστησόµενον. 
 
Agis got thirty talents of silver from Autophradates and ten triremes and 
despatched Hippias to take them to his brother Agesilaos at Taenarum.  He 
ordered him to tell Agesilaus to give full pay to the sailors and to sail as quickly 
as possible to Crete, to settle things there. (Arr., Anab. 2.13.6) 
 
If we put the actions of Agis back into their fourth-century and immediate 
context, his order to his brother to pay the crews in full can begin to make sense.  The 
fact that Agis needed to specify to Agesilaos to pay the ναῦται “ἐντελῆ τὸν µισθὸν” 
implies strongly that it was not expected, or, to put it more precisely, that it could not be 
taken for granted in the late 330s, that sailors would receive µισθὸς ἐντελής from their 
employers—or at least not from the Spartans, whose financial weakness at this time can 
be gauged from the fact that Agis had had to go abroad to ask for funds for the naval 
campaign against Alexander.  Also, the immediate context—and the need to hire men 
quickly to fill the triremes for the expedition to Crete—demanded that the Spartans had to 
pay well to recruit rapidly for the campaign.
144
  Therefore the most probable 
interpretation of the Spartans’ decision to pay “ἐντελῆ τὸν µισθὸν” is that, just as at 
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 For its only (very brief) mention in the debate on the meaning of this term, see n.145 below. 
 
144
 Cf. chapter 5 section iii on sudden surges in demand for military and naval manpower leading to rises in 




Athens in the mid-fourth century, it had become the norm in the Peloponnese in the 330s 
to pay sailors their σιτηρέσιον only, so that any promise to pay µισθὸς ἐντελής, that is to 
say µισθός and σιτηρέσιον, was sufficient incentive to attract men (quickly) to service.145 
 
 viii. The time and periodicity of payment of µισθς 
 Literary and epigraphical evidence shows that the fifth century Athenian state 
disbursed sailors’ µισθός in full in advance of service.  At Acharnians 544-554 (produced 
at the Lenaea of 425), Aristophanes, poking fun at the belligerent nature of the Athenians, 
has Dicaeopolis describe the scene in the Piraeus just before the imagined departure of a 
typical overseas expedition launched by the Athenians in response to a laughably flimsy 
grievance (the Spartan seizure of a pup from the tiny and inconsequential island of 
Seriphos).  Part of this description concerns rowers’ pay (544-547):  “why on the very 
instant you’d have been launching 300 ships, and the city would have been full of the 
hubbub of soldiers, noisy crowds surrounding ships’ captains, (547) µισθός being handed 
out…”
146
  The crucial point here is that Dicaeopolis is describing the actions taken before 
a typical Athenian campaign:  Aristophanes and his audience
147
 therefore saw µισθός 
being paid before the start of a campaign as usual practice.
148
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 Griffith ([1935] 272 n.1) commented that the phrase µισθὸς ἐντελής is found at Arr., Anab. 2.13.6, “with 
no special meaning apparently.”  In so far as it means here an expected amount of pay that has been 
promised to be disbursed in full and on campaign, this is correct. 
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 “καὶ κάρτα µέντἂν εὐθέως καθείλκετε / τριακοσίας ναῦς, ἦν δ’ ἂν ἡ πόλις πλέα / θορύβου στρατιωτῶν, 
περὶ τριηράρχου βοῆς, / µισθοῦ διδοµενόυ...”  The context demands that “στρατιωτῶν” be taken to mean 
“sailors” here: this usage can be paralleled in several other Athenian authors from the fifth and fourth 
centuries, namely Thucydides, Isocrates, and the author of [Dem.] 50:  see esp. Morrison (1984) 53, and 
also Andrewes, HCT v.318 (ad Thucy. 8.95.4). 
 
147




Describing the departure of the Sicilian expedition, Thucydides narrates at 6.31.3 
that the fleet had been equipped at great cost both to the trierarchs and to the (Athenian) 
state, and lists some of the expenditures made by both prior to the embarkation of the 
fleet; among other things, “τοῦ µὲν δηµοσίου δραχµὴν τῆς ἡµέρας τῷ ναύτῃ διδόντος,” the 
state gave “a drachma per day for each rower...”
 149
  Pay given to the rowers, then, at a 
rate of a drachma a day, is counted as money already expended by the state before the 
expedition set out.  At 6.31.5, it is confirmed that the state had distributed pay to the 
rowers before they set out on the campaign.  The passage is worth quoting in full: 
εἰ γάρ τις ἐλογίσατο τήν τε τῆς πόλεως ἀνάλωσιν δηµοσίαν καὶ τῶν 
στρατευοµένων τὴν ἰδίαν, τῆς µὲν πόλεως ὅσα τε ἤδη προυτετελέκει καὶ ἃ 
ἔχοντας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἀπέστελλε, τῶν δὲ ἰδιωτῶν ἅ τε περὶ τὸ σῶµά τις καὶ 
τριήραρχος ἐς τὴν ναῦν ἀνηλώκει καὶ ὅσα ἔτι ἔµελλεν ἀναλώσειν, χωρὶς δ’ ἃ 
εἰκὸς ἦν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐκ δηµοσίου µισθοῦ πάντα τινὰ παρασκευάσασθαι ἐφόδιον 
ὡς ἐπὶ χρόνιον στρατείαν, καὶ ὅσα ἐπὶ µεταβολῇ τις ἢ στρατιώτης ἢ ἔµπορος 
ἔχων ἔπλει, πολλὰ ἂν τάλαντα ηὑρέθη ἐκ τῆς πόλεως τὰ πάντα ἐξαγόµενα. 
 
For if anyone had counted up the public expenditure of the state, and the private 
outlay of individuals—that is to say, the sums which the state had already spent 
upon the expedition and was sending in the hands of the generals, and those sums 
which individuals had expended upon their personal outfit, or as trierarchs had 
laid out and were still to lay out upon their vessels; and if he had added to this the 
journey money which each was likely to have provided himself with, 
independently of the pay from the treasury [my emphasis], for a voyage of such 
length, and what the soldiers or traders took with them for the purpose of 
exchange—it would have been found that many talents in all were being taken 
out of the city. 
 
Here, Thucydides opposes the public expenditure of the state on the expedition to the 
private expenses of individuals setting out on the campaign, and, in the description of the 
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 Note that the humor in these lines lies in the incongruity between the flimsiness of the imagined 
motivation for going to war and the large scale of preparations undertaken at Athens before the 
embarkation of a typical expedition from the city.  Aristophanes thus does not need to exaggerate here in 
his description of the arrangements made before a typical expedition overseas. 
 
149
 Thucydides here is referring strictly to the rowers of the fleet, rather than the crews of the triremes as a 




latter, the pay provided by the state (“τοῦ ἐκ δηµοσίου µισθοῦ”) is set aside from private 
expenses, as it naturally forms part of the public expenditure.  I make this obvious point 
because it raises another crucial one that I am trying to make, that is that both forms of 
expense—including pay provided by the state to those setting out on the campaign—are 
counted among the many talents being taken out of the city, i.e. the money already 
expended by the state before the launch of the expedition.  The µισθός given out, i.e. paid 
to all the members of the expedition before its embarkation, at 6.31.5 must surely include 
the drachma per day mentioned as paid to each rower at 6.31.3.  Thus, the Athenian state 
paid its rowers µισθός in advance before the Sicilian expedition (and in full).150  The 
arrangements made for the payment of the members of the Sicilian expedition are 
especially significant in that they represent the payment methods of the Athenian state 
when polis finances were healthy
151
 and when there were no other military theaters or 
campaigns competing for state expenditure.  The payment of µισθός in advance and in 
full therefore represented normal practice at Athens in the late fifth century.
152
 
One more Thucydidean passage provides explicit information on Athenian 
methods of disbursing pay in the late fifth century:  7.27.2.
153
  In the summer of 413, 
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 There is no hint at 6.31.3 or 6.31.5 of any pay being withheld at Athens, or of installments of pay of any 
kind.  Furthermore, if the one drachma per day rate attested here was only the first installment of a µισθὸς 
ἐντελής, the rate of pay given to the sailors on the Sicilian expedition would be substantially, and 
implausibly, higher than any other attested rate of pay at Athens in the fifth (or fourth) centuries. 
 
151
 See esp. Thucy. 6.26.2 for this point. 
 
152
 Cf. van Wees (2004) 308 and n.40 for the Sicilian expedition representing “normal practice” in the 
recruiting of thêtes as marines for the expedition’s triremes. 
 
153
 “οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ὕστερον ἧκον, διενοοῦντο αὐτοὺς πάλιν ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐς Θρᾴκην ἀποπέµπειν.  τὸ γὰρ 
ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς ∆εκελείας πόλεµον αὐτοὺς πολυτελὲς ἐφαίνετο· δραχµὴν γὰρ τῆς ἡµέρας ἕκαστος 
ἐλάµβανεν”; “[s]ince they [i.e., the Thracian peltasts] had come too late, the Athenians determined to send 
  
421 
thirteen hundred Thracian peltasts arrived in Athens in order to sail with Demosthenes to 
Sicily to reinforce the Athenian expedition there (7.27.1).  Having reached Athens too 
late to join with Demosthenes, the Athenians decided to send the Thracians home, as they 
were receiving a drachma per day, and therefore to keep them seemed too expensive 
(“πολυτελὲς”) in light of the Decelean War (7.27.2).  As noted above, Thucydides’ use of 
the imperfect (“ἐλάµβανεν”) to describe the Thracians’ receipt of their pay shows that 
each of them had been actually drawing their full pay of one drachma per day in Athens, 
before their dispatch abroad.
154
  Thus, again, we have evidence of late fifth century 
Athenian practice of disbursing military pay in advance of service (and in full).
155
 
 Epigraphical evidence also shows that µισθός was also disbursed to Athenian 
sailors in the fifth century in advance of service.  IG I
3
 364.12, 23 show that the full 
amount of money disbursed by the treasury of Athena (and thus the polis of Athens) for 
the pay of the thirty triremes sent out to Corcyra by the Athenians in the summer of 433/2 
was disbursed before those triremes set out for Corcyra.
156
  Although the fact that the 
money for the pay of the triremes was disbursed to the generals of the expedition before 
the triremes left Athens does not necessarily mean that the generals disbursed this money 
                                                                                                                                                 
them back to Thrace, from where they had come; to keep them, in view of the Dekeleian war, seemed too 
expensive, for each of them was being paid a drachma a day.”  See again Hornblower, CT iii.589 for the 
translation of “πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς ∆εκελείας πόλεµον” here. 
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 See again chapter 5 section ii with Loomis (1998) 44. 
 
155
 See p.420 n.150 above for the great improbability of a rate of pay of an Attic drachma per man per day 
comprising only the first installment of a supposed µισθὸς ἐντελής. 
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 See the full discussion of this inscription at chapter v section iv:  note esp. again that the transfers from 





as pay to the trireme crews before they set out for Corcyra, this would seem to be the 
natural inference from the inscription.  It should be noted here, too, that there are no 
disbursements listed from the treasury of Athena for the thirty triremes after they had 
returned from Corcyra:  there was therefore no pay being withheld at Athens for these 
triremes; in other words, they were being paid in full during their term of service. 
 Peloponnesian fleets in the late fifth and early fourth centuries were also (meant 
to be) paid in advance.  This can be seen from three passages in Xenophon’s Hellenica.  
At 1.5.7, Xenophon tells us that in 406 Cyrus (who had brought five hundred talents with 
him to Ionia (Hell. 1.5.3)) settled all the arrears owed by the Persians to the 
Peloponnesian sailors and in addition gave them a month’s µισθός in advance; in the 
winter of 406/405, Eteonicus the Spartan, having extorted money from the Chians (Hell. 
2.1.5), paid his sailors a month’s µισθός before setting out from Chios; in 389, Teleutias, 
in command of the Peloponnesian fleet, took much booty from Athens and sold it at 
Aegina, and paid his sailors a month’s µισθός in advance (Hell. 5.1.24).  If Xenophon 
mentions each of these payments of µισθός in advance as notable occurrences, this was 
not because µισθός was not meant to be paid in advance, but because, due to the poor 
financial situation of the Spartans(/Peloponnesians) throughout these years, µισθός was 
rarely paid in advance, and sometimes not at all to their trireme crews.
157
  But when the 
paymasters of Peloponnesian triremes did have sufficient money, their rowers received 
their µισθός in advance. 
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 Each of the payments in advance noted here came after (lengthy) periods during which Peloponnesian 
crews were paid badly or not all:  see Xen., Hell. 1.5.1-6 (and on the poor payment record of the King 




The Ten Thousand were also paid their µισθός, or were promised to be paid their 
µισθός, in advance of any service.  Thus, at Xen., Anab. 1.2.11-12, at Caÿstru-pedion, the 
army was owed more than three month’s pay by Cyrus (“καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις ὠφείλετο 
µισθὸς πλέον ἢ τριῶν µηνῶν”).  On his receipt there of a large amount of money from the 
wife of the king of the Cilicians (at least this is how the Greeks supposed he got the 
money), Cyrus paid the troops at that time four month’s wages.  If µισθός was usually 
paid at the end of a month, Cyrus would only have had to pay three months’ wages.
158
  In 
the summer of 400, when the mercenaries on their katabasis had reached Cotyora, 
Timasion the Dardanian “promised to provide the men pay from the first of the month,” 
“ὑπισχνοῦµαι δὲ ὑµῖν... ἀπὸ νουµηνίας µισθοφορὰν παρέξειν” and to take them to Troas, 
from which he was an exile (Xen., Anab. 5.6.23).  Thorax the Boiotian also promised the 
troops pay “καθάπερ Τιµασίων” “like Timasion” (Xen., Anab. 5.6.26), and Xenophon, 
referring to the fact that Timasion and Thorax were promising the men µισθός from the 
first of the month (ἀπὸ νουµηνίας) (Xen., Anab. 5.6.31), said to the troops that “it seems 
to me it is a fine thing to be carried safely where we want to go and at the same time 
receive pay for our preservation.”
159
  Furthermore, Timasion and Thorax initially 
requested this µισθός from the Heracleots and Sinopeans (through the mediation of some 
merchants from those cities) so that the soldiers would have provisions for the voyage 
                                                 
158
 Cf. Trundle (2004) 86. 
 
159
 Xen., Anab. 5.6.31: “καλόν µοι δοκεῖ εἶναι σῳζοµένους ἔνθα βουλόµεθα µισθὸν τῆς σωτηρίας 
λαµβάνειν...”  Griffith translated “ἀπὸ νουµηνίας” as “reckoning from the first of the month” but this is not 
a natural translation, and the only reason Griffith takes the phrase in this way is to provide support for his 




from Cotyora (“µισθὸν ὥστε ἔχειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐκπλέοντας”) (Xen., Anab. 5.6.19).160  
Μισθός in the proposed (but never executed) agreement between the Heracleots and 
Sinopeans and the remnants of the Ten Thousand was to be provided, then, at the start of 
the month (for the purpose of purchasing provisions for the Cyreans’ onward voyage).   
At Xen., Anab. 7.1.7, Anaxibius, the Spartan admiral, having promised the 
Cyreans that there would by pay (“µισθοφορὰν”) if they crossed over to Byzantium (Xen., 
Anab. 7.1.3; cf. 6.1.16), did not give µισθός to the mercenaries after they had crossed 
over to the city, something which angered the Greeks, since they had no money with 
which to procure provisions for their journey from Byzantium (“ὅτι οὐκ εἶχον ἀργύριον 
ἐπισιτίζεσθαι εἰς τὴν πορείαν”).  Μισθός here again was expected before any action (and 
was meant for the purchase of provisions).
161
  Two final instances from the Anabasis 
confirm that it was customary for Greek mercenaries in the eastern Mediterranean at the 
turn of the fifth century be paid in advance of service.  Heracleides, the agent of Seuthes, 
promised the generals of the Cyreans, as part of his machinations against Xenophon, that 
the soldiers would receive pay in full for two months (“τόν τε µισθὸν... ἔκπλεων... δυοῖν 
µηνοῖν”) (Xen., Anab. 7.5.9), although only a month of service had passed (Xen., Anab. 
7.5.4).  Finally, when the remnants of the Ten Thousand agreed to service under Thibron, 
two Spartan officers arrived at Ophrynium with money to give to the army before any 
campaign under Thibron had begun (Xen., Anab. 7.8.6). 
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 Griffith ([1935] 266) realized that Xen., Anab. 5.6.19 provided insuperable problems for his thesis that 
the µισθός of mercenaries was (a second part of) pay given at the end of a month’s service and resorted to 
translating µισθὸν here as “bribe,” for which there are no grounds and no parallels in the Anabasis. 
 
161
 See Marinovic (1988) 162 on Xen., Anab. 5.6.23 and 7.1.7 (contra Griffith):  “dans le deux cas, le mot 
misthos est utilisé quand il est question des vivres:  ce qui fait penser qu’il s’agit plutôt de l’ensemble de la 




 Two passages from the ps.-Aristotelian Oeconomica show that it continued to be 
usual practice in the fourth century for µισθός to be paid in advance of military (or naval) 
service.  The polis of Heraclea Pontica advanced two months’ µισθός to a fleet of 
triremes sailing against the tyrants of Bosporus at some unknown point in the fourth 
century (2.2.8, 1347b9-10);
162
 and it emerges from 2.2.29d, 1351b16-19 that Memnon 
normally paid his mercenaries at the beginning of the month (at some point in the 340s or 
330s), and from 2.2.39, 1353b1-7 that Cleomenes also normally distributed µισθός at the 
beginning of the month (at some point between 331 and 323).
163
 
 Payment of µισθός was (meant to be) paid in (full) monthly installments in 
advance of each month’s military and naval service throughout the fifth and fourth 
centuries.  This finds confirmation in all our sources dealing with the disbursement of pay 
to classical Greek sailors and soldiers.  Thucydides at 8.29.1-2 takes it for granted that 
pay would not only be reckoned on a monthly basis but would also be paid in monthly 
installments.
164
  Xenophon mentions only the month as the period for which pay was 
given (or offered) or by which it was calculated.
165
  Apollodorus, during his service as 
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 This is not the unusual or clever feature of the Heracleots’ financial stratagem:  see chapter 2 section iii. 
 
163
 At 2.2.39, the author of the Oeconomica equates µισθός with σιταρχία; thus, while σιταρχία is spoken of 
at 2.2.29d, it is accurate to translate this as ‘pay,’ rather than ration-allowance.  In both of these anecdotes, 
it is the deviation from payment at the beginning of the month that marks out the respective payment 
measures as exceptional. 
 
164 See Andrewes, HCT v.70 ad 8.29.1:  “... Thucydides writes here as in sect. 2 (later passages on pay are 
not specific) as if the money were not only calculated on a monthly basis but given as a lump sum for the 
month.”  See also Lapini, (2002) 25 n.4 ad Thucy. 8.29.1:  “[i]l mese funzionava come unità fiscale; in 
5.47.6, sede del testo del trattato a quattro, si legge che la città che ne chiamerà un’altra alleata sul suo 
territorio dovrà fornire il σῖτος per 30 giorni dopo l’intervento, e la stessa cosa dovrà accadere per il viaggio 
di ritorno.”  See also Thucy. 6.8.1 for triremes’ pay being calculated on a monthly basis. 
 
165
 Burrer (2008) 78. 
  
426 
trierarch, paid his men a lump sum of (monthly) pay each month ([Dem.] 50.10, 25).
166
  
At Dem. 4.28-29, pay (σιτηρέσιον) is calculated on a monthly basis and proposed as being 
paid in monthly installments.  At Polyaenus, Strateg. 3.9.51, Iphicrates pays his men 
every month in monthly installments.  Finally, in all of the financial stratagems 
concerning the pay of military and naval forces in the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica, 
pay is always calculated and paid (as a lump sum for the month) on a monthly basis.    
 
ix. The relationship between µισθς and τροφ in the fifth and fourth centuries 
As noted above, µισθός and τροφή were used synonymously for the pay of Greek 
military and naval forces in the fifth century.
167
  These terms could be used 
interchangeably since both described rewards for services and both were used to support 
or maintain payees.  As Gabrielsen notes of the usage of µισθός, τροφή, and the related 
term σῖτος,168 
[t]he general tendency to make free usage of these terms when referring to the 
same payment... may be in agreement with the indisputable fact that misthós’ 
(sic) functional significance was first and foremost to ensure one’s living, as did 
the payments termed trofé
169
 (sic) and sitos, and that, regardless of their specific 
name, all three were generally received or given in return for a service. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
166
 Ballin ([1978] 188) and Burrer ([2008] 78) take [Dem.] 50.53 to show that σιτηρέσιον could sometimes, 
and even usually, be paid daily.  But σιτηρέσιον was disbursed daily in this instance (exceptionally) because 




 See chapter 5 section i; note also, e.g., Aristoph., Birds 1367 (first produced at the City Dionysia in 
414):  Peisetairos tells a young man looking for wings:  “φρούρει, στρατεύου, µισθοφορῶν σαυτὸν τρέφε.” 
 
168
 (1981) 73-74.  Gabrielsen is here, in fact, describing the usage of these terms in the fourth century, but 
the considerations expressed here are equally valid for the fifth century. 
 
169
 Cf. again Loomis (1998) 34:  τροφή having “the narrower meaning of ‘food’” as well as “the broader 




In the fourth century, Greek terminology for military and naval pay changed as 
the conditions of military and naval service changed.
170
  Some scholars, relying on 
passages such as Dem. 4.28-29, have argued that in the fourth century a permanent 
distinction came to be made between µισθός, pay as such, and τροφή, ration-money, in 
contrast to fifth and early fourth century usage.
171
  This is incorrect; a distinction was 
sometimes made in the fourth century between µισθός and τροφή (and σῖτος), but such 
usage was limited to specific contexts.  I will quote Gabrielsen again on this subject: 
Although the examples in which the terms [µισθός and τροφή] are used 
synonymously are by far the most numerous, we can occasionally point at single 
instances where there seems to be a distinction.  But a thorough analysis of the 
instances has shown that the distinction between misthós (sic) on the one hand 
and trofé (sic) and sitos (sic) on the other can be drawn (1) whenever two 
payments are to be differentiated as being either monetary payments or payments 
in kind – which are most properly expressed respectively by misthós and 
trofé/sitos – or (2) whenever trofé/sitos refer to sums that constitute merely a 
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 Xen., Anab. 6.2.4 has been taken as the first attestation of σιτηρέσιον as a subsistence payment for 
military forces distinct from µισθός (Griffith [1935] 268, Pritchett [1971] 6, Burrer [2008] 75 and n.18).  
But σιτηρέσιον in this passage simply means the money (which according to Lycon to Achaean) the 
Cyreans should demand (in the absence of any other source of funds) to purchase provisions from the 
Heracleots in the absence of any other means of acquiring provisions:  see Marinovic (1988) 162.  Also, 
Cook [1990] 79 took Xen., Hell. 5.1.13-24 as evidence that a distinction between µισθός and payments for 
subsistence had developed by 389:  but Xen., Hell. 5.1.17 clearly shows that provisions were still at this 
date to be bought from the (sole) payment of µισθός (and not any specific payment for subsistence). 
 
171
 Pritchett (1971) 3-6, Cook (1990) 78 (although see pp.428-429 nn.174-175 below).  Compare Loomis 
(1998) 52-53:  “[Dem. 4.28] shows that τροφή now was (at least in this instance) the equivalent of 
σιτηρέσιον rather than µισθός.” 
 
172
 (1981) 71-72; see (1981) 70-76, 151-155 for full documentation of and supporting argumentation for the 
conclusions quoted here.  See again Gabrielsen’s comments above on the reasons for the (frequent) 
synonymity of µισθός and τροφή (and σῖτος) in the fifth and fourth centuries).  Cf. Marinovic (1988) 167, 




The usage we find in the First Philippic at 4.23 and 4.28-29 is, then, an example of the 
second type of distinction described by Gabrielsen.
173
  This distinction in the fourth 
century between µισθός and τροφή arose as a response to financial difficulties on the part 
of Greek poleis:
174
 as in Dem. 4 and [Dem.] 50, fourth-century Greek city-states paid (or 
proposed to pay) τροφή (= σιτηρέσιον) since it was “absolutely essential” to the 
“immediate situation,” (i.e. for the immediate subsistence needs of men on military 
service,) whereas µισθός, although expected to paid together with σιτηρέσιον before 
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 Cf. Trundle (2004) 88-89 on 4.28 (and [Dem.] 50.10):  “[a]ll this would suggest that sitêresion could be 
considered as part, but not all, of a full wage paid to sailors and mercenaries in the mid-fourth century BC.” 
 
174
 See section vii above and Cook (1990) 79.  The idea that a permanent distinction between µισθός and 
τροφή developed in the fourth century was formulated by Pritchett:  “[i]n military economics, the concept 
of any pay except for sustenance was primarily a development of the period after the Peloponnesian war 
and of mercenary service” ([1971] 27; cf. [1971] 40-41).  In Pritchett’s view, the citizen-soldiers of the fifth 
century and the Peloponnesian War could be satisfied with ration-money only, while the rise of 
“professional soldiering” in the fourth century meant that pay had to be added to ration-money in order to 
attract mercenaries to military service, in the absence of any other motivation for them to serve ([1971] 27-
29).  Pritchett’s views, however, were based on incorrect assumption and argumentation, as well as a 
misunderstanding of the role played by mercenaries in the wars the fifth and fourth century Greek world.  
To deal with the first of these:  as I have shown, there is no foundation for Pritchett’s argument that µισθός 
and τροφή were paid in the fifth century solely to cover the purchase of rations and therefore no reason to 
think that any military or naval payment above subsistence represented an innovation of the fourth century 
(see chapter 4 section iv and chapter 5 sections i, ii, iv).  Secondly, the employment of large numbers of 
mercenaries by Greek poleis was not a phenomenon that originated in the fourth century:  large numbers of 
troops were hired and employed by Greek city-states in fifth century; in fact, there is no reason to think that 
there were any more mercenaries employed in the fourth century than there were in the fifth (see van Wees 
[2004] 41-42, 73-74).  Thus, there is no reason to think that remuneration for military or naval service in 
the fourth century changed, either in its nature or amount, to reflect new sources of military manpower:  
Pritchett was simply incorrect on this point. 
 
175
 Cook (1990) 79; see also Cook (1990) 79 n.40 making this point against Pritchett.  Cook is correct on 
this point despite the fact that she is contradicting herself, since earlier in her article ([1990] 78), she 
followed Pritchett on seeing pay in the fifth century as being distributed “primarily for rations,” and later in 
the same article ([1990] 80), summarizing her argument, stated that “in the fifth and early fourth century, 




Finally, the fact that the terms µισθός, τροφή, and σῖτος could be used 
interchangeably in the fifth century means that Griffith’s thesis on the nature of pay given 
to mercenaries (as well as citizens) in the fifth century fails.  Almost certainly influenced 
by the clear distinction that existed in the Hellenistic period between ration-money and 
money for pay proper,
176
 he posited:  1) that both σῖτος—rations of food provided by the 
state, and called by various Greek terms (e.g., σιτηρέσιον, σιτία, σιταρχία, ἐπιτήδεια)—
and µισθός—payment in money, pay proper—existed in fifth and fourth century armies at 
the same time; and 2) that this was because rations in food, or, at least, money for rations, 
were given at the start of a campaign, since they “are something without which a soldier 
cannot begin to fight,” whereas pay proper (µισθός) was given at the end of the campaign, 
in return for work done, “like any other wages or salary.”
177
  But, as we have seen, fifth 
century mercenary and citizen soldiers only received one payment for their service:  
payments of µισθός were (meant to be) always paid in advance of military and naval 
expeditions; and, in addition, there is simply no evidence of a system of dual payments 
for military and naval service in the fifth century.
178
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 See Cook (1990) 78 n.39. 
 
177 Griffith (1935) 264-265.  Cf. Burrer (2008) 78 (apparently independent of Griffith):  “[w]ährend die 
Soldzahlung normalerweise wohl nachträglich erfolgte, wurde Verpflegungsgeld im Voraus bezahlt, um 
den Soldaten zu ermöglichen, ihre Verpflegung selbst zu kaufen...” 
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 See already Cook (1978) 78 n.39 (with the criticisms noted at n.175 above), and esp. on the difficulties 
that Thucy. 5.47.6 (where a sole payment of σῖτος is mentioned) posed for Griffith’s thesis, difficulties 
which Griffith acknowledged he was unable to resolve.  Griffith’s evidence for his first proposition on the 
nature of pay for classical Greek military forces consisted primarily of three Aristophanic passages:  
Acharnians 197, Wasps 243, and Peace 311 ([1935] 264 n.2, 265).  Each of these passages refers to the 
Athenian practice of ordering citizen hoplites mustering for an expedition to bring three days’ provisions—
σιτία (and not σῖτος as Griffith ([1935] 264 n.2) has it) τριῶν ἡµερῶν—with them (see chapter 3 section ii 
for discussion of this practice).  Other Aristophanic passages, however, show that these provisions were not 
given to the hoplites by the state as rations in kind, or in the form of ration-money, but were expected either 
to be bought by the hoplite from his own money (Peace, 368, 1182) or to be provided out of the resources 
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 The general synonymity between the terms µισθός, τροφή, and σῖτος in the fourth 
century, too, also caused insuperable problems for Griffith’s treatment of pay in that 
century.  Furthermore, the fourth-century usage of µισθὸς ἐντελής (i.e. a payment of both 
σιτηρέσιον and µισθός, σιτηρέσιον being therefore a part of µισθὸς ἐντελής) also caused 
intractable difficulties for Griffith’s schema, which he could only escape by circular and 
incorrect argumentation.
179
  Thus, having raised the correct interpretation of µισθὸς 
ἐντελής at Dem. 4.28-29 only to dismiss it, he continues: 
the foregoing pages have been based on evidence showing σιταρχία (=  
σιτήρεσιον) and µισθός as two perfectly distinct payments to soldiers on 
campaign:  is the issue to be obscured now by these words of Demosthenes?  To 
speak impartially, there is at least no need for the obscurity, if it is to exist.  The 
passage can equally well be translated “the army will make make the rest for 
itself from the war... so as to have full pay” (i.e. it will make not merely part of 
its µισθός but all of it, assuming µισθός to be perfectly distinct from σιτήρεσιον).  
And fortunately one can quote a parallel use of this very phrase from 
Aristophanes (Eq. 1367):  [cites passage]... Here surely the poet cannot have in 
mind a previously paid σιτήρεσιον as part of the µισθός:  he merely means “to the 
sailors, when they come ashore, I will pay their full pay”—i.e. without 
deductions and delays. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the hoplite’s own household (Acharnians, 1095ff.).  Griffith also cited Diod. 13.95.3 in support of his 
argument:  here again, citizen soldiers are ordered (by Dionysius I of Syracuse) to report for a campaign 
with food they have provided themselves (for thirty days in this instance); there is no indication that these 
provisions were to be supplied by the state.  He compared, too, a passage from Thucydides (1.48.1) that 
describes the Corinthians and their allies, in their campaign again Corcyra, taking provisions for three days 
(τριῶν ἡµερῶν σιτία) as they set out from Chimerium with the intention of establishing a beach-head on 
Corcyra against the Corcyrans.  But Thucydides does not provide any indication as to the means of 
distribution of these provisions, and thus there is no way we can be certain whether these provisions were 
state-supplies or bought by troops before their departure (and the latter seems likely given all other 
evidence for fifth-century provisioning:  see chapter 2 esp. section v).  Thus, none of the passages cited by 
Griffith provide evidence that a payment of σῖτος was distributed in addition to a payment of µισθός by fifth 
and early fourth century Greek poleis to their citizen and mercenary sailors and soldiers.  Griffith also 
believed ([1935] 266 and n.2) that the Ten Thousand received rations in kind (in addition to a payment of 
µισθός), requisitioned from the country, from Cyrus on the march to Cunaxa.  This is also demonstrably 
incorrect:  see appendix 4 section i. 
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But, as I have shown, there is no evidence showing “σιταρχία (=  σιτήρεσιον) and µισθός 
as two perfectly distinct payments to soldiers on campaign” and the passage from Knights 
can offer no guidance on this question, as separate payments of σιτήρεσιον and µισθός did 
not exist yet in the fifth century.   
Griffith also attempted to use the ps.-Aristotelian Oeconomica to provide 
evidence for the fourth century of his dual payment schema,
180
 but, as the careful 
criticisms of Marinovic demonstrated,
181
 Griffith was forced to misinterpret or invent 
new readings for several passages in order to get them to fit into his schema.  I will only 
note here three separate criticisms of Griffith to underline the point that the Oeconomica 
provides no support for his thesis:  the fact that Datames’ men foraged for their 
provisions while still receiving (or expecting to receive) µισθός does not provide 
evidence for the distribution of rations by Datames to his force (2.2.24a, 1350b15-30); 
the point of 2.2.23c, 1350b5-15 is that Timotheus’ soldiers only received rations in kind 
exceptionally, and that they normally bought their provisions retail; finally, the 
synonymity between σιταρχία and µισθός found at 2.2.39, 1353b1-7182 destroys the thesis 
that these payments were different in kind and made at different times.
183
  There is simply 
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 (1935) 268-271. 
 
181
 (1988) 162-165.  In light of these criticisms, it is puzzling to find that she concludes that Griffith’s 
treatment of the Oeconomica was “juste dans l’ensemble,” a statement that is contradicted by her own 
examination of Griffith’s treatment of this work. 
 
182
 See p.425 and n.163 above. 
 
183
 Timotheus provided σιταρχία in kind in addition to µισθός during operations at Corcyra (in 375) 
(2.2.23b, 1350a30-1350b5) but the point of the anecdote is that this was an exceptional measure:  see again 




no ancient support for the existence in the fifth and fourth centuries of a system of 
payment of rations (in kind or in money) before the beginning of a term of service, to be 
followed by a payment of µισθός at its end. 
 
x. Conclusions 
 Classical Greek sailors and soldiers expected to receive the rates of pay promised 
to them (whatever they were) in full, in advance of (each month of) service (during that 
service), and in monthly installments.  They never expected that half (or any part) of their 
pay would be withheld by their employer until the completion of a voyage, campaign, or 
term of service.  In the fourth century, as a result of the weakness of its public finances 
(compared to its military ambitions), the Athenian state often could provide to their 
sailors (and soldiers) only enough money to cover their immediate subsistence needs—
i.e., the Athenian state was often in a position to provide only a subsistence payment of 
σιτηρέσιον (sometimes referred to as τροφή) to the men serving on its campaigns.  Thus, 
in some discussions and descriptions of military pay in mid-fourth-century Athens, the 
term µισθός (in order to reflect the changed conditions of military and naval pay) came to 
take on the more limited meaning of ‘pay as such,’ i.e. the amount of money that the 
Athenian state now had great difficulty in paying, but that together with his τροφή 
(=σιτηρέσιον) made up a sailor’s (and soldier’s) expected full remuneration for service.  
In these contexts, the term µισθὸς ἐντελής was now used to denote this expected full 
remuneration for military service; i.e., µισθὸς ἐντελής now came to denote the payment 
of both τροφή (=σιτηρέσιον) and µισθός.  And although the payment of µισθὸς ἐντελής in 
the mid- and late fourth century seemed to have been more often something to be aspired 
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to rather than common practice (both at Athens and elsewhere, as the passage from 
Arrian’s Anabasis demonstrates), the details of Demosthenes’ plan in the First Philippic 
and Apollodorus’ description of the travails of his rowers in the Against Polycles show 
that it was still considered ‘best practice’ at Athens at this time to give sailors their µισθὸς 
ἐντελής on campaign; i.e., µισθὸς ἐντελής was still presented in public discourse as a 
sailor’s (or soldier’s) full pay, that was expected to be paid punctually and up front to him 
while he was serving on campaign;
184
 thus, µισθὸς ἐντελής had essentially the same 
meaning as it had in earlier and more general contexts.  But although the term now came 
to denote in the contexts just discussed the sum of two payments, it never, at any point, 
came to mean or imply the disbursement of naval pay in two equal installments, one on 
active service abroad, and one on return to the Piraeus. 
Demonstrating these points has necessitated a full refutation of the scholarly 
consensus on the meaning of µισθὸς ἐντελής and a full argumentation for the 
interpretation of µισθὸς ἐντελής found here (since it is radically different from the 
conventional one).  This refutation and argumentation has been necessary in an 
investigation of the behavior of military markets in the classical Greek world in the fifth 
and fourth centuries since establishing the fact that a failure to pay µισθὸς ἐντελής at 
Athens and elsewhere in the fifth and fourth centuries meant simply to leave men short 
while on campaign of the full µισθός they were expecting to be paid punctually and on 
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 Cf. Loomis (1998) 60 taking Dem. 4.28-29 to show that µισθὸς ἐντελής was normally paid to men 
participating in military expeditions by the Athenian state at this time.  It could be objected here that 
Polycles’ attack on Apollodorus for giving his hyperesia and epibatai “µισθοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ ἐντελοῦς” ([Dem. 
50.35) might imply that the payment of µισθὸς ἐντελής by trierarchs to any members of their crews at this 
time was unusual, but Polycles’ words in this passage are part of a transparently tendentious attack, and 
even if they had a ring of plausibility, they do not imply that µισθὸς ἐντελής was rarely paid to hyperesiai 




campaign allows us to ascertain how much and when men were paid on campaign, and 
thus to estimate the amount of cash that was available to be spent in military markets, and 
therefore the levels of effective demand in these markets.  In other words, the rates of pay 
we find mentioned in our literary sources provide us (unless those sources indicate 
otherwise) with evidence for the full amount of pay that classical Greek sailors and 
soldiers had to spend in the markets provided to them. 
One final point.  The amount of pay classical Greek sailors and soldiers were paid 
by their employers did not necessarily represent all the cash that all those sailors and 
soldiers had available to spend during their campaigns and services.  Firstly, rowers and 
members of hyperesiai often received bonuses and advance payments as part of their 
recruitment.
185
  The Anabasis shows that a bonus paid on recruitment seems to have been 
part of the standard terms of recruitment of mercenaries in the eastern Mediterranean at 
the turn of the fifth century:
186
  Xenophon remarked specifically on the fact that Seuthes 
did not pay such a bonus (Xen., Anab. 7.7.25), and the Spartans paid one later to the 
troops (Xen., Anab. 7.8.6).
187
  Demand for mercenaries could also mean the payment of 
special donatives in addition of pay.
188
  Secondly, it seems to have been common practice 
                                                 
185
 See Gabrielsen (1994) 121-122 and, e.g., p.400, pp.403-405 above on [Dem.] 50.7, 12.  This practice 
was not confined to Athens:  see, e.g., pp.406-407 above on [Dem.] 50.14. 
 
186
 Roy (1967) 312 and n.98. 
 
187
 Though we do not hear of any such bonus given by Cyrus to the mercenaries he recruited, this may 
simply be a consequence of the fact that their contract with Cyrus started before the march, and therefore 
before Xenophon’s detailed narrative, and also because it could be taken for granted as standard practice.  
See Roy (1967) 316:  “... mercenary service of this nature had been practised long enough to have 




 See again chapter 5 section iii. 
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in Athens (at least) during this period for sailors and soldiers to bring money to spend, in 
addition to µισθός, for campaigns, both long and short.189  This practice must have grown 
out of long experience of the inability of the Athenian state to deliver pay regularly and in 
full.  Thus, as already noted, Thucydides, reckoning the amount of money that left Athens 
as part of the Sicilian expedition, includes (6.31.5):  “the money we may suppose that 
everyone, even apart from the pay he received from the state, provided for himself as 
traveling expenses, counting upon an expedition of long duration...”
190
  But even for an 
expedition just across the border for a campaign that could be expected to be relatively 
short, it was usual to bring along money for traveling expenses.  So a wealthy Athenian 
citizen named Mantitheus thought that well-off men in Athens should give money to 
those “ἐφοδίων δὲ ἀποροῦντας,” “lacking means for expenses of service” for the campaign 
in relief of Haliartus in 395, and himself gave thirty drachmae each to two men (Lys. 
16.14).  Demosthenes claimed that the Athenian overland expedition to Thermopylae in 
352 cost more than two hundred talents, “ἂν λογίσησθε τὰς ἰδίας δαπάνας τὰς τῶν 
στρατευσαµένων,” “if you include the private expenses of those campaigning” (Dem. 
19.84).  Xenophon may have been referring to similar undertakings at Xen., Anab. 6.4.8 
when he writes that some of the members of the Ten Thousand had brought other men 
with them, and some of them had even spent money of their own on the enterprise.
191
  In 
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 See Cook (1990) 75-76. 
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addition to their basic pay, then, classical Greek sailors and soldiers may sometimes or 
often have had other sources of funds to spend in the markets provided to them—but 
most probably not too often or too much, given the evidence of the frequent military 
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Chapter 7:  The Administration and Functioning of Markets used by 
Classical Greek Military Forces 
 
 i. Introduction 
 In this chapter, I aim to situate the markets used by classical Greek forces in what 
we already know of the institutions and practices of Greek economies in order to show 
that these markets functioned effectively.  I will begin by discussing the legal and 
institutional framework in which classical Greek sailors and soldiers made their 
purchases (and sold their plunder).  I will demonstrate that the agorai provided by poleis 
to Greek military forces and those supplied by traders accompanying or traveling to 
armies, navies, and amphibious forces were overseen by the same officials and worked 
under the same legal mechanisms as other agorai organized by Greek poleis (showing 
this to be true for the agorai located in the camps and bases of classical Greek military 
forces will necessitate a lengthy analysis of a speech given by Xenophon to the 
assembled Cyreans at Cotyora in the summer of 400).  After analyzing the institutions 
and legal mechanisms underlying market exchanges between traders and classical Greek 
sailors and soldiers, I will reconstruct the behavior of markets provided by classical 
Greek poleis to passing military forces, the markets supplied by traders accompanying 
Greek overland expeditions, and those supplied by traders sailing to the camps of 
amphibious forces besieging cities and the operational bases of trireme fleets.  I will 
show that while the high costs of overland transport restricted the traders following 
classical Greek armies to selling high value per unit of weight goods to soldiers (and 
purchasing booty from them) (and also restricted the frequency of sieges of inland poleis 
in the Greek world), the same high costs together with the institutional and political 
structures of Greek poleis had the effect that the markets provided by inland poleis to 
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passing armies were normally capable of feeding those armies; on the other hand, the 
constant demand and high purchasing power in the camps of amphibious forces besieging 
poleis and the bases of trireme fleets encouraged traders to sail to them and ensured that 
the agorai in those camps and bases would usually be sufficiently supplied.  I will 
conclude by considering briefly what the markets used by classical Greek armies, navies, 
and amphibious forces can tell us about the structure of classical Greek economies. 
 
ii. The legal and institutional framework of markets provided by poleis and 
traders to classical Greek military forces 
a. Markets provided by friendly or neutral poleis to passing armies, navies, and 
amphibious expeditions 
 This subject has already been well treated by Descat.
1
  He demonstrated that, 
while it has sometimes been thought that the agorai established by poleis for passing 
armies, navies, and amphibious forces were in some way ‘special’ because of their 
location and temporary nature,
2
 the granting of temporary markets by cities to groups of 
foreigners was a common practice in the Greek world.  Classical (and Hellenistic) poleis, 
in general, strictly controlled the rights of foreigners to purchase and sell in their 
territories;
3
 the authorization and organization by poleis of markets for passing military 
forces were simply another expression of the desire of Greek states to control trade (with 
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 See (1995a) 106 (and cf. Descat [1993] 151-155) for what follows in this paragraph. 
 
2
 See, e.g., de Ste. Croix (1972) 399-400; Stanley (1976) 115-135; Dalby (1992) 25 n.66. 
 
3




foreigners) within their jurisdictions.  The granting of temporary agorai by Greek states 
was not restricted to passing armies and navies, then,
4
 but could be extended to any 
transient group of non-citizens.
5
  Temporary agorai were, for example, also commonly 
authorized and established by poleis for the crowds of foreigners who traveled to attend 
festivals within their territories.
6
  It is true that markets for military forces were often set 
up by Greek cities outside their city walls, but this is easily explained by the desire of 
polis authorities not to have thousands of armed foreigners milling around within their 
towns,
7
 and does not imply that the institutional basis of these markets was in any way 
unusual.  In sum, “[p]lutôt que de dire qu’il y a une forme spécifique de fonctionnement 
des échanges dû à l’armée, il faut reconnaître que l’armée est intégrée dans les formes 
normales de rapport avec les étrangers mais qu’elle en constitue souvent la forme limite 
pour des raisons évidentes de masse d’hommes et de sécurité dans la ville.”
8
 
                                                 
4
 Descat (1995a) 106:  “[l]e fait donc d’accorder le droit d’agora n’est pas spécifique à ce qui serait une 
agora militaire dont le concept n’existe pas.” 
 
5
 See Descat (1993) 153 for two examples of the granting of agorai by Greek states to groups of foreigners. 
 
6




 See Xen., Anab. 7.1.7ff., Diod. 15.46.2 for the potential of disorder and danger consequent on the 
reception by poleis of armed forces.  Cf. McKechnie (1989) 182 commenting on Plato, Laws 952D-953A:  
“[a] practical formula for avoiding the influence of traders without isolating the city from the benefits of 
trade is given in Book XI [of Plato’s Laws]:  traders are to be received in markets, harbours and a public 
building outside the city.” 
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 Although there is no explicit evidence for the administrative framework of the 
temporary agorai provided by poleis to passing military forces,
9
 the fact that these agorai 
were set up and operated by the polis in whose jurisdiction they were located,
10
 together 
with the facts that poleis organizing temporary markets for the duration of festivals 
designated agoranomoi to supervise those markets,
11
 and that these agoranomoi had the 
same duties and powers as agoranomoi overseeing polis markets,
12
 means that it is 
almost certain that classical Greek poleis appointed market magistrates to oversee the 
agorai they organized for passing military forces. 
 Finally, armies, navies, and amphibious forces passing by friendly (or neutral) 
poleis were often received within the walls of those poleis and permitted to purchase 
supplies in their civic agorai.  Thus, in the fall of 400, the Cyreans were received within 
the city walls of Byzantium and bought their provisions in the ‘normal’ polis market 
there.
13
  The fact that, in Italy and Sicily in the late summer of 415, the provision of a 
                                                 
9
 Descat (ibid.) was incorrect to state that the agoranomoi mentioned at Xen., Anab. 5.7.23 were 
Cerasuntians overseeing a market provided by the polis of Cerasus:  see section iib. 
 
10
 Cf. Xen., Anab. 6.2.8; Stanley (1976) 117.  Tänzer ([1912] 27-28) incorrectly treated temporary agorai 
set up by poleis outside their city walls as opened and operated by the passing military force. 
 
11
 Chandezon (2000a) 79.  Although the first attested polis-appointed agoranomos overseeing a festival 
agora dates to the third century (IvIlion 3) (see de Ligt [1993] 42), this is a function of the fact that the 
epigraphical record for the Greek world (outside Athens), and Asia Minor in particular, is much richer in 
the third century than in the classical period.  In addition, continuity between classical and Hellenistic polis 
institutions can normally be assumed: see Migeotte (1995) 8-9, 23 on classical and Hellenistic poleis 
sharing “les mêmes cadres institutionnels”; and id. (2002) 8 on the “longues continuités dans les conditions, 
les pratiques et les attitudes économiques” between classical and later Greek economies. 
 
12
 Chandezon (2000a) 80-85, and esp. 80:  “[l]es fonctions des agoranomes de panégyries étaient 
semblables à celles de leurs collègues qui exerçaient sur l’agora civique.” 
 
13




market to a passing military force by a polis outside its city walls, together with a 
simultaneous refusal by that polis to receive the force within its astu, could be used by 
poleis in order to indicate their neutrality toward military forces, demonstrates that 
military forces could normally expect to be received within city walls and use polis 
markets.
14
  The Spartan attempt to enter Corcyra by trickery in 373 attempted to exploit 
the fact that passing naval forces could normally expected to be received by poleis (and 
thus be in a position to purchase in their civic agorai) (Diod. 15.46.2).  Obviously, in all 
of those cases where passing military forces were permitted to purchase provisions in the 
civic agorai of poleis, they were purchasing within the same legal and institutional 
frameworks that governed all market exchanges (at a retail level) in the Greek world 
 
b. Traveling markets and agoranomoi
15
 
The exchanges between traders and soldiers in the markets in the camps and 
operational bases of classical Greek military forces were also supervised by agoranomoi.  
Demonstrating this will require a lengthy analysis of a speech given by Xenophon to the 
Ten Thousand at one of the halts during their parabasis along the southern Black Sea 
coast. 
 
When the Cyreans were encamped outside the city of Cotyora in the early 
summer of 400, Xenophon addressed the soldiers gathered in assembly, in order to 
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 See Thucy. 6.44.2, 6.50.1 and chapter 1 section iiia.  Cf. Xen., Anab. 5.5.19 for the reception of a 
military force indicating friendliness to it, and for the provision of a market outside a city’s walls to a 
military force (without receiving it) indicating a non-hostile stance towards it. 
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defend himself against accusations (see 5.6.27, 5.7.1) that he was planning to lead the 
men on a colonizing expedition to the land of the Phasians.  Having demonstrated that he 
was not misleading the soldiers (i.e. that his true intentions were not to lead them to 
Phasis), by proving to the men that he could not hope to deceive them into traveling 
East,
16
 Xenophon then moved on to what he presented as a more serious matter for the 
assembled mercenaries:  the problem of growing indiscipline in the army, and its 
potential (and actual) consequences.
17
  Xenophon illustrated the extent of the problem by 
describing to the soldiers two incidents in detail. 
 The first of these, described at 5.7.13-19, began with an unauthorized plundering 
raid by some of the Cyreans on a Colchian village near Cerasus that was friendly to the 
Cerasuntians and to the army.
18
  The raid had ended in disaster:  the villagers repelled the 
attack and killed several of the mercenaries.  To make matters worse, when the Colchians 
had sent some elders as ambassadors to Cerasus to ask the army why it had attacked their 
village (not knowing that the bulk of the soldiers had already left the city), some of the 
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 See 5.7.5-9 with Rood (2004) 323. 
 
17
 See 5.7.12 for the change in direction of the speech.  Focusing on the violent wrongdoings of others in 
the army enabled Xenophon to deflect the charges against him:  see Rood (2004) 323 for this point.  
Xenophon’s inclusion of this speech in his narrative also has a broader purpose, however, when seen in the 
wider context of the Anabasis and Xenophon’s oeuvre as a whole:  the speech gives Xenophon the 
opportunity to expound at length on the importance of discipline in a community, and the related subject of 
the proper relations between commander and commanded, subjects that are crucial to the Anabasis and 
other works of Xenophon:  see Nussbaum (1967) 19-22, 172-175; Dillery (1995) 81-83, 156; and esp. Rood 
(2004) 323-325.  See also, e.g., Anab. 3.1.39, Oec. 8, Mem. 3.1.7, Cyr. 2.1.27. 
 
18
 That the village was friendly to the Cyreans can be inferred from the fact that it had engaged in trading 
with some of the mercenaries:  see 5.7.13-14.  Earlier in the march, at Trapezus, the army had resolved that 
any man of the army going out on a plundering raid had to inform the army that he was doing so (5.1.8).  
The leader of the attack on the village, Clearetus, a lochagos in the army, had not informed the army of his 
planned plundering raid (almost certainly because he knew that it would not be approved and because he 
was planning to sail away from the army with whatever booty he managed to obtain in the raid (see 5.7.15 




Cyreans who had survived the raid, and who had stayed back at Cerasus after the rest of 
the men had left the city, stoned to death the Colchian ambassadors to prevent news of 
the raid on the village reaching the other soldiers. 
The second incident Xenophon narrated in order to demonstrate to the men the 
increasing lawlessness amongst them was a riot in which a crowd of men from the army 
attacked some agoranomoi on account of their (allegedly) outrageous treatment of the 
soldiers; in the ensuing disorder, some Cerasuntian ambassadors, as well as some of the 
soldiers, came to fear for their lives and fled from the army.  Based on Xenophon’s 
description of their treatment, J. K. Anderson made the following statement: 
[w]hen a market was provided by a friendly city instead of by travelling 
merchants, regulations were likely to be made by magistrates for the benefit of 
the sellers rather than by the general to protect the soldiers, as when the Ten 
Thousand reached Cerasus on the Black Sea.  Here the officials [he means of the 
city of Cerasus, as the preceding sentence shows] narrowly escaped stoning at the 





Anderson’s statement was based on the understanding that the agoranomoi mentioned at 
5.7.21-29 were Cerasuntian and administering a market established by the city of Cerasus 
just outside or near that city.  Almost every modern discussion of this incident has 
similarly understood the agoranomoi in question to have been Cerasuntian and the 
disorder involving them to have taken place just outside Cerasus.
20
  A close reading of 
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 (1970) 52 (n.60 there cites 5.7.21-29 and Tänzer [1912] 47 for the passage just quoted:  but Tänzer 
simply states there without argument that 5.7.21-29 provides evidence that the agoranomoi who supervised 
markets provided to classical Greek armies were appointed by the cities whose inhabitants provided the 
markets).  Anderson is followed by Stanley (1976) 122. 
 
20
 Grote (1869) 7: 440-441, Tänzer (1912) 46-47, Nussbaum (1967) 172-173 (cf. 42-43, 104), Perlman 
(1976/77) 264 (with n.99), Manfredi (1980) 246-247 (esp. 246 nn.2-3), Baccarin (1991) 614 n.23, Descat 
(1995a) 106, Lendle (1995) 353-354, Rood (2004) 319 (with Rood [2005] xxxiii), and Lee (2007) 38 and 
n.141, all take the agoranomoi to have been appointed by the Cerasuntians to supervise a market 




Xenophon’s speech shows, however, that the disturbance caused by the alleged 
wrongdoing of these agoranomoi took place just outside Cotyora, not Cerasus; that the 
agoranomoi were not Cerasuntians, but, in fact, Cyreans, members of the Ten Thousand 
and appointed by the Ten Thousand; and therefore that the inference made by Anderson 
from 5.7.21-29 regarding the usual workings of markets provided by Greek cities to 
passing armies is invalid.  I will begin by showing that the riot took place beside Cotyora, 
and not just outside Cerasus.   
 
At the start of Xenophon’s description of the attack on the agoranomoi, he tells 
the assembled mercenaries that, just before the riot, some Cerasuntians had come to the 
generals of the Ten Thousand to tell them of the whole Colchian ‘affair’:  “ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο 
ἐγένετο, ἔρχονται πρὸς ἡµᾶς οἱ Κερασούντιοι καὶ λέγουσι τὸ πρᾶγµα...”21  After the 
generals had heard what had happened, and while they and the Cerasuntians were 
deliberating on how the bodies of the Greek dead from the attack on the Colchian village 
might be buried, the generals and the Cerasuntians saw a crowd of men rushing towards 
them, shouting “Παῖε, παῖε, βάλλε, βάλλε,” some carrying stones in their hands, and 
others picking stones up (5.7.20-21).  The shouts of “Παῖε, παῖε, βάλλε, βάλλε” and the 
rush of men in the direction of the generals and the Cerasuntians marked the start of the 
agoranomoi riot, as Xenophon found out a little later from questioning some of the men 
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 5.7.20:  “When this [the attack on the village and the murder of the envoys sent by the Colchians to 
Cerasus] had taken place, the Cerasuntians came to us and told us of the affair...”  That the “ἡµᾶς” here 
refers to the generals of the Ten Thousand can be seen from the following clause (5.7.20):  “καὶ ἡµεῖς οἱ 
στρατηγοὶ ἀκούσαντες ἠχθόµεθά τε τοῖς γεγενηµένοις καὶ ἐβουλευόµεθα σὺν τοῖς Κερασουντίοις ὅπως ἂν 
ταφείησαν οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νεκροί” (“and we generals, upon hearing the story, were distressed at what had 
happened, and we proceeded to take counsel with the Cerasuntians as to how the bodies of the Greek dead 




involved in the disturbance (5.7.23).  Seeing this rush of men, the Cerasuntians, as 
Xenophon reports, “καὶ οἱ µὲν Κερασούντιοι, ὡς ἂν καὶ ἑορακότες τὸ παρ’ αὐτοῖς 
πρᾶγµα, δείσαντες ἀποχωροῦσι πρὸς τὰ πλοῖα” (“were naturally terrified, as they too 
would have witnessed the affair in their own city, and hurried back toward their ships”) 
(5.7.22).
22
  Xenophon thus differentiates here between the location of the Cerasuntians at 
the start of the agoranomoi riot and their location at the time of the murder of the 
Colchian heralds, when they were “παρ’ αὐτοῖς”—in “their own place,” “their own city.”  
The inference resulting from this statement must be, then, that, at the time of the riot, the 
Cerasuntians were no longer in their own city, that they were, in fact, somewhere else 
other than Cerasus.  This inference is confirmed by the fact that the Cerasuntians had had 
to sail to meet with the generals of the Ten Thousand, evidenced by the fact that the 
Cerasuntians had rushed back to their ships on seeing the soldiers rushing towards them 
with stones.  If the Ten Thousand had been encamped just outside Cerasus at the time of 
the riot, there would have been no need for the Cerasuntians to sail to the generals of the 
army to inform them of the Colchian “affair”:  but the Cerasuntians did have to sail to the 
generals, and thus the Ten Thousand could not have been encamped near the city of 
Cerasus when the riot broke out. 
 As to where the Cerasuntians had had to sail to, and where, consequently, the riot 
did take place, the answer to these questions lie in Xenophon’s description of the events 
leading up to the stoning to death of the Colchian ambassadors at Cerasus and the 
narrative surrounding his speech as a whole.  At 5.7.17, Xenophon tells the men that the 
failed plundering raid on the Colchian village took place “ἐν τῇ ἡµέρᾳ ᾗ ἡµεῖς δεῦρο 
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ἐξωρµῶµεν πεζῇ· τῶν δὲ παραπλεόντων ἔτι τινὲς ἦσαν ἐν Κερασοῦντι, οὔπω ἀνηγµένοι” 
(“on the day when we setting forth to come here by land; and some of those who were 
going by sea along the coast were still at Cerasus, not having as yet set sail”).  “Here,” 
“δεῦρο,” is the place where Xenophon and the assembled army were when he was 
addressing them:  the narrative preceding, and succeeding, the speech demonstrates 
clearly and unambiguously that this was just outside the city of Cotyora.
23
 
 Directly following this passage, at 5.7.17-18, Xenophon informs the men that the 
Cerasuntians had told the generals that, after the failed plundering raid on the Colchian 
village, 
... ἀφικνοῦνται τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου τρεῖς ἄνδρες τῶν γεραιτέρων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ 
ἡµέτερον χρῄζοντες ἐλθεῖν. (18) ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡµᾶς οὐ κατέλαβον, πρὸς τοὺς 
Κερασουντίους ἔλεγον ὅτι θαυµάζοιεν τί ἡµῖν δόξειεν ἐλθεῖν ἐπ’ ἀυτούς.  ἐπεὶ 
µέντοι σφεῖς λέγειν, ἔφασαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ γένοιτο τὸ πρᾶγµα, ἥδεσθαί τε 
αὐτους καὶ µέλλειν ἐνθάδε πλεῖν, ὡς ἡµῖν λέξειαν τὰ γένοµενα, καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς 
κελεύειν αὐτοὺς θάπτειν λαβόντας τοὺς τούτου δεοµένους. 
 
... there arrived at Cerasus three of the inhabitants of the stronghold, all elderly 
men, desiring to come before our general assembly. (18) But since they did not 
find us, they addressed themselves to the Cerasuntians, saying that they 
wondered why we had seen fit to make an attack on them.  When, however, the 
Cerasuntians replied, so their statement ran, that it was not by public authority 
that the affair took place, the envoys were pleased, and were intending to sail 
                                                 
23
 At 5.5.4 (i.e. before the speech to the assembled army), Xenophon reports the arrival of the army at 
Cotyora (where they stayed for forty-five days:  5.5.5); at 6.1.1 (i.e. after the speech), the army was still 
encamped outside Cotyora.  There is no indication from Xenophon’s narrative that the army as a body had 
moved from the city at any point in the interim; in fact, his narrative of the time between the arrival of Ten 
Thousand at Cotyora and his speech to the men regarding the Colchian affair and the agoranomoi riot make 
it clear that the army as a body did not leave Cotyora during that time (although individuals and groups of 
men from the army had gone into the hinterland of the city to forage (5.5.6)).  After an initial 
undeterminable period of time (5.5.7:  “ἐν τούτῳ”) after the army’s arrival at Cotyora, ambassadors from 
Sinope came to the army, encamped outside Cotyora, to discuss the fate of the Cotyorites (their colonists) 
and the mercenaries’ future plans.  From the arrival of the Sinopean ambassadors to the point of 
Xenophon’s speech, Xenophon’s account of events is taken up, firstly, with speeches from Hecotonymus (a 
Sinopean envoy) and Xenophon that explicitly discuss and take place at Cotyora (see esp. 5.5.25; cf. 5.5.9-
10, 19); secondly, with speeches and plans that have as their explicit concern the acquisition of resources to 
allow the mercenaries to set sail from Cotyora (see 5.6.1-10 (esp.10), 5.6.11, and esp. 5.6.19 (cf. 5.6.31); 
and thirdly, with an abandoned plan of Xenophon’s and then rumors concerning the establishment at 
Cotyora of a colony comprising the mercenaries (5.6.15-20; 5.6.36-5.7.2).  Xenophon’s speech, then, was 




here in order to tell us what happened, and to bid those concerned to retrieve and 
bury the corpses. 
  
The crucial point in this passage is when Xenophon reports that the Colchian 
ambassadors were planning to sail “here,” “ἐνθάδε.”  Again, “here,” “ἐνθάδε,” just as 
“δεῦρο” at 5.7.17 above, refers to the place where Xenophon gave his speech to the men, 
that is, as I have just shown, somewhere just outside the city of Cotyora.
24
  Therefore, by 
the time of the murder of the Colchian envoys, which took place just after those envoys’ 
decision to sail to the army to tell it of the attack on their village (5.7.19), the Ten 
Thousand were already at Cotyora.  Thus, when the Cerasuntians came to speak to the 
generals of the mercenaries about the murder of the envoys, the mercenaries were still at 
Cotyora.
25
  And since it was just after the Cerasuntians had come to Cotyora to speak 
with the generals that the disorder involving the agoranomoi occurred (see again 5.7.20-
24), the agoranomoi riot therefore took place outside the city of Cotyora, and not 
Cerasus, as Anderson and other scholars have assumed.
26
  Since, then, the agoranomoi 
riot occurred just outside Cotyora, it therefore took place outside of Cerasuntian territory 
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 Note, too, that the fact that the Colchian ambassadors were planning to sail from Cerasus to the same 
place where Xenophon addressed the men shows that Xenophon did not make this speech anywhere near 
Cerasus.  In addition, the fact that, at 5.7.17, the army had set forth from Cerasus to come “here,” i.e. to the 
location of Xenophon’s speech, again shows that Xenophon was not addressing the men near Cerasus. 
 
25
 Since they had not moved anywhere in the time between their arrival at that city and Xenophon’s speech:  
see again n.23 above. 
 
26
 See Tuplin (1998) 288 correcting Lendle on this point:  “[Lendle] wrongly locates the agoranomoi riot 
just west of Cerasus rather than at Cotyora.”  Tuplin notes this in a list of miscellaneous corrections and 
queries in his review of Lendle, and does not make the argument that the riot took place outside Cotyora in 
any detail, hence the discussion here.  Note, however, that since Tuplin does not specify in his list of 
corrections that he disagrees with Lendle on the identity of the agoranomoi, he, too, presumably believes 




and Cerasuntian jurisdiction; given these facts, there is no reason to think that the 
agoranomoi involved in the disturbances with the army were from the city of Cerasus.  
 
In fact, a close reading of Xenophon’s entire description of the riot and its 
aftermath, brief as it is, demonstrates conclusively that the agoranomoi in question were 
not Cerasuntian.  As already mentioned, while the generals of the Ten Thousand were in 
deliberations with the Cerasuntians, they had heard a great uproar, and shouts of “Παῖε, 
παῖε, βάλλε, βάλλε,” and seen a large number of men running towards them with stones, 
and others picking up stones (5.7.21).  The Cerasuntians were terrified, and even some of 
the generals were terrified (5.7.22).  But when Xenophon went up to the men and asked 
what the trouble was about, he found out eventually that the shouts and stones were not 
directed against the generals and the Cerasuntians, but against the agoranomoi, who were 
supposedly treating the army outrageously (5.7.23).  Then Xenophon tells us (5.7.24-25):   
ἐν τούτῳ τις ὁρᾷ τὸν ἀγορανόµον Ζήλαρχον πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν ἀποχωροῦντα, 
καὶ ἀνέκραγεν· οἱ δὲ ὡς ἤκουσαν, ὥσπερ ἢ συὸς ἀγρίου ἢ ἐλάφου φανέντος ἵενται 
ἐπ’ αὐτόν. (25) οἱ δ’ αὖ Κερασούντιοι ὡς εἶδον ὁρµῶντας καθ’ αὑτούς, σαφῶς 
νοµίσαντες ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἵεσθαι, φεύγουσι δρόµῳ καὶ ἐµπίπτουσιν εἰς τὴν θάλατταν. 
 
At this moment someone saw the agoranomos, Zelarchus, retreating toward the 
sea, and set up a shout; and when the rest heard it, they rushed upon him as 
though a wild boar or a stag had been sighted. (25) And the Cerasuntians, in turn, 
seeing this rush in their neighborhood and believing it was certainly directed 
against themselves, took to running in their flight and threw themselves into the 
sea. 
 
I want to focus here on Xenophon’s use of the adverb “αὖ” at the start of 5.7.25.  
At 5.7.23 and 24, after describing the reactions of the Cerasuntians to the start of the riot 
at 5.7.22, Xenophon tells how he found out that the tumult had arisen in response to some 
allegedly unjust action on behalf of the agoranomoi, and describes the attack on one 
particular agoranomos, Zelarchus.  Then, at the start of 5.7.25, by his use of αὖ—an 
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adverb that marks a return to a previously mentioned subject (it should be translated here 
as “again, once more,” or “in turn”
27
)—Xenophon indicates that he is changing subject, 
turning away from the just described experiences of Zelarchus and the other agoranomoi, 
and back to the flight of the Cerasuntians, which he had left off describing at 5.7.22:  
there the Cerasuntians were described as hurrying back to their ships because of the start 
of the riot, now at 5.7.25 they have taken to running to the sea in their terror at the 
developing disorder.  By his use of the adverb αὖ at 5.7.25, then, Xenophon distinguishes 
between the experiences of the Zelarchus and the other agoranomoi, on the one hand, and 
those of the Cerasuntians, on the other; he therefore clearly believed the two to be 
separate matters.   
In fact, at no point in Xenophon’s description are the Cerasuntians ever presented 
as playing an integral role in the riot.  Their actions are always reactions to and 
consequences of the disorder in the army, rather than a part of it.  Thus, at 5.7.20-22, the 
Cerasuntians were in discussions with the generals outside the camp of the mercenaries 
when the riot started somewhere else, and when the Cerasuntians hurried back to their 
ships on seeing the angry rush of soldiers armed with stones, it was for no other reason 
than they had seen in their own city the stoning of the Colchian envoys by some of the 
Cyreans; as 5.7.23 makes clear, the anger of the crowd of men with stones was not 
directed against the Cerasuntians (or the generals), but against the agoranomoi, and so 
the Cerasuntians’ rushed return to their ships was unnecessary.  Similarly, at 5.7.25, 
having seen the crowd of men, in the chase of Zelarchus, move in their direction, the 
Cerasuntians threw themselves into the sea.  But, as just pointed out by Xenophon, it was 
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the agoranomoi and not the Cerasuntians who were the target of the soldiers’ anger, and 
there was thus no reason for the Cerasuntians to flee:  accordingly, since they had no 
reason to fear for their safety, Xenophon has to include, in his description of the 
Cerasuntians’ actions, the reason for their flight to the sea, since its motivation was 
unexplained on his account of events; they fled “σαφῶς νοµίσαντες ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἵεσθαι,” 
“believing [that the rush of men] was certainly directed against themselves.”  The 
Cerasuntians, then, although they were not involved in any way in the disturbances, fled 
from the army under the mistaken impression that the ensuing disorder was somehow 
directed against them.  Their unfortunate experiences were a result of their 
misunderstanding of the true cause of the tumult in the army (i.e. the alleged 
mistreatment of the soldiers by the agoranomoi) and not a result of anything they had 
done to the soldiers.  Xenophon included the Cerasuntians’ sufferings as an appendage to 
his description of the riot and its aftermath because the Cerasuntians’ reaction to the riot, 
their panicked escape to the sea, helped him to bring out for the soldiers just how violent 
and uncontrolled their actions in the dispute with the agoranomoi had been; the very fact 
that the Cerasuntians had had no part in the dispute, but had still feared for their lives, 
allowed Xenophon, in his final remarks on the riot, to emphasize the soldiers’ 
indiscipline to them:  “καὶ τούτους τί δοκεῖτε; ἠδίκουν µὲν οὐδέν, ἔδεισαν δὲ µὴ λύττα τις 
ὥσπερ κυσὶν ἡµῖν” (“now what think you about these Cerasuntians?  They had done no 
wrong, but they were afraid that as a kind of madness, such as attacks dogs, had seized 
upon us”) (5.7.26).  That is, Xenophon included the experiences of the Cerasuntians in 
his description of the agoranomoi riot and its aftermath precisely because they had had 
no part in the riot.   
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Xenophon, then, in his full description of the riot and its aftermath, not only 
clearly distinguishes the experiences of the Cerasuntians present at Cotyora from those of 
the attacked market-officials, but also presents the Cerasuntians visiting the army as in no 
way involved in the dispute leading to the riot, or in the riot itself.  One other feature of 
Xenophon’s description of the riot and the associated experiences of the Cerasuntians 
helps to build on these observations to make an important point regarding the identity of 
the agoranomoi involved in the riot.  At no point in his description of the riot does 
Xenophon specify the Cerasuntians who had come to deliberate with the generals of the 
army as a specific group of Cerasuntians:  i.e. he never designates the deputation of 
Cerasuntians as just that, a deputation; rather, on each occasion Xenophon refers to these 
men (5.7.20, 22, 25), he refers to them simply as “the Cerasuntians.”  At 5.7.20, it is clear 
from the context that, by “the Cerasuntians,” he means only those Cerasuntians who had 
come from to Cotyora to deliberate with the generals.  But at 5.7.25, when Xenophon is 
distinguishing the experiences of the delegation of Cerasuntians from those of the 
agoranomoi (just mentioned at 5.7.24), the fact that, in distinguishing between these two 
groups, Xenophon still felt himself able to refer to the men making up the delegation as 
“the Cerasuntians” tout court, without any indication that describing these men in this 
way could cause any confusion to his audience of assembled Cyreans—i.e. the fact that 
Xenophon did not feel the need to include at this point of his description of the riot an 
aside clarifying that by his use of “the Cerasuntians” here he meant those Cerasuntians 
who had come to deliberate with the generals—shows that the agoranomoi were not 
Cerasuntian.  That is, if the agoranomoi involved in the riot had been Cerasuntian (or 
even if some of them had been Cerasuntian), it would not have been clear to the 
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assembled soldiers, in the lack of any clarification from Xenophon at 5.7.25 that he was 
referring specifically to the Cerasuntian envoys, which group of Cerasuntians he was 
speaking of in particular at 5.7.25.  But if Xenophon was speaking, and the soldiers were 
listening to him, on the understanding that the agoranomoi were not Cerasuntian, then no 
confusion would have arisen from the simple reference to “the Cerasuntians” at 5.7.25, 
and his account of the riot would have been easily and clearly comprehensible.
28
  This is 
clearly the understanding we should have too, then:  the agoranomoi involved in the riot 
at Cotyora were therefore not from the city of Cerasus.  
 
After Xenophon had finished his detailed account of the failed raid on the 
Colchian village and the subsequent murder of the ambassadors the villagers sent to 
Cerasus, and then the agoranomoi riot just outside Cotyora, he changed mode from 
description to analysis, using the just described episodes to outline for the soldiers, firstly, 
the potential negative consequences for the army if the kind of indiscipline evidenced by 
these incidents was allowed to run unchecked within it; and, secondly, the actual harm 
already caused to the mercenaries by the soldiers’ uncontrolled violence at Cerasus and 
Cotyora.  In the next part of this section, I will show that a close reading of this part of 
Xenophon’s speech proves conclusively that the agoranomoi at Cotyora were not 
Cerasuntian, that they were, instead, officers elected by and part of the Ten Thousand. 
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 The same is true of 5.7.22:  if speaker and audience shared the understanding that the agoranomoi were 
not Cerasuntian, then no confusion would have ensued from Xenophon’s reference to “the Cerasuntians” 
here (he would clearly be referring to the Cerasuntians who had come to talk to the generals).  But if the 
agoranomoi were Cerasuntian, it would be unclear, without any explanatory aside on Xenophon’s part, 
which Cerasuntians were fleeing towards their ships, those who were part of the deputation sent to the army 




Having demonstrated the extent of lawlessness in the army to the soldiers, 
Xenophon signaled explicitly to the soldiers that he was changing tack, that he was now 
going to draw out for the soldiers the dangers for the army arising from the sorts of 
actions he had just narrated:  “εἰ οὖν ταῦτα τοιαῦτα ἔσται, θεάσασθε οἵα ἡ κατάστασις 
ἡµῖν ἔσται τῆς στρατιᾶς” (“now if these things are to go on in this way, observe what the 
situation of your army will be”) (5.7.26).  Xenophon first outlined the potential 
consequences of the lawlessness he had just described (5.7.27-28): 
ὑµεῖς µὲν οἱ πάντες οὐκ ἔσεσθε κύριοι οὔτε ἀνελέσθαι πόλεµον ᾧ ἂν βούλησθε 
οὔτε καταλῦσαι, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ὁ βουλόµενος ἄξει στράτευµα ἐφ’ ὅ τι ἂν ἐθέλῃ.  κἄν 
τινες πρὸς ὑµᾶς ἴωσι πρέσβεις ἢ εἰρήνης δεόµενοι ἢ ἄλλου τινός, κατακανόντες 
τούτους οἱ βουλόµενοι ποιήσουσιν ὑµᾶς τῶν λόγων µὴ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν πρὸς ὑµᾶς 
ἰόντων. (28) ἔπειτα δὲ οὓς µὲν ἂν ὑµεῖς ἅπαντες ἕλησθε ἄρχοντας, ἐν οὐδεµιᾷ 
χώρᾳ ἔσονται, ὅστις δ’ ἂν ἑαυτὸν ἕληται στρατηγὸν καὶ ἐθέλῃ λέγειν Βάλλε, 
βάλλε, οὗτος ἔσται ἱκανὸς καὶ ἄρχοντα κατακανεῖν καὶ ἰδιώτην ὃν ἂν ὑµῶν 
ἐθέλῃ ἄκριτον, ἢν ὦσιν οἱ πεισόµενοι αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐγένετο. 
 
You, the general body, will not have it in your power either to undertake war 
upon whom you please or to bring war to an end, but any individual who wishes 
will be leading an army to gain any end he may desire.  And if people come to 
you as ambassadors, either desiring peace or anything else, any who choose will 
kill them and prevent you from hearing the words of those who come to confer 
with you. (28) Furthermore, the men whom you as a body may choose for 
<commanders> will be of no account, but whoever may choose himself general 
and will raise the cry ‘Pelt, pelt!,’ that man will have the power to slay either 
<commander> or private, any one of you he pleases, without a trial, provided—





The potential consequences are of two different kinds, then.  5.7.27, with its 
references to the dangers of individual war-making, and especially the dangers of 
individuals undertaking military actions without the approval of the army as a whole, and 
also to the murder of ambassadors with the aim of preventing them addressing the army, 
clearly refers to the Colchian incidents:  the potential consequences are for what one 
                                                 




might call the army’s external relations; the army as a whole will not be able to choose 
whom it makes wars upon, or to deal with ambassadors appropriately.   
At 5.7.28,
30
 when Xenophon scolds the soldiers that the men whom they as a 
body have chosen as ἄρχοντας of the army will be of no account if any man may elect 
himself general and raise the shout “Βάλλε, βάλλε” against them, his use of the words 
“Βάλλε, βάλλε” is clearly meant to recall the reported earlier shouts (at 5.7.21) of “Παῖε, 
παῖε, βάλλε, βάλλε” that marked the beginning of the riot involving the market-officials; 
Xenophon is thus presenting (as he indicated he would do at 5.7.26) to the soldiers the 
potential consequences for the mercenaries if the sort of behavior that had characterized 
the agoranomoi riot was allowed to continue within the army.  In contrast to the analysis 
of the potential consequences of the continuance of the sort of behavior that had 
characterized the Colchian incidents, Xenophon sees the type of conduct that had marked 
the incident with the agoranomoi riot as potentially leading to internal disorder within the 
army:  if this sort of thing is allowed to continue in the army, whoever in the future elects 
himself general and raises an uproar against the ἄρχοντες of the army “will have the 
power to kill any one of you, ὑµῶν, he pleases, ἄρχοντα καὶ ἰδιώτην, without a trial, 
ἄκριτον.”31  The potential consequences of the agoranomoi riot do not involve its 
relations with other communities, then, but only relations within the army itself. 
                                                 
30
 Note ἔπειτα at the start of 5.7.28 marking the sequence of thought, i.e. indicating that Xenophon is here 
moving on to a new subject. 
 
31
 Provided, Xenophon says, there are men who will obey a man starting such a riot “as indeed it came 
about in the present case,” “ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐγένετο.”  These last words confirm Xenophon’s earlier 
statement (5.7.26) that his analysis in this section of the speech will be drawn from the events he has 
described to the mercenaries earlier in the speech (in this case, the agoranomoi riot).  And see the text 
above immediately following on 5.7.29 and Xenophon’s presentation of the actual consequences for the 




In the next section of his speech (5.7.29), Xenophon explicitly indicates that he is 
moving on from drawing out the potential consequences of the men’s lawlessness to 
describing the actual consequences of their indiscipline to them:  “οἷα δὲ ὑµῖν καὶ 
διαπεπράχασιν οἱ αὐθαίρετοι οὗτοι στρατηγοὶ σκέψασθε” (“consider the sort of things 
these self-chosen generals have actually accomplished for you”).  Xenophon first raises 
the issue of the attack on Zelarchus the agoranomos:  “Ζήλαρχος µὲν ὁ ἀγορανόµος εἰ µὲν 
ἀδικεῖ ὑµᾶς, οἴχεται ἀποπλέων οὐ δοὺς ὑµῖν δίκην· εἰ δὲ µὴ ἀδικεῖ, φεύγει ἐκ τοῦ 
στρατεύµατος δείσας µὴ ἀδίκως ἄκριτος ἀποθάνῃ” (“take Zelarchus, the agoranomos:  
supposing he has done you wrong, he has sailed off without paying you the penalty; 
supposing he is not guilty, he has fled from the army out of fear that he might be slain 
unjustly and without a trial”).  Again, the subject of Zelarchus, and thus the agoranomoi 
riot (of which the Zelarchus’ escape was a part:  see 5.7.24), is discussed as a matter 
internal to the army and not involving another community:  Xenophon tells the assembled 
men that Zelarchus may have wronged “you,” “ὑµᾶς,” and that Zelarchus may have 
sailed off without paying “you” the penalty, “οὐ δοὺς ὑµῖν δίκην.”32  All of this strongly 
suggests that Zelarchus the agoranomos was a member of the army, and this hypothesis 
is confirmed by returning to 5.7.28 and by an analysis of the rest of 5.7.29, and especially 
Xenophon’s supposition that Zelarchus fled from the army out of fear he might be slain 
unjustly and “without a trial,” “ἄκριτος.”  To return to 5.7.28, Xenophon had raised there 
the possibility, if the army’s lawlessness were to continue, that the ἄρχοντας, whom the 
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 And note, in contrast to Zelarchus who is presented by Xenophon as possibly having wronged the army, 
that earlier in the speech (5.7.26), Xenophon can take it for granted that the assembled mercenaries will 
agree with him that the Cerasuntians who fled to their ships in the belief that they were being attacked by 




army had chosen, would have no authority, if any man could elect himself general and 
raise the shout “βάλλε, βάλλε” against them, and slay either ἄρχοντα or ἰδιώτην, without 
a trial, “ἄκριτον.”  These ἄρχοντας at 5.7.28 must be the agoranomoi for two reasons.  
Firstly, because in the reference to the shout “βάλλε, βάλλε” against the ἄρχοντας, 
Xenophon was clearly recalling the shout “Παῖε, παῖε, βάλλε, βάλλε” that was directed 
against the agoranomoi (see 5.7.21, 23); in his analysis of the potential consequences for 
the army based on the type of behavior evidenced in the agoranomoi riot, then, 
Xenophon makes an equivalency between the ἄρχοντες of the army and the agoranomoi 
involved in the riot.  Secondly, and crucially, the use of the word “ἄκριτον” at 5.7.28, and 
Zelarchus’ supposed fear that he would be slain “ἄκριτος” at 5.7.29, show that at 5.7.28 
Xenophon is drawing the particular detail of the potential killing of an ἄρχων in the army 
without a trial from Zelarchus’ actual fear that he might have been killed without a trial.
33
  
Thus, Xenophon is equating the potential killing of an ἄρχων in the army with the feared 
killing of the agoranomos.  The agoranomoi in the riot, therefore, were ἄρχοντες in the 
army.
34
  In other words, they were Cyreans. 
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 5.7.28 does refer to the killing of “ἄρχοντα... καὶ ἰδιώτην,” but Zelarchus is referred on both occasions in 
the speech as “Zelarchus the agoranomos,” i.e. as a magistrate/official, and thus we should understand the 
use of “ἄκριτος” to describe Zelarchus at 5.7.29 as referring back to “ἄρχοντα” at 5.7.29.  Xenophon might 
have drawn the potential consequence that private members of the army might be slain by self-elected 
generals from two considerations:  firstly, the fact that some ordinary soldiers drowned as a result of the 
disorder surrounding the agoranomoi riot (5.7.25); and secondly, from the general consideration that any 
man willing to kill an officer obviously would not shrink from doing the same to a private soldier. 
 
34
 Thus, in my quotation of the Loeb translation of 5.7.28 above, I put brackets around its translation of 
“ἄρχοντας” and “ἄρχοντα” as “commanders” and “commander.”  “ἄρχοντας” in this passage should be 
translated as “magistrates” or “officers.”  That the “ἄρχοντας” of 5.7.28 were part of another another class 
of officers separate from the generals is also shown by the opposition Xenophon posits in 5.7.28 between 
the man who may choose himself general (“στρατηγὸν”), i.e. a man taking upon himself to act like a 




5.7.30 confirms that the agoranomoi were part of the army, and not 
Cerasuntians.
35
  Here, Xenophon describes the actual consequences of the Cyrean stoning 
of the Colchian envoys:
36
  alone of all the Greeks, the remnants of the Ten Thousand 
cannot enter Cerasus without a strong force; and it is not possible for the mercenaries 
themselves to bury the bodies of those Cyreans who fell while attacking the Colchian 
village.  The actual consequences of the murder of the Colchian heralds, then, consist of 
the breach in relations with the Cerasuntians (and with the Colchian villagers):  the 
consequences of the Colchian affair are thus, again, in contrast to the agoranomoi riot, 
external; and crucially, it is the murder of the Colchian ambassadors that Xenophon sees 
as destroying relations with the Cerasuntians, and not the Zelarchus episode.
37
  If 
Zelarchus and the other agoranomoi were magistrates of Cerasus, their mistreatment by 
the army would surely have been included by Xenophon in his analysis of the factors 
leading to the breakdown in relations with the Cerasuntians.  That it is not shows that the 
agoranomoi involved in the riot cannot have been Cerasuntian. 
                                                 
35 “οἱ δὲ καταλεύσαντες τοὺς πρέσβεις διεπράξαντο ὑµῖν µόνοις µὲν τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς Κερασοῦντα µὴ 
ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι ἂν µὴ σὺν ἰσχύι ἀφικνεῖσθαι· τοὺς δὲ νέκρους οὓς πρόσθεν αὐτοὶ οἱ κατακανόντες ἐκέλευον 
θάπτειν, τούτους διεπράξαντο µηδὲ σὺν κηρυκείῳ ἔτι ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι ἀνελέσθαι.  τίς γὰρ ἐθελήσει κῆρυξ 
ἰέναι κήρυκας ἀπεκτονώς;  ἀλλ’ ἡµεῖς Κερασουντίων θάψαι αὐτοὺς ἐδεήθηµεν.”  (“Take those who stoned 
to death the ambassadors:  they have accomplished this result, that for you alone of all the Greeks it is not 
safe to enter Cerasus unless with a strong force; and as for the dead whom previously the very men who 
killed them proposed burying, the result accomplished is that now it is not safe to pick up their bodies even 
for one who carries a herald’s staff.  For who will care to go as herald when he has the blood of heralds 
upon his hands?  So we requested the Cerasuntians to bury them.”) 
 
36
 Note that, in the words “οἱ δὲ καταλεύσαντες” at the start of 5.7.30, the “δὲ” answers the “µὲν” in the 
words “Ζήλαρχος µὲν ὁ ἀγορανόµος” beginning 5.7.29, and shows that Xenophon is moving on to a 
different, but related, subject. 
 
37
 That the ambassadors referred to as stoned to death at the beginning of 5.7.30 are the Colchian elders 
stoned to death at Cerasus by those Cyreans who had survived the failed raid on the Colchian village (see 
5.7.19) is clear from reading the rest of 5.7.30.  Xenophon never describes the Cerasuntians who came to 




So, the agoranomoi at Xen., Anab. 5.7.21-29 were Cyreans, and not Cerasuntians; 
there is no reason to assume or think that they were Cerasuntian:
38
  remarkably enough, 
although it is currently the consensus view in all scholarly traditions that the agoranomoi 
mentioned at 5.7.21-29 (and 5.7.2) were Cerasuntian, the view that they were, in fact, 
part of the army was unremarkable and uncontroversial to commentators on these 
passages in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, who simply stated the fact 
without feeling any need to argue the point.
39
  5.7.21-29 does not, then, provide evidence 
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 A passage from the speech, and a remark in the narrative just before the speech, lend support to this 
conclusion.  At 5.7.24, when describing the attack on the market-officials, Xenophon refers by name to the 
agoranomos Zelarchus without an ethnic:  “τὸν ἀγορανόµον Ζήλαρχον.”  This naming of an individual 
without an ethnic contrasts with Xenophon’s description of the Cerasuntians:  not just in his account of the 
riot, but throughout his speech, he refers to these as a group, “the Cerasuntians” (in addition to 5.7.20, 22, 
25, cf. 5.7.13, 17, 18, 30), and nowhere in this speech (or anywhere else in the Anabasis) are individual 
Cerasuntians ever distinguished by name (or even mentioned) by Xenophon.  This difference in treatment 
implies two things:  that Zelarchus was known to the men and that he was not Cerasuntian.  5.7.2, a passage 
in which Xenophon is describing the mood amongst the soldiers before his speech, can be usefully 
compared in this regard.  Here Xenophon states that it was greatly to be feared that the army would do the 
sorts of things they had done to the heralds of the Colchians and the agoranomoi:  “καὶ µάλα φοβεροὶ ἦσαν 
µὴ ποιήσειαν οἷα καὶ τοὺς τῶν Κόλχων κήρυκας ἐποίησαν καὶ τοὺς ἀγορανόµους.”  In contrast to the 
Colchian heralds, the ethnic origin of the agoranomoi does not have to be specified:  cf. 5.7.23, where the 
agoranomoi are again mentioned without any other term to distinguish them.  (The reference to “τοὺς τῶν 
Κόλχων κήρυκας” here is to the Colchian elders killed at Cerasus by the rogue Cyreans.  Xenophon uses the 
terms “heralds” (“κήρυκες”) and “envoys” (“πρέσβεις”) interchangeably to describe these men:  cf. esp. 
5.7.30 for clarification on this point.)  The fact that, both in his reported speech and in his narrative, 
Xenophon could refer to the agoranomoi, in contrast to groups of men from other communities he 
mentions, without any other identifier, assuming that, in so doing, there would no confusion for his 
audiences (of readers and mercenaries), suggests very strongly that the agoranomoi were part of the army. 
 
39 So Masqueray, in the Budé edition (2000:  a reprint of the first edition of 1930/31) 81, on οἱ ἀγορανόµοι 
at 5.7.23:  “[l]’agoranome, chargé de la police des marchés, portait un fouet pour se faire obéir.  (Cf. 
Acharn. 723 sq.)  Dans les armées il frappait aussi les soldats et se faisait ainsi détester.”  (Masqueray 
[2000: 82 and n.1], however, was mistaken in taking the ἄρχοντας mentioned at 5.7.27 as referring to the 
generals of the army:  see again p.456 above.)  In the Anglophone world, one has to go back to the 
nineteenth century to find scholars who saw that the agoronomoi were appointed by the army, and not by 
the Cerasuntians (even if these scholars did import anachronistic ideas about a commissariat accompanying 
the army into their notes:  no such thing existed in any classical Greek army (see chapter 3 section ivb)):  
see Pretor (1895) 108 ad 5.7.2—τοὺς ἀγορανόµους:  “[t]hese officers were appointed to regulate the sale of 
provisions in the soldiers’ market, and in this capacity would correspond to the commissariat of modern 
times...”; and Anthon (1852) 537 ad 5.7.1-4—ἀγορανόµους:  “[t]hese ἀγορανόµοι belonged to what we 
would call, in modern parlance, the commissariat.  They regulated the buying and selling in the market that 




for Cerasuntian magistrates colluding with merchants to exploit the Ten Thousand, but, 
on the contrary, our only mention of army-appointed agoranomoi supervising a market in 




 The agoranomoi elected by the remnants of the Ten Thousand were supervising a 
traveling market which had accompanied the army on its march to Cotyora (from Cerasus 
and, possibly, Trapezus).  After Xenophon had presented to the army the potential and 
actual consequences of their conduct in the Colchian and agoranomoi incidents, he 
closed his speech with a series of questions asking the soldiers how would they be able to 
maintain order in their internal and external relations if they were continue to behave in 
the ways he had described earlier (5.7.32-33).  The series of questions included the 
following (5.7.33):  “ἀγορὰν δὲ τίς ἄξει θαρρῶν, ἢν περὶ τὰ µέγιστα τοιαῦτα 
ἐξαµαρτάνοντες φαινώµεθα;”  The Loeb translates this as follows:  “who will dare to 
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 Garlan (1975) 141—a verbatim translation of Garlan (1972) 166-167—may refer to the appointment of 
agoranomoi by the Ten Thousand.  Garlan mentions the appointment of market overseers in a discussion of 
the food supply of classical and Hellenistic Greek armies but without any reference (either in the French 
original or the English translation) to an ancient source:  “[h]owever, the armies were not wholly at the 
mercy of the merchants, wholesale or retail, who were always inclined to take advantage of circumstances.  
These special markets were strictly supervised by the military authorities who would subsequently be 
responsible for apportioning the booty.  Sometimes they appointed market overseers [named at Garlan 
[1972] 167 as “agoranomes”], or intervened, for instance, to increase the supply of ready cash by artificial 
means, most often to impose price controls in order to protect the soldiers’ purse and prevent discontent.”  
(Increasing the supply of ready cash by artificial means presumably refers to Timotheus’ coining of token 
money at Olynthus in 364 in order to provide cash to his troops so that they could purchase provisions from 
the merchants who were accompanying them (ps.-Aristot., Oec. 2.2.23a, 1350a23-30 (a version of the same 
anecdote is found Polyaenus, Strateg. 3.10.1) (on this coinage, see Robinson and Price [1967] (although see 
also Price [1979] 358 n.19)).  There is no evidence, however, for military authorities imposing price 
controls in the classical period (as there is for the Hellenistic period, see appendix 5 section iii; see there 
also for Garlan ascribing another practice—in this case, the right of soldiers to buy provisions at set 
prices—that was only current in Hellenistic armies to both classical and Hellenistic armies).)  Since there is 
no evidence for agoranomoi being present in any Hellenistic army, or in any classical Greek army other 
than the Ten Thousand, Garlan may be referring here to Xen., Anab. 5.7.21-29 (and/or 5.7.2).  In any case, 
whatever Garlan meant, his work has had no influence on subsequent readings of or the general thinking on 
Xen., Anab. 5.7.21-29, so that a close reading of this passage and extended argument for the view that the 




supply us a market if in matters of the greatest import we show ourselves guilty of such 
offences?”  But this is to translate the verb “ἄξει” incorrectly:  “ἄξει” here is being used 
with its literal, standard meaning of ‘to lead or carry, bring.’
41
  The verb is describing a 
physical action:
42
  Xenophon is warning the mercenaries that, literally, nobody will bring 
along or carry goods for sale in a market to them if they continue committing great 
crimes.  (If Xenophon had wanted to say that nobody would want “to supply” a market to 
the mercenaries, he would have used, as elsewhere (see, e.g., 4.8.23, 5.5.6), the verb 
παρέχειν.)  Xenophon, then, is referring in this question to a traveling market made up of 
traders who accompanied the soldiers on their march.  That he is not referring here to a 
polis supplying a market to the army is confirmed by the preceding question in the series:  
“πόλις δὲ φιλία τίς ἡµᾶς δέξεται, ἥτις ἂν ὁρᾳ τοσαύτην ἀνοµίαν ἐν ἡµῖν;”43  Since the 
reception by a friendly city in the Greek world of a passing military force could always 
be assumed to include the provision of a market,
44
 the warning that the army would not 
receive a market from friendly cities if it continued on its present path of lawless 
behavior had already been made by Xenophon to the mercenaries prior to the question 
warning that no one “ἄξει” a market to them. 
                                                 
41
 See LSJ s.v. ἄγω, I. 
 
42
 Masqueray’s translation ([2000] 83) of the question conveys “ἄξει” accurately, but mistranslates 
“ἀγορὰν”:  “[q]ui nous apportera des vivres avec confiance, si l’on nous voit commettre ainsi les plus 




 5.7.33:  “[a]nd what friendly city will receive us when it sees so great lawlessness amongst us?” 
 
44




 The question warning that nobody would carry goods for sale in a market to the 
mercenaries if they continued committing crimes of the greatest seriousness forms a 
distinct series with three other questions that describe practices that had been and were 
important to the army’s survival, but that would not continue if the mercenaries did not 
change their undisciplined ways (the other practices being sacrificing to the gods, 
fighting with enemies, and reception by friendly cities).
45
  We should therefore 
understand that traveling markets had been a feature of the army’s existence in its 
parabasis along the southern Black Sea coast to Cotyora and that Xenophon hoped that 
they would continue to be so.
46
  That a traveling market had accompanied the army along 
the initial part of its journey along the Black Sea coast can also be inferred from a later 
passage describing the soldiers’ experiences at Calpe Harbor.  The soldiers had no 
provisions (6.4.11) and the sacrifices undertaken with a view to departure from the camp 
for a foraging expedition were proving unfavourable, despite repeated attempts (6.4.11-
16).  As Xenophon narrates (6.4.16), “... χαλεπῶς εἶχον οἱ στρατιῶται· καὶ γὰρ τὰ 
ἐπιτήδεια ἐπέλιπεν ἃ ἔχοντες ἦλθον, καὶ ἀγορὰ οὐδεµία πω παρῆν” (“the soldiers were 
angry for the provisions they brought with them had given out and there was not yet any 
market at hand”).  The latter consideration implies that there was, during earlier stages of 
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 All four of these questions take the form of future more vivid conditional clauses:  the practices in 
question will continue if the soldiers cease behaving lawlessly.  Contrast Xenophon’s final question to the 
army, which is syntactically different from the rest of the series, taking the form of a potential optative to 
express an assumption about the future considered as less certain to come true:  “οὗ δὲ δὴ πάντων ᾠόµεθα 
τεύξεσθαι ἐπαίνου, τίς ἂν ἡµᾶς τοιούτους ὄντας ἐπαινέσειεν; (“And in that land where we were fancying 
that we would obtain praise from everyone, who would praise us if we are men of this sort?”) 
 
46
 The previous question, with its reference to reception by friendly cities, shows that Xenophon is thinking 
here of the soldiers’ experiences on the Black Sea coast.  Xenophon is not referring here to the Lydian 
agora:  the Lydian market accompanied the non-Greek part of Cyrus’ army (see chapter 4 section ii) that 




the march along the coast, a market accompanying the army which the soldiers were able 
to resort to when their primary source of supplies had given out. 
It can be demonstrated, then, that there was (almost certainly) a traveling market 
accompanying the Ten Thousand at this point on their parabasis.  In addition, it can be 
shown, too, that the Cyrean agoranomoi were not overseeing a market provided by the 
Cotyorites outside their city walls.  On the mercenaries’ arrival at Cotyora, they were 
treated as a hostile force by the Cotyorites and, as such, were not provided with a market 
by the Cotyorites (5.5.6).  The Cotyorites were still refusing to provide a market to the 
mercenaries (5.5.19) when, after the army had spent a substantial but undefined amount 
of time at Cotyora (5.5.7), some Sinopean ambassadors came to Cotyora to discuss the 
army’s relations with the Cotyorites, who were their colonists.
47
  It was only after 
discussions between the Sinopean ambassadors and the mercenaries that friendly 
relations were established between the army and the Cotyorites (5.6.24-25); it was also 
presumably from this point on that the Cotyorites provided a market for the army, 
although their doing so is reported by Xenophon only after his speech to the assembled 
mercenaries (6.1.1).  
 The agoranomoi riot took place, however, in the time after the mercenaries’ 
arrival at Cotyora and before the discussions with the Sinopeans.  Xenophon’s narrative 
of the army’s stay at Cotyora after the arrival of the Sinopean ambassadors is quite 
detailed and it is incredible that the arrival of emissaries from Cerasus would not have 
found a mention in his description of the various intrigues that were being undertaken at 
that time at Cotyora.  The converse is also true:  it is incredible that, if the various 
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schemes being plotted at Cotyora after the arrival of the Sinopeans were being devised at 
the time of the attack on the agoranomoi, they would have found no mention in 
Xenophon’s description of the riot and its consequences.  Xenophon’s account of the 
attacks on the Colchian villages and the subsequent dispatch of ambassadors to Cotyora 
also suggests strongly that the riot took place shortly after the army’s arrival at Cotyora.
48
  
Since, then, the agoranomoi riot occurred at a time when the Cotyorites were not 
providing a market to the mercenaries and were unfriendly to them, the agoranomoi 
elected by the Ten Thousand were therefore not overseeing a market provided by the 
inhabitants of the polis of Cotyora; they must have been supervising, instead, the 
traveling market accompanying the army on its march along the southern Pontic 
seaboard.   
In conclusion, then, Xen., Anab. 5.7.21-29 presents us with our only attested 
instance of agoranomoi supervising the exchanges between traders and soldiers in the 
temporary agorai in the camps of classical Greek armies on campaign. 
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 The army took at least ten days to march from Cerasus to Cotyora:  see 5.4.1 (undetermined amount of 
time marching from Cerasus to the borders of the territory with the Mossynoecians); 5.5.1 (eight days’ 
marching through the territory of the Mossynoecians); and 5.5.4 (two days’ marching through the territory 
of the Tibarenians to Cotyora).  The failed attack on the Colchian villages took place the night before the 
army’s departure from Cerasus (5.7.17).  It was some (unspecified, but apparently not lengthy period of) 
time after this that the Colchian ambassadors came to Cerasus to complain of the attack (5.7.17), and again 
some unspecified, but apparently not lengthy period of time after their murder that the Cerasuntians sailed 
to Cotyora to tell the generals of the affair (5.7.20).  Although it is impossible to be precise on this 
question, it appears likely, then, that the Cerasuntians came to Cotyora not long after the mercenaries 
arrived there.  Cf. 5.7.12 in this regard:  the mercenaries at a loss when Xenophon alludes to serious 
misbehavior manifesting itself in the army—if the murder of the heralds and the agoranomoi riot had taken 
place in the days between the arrival of the Sinopeans and Xenophon’s speech, the mercenaries would 




c. The legal and administrative framework within which classical Greek sailors 
and soldiers bought their provisions (and sold their booty) 
 There is no reason to think that that the appointment of agoranomoi by the Ten 
Thousand to oversee their market exchanges with traders was an unusual measure.
49
  
Other sources indicate an intense interest by classical Greek military forces and their 
leaders in controlling and encouraging exchanges in the markets established in their 
camps and bases.
50
  Classical Greek generals controlled the use of weights and measures 
in the markets their forces used;
51
 they could also control the means of exchange used in 
those markets.
52
  Xenophon’s paradigmatic military leader, Cyrus, took measures to 
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 Cf. in this respect Xen., Anab. 5.8.34:  after Xenophon’s speech to the mercenaries at Cotyora on the 
growing lawlessness within the army, the men decide, in order to prevent disorder breaking out in the army 
again, that in future the lochagoi would serve as dikasts overseeing trials of men accused of lawlessness.  
The establishment of courts within the Ten Thousand was extraordinary—there is no other attestation of 
courts in any other Greek army—but it took place only because, exceptionally, there could be no recourse 
to polis courts at the end of the army’s campaign (see Lys. 14.5, 15.1-4 for Athenian soldiers accused of 
crimes on campaign being tried in polis courts on their return to Athens; see also the discussion at Parke 
[1933] 78).  In contrast, polis military forces were accompanied on campaign by traders just as the Ten 
Thousand were, and had to face the issue of how to control and manage exchanges with traders on 
campaign, just as the Ten Thousand had to. 
 
50
 Cf. Garlan (1972), (1975) at p.459 n.40 above.  Classical Greek military leaders naturally also took an 
interest in the functioning of the markets provided to their forces by cities on the routes of their marches.  
See Xen., Anab. 1.5.12:  Clearchus crossing the river to Charmande to inspect the agora (“κατασκεψάµενος 
τὴν ἀγορὰν”) provided by that city for the Cyreans. 
 
51 See ps.-Aristot., Oec. 2.2.23c, 1350b5-15 (the same anecdote is found at Polyaenus, Strateg. 3.10.10) 
(see already pp.274-275 n.50 for discussion of this passage):  Timotheus, besieging Samos in 366, found 
that his camp was becoming short of provisions because of the many foreigners who were arriving into his 
camp and buying provisions in the market there; to counter this, he gave orders forbidding the sale of 
milled grain, wine or oil in measures less than a medimnos of grain or a metretes of wine or oil. 
 
52
 See p.459 n.40 above on ps.-Aristot., Oec. 2.2.23a, 1350a23-30 (and Polyaenus, Strateg. 3.10.1) on 




ensure that the kapeloi accompanying his army could trade in its agora without harm.
53
  
Cyrus also, in order to boost supply to his army on the march to Thymbrara, allowed the 
emporoi following his army, once the twenty days for which the soldiers had to bring 
their own provisions had elapsed, to sell “ὅπως ἄν βούληται,” “in whatever way they 
wish” (Cyr. 6.2.38).  This passage would seem to imply that merchants might not usually 
sell however they wanted; rather, that their activities in military agorai were usually 
(closely) controlled.  Classical Greek states also exercised strict control over sales of the 
plunder taken by their military forces to the traders accompanying those forces.  Spartan 
armies had a permanent λαφυροπώλης (‘booty-seller’) to whom all plunder had to be 
reported and who organized and oversaw auctions of that plunder;
54
 other classical Greek 
military forces appointed λαφυροπῶλαι and other officials on an ad hoc basis to supervise 
and control sales of booty to traders.
55
  The Ten Thousand also appointed λαφυροπῶλαι to 
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 See Cyr., 4.5.42:  Cyrus, after the capture of the Assyrian camp after the great battle, ordering that it be 
announced that “τὴν δ’ ἀγορὰν τὴν οὖσαν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ... µὴ ἀδικεῖν µηδένα, πωλεῖν δὲ τοὺς 
καπήλους ὅ τι ἔχει ἕκαστος πράσιµον...” (“no one shall interfere with the market in the camp, but that the 




 See Pritchett (1991) 402-416 for sources. 
 
55
 See Polyaenus, Strateg. 6.1.7:  Jason of Pherai appointing, as part of a ruse to extort money from him, his 
brother Polydorus as λαφυροπώλης to deal with the booty resulting from the capture of some unnamed city 
(this reference was missed by Pritchett [1991]).  Cf. IG V, 2, 6.9-12:  in the mid-fourth century, a decree 
from Tegea providing for repairs on the city walls and other public buildings damaged in war being paid 
for out of the sale of plunder; the generals of the polis are instructed to hold a λαφυροπωλίον (cf. Brun and 
Descat [2000] 222).  See Pritchett (1991) 402-403 for references to other officials involved in the state sale 
of plunder (cf. Rawlings [2007] 153-154 for discussion).  In addition to these few references, the fact that 
the collection and sale of plunder was centralized by classical Greek states in the early fifth century and 
state control of plunder in the field remained normal practice throughout the classical period (see esp. van 
Wees [2004] 236-237; cf. Rawlings [2007] 153-154) implies the regular appointment of officials in 
classical Greek military forces to supervise the collection and sale of plunder.  Classical Greek states were 
not always successful in their efforts to gain control of the all of the booty seized by their military forces:  






 confirming that they participated in the same conventions and institutions 
that usually governed the exchange of goods between military forces and traders in the 
Greek world. 
 The market exchanges between sailors and soldiers and traders in the agorai 
located in the camps and bases of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces 
did not take place, therefore, in a legal and institutional vacuum.
57
  Although the evidence 
is scanty and it is often necessary to use indirect reasoning to reconstruct the institutional 
framework of the markets organized for Greek military forces, it seems fair to conclude 
that these markets—just as the markets provided by poleis to passing military forces in 
the classical Greek world—were organized and administered similarly to normal civic 
polis agorai.  If the office of agoranomos is only attested for the Ten Thousand, this is 
almost certainly because of the exceptional nature of that text,
58
 and not because 
agoranomoi did not exist in other classical Greek military forces; like other mundane 
details connected to provisioning, they could simply be taken for granted by authors (and 
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 See Xen., Anab. 7.7.56:  Charminus and Polynicus, two Spartiates sent by Thibron to take the Cyreans 
into his service, took over the captured livestock from Xenophon (to whom the livestock had been given by 
Seuthes in order to raise pay for the mercenaries), appointed booty-sellers and proceeded to sell it (“καὶ 
λαφυροπώλας καταστήσαντες ἐπώλουν”).  Although this sale of plunder for the Cyreans was organized by 
Spartiates, the mercenaries had probably appointed booty-sellers on their own initiative to sell the army’s 
plunder earlier in the march, too.  See Xen., Anab. 6.6.38:  the mercenaries remained at Chrysopolis for 
seven days “λαφυροπωλοῦντες” (having pillaged the Bithynian countryside with the aim of raising money).  
Note that Xenophon uses this term only after the principle of common ownership of plunder acquired by 
the army as a whole was adopted by the army (at Calpe, see Xen., Anab. 6.6.2-3 with Dalby [1992] 25-26).  
Cf. Xen., Anab. 5.3.4 for another sale of plunder by the army as a whole. 
 
57
 This phrase is adapted from E. M. Harris’ discussion of the institutions of the Athenian agora in the 
classical period ([2002] 5). 
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their audiences) for other military forces and therefore not mentioned in ancient military 
narratives. 
 As in normal civic agorai, the institutional framework of both the markets 
provided by poleis to passing armies and navies, and of the markets located in the camps 
and bases of Greek military forces, would have provided a (relatively) efficient and stable 
structure for exchanges between sailors and soldiers and traders.
59
  Exclusive property 
rights would have been established by public weights and measures and protected by 
agoranomoi,
60
 whose jurisdiction not only extended over weights and measures, but also 
to the supervision of contracts.
61
  Agoranomoi were also charged with maintaining law 
and order in the agora; presumably this entailed guarding against the illegal and violent 
expropriation of property during transactions there.
62
  The tasks of market supervisors 
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 See Bresson (2008b) 7-39.  Cf. North (1990) 6. 
 
60
 See again p.464 and n.51 above for state control of the weights and measures used in the market 
exchanges in the camps of military forces. 
 
61
 See Aristot., Pol. 1321b12-18:  one of the indispensable magistracies for a polis is an agoranomos for the 
supervision of contracts and the maintenance of good order.  Cf. Theophr. fr. 651 (FHSG):  agoranomoi 
must ensure orderly conduct in the marketplace and truthfulness on the part not only of the sellers but also 
of those buying  See Cohen (2005) 292-293 and esp. n.17; Moreno (2007) 334 for the Athenian evidence; 
at Athens, however, some of the duties normally exercised by agoranomoi were discharged by other 
specialized magistrates such as metronomoi (in charge of weights and measures) and sitophylakes (in 
charge of supervising the grain market) (see, e.g., Moreno (ibid.)).  On the necessity for efficient markets of 
having legal mechanisms to establish and enforce property rights, see esp. North (1981) 42:  “[p]rice-
making markets require well-defined and enforced property rights.  It must be possible to measure the 
dimensions of a good or service; moreover, the consequent rights must be exclusive and there must be an 
enforcement mechanism to police the exchange of goods.”  Cf. McMillan (2002) ix, 11, 101-102 for the 
importance of the defining and protection (enforcement) of property rights for properly functioning 
markets.  Since “[m]easurement constitutes the formalized description of a good or service, and therefore 
without some form of measurement, property rights cannot be established nor exchange take place” (North 
[1981] 18-19), the presence of public weights and measures in classical Greek agorai played a key role in 
establishing property rights (cf. Morley [2007a] 60-61), as did the use of coinage issued and guaranteed by 
classical Greek states:  see McMillan (2002) 11; Morley (2007a) 61-64. 
 
62
 See ancient references in last note, and also Aristot., Pol. 1299b14-18:  keeping “εὐκοσµίας... ἐν ἀγορᾷ” 
a crucial duty of the agoranomos.  Cf. Migeotte (2002) 120. 
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also included the enforcement of the (promised) quality of goods and contracts, and the 
prevention of misrepresentation in the dealings taking place in agorai; thus, there were 
mechanisms in place in classical Greek agorai to prevent possible opportunism through 
the exploitation of asymmetry of information between buyer and seller.
63
  A set of 
strongly embedded ethical norms condemning cheating in the agora also constituted an 




 It might be argued here that conditions peculiar to the markets in which classical 
Greek sailors and soldiers took part could have rendered these markets less stable and 
more inefficient than regular polis markets.  The first part of this argument might go 
something along the lines of the following:  because classical Greek military forces 
(naval and amphibious forces especially) operating in foreign territory were dealing with 
traders with whom they had not had repeated dealings (whether in agorai provided by 
poleis or in the agorai in their camps/bases) or prior personal contacts, and in areas with 
which they were unfamiliar—and in which, therefore, they did not have as much 
information on local conditions as the traders they were transacting with—they may have 
been particularly vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by traders.  But several factors will 
have reduced the risk of opportunism (and exploitation of sailors and soldiers) in the 
markets organized for classical Greek military forces in foreign territory.  Firstly, the 
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 See Bresson (2008b) 34-39 on the threat posed by asymmetry of information to the efficient working of 
agorai and the steps taken by poleis to reduce this threat.  Cf. McMillan (2002) ix-x. 
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level of overcharging will have been limited by military forces’ potential resort to violent 
appropriation of offending traders’ goods:  fear of disorder will have motivated the 
authorities of friendly poleis to monitor trade especially closely.
65
  Secondly, to anticipate 
briefly the next three sections of the chapter, there were usually many traders selling and 
purchasing from classical Greek military forces in markets: no one trader ever had 
enough market power to force up prices; rather, competition between the many traders 
exchanging with sailors and soldiers will have limited opportunistic behavior.
66
  Thirdly, 
with respect to grain, the general sense throughout the Greek world of the ‘right’ price of 
barley-meal and wheat in the months after harvest will have constrained traders’ ability to 
overcharge for this good.
67
  Fourthly, the traveling markets accompanying classical 
Greek armies will have been made up mostly of traders from those armies’ home poleis:  
in this case, soldiers may have had previous repeated exchanges and personal contacts 
with (at least) some of the traders accompanying them, thus limiting the chances of sharp 
practice by those traders.
68
  In addition, the fact that the traders in traveling markets 
accompanying armies in hostile territory had to remain with those armies for the duration 
of their campaigns because of security considerations may have led to a greater 
personalization of exchanges in those traveling markets over time (thus again 
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 I am grateful to Josh Ober for this and the next point. 
 
66
 See also North (1981) 36, 204. 
 
67
 See Reger (2007) 469 (discussing Hellenistic Greece and western Asia Minor but the point should be 
valid for the classical Greek world, too). 
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constraining opportunism in them).
69
  Fifthly, the fear of reputational sanctions will also 
have constrained traders’ opportunistic behavior,
70
 especially for those traders 
accompanying armies from the poleis in which they lived, but also for those traders who 
dealt with classical Greek amphibious and naval forces consisting of men from all over 
the Greek world, who could spread news of traders’ cheating across the eastern (and 
western) Mediterranean.  Finally, as discussed above, the normal legal and administrative 
mechanisms of the agora would also have worked to limit opportunities for cheating in 
market transactions between members of classical Greek military forces and the sutlers 
and merchants following or sailing to them. 
 It might also be argued—citing, e.g., Xen., Anab. 5.7.21-29 as evidence—that 
traders or poleis might be discouraged from trading with classical Greek sailors and 
soldiers because of fear of the violent expropriation of their goods by those sailors and 
soldiers.
71
  But, again, one of the main tasks of the market magistrates present in the 
agorai in which classical Greek military forces bought their food was to maintain law and 
order:  these magistrates would have restricted any attempts to rob or endanger traders.
72
  
                                                 
69
 The fact that traders knew that they would have to continue transacting with the armed men they were 
dealing with would also have deterred them from overcharging (for fear of being discovered and having 
their goods violently expropriated).  For traders accompanying amphibious forces (i.e., not just sailing to 
and from their camps/bases), see again Xen., Hell. 1.6.37; cf. Xen., Hell. 6.2.23. 
 
70
 See McMillan (2002) 56-58 for the idea. 
 
71
 See McMillan (2002) 90:  “[a]ssurance against expropriation is needed if markets are to operate 
successfully.  People will invest if they have some assurance that they will reap the returns on their 
investment.”  Cf. Morley (2007a) 56-58 on the importance of creating a risk-free, welcoming environment 
in order to attract traders.  On poleis ceasing to trade with a military force because of the threat of disorder 
(and possible violent expropriation), see Xen., Anab. 6.2.8.  Cf. France (2006) 83, 85 for forces of the First 
Crusade receiving markets from cities only grudgingly or not at all because of their violent behavior. 
 
72
 Note that, in the case of the agoranomoi riot at Cotyora, the soldiers in the disturbance knew that they 
would face no polis sanctions nor any sanctions from the leadership of the Cyreans:  it was only after (and 
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Secondly, classical Greek military leaders were also well aware of this potential 
problem,
73
 and had great incentives to prevent disorder and violent treatment in the 
agorai their forces used (violence in these agorai could lead to shortages of provisions 
and low prices for plunder through discouraging the presence of traders); accordingly, 
they put in place measures to ensure that traders would not be mistreated in the agorai 
they controlled (see again Xen., Cyr. 4.5.42).  
 The legal and institutional structures of the markets provided by poleis to passing 
armies and navies and the markets located in the camps and bases of Greek military 
forces therefore did not prevent those markets from functioning efficiently to supply the 
provisioning needs of those forces.  In the following three sections of this chapter, I will 
investigate if the conditions of production and distribution, and the social structures and 
political institutions, of the classical Greek world also enabled Greek armies, navies, and 
amphibious forces to meet their food supply requirements on campaign. 
 
iii. The behavior of markets provided by poleis to classical Greek military forces 
 The demand of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces (on the 
move to war zones) for grain (and other foods) in the markets provided by the poleis on 
their marches or voyages to campaign theaters was not normally great.  Firstly, sailors 
and soldiers needed to purchase provisions to subsist during their halts at friendly (or 
neutral) poleis.  The duration of these halts is not (usually) indicated by ancient authors, 
                                                                                                                                                 
as a result of) this riot that the mercenaries established a court to limit lawlessness within the army (see 
p.464 n.59 above). 
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although Xenophon’s Anabasis again proves an exception:  there is a pattern throughout 
the Cyreans’ march from Sardis to Cunaxa of a series of multi-day marches followed by a 
three-day halt;
74
 in fact, this pattern recurs after Cunaxa and throughout the march to 
Trapezus, too.
75
  But the distance, and the number of days’ march, between halts on the 
Cyreans’ march to Cunaxa was much greater than for marches by armies operating in the 
classical Greek world of micro-states closely packed together; the normal five to eight 
kilometers’ distance between inland (and coastal) poleis could have been easily covered 
by Greek armies in a days’ march.
76
  Amphibious and naval forces would normally have 
taken no more than one or two days to sail between the island and coastal poleis on the 
way to their theaters of operations.
77
  One should therefore be thinking of a duration of no 
more than one or two days for the halts of classical Greek military forces at the poleis 
they passed by on their way to campaign theaters.
78
  Secondly, sailors and soldiers 
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 Tuplin (1999) 346, Lee (2007) 174, 219.  See also Lee (2007) 219:  “Xenophon gives reasons for all the 
longer halts and most of the three-day pauses:  waits for new contingents or emissaries to arrive, the 
celebration of the Lycaean festival at Peltae, unrest among the troops at Tarsus, confusion caused by the 
desertion of Xenias and Pasion at Myriandrus.” 
 
75
 Lee (2007) 219.  See p.481 below for discussion of the duration of the mercenaries’ stays at poleis at 
Trapezus and the other poleis they halted at before being taken into service by Thibron. 
 
76
 For classical Greek micro-states and the short distances between them, see IACP 71-72, and esp. Bintliff 
(2008) 19:  “60 per cent of all Greek poleis [had] a territory of 5-6km radius, and 80 per cent [were] within 
an 8km radius.”    See Krentz (2007) 161 for the marching rates of Greek armies; cf. Xen., Hell. 5.4.49:  
Agesilaus in 377 completing what would be a normal two days’ march for an army in one day when he 
marched from Plataea past Erythrae and Scolus into Theban territory, a distance of ten to fifteen kilometers. 
 
77
 The uninhabited eastern coast of the Peloponnese and western coasts of the Italian peninsula were 
exceptions:  see chapter 1 section ii; chapter 2 section iic; chapter 2 section iii. 
 
78
 Note that Dionysius’ ruse at Rhegium (or Himera) (see the discussion at chapter 3 section iiib, and p.482 
n.111 below) exploited the fact that poleis could typically expect military forces to halt in their territories 




needed to purchase provisions for their onward marches or voyages.  Although, as just 
discussed, the opportunity to purchase at other friendly poleis (or to forage in enemy 
territory, or to purchase from accompanying traders on overseas campaigns) would 
normally be available within a day or two of leaving a friendly city, three days’ 
provisions seems to have been the usual amount purchased by the members of classical 
Greek military forces in the agorai of friendly cities before they departed for the next part 
of their march or voyage.
79
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 See again the references at chapter 3 section ii.   See also again Xen., Anab. 6.2.4:  Lycon was astonished 
at Heracleia that “... τῶν στρατηγῶν ὅτι οὐ πειρῶνται ἡµῖν ἐκπορίζειν σιτηρέσιον· τὰ µὲν γὰρ ξένια οὐ µὴ 
γένηται τῇ στρατιᾷ τριῶν ἡµερῶν σιτία· ὁπόθεν δ’ ἐπισιτισάµενοι πορευσόµεθα οὐκ ἔστιν...” (“the generals 
do not endeavor to supply us with money to buy provisions; for our gifts of hospitality will not make three 
days’ rations for the army; and there is no place from which we can procure provisions before beginning 
our journey.”)  The two modern scholars who have commented at length on this passage have found 
Lycon’s arguments either puzzling or dishonest.  Anderson ([1970] 51 (cf. id. [1974] 132) writes on 
Lycon’s proposal:  “[o]ne malcontent stated emphatically that this would not feed the army for three days, 
but as they were now reduced to about 8500 combatants, besides women and children, the barley (144,-000 
choinikes) ought to have lasted them for more than a week even on the generous scale of two choinikes a 
day.  Presumably therefore the shortage of meat was the cause of complaint; but at Sinope the 
“entertainment” had included no meat, only three thousand medimni of barley and fifteen hundred jars of 
wine.”  Lendle ([1995] 373 ad Anab. 6.2.4/5) accuses Lycon of producing specious arguments to press the 
case for extorting some money from the Heracleots:  “...stellte das Gastgeschenk der Herakleoten die 
Ernährung für 1-2 Wochen sicher:  Lykon betreibt hier mit seinem Redebeitrag regelrechte Panikmache, 
um zusätzlich zu den Naturalien noch Bargeld zu erpressen.”  Both Anderson’s and Lendle’s treatments of 
this passage are based on the thinking that Lycon was proposing a source of provisions for the length of the 
men’s stay at Heraclea (thus the negative judgment of Lycon’s plan based on the rationale that 3,000 
medimnoi would have lasted the men more than three days (and especially in the case of Lendle, since he 
takes one choinix of alphita to be the standard daily ration for soldiers [1995] 366).  Lycon was proposing, 
however, that the men obtain money in order to be able to provision themselves for the upcoming journey 
from Heraclea, as examination of two parts of his proposal indicates.  Firstly, “τριῶν ἡµερῶν σιτία” was the 
usual standing order for an army about to embark on a march (see Nall [1922] 45, and the references again 
at chapter 3 section ii).  Secondly, as the clause “δ’ ἐπισιτισάµενοι πορευσόµεθα οὐκ ἔστιν...” makes clear, 
Lycon was thinking of provisions for an impending march, and nothing else.  The use of “ἐπισιτισάµενοι” 
shows definitively that this is the case.  At Xen., Anab. 7.1.7, when Anaxibius would not give the soldiers 
the µισθός he had promised them, the soldiers were unhappy since they had no money with which to 
procure provisions for the journey home (“ὅτι οὐκ εἶχον ἀργύριον ἐπισιτίζεσθαι εἰς τὴν πορείαν”); and when 
Cleander, the Spartan harmost at Byzantium, told Xenophon he would be held responsible for the soldiers’ 
refusal to leave the city, Xenophon replied that he was not responsible for that, and the soldiers were 
refusing to leave since lacked a means of supplying themselves (“ἐπισιτισµοῦ δεόµενοι”) for the journey 
(Xen., Anab. 7.1.9).  When the army later fell out with Seuthes over his failure to pay them what he owed, 
the Greeks took up quarters in villages “ὅθεν ἔµελλον πλεῖστα ἐπισιτισάµενοι ἐπὶ θάλατταν ἥξειν” (“from 
which they could secure provisions in greatest abundance before their journey to the coast”) (Xen., Anab. 
7.7.1).  In each of these cases, we see episitismos used to describe something more than just the furnishing 
or collection of provisions, but rather the procurement of provisions with the particular purpose of 
supplying oneself for a journey or a military campaign.  Lycon, then, was addressing the army after it had 
spent three or four days at Heraclea (Chirisophus had been elected sole leader of the army at Sinope (Xen., 
  
474 
 The amounts of grain passing classical Greek military forces had to acquire in the 
agorai of friendly poleis to meet their daily energy requirements were therefore not 
enormous.  Some calculations will indicate the scale one should be thinking on here.  The 
thirty to fifty thousand men on the Sicilian expedition will have needed to purchase 
somewhere between 6,000 and 11,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or between 100,000 and 
170,000kg. of wheat equivalent of grain) during their halts at poleis which received 
them.
80
  But the eight thousand men who began the siege of Mytilene in 428 will only 
have required somewhere in the range of 1,500 and 2,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or 
between 25,000 and 30,000kg. of w.e. of grain) from the agorai of the friendly/subject 
states they halted at on their voyage across the Aegean.
81
  The Athenian periploi sent 
around the Peloponnese in the fifth century will have bought somewhere between 800 
and 5,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or between 10,000 and 80,000kg. of w.e. of grain) in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Anab. 6.1.32); on the next day the army sailed to Heraclea, and took two days to make it there (Xen., Anab. 
6.2.1); Chirisophus’ supreme leadership was ended on the sixth or seventh day after it had begun (Xen., 
Anab. 6.2.12), the same day, it seems, as Lycon’s proposal (though certainty on this last point is 
impossible)).  Lycon’s proposals, therefore, were based on the premise that 3,000 medimnoi would be 
insufficient to feed the army (8,500 men, with some women and children, but very few slaves (after the sale 
of captives at Cerasus (Xen., Anab. 5.3.4), the men had marched through mostly friendly territory to 
Cotyora, and there had difficulty in pillaging the Paphlagonians; from Cotyora they had gotten to Sinope 
and Heraclea by ship)) for six to seven days (the three or four days they had already spent at Heraclea, and 
the three on the upcoming journey).  This is plausible (seven days of 8,500 men eating two choinikes of 
alphita a day adds up to 119,000 choinikes) but it should be noted that there was no dissension at Sinope, 
where the men also received xenia including 3,000 medimnoi of alphita (6.1.15), and where they stayed for 
five days (6.1.17) before embarking on the three day journey to Heraclea.  (But perhaps they had sufficient 
money at Sinope to supplement the xenia?) 
 
80
 30,000-50,000 men:  see appendix 2.  30,000 x 2 choinikes of barley-meal (see appendix 3, sections i, ii) 
x 5 days (2 halt, 3 for onward voyage) = 6,250 medimnoi of barley-meal.  50,000 x 2 choinikes of barley-
meal x 5 days = 10,416.67 medimnoi of barley-meal.  One medimnos of barley-meal = 16.482kg. of wheat 
equivalent:  see again appendix 3 section iii.  Note, however, that only 12,000 men (=the crews of 60 
triremes) would have been purchasing in the first agora provided to the expedition (by the Naxians (Thucy. 
6.50.3, with 6.50.2)). 
 
81
 40 triremes x 200 men (see appendix 2) = 8,000 men. 8,000 x 2 choinikes of barley-meal x 5 days = 




the polis markets they bought in.
82
  Finally, while Agesilaos’ land force in Asia Minor in 
396, consisting of somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 men,
83
 will have acquired by 
purchase somewhere in the range of 2,000 to 3,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or between 
30,000 and 50,000kg. of w.e. of grain) from the cities they halted at during the march, 
Aristeus’ and Brasidas’ forces on their overland marches from the Peloponnese to Thrace 
in 432 and 425, respectively, will have needed to buy less than 800 medimnoi of barley-
meal (or somewhere over 10,000kg. of w.e. of grain) in the markets of friendly poleis on 
their journeys to the north.
84
  These figures can only be indicative, in the lack of complete 
certainty regarding some of the variables in the calculations, but they do serve to 
illustrate the orders of magnitude one should have in mind.  The amounts of grain bought 
                                                 
82
 The smallest Athenian periplous of the fifth century (in 413) consisted of twenty triremes (see Thucy. 
7.26.1 and chapter 2 section iii).  20 triremes x 200 men = 4,000 men:  8,000 x 2 choinikes of barley-meal x 
5 days = 833.33 medimnoi of barley-meal (=13,735kg. of w.e. of grain).  The largest Athenian periplous of 
the fifth century (in 431) consisted of 22,400 men (see Thucy. 2.17.4, 2.23.2, 2.25.1 with chapter 2 sections 
iii, v):  22,400 x 2 choinikes of barley-meal x 5 days = 4,666.67 medimnoi of barley-meal (=76,916kg. of 
w.e. of grain). 
 
83
 Agesilaos left for Asia Minor with 30 Spartiates, 2,000 neodamodeis, and 6,000 allied soldiers (Xen., 
Hell. 3.4.2-3).  The neodamodeis will not have been accompanied by slave attendants; it is unclear how 
many of the allied soldiers were hoplites (accompanied by slave attendants).  Agesilaos also had 
contingents from allied poleis in Asia Minor serving under him (Xen., Hell. 3.4.11, 3.4.12) too, but 
Xenophon does not specify how many men these contingents comprised.  Diodorus has Agesilaos enlisting 
4,000 troops at Ephesus to make a total of 10,000 infantry and 400 cavalry (14.79.2); the figures of 
Xenophon, who accompanied Agesilaos on this campaign, should be preferred.  In the light of the 
vagueness of Xenophon’s figures, however, I will adopt an estimate of 10,000 to 15,000 men.  Thus, 
10,000 x 2 choinikes of barley-meal x 5 days = 2,083.33 medimnoi of barley-meal (=34,337.5kg. of w.e. of 
grain); 15,000 x 2 choinikes of barley-meal x 5 days = 3,125 medimnoi of barley-meal (=51,506.25kg. of 
w.e. of grain). 
 
84
 Aristeus’ force consisted of 1,600 hoplites (an unknown number of whom were mercenaries) and 400 
light troops (Thucy. 1.60.1):  although it is doubtful that each of the mercenary hoplites was accompanied 
by a slave attendant, I will proceed on the basis that they were (the light troops will not have been 
accompanied by slave attendants) (see appendix 2 for both of these points).  Thus, 4,000 x 2 choinikes of 
barley-meal x 5 days = 750 medimnoi of barley-meal (=12,631.5kg. of w.e. of grain).  Brasidas’ force in 
425 consisted of 1,700 hoplites (Thucy. 4.78.1):  3,400 men (assuming each hoplite to have followed by a 
slave attendant) x 2 choinikes of barley-meal x 5 days = 708.33 medimnoi of barley-meal (=11,674.75kg. of 




in agorai provided by friendly Greek poleis to passing military forces represent the yield 
of barley or wheat harvests of tens or (low) hundreds of hectares,
85
 or the cargoes of one 
to four or five trading ships.
86
 
 In addition, classical Greek armies “did not commonly pass back and forth across 
the same areas often,”
87
 nor did classical Greek navies and amphibious forces regularly 
sail back and forth through the same areas of the Aegean or the western Mediterranean.   
Classical Greek military forces were (almost) always invasion forces, too:  that is, it was 
rare for two Greek military forces to be operating against each other in areas outside their 
respective polis territories; thus, the inhabitants of poleis receiving a classical Greek 
military force, having provided an agora to that passing military force, did not normally 
have to be concerned by the prospect of having to provide an agora to another force 
within a short period of time thereafter (or of having their territory foraged or pillaged by 
enemy troops).
88
  The fighting of the Ionian War is an exception in both of these respects, 
however:  the demand for markets by the two warring sides sailing the seas off Asia 
Minor (and Thrace) and operating hundreds of kilometers from their home states may 
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 See Cahill (2002) 331 n.20 for a summary of the debate on the yields of barley and wheat per hectare in 
classical Greece:  the figures are essentially unrecoverable but modern estimates range between 400kg. and 
900kg. per hectare (wheat yields being at the lower end of this range, barley yields at the higher end). 
 
86
 See section v below on (trading) ship sizes. 
 
87
 Tuplin (1997) 373.  The presence of regular marching routes in later pre-industrial European wars “could 
impose a serious burden on areas neighbouring” them (see Erdkamp [1998] 24); this was never an issue in 
the classical Greek world.  Cf. France (2006) 81, Pryor (2006b) 287 for Crusading forces experiencing 
supply problems when marching on routes along which other Crusading forces had passed and had received 








have represented a considerable burden on the resources of poleis on the Ionian and 
Hellespontine (and Thracian) seaboards.
89
  Usually, however, the demand of passing 
Greek land, naval, and amphibious forces for grain and other foods in the agorai 
provided to them was not only not very onerous, but also (very) infrequent. 
 The capacity to supply markets to satisfy the provisioning requirements of passing 
military forces will obviously have varied from polis to polis.  Some general remarks can 
be made here, however.  Firstly, grain markets in inland areas in the classical Greek 
world were not closely integrated across space.
90
  “As far the distribution of grain was 
concerned, inland regions in antiquity were truly isolated.”
91
  This was primarily because 
of the high costs of the overland transport of grain common to all pre-industrial 
societies,
92
 but it was also because of the political fragmentation and intense political 
particularism in the classical Greek world, which presented institutional obstacles to 
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 These problems would also have been present (on a much smaller scale) in the amphibious and naval 
fighting of the Corinthian and Social Wars in the fourth century, too. 
 
90
 Cf. Erdkamp (2005) 175-205. 
 
91
 See Erdkamp (2005) 199 citing Xen., Hell. 4.7.1. 
 
92
 See again Pleket (2008) 182 quoted at p.253 above.  See here also Langton (1998) 387:  “... but it is 
incontrovertible that bulky commodities could not be hauled long distances overland before railways 
applied mineral energy to the task.  In early modern times, agricultural surpluses were of very little value 
except near to navigable water, and large towns could only exist on waterways because of the inordinate 
difficulty and cost of getting energy, in the forms of food and fuel, to them.” See, too, Temin (2001) 179-
180:  “[s]urviving prices also tend to be for places that were accessible by water.  Ships could carry bulk 
goods across the Mediterranean and up rivers, but it was hard and expensive to carry them over land.  
Roman roads were not primarily for the transport of goods, and they did not go everywhere.  Wagons off 
the roads moved with far greater effort and diminished speed.  The result is that inland locations were less 
firmly connected to the general market.  To a first approximation, the Roman market for bulk commodities 





regional market integration and urban specialization among poleis.
93
  The astu of each 
classical Greek micro-state was the center of consumption and (administrative control of) 
distribution of grain and other goods produced in its territory; in addition, each polis 
strictly controlled the export of grain from its territory (export was only possible once a 
license had been granted by the state authorities).
94
  Each (especially inland) polis 
attempted to act “as a local monopolist” of grain as an ethic of self-sufficiency pervaded 
polis decision-making regarding the proper distribution of this product.
95
  In addition, the 
frequent (and long-lasting) bad feelings between neighboring poleis also hindered 
regional trade in grain and other goods.
96
  This political fragmentation and particularism 
was also characteristic of maritime poleis, too.  But the (relatively) cheap costs of sea 
transport permitted the commercialization and export of grain surpluses from maritime 
cities once polis authorities had ascertained that their city had enough grain for its 
needs.
97
  This could happen often enough so that regional markets in seaborne grain in 
the classical Aegean (at least) could become (weakly) integrated over time.
98
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 I owe this idea to Epstein (2001) 18 (describing a similar phenomenon in early modern Europe).  Cf. 
Bintliff (2002) for the arguments in the rest of this paragraph. 
 
94
 See Gauthier (1979); Bresson (2008b) 72-83, 189-192. 
 
95
 See again Epstein (2001) 18.  For poleis aiming for self-sufficiency in grain, see, e.g., Osborne (1987) 
103-104.  Note, however, that the classical Greek understanding of autarkeia (“having enough for one’s 
own needs” (Harris [2001a] 5)) did not necessarily mean that a polis attempted to rely solely on its own 
resources:  see Bresson (2000) 109-130 with Harris (2001a) 5, and main text just below. 
 
96
 Cf. Bintliff (2002) 243. 
 
97
 Cf. Epstein (1992) 282 on sea transport permitting domestic trade in grain in medieval Sicily.  See also 
Descat (1993) 151:  “l’interdiction générale portant sur un produit est une forme de contrôle du commerce 
compatible avec des authorisations d’exporter accordées à des individus...”  See also in this regard Aristot., 
Rhet. 1.4.11, 1360a12-17:  the men wishing to be active in political affairs should know regarding the food 
supply of his polis what his polis produces and what it lacks, and with whom it is necessary to make 
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 All of this is to say that the inhabitants of classical Greek poleis, and especially 
inland poleis,
99
 would normally have had more than sufficient surpluses of grain to sell in 
agorai to meet the demand of passing military forces.
100
  But the distribution and 
production of grain in inland poleis may normally have been only partially 
commercialized since producers did not have usually have access to outside markets, and 
therefore had limited opportunity or incentive to produce grain and other goods for sale; 
this, rather than the need for polis authorities to acquire more grain, probably explains 
why the leaders of classical Greek generals alerted inland poleis along their lines of 
                                                                                                                                                 
importation and exportation agreements (“ἔτι δὲ περὶ τροφῆς, πόση δαπάνη ἱκανὴ τῇ πόλει, καὶ ποία, ἡ 
αὐτοῦ τε γιγνοµένη καὶ εἰςαγώγιµος, καὶ τίνων τ’ ἐξαγωγῆς δέονται καὶ τίνων εἰσαγωγῆς, ἵνα πρὸς 
τούτους καὶ συνθῆκαι καὶ συµβολαὶ γίνωνται”).  For full discussion of the implications of this passage, see 
Bresson (2000) 119-130. 
 
98
 See, e.g., Rhodes and Osborne no.18.17-20 demonstrating that neighboring poleis could function as 
regular sources of imports for coastal poleis in the Aegean:  in 387/6, the Athenians allow the 
Clazomenians to visit the ports of the poleis from which they import their grain; “τῶµ πό]- / [λεω]ν ὅθεν 
σιταγωγgνται Κλαζοµέ[νιοι, Φωκάας καὶ Χί]- / [ο(?) καὶ Σ]µύρνης, εἶναι ἔνσπονδον αὐ[τοῖς (?) ἐς τὸς 
λιµένα]- / [ς ἐσπλk]ν.”  See Rhodes and Osborne, p.79 ad loc.:  “whether Clazomenae’s sources of corn are 
Phocaea, Chios, and Smyrna (Wilhelm) or Chios, Miletus and Smyrna (Ziebarth), it is striking that they are 
nearby cities, not the distant sources of which Athens has accustomed us to think.”  Cf. Reger (2007) 469-
470 on grain markets in the Hellenistic Aegean.  But regional grain markets in the classical Greek world 
(even among island or coastal poleis) were never so integrated or robust as to allow “the rise and 
consolidation of more complex and integrated urban hierarchies and networks which reflected the growth 
of market integration and functional specialization” (Epstein [2001] 18).  Cf. Bintliff (2002) 224, 234-235. 
 
99
 But see, importantly, Xen., Anab. 6.6.3, describing conditions during the later part of the Cyreans’ halt at 
Calpe Harbor:  “ἤδη δὲ ἦν πολλὴ πάντων ἀφθονία· καὶ γὰρ ἀγοραὶ πάντοθεν ἀφικνοῦντο ἐκ τῶν 
Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων...” (“And by this time there was a great abundance of everything, for market products 
came in from the Greek cities on all sides...”)  The fact that traders came from the Greek cities on all sides, 
(i.e. including those poleis that had already provided xenia and agorai to the mercenaries), and provided an 
abundance of products for sale, acts a forceful indicator of the ability of the traders of these poleis to 
mobilize large surpluses of grain and other goods for trade. 
 
100
 See again Tuplin (1991) 373:  “[o]ur historical sources are, for the most part, sovereignly disdainful 
about such mundane matters as how easy it was to keep bodies of soldiers sufficiently well fed and watered 
for them to be effective (and how often their effectiveness was hampered by failings in this regard).  To 
some extent this must be because the ordinary processes of the agricultural economy produced substantial 
stored surpluses of food in many regions and that armies did not commonly pass back and forth across the 
same areas often enough to exhaust the possibility of such surpluses for pillage or purchase – so major 




march in advance of their coming.
101
  The certainty of the arrival of an approaching army 
and thus a greatly increased (temporary) demand for grain and other goods at a polis will 
have provided a great incentive for producers to make available their surpluses for sale; it 
will also have encouraged itinerant traders from the region to come to the polis to sell 
other food products to soldiers.
102
  The practice of alerting poleis expected to provide 
markets by amphibious and naval forces is not specifically attested, but it may have 
occurred, too;
103
 in any case, news of the preparation and coming of large fleets of 
triremes will normally have reached cities before those triremes.
104
 
These considerations explain why it could be assumed by all actors in wars in the 
classical Greek world that poleis could receive passing armies, navies, and amphibious 
forces, even ones as large as the Sicilian expedition.
105
  They also explain why the 
problems of supply we do sometimes find mentioned in our ancient literary sources in 
                                                 
101
 See again Xen., Hell. 3.4.11; Xen., Hell. 5.4.48.  See also Polyb. 28.12.4:  the Achaean League in 170 
sending envoys to the poleis on the way to Thessaly (where it planned to fight against Perseus) “ἵνα τὸ 
στράτευµα πὰν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀγορὰς ἔχῃ.”  Cf. Anderson (1970) 53:  “[e]ven willing allies... could not 
be expected to provide an adequate and convenient market for a large body of men without notice in 




 Cf. de Ligt and de Neeve (1988) 399 on temporary large aggregations of people at festivals encouraging 
the presence of itinerant traders at those festivals. 
 
103
 The generals of the Sicilian expedition sent three triremes ahead of the main body of the expedition to 
find out which of the cities along the coasts of Italy and Sicily would receive them (Thucy. 6.42.3), but this 




 See chapter 2 section iic.  See also ps.-Aristot., Oec. 2.2.7, 1347a32-1347b2:  the authorities at 
Lampsacus apparently hearing by chance about the fleet of triremes sailing to their polis rather than having 
been instructed of their coming. 
 
105
 See chapter 1 section iiia for the Sicilian expedition; chapter 1 section i, iiia for poleis in the Aegean; 




connection with markets provided by poleis were all products of extraordinary 
circumstances.  Xenophon mentions scarcity of supply in markets supplied by the poleis 
of Trapezus and Perinthus to the Cyreans,
106
 but this scarcity can be explained in both 
cases by the fact that the mercenaries were staying outside these cities in winter,
107
 
months after the old harvest and months before the new harvest, when supplies of grain 
for sale in markets would have been at their lowest level (throughout the Greek world);
108
 
and by the fact that the difficulties the markets at Trapezus and Perinthus had in 
supplying the mercenaries in winter would have been exacerbated by the extraordinary 
length of their stays near these cities.
109
  The Cyreans, because of their stateless and 
leaderless status, were in an extraordinary position both at Trapezus and Perinthus; rather 
than halting briefly at these poleis on their way to a campaign theater, they had to stay for 
extended periods of time at both cities as they figured out (literally and figuratively) 
where they would go next.  The same problems (protracted winter stays at poleis) 
probably explain Xenophon’s comment that Derkylidas, having taken nine cities in eight 
days in Asia Minor in 398, set out about planning how he might avoid being a burden to 
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 See Anab. 5.1.6, 7.6.24 with chapter 3 section iiia. 
 
107
 The Cyreans were staying at Trapezus in January and February of 400:  Lee (2007) 19, 29-30 and n.72, 
and Table 1.  Their halt at Perinthus took place in the early winter of 400/399:  see Xen., Anab. 7.6.24 with 
Lee (2007) 41, Table 1. 
 
108
 See the discussion at Erdkamp (2005) 147-155; cf. Pleket (2008) 182.  For attempts by Greek poleis to 
provide grain for sale in winter months to smooth the intra-annual price volatility caused by decreasing 
amounts of grain in the market, together with the inelastic nature of demand (for grain), see Gauthier 
(1987), Stroud (1998). 
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 Xenophon mentions that supplies were scanty in the agora provided by the Trapezuntians in an 
assembly held after the mercenaries had already spent thirty days encamped in some Colchian villages near 




his allies, as Thibron had been the previous winter, by wintering in a friendly country;
110
 
the pressures exerted by the continued and prolonged demand of Thibron’s forces for 
grain when the market supply in the poleis they stayed in was at its lowest annual level 
would have placed a great burden on the resources of these poleis.
111
  Again, though, 
since passing armies, navies, and amphibious forces usually requested agorai from poleis 
in the summer (after the grain harvest) and for (very) short periods of time, they could 
normally expect that poleis would (always) be in a position to offer them sufficient 
market supply of grain and other goods for their brief halts and onward marches and 
voyages. 
 
iv. The behavior of markets provisioned by traders accompanying classical Greek 
land campaigns 
 In chapter 3, I noted that private traders played only a supplementary role in the 
provisioning of classical Greek land campaigns because of the high costs of transporting 
grain overland.  But this is not the full story, since it does not take into consideration the 
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 Hell. 3.2.1:  Derkylidas “ἐβουλεύετο ὅπως ἂν µὴ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ χειµάζων βαρὺς εἴη τοῖς συµµάχοις...”  
Derkylidas avoided being a burden on friendly cities by making a truce with Pharnabazus that allowed him 




 Cf. here Diod. 14.108.1-2 (with Frontinus, Strat. 3.4.3; Polyaenus, Strateg. 5.2.10; and chapter 3 section 
iiib):  Dionysius asking Rhegium (or Himera) in 391 to provide him with an agora, with the intention that 
if the Rhegians (or Himerans) did not provide one, he would have a pretext to attack their city; and that, if 
Rhegium (or Himera) did provide an agora, he could easily reduce the city by starvation after their supplies 
had been exhausted in provisioning his force (Diod. 14.108.1:  “... δόντων δ’ ἐνόµιζεν ἐξαναλώσειν αὐτῶν 
τὸν σῖτον καὶ προσκαθίσας τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὴν σπάνιν ταχὺ κυριεύσειν αὐτῆς”).  In the event, the Rhegians 
(or Himerans) provided the market for several days but ceased doing so when they became suspicious of 
the fact that Dionysius’ army continued to remain outside their city for an extended period; Dionysius used 
the refusal to continue providing an agora as a pretext to lay siege to the city.  Again, the reasoning behind 
Dionysius’ ruse was that a city could normally expect to provide an agora to a passing military force for 
only a limited period (of a few days); it was only an extended stay by a military force that could to lead to 




question of demand:  that is, despite the expense of transporting grain overland, private 
traders would have done so if the demand of soldiers on land campaigns for grain was 
sufficiently inelastic to tolerate the increase in prices caused by its transport.
112
  Since, 
however, soldiers could normally acquire provisions while on campaign from markets 
provided by poleis in friendly territory, and from foraging in hostile territory, their 
demand for grain from the private traders accompanying them would have been very 
weak.  Even in cases of real scarcity of grain, traders’ windfall profits from selling grain 
would be limited by soldiers’ substitution of unusual foods for grain,
113
 soldiers’ 
expectations that they would/might be able to purchase grain at a (substantially) cheaper 
price in the near future at a friendly polis, and by the fact that trust between traders and 
soldiers would deteriorate in such situations (thus increasing the chances of soldiers’ 
violent expropriation of the property of traders who engaged in (high) price-taking).  
Traders accompanying classical Greek armies would have limited themselves, then, to 
carrying ‘topping up’ amounts of grain,
114
 or would have carried no grain at all. 
Private traders following Greek armies, however, may have been able to make a 
profit in some cases by carrying for sale low bulk, high value per unit of weight foods 
such as cheese or honey.
115
  Especially for the better paid land forces of the fifth and 
early fourth centuries, and for any land forces throughout the classical period who had 
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 See Harris (1993) 27; Morley (2007a) 41; cf. Jongman (1988) 140-141. 
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 See chapter 4 section ii for discussion and illustration of this point. 
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 See Hale (1985) 160 for this phrase. 
 
115




gained substantial amounts of plunder, the (relatively) high amounts of money in those 
armies may have led to a greater demand for such foods, and for other goods with 
(relatively) high income elasticities of demand such as better-quality, more expensive 
wines and olive oils.
116





together with the fact that they could be bought more cheaply in friendly territory in 
polis-provided markets (because they were not bearing the same transport costs as the 
goods carried by traders following armies) and foraged in hostile territory (or substituted 
for out of locally gathered greens and herbs in friendly territory),
119
 meant they could not 
bear the costs of transport.  Higher-value foods were probably often available to armies, 
too, by purchase in the agorai provided by the cities along their lines of march or by 
foraging or plundering from enemy territory;
120
  these opportunities to acquire higher-
value goods elsewhere and more cheaply (or for free) would obviously have limited 
soldiers’ demand for these goods from the private traders who followed them. In 
addition, in armies in which soldiers were struggling to receive their pay (i.e., most fourth 
century armies) and/or had limited opportunities to raise money through plunder, the 
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 Cf. Morley (1996) 67.  See also section v. 
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 See Böckh (1886) 127-132; Markle (1985) 280-281 with Cook (1990) 85 n.60. 
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 Clark and Haswell (1970) 182-183:  “vegetables less valuable per unit of weight than grain.” 
 
119
 See Thucy. 3.111.1:  in the winter of 426/5, the Mantineans and soldiers from other Peloponnesian states 
deserted from their Ambraciot allies by leaving camp “ἐπὶ λαχανισµὸν καὶ φρυγάνων ξυλλογὴν 
ἐξελθόντες,” “under the pretense of gathering herbs and firewood.”  The fact that the Peloponnesian soldiers 




 See the soldiers of Mnasippus getting a taste for fine wine from the plundered wine-cellars of Corcyran 




greater price and income elasticities of demand of higher value foods and wines may 
have (greatly) restricted soldiers’ consumption of these foods and therefore their purchase 
from traders.
121
  Demand, then, for all foods carried by private traders accompanying 
classical Greek armies was frequently, if not mostly, (very) restricted.  
 Why, then, were traders a constant presence on classical Greek land campaigns, 
and sometimes in great numbers?
122
  The answer can be given in one word:  booty.  
Classical Greek armies normally sold their booty on the spot; as Pritchett points out, “this 
is not surprising, since... the progress of an army would be greatly impeded by the 
transportation of booty, particularly livestock.  Moreover, pay was often in arrears, and 
money was required to satisfy this need.”
123
  Thus, the λαφυροπῶλαι and other officials in 
Greek armies charged with the sale of plunder usually sold it in hostile (and often remote) 
territory; this meant that the private traders accompanying armies represented the only 
source of demand for these goods.  This, in turn, meant that the traders on classical Greek 
land campaigns were able to purchase plunder (very) cheaply in the field.
124
  Two 
examples illustrate the point:  firstly, on Agesilaos’ campaign in Phrygia in 396, the 
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 For the elasticity of demand for wine, note that Cyrus, in his instructions for the march to Thymbrara, 
believed that his army could eventually adapt to living without wine (Xen., Cyr. 6.2.26-29). 
 
122
 See, e.g., Diod. 14.79.2:  Agesilaos’ army setting out from Ephesus in the summer of 396 accompanying 
by an “ἀγοραῖος... ὄχλος” no less in number.  The description of the preliminaries to the battle of Leuctra at 
Xen., Hell. 6.4.9 also implies the presence of a large number of traders within the Boeotian army (see 
chapter 3 section iva for full discussion of this passage). 
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 (1991) 433. 
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plunder was so great that traders could buy it for “almost nothing,” “ἀντίπροικα”;125 
secondly, as a result of the Peloponnesians epiteichismos at Decelea in the latter years of 
the Peloponnesian War, the Thebans enjoyed great riches because “τά τε γὰρ ἀνδράποδα 
καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὸν πόλεµον ἁλισκόµενα µικροῦ τινος ἀργυρίου 
παρελάµβανον” (“because they took possession of the slaves and all the other plunder 
very cheaply”) (Hell. Oxy. 13.4).   
The opportunity to make large profits from the resale of this booty in nearby cities 
or their home cities provided a great incentive to traders to follow land campaigns.
126
  
Some idea of the profits that could be made by traders following campaigns can be 
provided by an examination of Agesilaos’ campaign in Asia Minor in 396-394.  As the 
result of one battle with Persian forces in the early spring of 395, in which he captured 
the enemy camp, Agesilaos raised more than seventy talents from the sale of plunder.
127
  
In total, he raised more than one thousand talents from the sale of plunder during his time 
in Asia Minor
128
 (this is the largest securely attested sum for proceeds from the sale of 
booty in the classical Greek world).
129
  Although some of this money was raised from 
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 See Xen., Ages. 1.18 (with chapter 2 section v for full context). 
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 As it did in later pre-industrial European land warfare:  see chapter 3 section iva for references. 
 
127
 See Xen., Hell. 3.4.24 for the figure.  See Xen., Ages. 1.28-33, Hell. 3.4.21-24 and Hell. Oxy. 11 for 
(different) accounts of this battle. 
 
128
 Recalled to Greece in 394 and having defeated an anti-Spartan coalition at Coronea, Agesilaos deposited 
the obligatory dekate to Apollo at Delphi, a tenth of the proceeds of the plunder he had sold during his 
campaigns in Asia (see Plut., Ages. 19.4).  Xenophon states that the dekate came to no less than one 
hundred talents (Hell. 4.3.21, Ages. 1.34); thus Agesilaos managed to amass at least one thousand talents 
from the proceeds of sales of booty in Asia Minor. 
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selling booty in cities in Asia Minor,
130
 the great bulk of it would have been raised by 
sales to traders at low prices:  that is, the total profit of traders following Agesilaos’ 
campaign could have extended into thousands of talents.  Agesilaos’ campaign was 
exceptional in being able to plunder wide areas of rich and previously unplundered 
territory, but large sums (just not as large) could also be raised from plunder in 
‘mainland’ Greece, too:  thus, Thucydides states that, in 414, the Argives invaded the 




There were, then, potentially large amounts of money for traders to be made from 
the purchase of plunder from classical Greek armies.  In the final analysis, it may have 
been this fact that provided the rationale for much of the food carried by sutlers to sell to 
soldiers on their marches to war zones.  Since traders on overland campaigns had to bring 
baggage-animals to carry back their purchased plunder from campaign theaters anyway, 
it made sense for them to attempt to make a profit, or at least cover their costs of 
transport,
132
 by using the transport capacity of these animals to carry food to sell to 
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 See Xen., Hell. 3.4.19, Ages. 1.29:  Agesilaos instructing the heralds at Ephesus in the winter of 396 to 
sell naked the captives seized by his army’s raiding parties from the territory surrounding the city.  More 
importantly, while Agesilaos was wintering at Lake Dascylitis in the winter of 395, he ordered his admiral 
Pancalus “ἐνθέµενον ὅσα τῶν [διηρπασµ]ένων ἦ<ν) πλείνος ἄξια διαγαγεῖν εἰς τ[.]ο [..... περ]ὶ Κύζιζον, 
ὅπως {αν} ἀπ’ αὐτῶν µισθὸς τῷ [σ]τq[ρατεύµατι] γένοιτο” (“to put on board all the more valuable part of the 
[plunder] and transport it to Cyzicus, that it might produce pay for the army”) (Hell. Oxy. 22.4). 
 
131
 6.95.2:  “λείαν τῶν Λακεδαιµονίων πολλὴν ἔλαβον, ἣ ἐπράθη ταλάντων οὐκ ἔλασσον πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι.”  
See Hornblower, CT iii.523 ad loc.:  “[i]t is most unusual for Th. to give this sort of financial detail about 








soldiers on the outward march to war zones.
133
  Those land campaigns that could be 
expected to acquire large amounts of booty might have been accompanied by 
exceptionally large amounts of traders (and food carried by traders) for two reasons, then:  
firstly, because as noted above, traders could expect soldiers to have more income than 
usual and thus demand for their goods to be higher than usual; but also, secondly, 
because more traders would follow along in the hope of making profits from plunder (and 




I end this section by briefly discussing the provisioning of sieges of inland poleis 
undertaken by classical Greek armies.  Sieges of inland poleis were very rare in the 
classical period;
135
 in addition, classical Greek states only attempted to blockade 
neighboring poleis (which were surrounded on all sides by states friendly to the besieging 
state).  Since, as has been discussed,
136
 classical Greek states did not have access to large 
stores of grain through requisitioning, taxation-in-kind, or private contractors, they relied 
on private trade to provision the continuous supply lines required to ensure the 
continuous security of supply necessary for forces blockading (both inland and maritime) 
poleis.  Private trade could be relied on to provision the few men who would be left 
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 I thank Peter Myler for making this point to me. 
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 Cf. Erdkamp (1998) 119-120 for wealthy Roman armies fighting in rich areas being accompanied by 
more sutlers and camp-followers than usual. 
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 See Krentz (2007) 180 for a list of land (circumvallation) sieges undertaken by classical Greek poleis; 
add also Mycenae (468) (see Diod. 11.65.2-5 with Krentz [2007] 176). 
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behind to man the circumvallation wall around a besieged inland city once the blockade 
had been completely established.
137
  Because the men manning the blockade would have 
quickly eaten out the area surrounding the besieged city,
138
 they would have soon needed 
new supplies of grain (and other foods).  In other words, private traders could transport 
grain overland to besiegers in the knowledge that those men could not acquire grain from 
any other source and therefore had a constant demand for grain.  For the same reason, 
agricultural producers from nearby poleis would have carried grain and other foods 
overland to inland sieges in the hope of making a profit—especially in the slack periods 
of the agricultural year, when the costs of their transport would have been externalized.
139
  
Such small trade would also have been encouraged by the complete tactical superiority 
enjoyed by the besiegers, rendering null the chance of attacks on traders or farmers 
carrying goods to the blockade.  But, because of the absence of the necessary 
infrastructure to transport large amounts of grain long distances overland in the classical 
Greek world,
140
 private trade was never capable of provisioning continuous overland 
supply lines to (large-scale) sieges of distant land poleis or those not surrounded on all 
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 See, e.g., Thucy. 2.78.2.  Cf. again chapter 2 section iic. 
 
138
 See again chapter 2 section iic. 
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 Cf. the Colchian villagers bringing down cattle and other goods to the Cyreans during their stay at 
Cerasus (Xen., Anab. 5.7.13).  For a similar phenomenon (peasants flocking to stationary armies 
establishing markets) in later pre-industrial European history, see Braudel (1981) 210-211 (the siege of 
Pavia in 1524-1525), Keegan (1993) 302 (Wellington’s army in the Iberian peninsula in 1807-1808). 
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sides by friendly states (to the besiegers);
141
 the contrast with the possibilities afforded by 
private trade to provision huge overseas forces engaged in blockades of distant coastal or 
island poleis is total.  
 
v. The behavior of markets supplied by traders in the operational bases of 
classical Greek naval and amphibious forces 
 In Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, Socrates tells Ischomachus that his father loved 
agriculture as much as 
οἱ ἔµποροι φιλόσιτοί εἰσι.  καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἔµποροι διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν τὸν σῖτον, 
ὅπου ἂν ἀκούσωσι πλεῖστον εἶναι, ἐκεῖσε πλέουσιν ἐπ’ αὐτὸν καὶ Αιγαῖον καὶ 
Εὔξεινον καὶ Σικελικὸν πόντον περῶντες: (28) ἔπειτα δὲ λαβόντες ὁπόσον 
δύνανται πλεῖστον ἄγουσιν αὐτὸν διὰ τῆς θαλάττης, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὸ πλοῖον 
ἐνθέµενοι ἐν ᾧπερ αὐτοὶ πλέουσι. καὶ ὅταν δεηθῶσιν ἀργυρίου, οὐκ εἰκῃ αὐτὸν 
ὅπου ἂν τύχωσιν ἀπέβαλον, ἀλλ’ ὅπου ἂν ἀκούσωσι τιµᾶσθαι τε µάλιστα τὸν 
σῖτον καὶ περὶ πλείστου αὐτὸν ποιῶνται οἱ ἄνθρωποι, τούτοις αὐτὸν ἄγοντες 
παραδιδόασι. 
 
merchants love grain.  So deep is their love of grain that on receiving reports that 
it is abundant anywhere, merchants will voyage in quest of it:  they will cross the 
Aegean, the Euxine, the Sicilian sea; (28) and when they have got as much as 
possible, they carry it over the sea, and they actually stow it in the very ship in 
which they sail themselves.  And when they want money, they don’t throw the 
grain anywhere at haphazard, but they carry it to the place where they hear that 





 The emporoi Socrates/Xenophon describes here would have been especially 
attracted to the markets located in the camps of classical Greek amphibious forces 
                                                 
141
 Classical Greek states would not have been able to effectively protect overland supply lines, in any case:  
see chapter 3 section ivb. 
 
142
 Cf. Plato, Laws 952D-953A:  traders mentioned as the first of four kinds of unavoidable foreign visitors 
to cities:  coming continually in summer (just like migratory birds) (952D), “οἱ πολλοὶ κατὰ θάλατταν 
ἀτεχνῶς οἷον πετόµενοι χρηµατισµοῦ χάριν ἐµπορευόµενοι ἔτους ὥρᾳ πέτονται πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις,” 





engaged in blockades of coastal and island poleis, and also to those in the operational 
bases of classical Greek navies engaged in protracted operations abroad.  This would 
have been so for a number of reasons.  Firstly, and most importantly, the (relatively) 
massive demand of amphibious forces (blockading cities) and stationary fleets provided a 
huge incentive to traders to sail with grain (and other goods) to them.  The size of the 
markets provided by the fleets fighting the Ionian War, and by the forces besieging (e.g.) 
Samos, Potidaea, or Mytilene, was larger than that provided by any urban population in 
the classical Greek world, with the exception of Athens and Syracuse—and the Athenian 
forces that attempted to reduce Syracuse, and those that did reduce Samos, may have 
been greater in number than even the populations of these two imperial poleis.
143
  In 
addition, the fact that amphibious forces and navies remaining immobile for operational 
reasons could not access grain or other foods from any source other than sea-borne 
supplies transported by traders (in contrast to the populations of the urban centers of 
poleis, many of whom would have been engaged in agriculture of some sort) magnified 
their demand for imported grain.
144
  Hence, the markets in the camps of stationary 
classical Greek amphibious forces and navies would have offered far more price stability 
to grain traders than the markets of normal poleis (or almost any other polis apart from 
Athens or Syracuse).
145
  Traders could sail to the bases of immobile amphibious forces 
                                                 
143
 See chapter 1 section v. 
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 See again chapter 2 section iic, iv:  classical Greek sailors and soldiers engaged in blockades would have 
quickly consumed all of the provisions in the area surrounding the besieged city; fleets in operational bases 
would have been surrounded by friendly territory and therefore had no opportunity to forage for provisions. 
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and navies with the certainty that the constant high demand for grain in the markets in 
these bases would ensure a constant price level for this good.
146
  In contrast, price levels 
for grain (and other goods) in the much smaller markets of maritime ‘Normalpoleis’ 
could collapse with the arrival of just one ship;
147
 traders sailing to the agorai of these 
‘Normalpoleis’ could never be sure that they would not be anticipated by competitors 
before they arrived with their grain.  This brings up a related point:  traders from all over 
the eastern Mediterranean would have known of the efforts of Athenian forces to reduce 
rebellious poleis by blockade in the fifth century,
148
 and of the locations of the bases of 
fleets operating in the seas off Asia Minor in the last years of the Peloponnesian War.  
The amount of time required to prepare these massive amphibious and naval undertakings 
would have given sufficient time for news of their preparation to spread throughout the 
Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean generally;
149
 and the fact that sailors and soldiers 
were recruited for these operations from all over the Greek world would have furthered 
the spread of news of their preparation.  In contrast, information on (sudden surges in) 
demand for grain in normal (i.e., small) maritime poleis (especially those in peripheral 
areas of the Greek world) may sometimes have been much slower in reaching grain 
traders, or may not have reached them at all.
150
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 Cf. Morley (2007a) 56. 
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 See again Erdkamp (2005) 190-191 (citing Reger [1993] 330f. on Hellenistic Delos). 
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 The same is valid for the Athenian siege of Syracuse and the western Mediterranean. 
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 See again chapter 2 section iic for the classic illustrative example of Thucy. 3.3.5. 
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 Cf. Pleket (2008) 183:  “‘[c]onnectivity’ was definitely promoted by mare nostrum; its potential, 
however, should not be overestimated.  Harvest shocks were unpredictable; good, fast, adequate 
  
493 
 The constant, massive demand of immobile amphibious and naval forces for 
grain, together with the fact that that traders throughout the Greek world would have 
known of the nature and scale of this demand, ensured, then, that traders of grain 
surpluses would have found the markets in the camps of these forces especially attractive 
destinations for their grain.  The fact that sailors and soldiers in these agorai would 
normally have had the purchasing power to make their demand for grain effective would 
also have drawn traders to the agorai of stationary amphibious and naval forces.
151
  The 
members of Athenian forces receiving a drachma per man per day (paid in full) during 
campaigns before 413
152
 would have had (much) greater daily incomes than (most of) the 
inhabitants of smaller island and coastal poleis in the Aegean.
153
  Even when pay rates for 
both the Athenian and Peloponnesian forces dropped to three obols in the early years of 
the Ionian War,
154
 or when, in the fourth century, τροφή was, increasingly, the only 
payment guaranteed to Greek sailors and soldiers (as opposed to µισθὸς ἐντελής),155 the 
total available income to spend on grain (and therefore the effective demand for it) in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
information on promising markets with high prices for grain was not easy to obtain; and competitors may 
well have forestalled a trader who had decided to try his luck in a city like Myra.”  See also esp. the lucid 
discussion at Erdkamp (2005) 185-196 (in particular, 190-191 for the point made in the main text on 
peripheral zones of the Greek world).  Cf. Morley (2007a) 32-33. 
 
151
 See Erdkamp (2005) 203, 325 for this point. 
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 See chapter 5 sections ii, iv; chapter 6 sections i-v, viii. 
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 Cf. Erdkamp (2005) 195. 
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 See chapter 5 section iii. 
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bases of amphibious and naval forces on protracted operations abroad would have been 
(much) greater than in normal poleis.   
In addition, especially for the very well-paid Athenian forces before 413, traders 
would also have been enticed to overseas amphibious and naval bases by the opportunity 
to sell goods with greater income elasticities of demand.  The fact that the one drachma 
per man per day dispensed to overseas Athenian forces before the outbreak of the Ionian 
War (as well as the lower rates of pay dispensed after this date) only had to provide for 
the subsistence requirements of the man receiving it (and not for a whole family) 
increased further the disposable income available to sailors and soldiers on operations 
abroad.  Thus, well-paid classical Greek sailors ashore in the fifth and fourth centuries 
could be characterized in elite representations of their behavior as spending like drunken 
sailors ashore, so to speak;
156
 even if these representations were claims made in highly 
tendentious speeches, they still had to proceed from some basis in reality in order to have 
any rhetorical effectiveness.
157
  Two anecdotes preserved from later sources confirm the 
point that the greater incomes of sailors and soldiers led to greater demand for goods and 
services other than grain and other essential provisions:
158
  thus, Polyaenus mentions in 
his collection of stratagems that  
Ἰφικράτης, εἰ µὲν µὴ ἔχοι διδόναι µισθοφορὰν, ἦγε τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς ἀοίκητα 
χωρία καὶ ἀκτὰς, ἵνα ὡς ἐλάχιστα ἀναλίσκοίεν· εἰ δὲ εὐποροίη χρηµάτων, ἦγεν 
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 See Thucy. 8.45.2 (with chapter 5 section iii), [Dem.] 50.35-36 (with chapter 6 section viii). 
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 Cf. Aristoph., Ach. 544-554:  sailors’ preparations for a typical major amphibious expedition including 
not only the purchase of essential provisions for their voyages, but also spending on parties. 
 
158
 The fact that classical Greek sailors and soldiers were paid in monthly lump sums may have added to 
any tendency of theirs to engage in periodic bouts of high spending (see chapter 6 section viii for the 




αὐτοὺς ἐς πόλεις καὶ χωρία εὐδαίµονα, ὅπου τάχιστα τὸν µισθὸν ἀναλώσαντες 
σπουδάζοιέν τι πράττειν διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀργυρίου ἔνδειαν. 
 
if Iphicrates could not pay his soldiers, he led them to uninhabited places and 
coasts, so they would spend as little as possible.  If he had plenty of money, he 
led them to cities and wealthy places, where they could spend their pay quickly 
and be eager for action due to their lack of money. (Strateg. 3.9.35) 
 
Similarly, Athenaeus reports Alexis of Samos as writing that the prostitutes 
accompanying the Athenian expedition to Samos in 441-439 made so much money from 
the sailors on this expedition that they were able to dedicate a temple to Aphrodite from 
the dekate on the proceeds of their trade during the siege (13.245F).  Since classical 
Greek traders were mostly engaged in ‘cabotage,’ amphibious and naval forces’ demand 
for goods other than grain will have also resulted in greater seaborne supplies of grain to 
these forces; Greek traders engaged in tramping will have brought, in addition to the 
small amounts of heterogeneous and more expensive goods they carried on-board the 
boats they were sailing in, small supplies of grain, too, to sell to sailors and soldiers.
159
 
 Fourthly, the fact that traders could count on return cargoes when sailing to the 
bases of classical Greek amphibious and naval forces provided another incentive for them 
to sail to these forces.
160
  This was especially true for Athenian forces employed on 
overseas operations.  In the mid fourth century, Xenophon could comment that one of the 
reasons why Athens was a most profitable port for traders (Xen., Poroi 3.1) was that 
whereas 
... τοὶς ἐµπόροις ἐν µὲν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἀντιφορτίζεσθαί τι ἀνάγκη: 
νοµίσµασι γὰρ οὐ χρησίµοις ἔξω χρῶνται· ἐν δε ταῖς Ἀθήναις πλεῖστα µὲν ἔστιν 
ἀντεξάγειν ὧν ἂν δέωνται ἄνθρωποι, ἢν δὲ µὴ βούλωνται ἀντιφορτίζεσθαι, καὶ 
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 See Braudel (1972) 102-108 for the classic discussion of ‘cabotage’; see also Horden and Purcell (2000) 
140-142; Erdkamp (2005) 177-181; Pleket (2008) 183. 
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ἀργύριον ἐξάγοντες καλὴν ἐµπορίαν ἐξάγουσιν, ὅπου γὰρ ἂν πωλῶσιν αὐτό, 
πανταχοῦ πλέον τοῦ ἀρχαίου λαµβάνουσιν. 
 
... at most ports merchants are compelled to ship a return cargo, because the local 
coinage has no circulation in other states; but at Athens they have the opportunity 
of exchanging their cargo and exporting very many classes of goods that are in 
demand, or, if they do not want to ship a return cargo of goods, it is sound 
business to export silver; for, wherever they sell it, they are sure to make a profit 
on the capital invested. (Poroi 3.2) 
 
The demand for Athenian coinage—caused by its reputation for purity—can also be seen 
by the number of hoards found throughout the eastern Mediterranean in the archaic and 
classical periods with large numbers of Athenian coins—and by the frequent striking of 
counterfeit Athenian coinage in the east.
161
  Traders sailing to Athenian overseas forces in 
the classical period could be assured, then, of a valuable return cargo (since these forces 
were (obviously) paid in Athenian coinage).
162
 
 Fifthly, private traders could often also expect to acquire a valuable return cargo 
in the bases of Athenian and other overseas forces abroad in the form of purchased 
plunder.  The fact that both the Athenian and Peloponnesian forces had to live off plunder 
in the Ionian War—that is, the fact that they had to acquire and sell large amounts of 
plunder in order to raise their pay
163
—meant that traders could often purchase large 
amounts of plunder cheaply from them; cheaply because, again, traders would have 
formed the only source of demand for the booty collected by the sailors of the Athenian 
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 See, e.g., Wartenburg (1995) 6-7 for (hoard) references and brief discussion; cf. Rutter (1981) 3-4. 
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 Occasionally, traders could be assured of the same valuable return cargo, too, when sailing to the 
operational bases of Peloponnesian overseas forces during the Ionian War:  see Briant (2002) 615-616 for 








and Peloponnesian fleets.  Even before the Ionian War, Athenian amphibious forces had 
collected and sold massive amounts of plunder while on campaign:  the sale of plunder 
from Cimon’s victory at Eurymedon had allowed the Athenians to meet the costs of 
various items of state expenditure and to finance the construction of the southern wall of 
the Acropolis;
164
 proceeds from the sale of plunder also made a limited contribution to 
meeting the expenses of the Athenian building program which started in the 440s.
165
  
Although Athenian amphibious forces did not have to sell booty to raise pay before the 
Ionian War,
166
 men engaged in blockades would have had plenty of time to scour the 
countryside surrounding besieged cities for property to sell off to merchants sailing to 
their agorai to trade with them.
167
  The hope (or expectation) of cheap plunder (to re-sell 
elsewhere) would have continued to draw traders to the operating bases of Greek 
amphibious and naval forces throughout the fourth century, too.
168
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 See esp. Plut., Cim. 13.6; see Blamire (1989) 151 for other references and brief discussion. 
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 See Samons (1993) 135-138, (2000) 93ff. against the idea of Kallet-Marx (1989), Giovannini (1990), 
(1997) (see now also Davies [2007b] 356) that the proceeds of plunder played a major role in the financing 
of the Athenian building program of the 440s. 
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 With the limited exception of the Sicilian expedition:  see chapter 1 section ivb.  But the funding of the 
Sicilian expedition through the sale of plunder, and plans to do so, occurred only when expected sources of 
income failed (the money from the Egestans) or were wanted for other operations (i.e., the war ‘at home’ 
against the Peloponnesians):  one should not therefore use the evidence for the (actual and planned) sale of 
booty in Sicily as evidence for the usual Athenian methods of financing amphibious expedition at (or prior) 
to this time. 
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 See again appendix 7 for a list of figures for the proceeds of the sale of plunder in the classical Greek 
world.  For Athenian and Peloponnesian forces raising pay through the sale of plunder during the 
Corinthian War, see, respectively, Sommerstein (2001) 2-3, Loomis (1992) 68 and n.100.  See also (again), 
e.g., ps.-Aristot., Oec. 2.2.23a, 1350a23-30 (a version of the same anecdote is found Polyaenus, Strateg. 
3.10.1):  Timotheus’ men at Olynthus in 364 selling booty stolen from the surrounding countryside to 
traders.   See ps.-Aristot., Oec., 2.2.23, 1350b5-7 (and Polyaenus, Strateg. 3.10.5, 9):  Timotheus raising 
  
498 
 Traders would also have been attracted to destinations that offered them security 
of supply.  As discussed, because there were no serious competitors to Athenian naval 
power in the Aegean between 480 and 412, traders could supply Athenian amphibious 
operation employed in protracted operations in the Aegean in complete security.
169
  But 
this complete naval superiority and security of supply disappeared in 412 with the 
outbreak of the Ionian War.  After that date in the Peloponnesian War, since traders 
sailing to enemy forces were (always) fair game for combatants,
170
 and both the origins 
and destinations of the goods carried by traders could be checked by written declarations 
                                                                                                                                                 
money at Samos in 366-365 by selling the Samians’ own crops and country property (“τοὺς κάρπους καὶ τὰ 
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄγρων”) back to them.  See also Isocrates in his Antidosis: praising Timotheus for taking twenty-
four cities in the course of his career (113), cities which included Corcyra, Samos, Sestos and Crithote in 
the Hellespont, and Potidaea and Torone in Thrace (107-109) (Sestos and Crithote in 365, Potidaea before 
361), all the most strategically important cities in their respective regions, and all with no great outlay of 
money, and without forcing the Athenians to pay eisphorai.  Isocrates pours most praise on Timotheus’ 
Samian campaign (111), a city which took Pericles two hundred ships and two thousand talents to capture 
[in 440], but which Timotheus captured after a siege of ten months with a force of eight thousand peltasts 
and thirty triremes, “and he paid all these forces from the spoils of war (καὶ τούτοις ἅπασιν ἐκ τῆς πολεµίας 
τὸν µισθὸν ἄπεδωκε).”  That is to say, Timotheus had to pay fourteen thousand men (eight thousand plus 
thirty x two hundred men) for ten months: at three obols per man per day, this would have cost three 
hundred and fifty talents; at two obols per day, just over two and hundred talents.  Note also that Cornelius 
Nepos (13.1) states that Timotheus gained booty to the value of twelve hundred talents in the war with 
Cotys, King of Thrace, in the late 360s.  The sum is very large and from a doubtful source but, as Pritchett 
([1991] 501) notes, Isocrates wrote of this same campaign in Thrace (7.9) that Athens had “πλείω δ’ ἢ 
χίλια τάλαντα µάτην εἰς τοὺς ξένους ἀνηλωκότες...” (“had squandered to no purpose more than a thousand 
talents on mercenary troops.”)  See also chapter 6 section viii for Athenian amphibious forces expected to 
be able to raise their own pay through the sale of plunder.  See also Gabrielsen (1994) 117 and 251 n.26 for 




 See chapter 1 section i; cf. chapter 2 section iic.  The naval power of the Athenian empire also allowed it 




 See, e.g., van Wees (2004) 223.  Cf. Andoc. 1.138:  in response to allegations of impiety in his taking up 
ship-owning after his exile from Athens, Andocides responds by stating:  “ἔτι δὲ πολέµου γενοµένου καὶ 
τριήρων ἀεὶ κατὰ θάλατταν οὐσῶν καὶ λῃστῶν, ὑφ’ ὧν πολλοὶ ληφθέντες, ἀπολέσαντες τὰ ὄντα, 
δουλεύοντες τὸν βίον διετέλεσαν...” (“Furthermore, it was war-time; the sea was infested with triremes and 
pirates, who took many a traveller prisoner, and after robbing him of his all, sent him to send his days in 
slavery.”)  The Athenian murder of the Peloponnesian ambassadors in the late 430 was in reprisal not so 
much against the attacks on their traders sailing around the Peloponnese but to some particularly heinous 




which they received when they bought those goods,
171
 their trading with both sets of 
combatants became less secure.  In the fourth century, when the Athenian navy was just 
one of many navies operating in the Aegean (if most of the time the strongest), i.e. when 
the Athenian navy was much less powerful and operating itself sometimes as a predatory 
agent, there were more dangers for traders sailing over the seas to stationary Athenian 
amphibious forces and navies, and thus possibly less grain supplied to those forces (and 
to the overseas forces of other states for the same reasons).  But this (greater) insecurity 
of supply in the Ionian War and the fourth century was probably as serious a problem for 
traders supplying grain and other goods to poleis, and therefore may not have greatly 
affected the supply of immobile overseas forces (relatively speaking).  In addition, while 
there is no explicit certain mention of classical Greek amphibious and naval forces 
providing convoys for the grain ships providing their food supply, we may assume that 
this was current practice in amphibious and naval warfare from 412 onwards.
172
   
Finally, the loss of complete control over the Aegean by the Athenian state would 
also have compromised the complete security of the food supply of their overseas forces 
in another way, too.  In the fifth century (before 412), Athens could count on 
provisioning support from (more or less) every state in the Aegean.
173
  But after 412, and 
the rebellion of many poleis from their empire, Athenian overseas forces had many fewer 
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 See Bresson (2000) 131-151 for demonstration and discussion. 
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 See Polyaenus, Strateg. 5.13.1, 5.22.1 for possible mentions of convoys escorting grain supplies to 
amphibious and naval forces.  Cf. Xen., Hell. 1.6.37:  the traders provisioning the Peloponnesian force 
engaged in the siege of Mytilene sailing as that part of that force when it lifted the siege after the 
Peloponnesian defeat at Arginusae. 
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states to draw supplies from, since enemy poleis would not supply grain or other goods to 
them (and, in any case, importation of goods from enemy states to Athenian forces during 
the Peloponnesian War was illegal).
174
  No other amphibious or naval force after 412 
would ever have the ability to import supplies from all over the Aegean (and the eastern 
Mediterranean) which the Athenians enjoyed before that date. 
 The performance of the markets supplied to stationary amphibious and naval 
forces in the Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries did not, then, remain 
unchanged over time.  The agorai in the bases of Athenian amphibious forces engaged in 
blockades of revolting poleis before 412 were probably particularly well supplied with 
grain (and other goods), since before this date Athenian forces were (mostly) very well 
paid,
175
 enjoyed complete security of supply, and had access to imports of grain from all 
over the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean.  After 412, Athenian and other 
amphibious and naval forces were never as well paid, or enjoyed the naval superiority or 
access to supplies which the Athenians had prior to that date.  In some cases, the pay of 
amphibious or naval forces was either not dispensed on time, or never dispensed at all.
176
  
News of delay in payment or lack of payment to immobile amphibious forces or fleets 
would have discouraged traders from sailing to those forces or fleets; the disorder caused 
by lack of pay, and the consequent (greater or lesser) loss of control of officers over 
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 See MacDowell (1991) for Athenian prohibitions on exports to and imports from enemy states.  Cf. 
Reed (2003) 48. 
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 See, however, chapter 6 sections ii, iii for the Athenians experiencing problems and delays in paying 
their overseas forces in the mid 420s. 
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 See, e.g., the discussion at chapter 6 section iv for irregularity of payment and non-payment of µισθός to 
Peloponnesian forces during the Ionian War; see also, e.g., Hell. Oxy. 19.2:  Conon’s forces in 395 owed 




sailors and soldiers, may have also deterred traders from sailing to these forces and fleets, 
since the chances of violent expropriation of their goods would have increased 
proportionately with the level of disorder within operating bases due to a lack of or delay 
in pay.  All that said, throughout the classical period, the (relatively) enormous demand 
of stationary amphibious forces and navies for grain, and for goods with high income 
elasticities of demand, the secure information available to traders about that demand (and 
the price stability it ensured), the opportunities for (highly) profitable return cargoes 
those forces and navies offered, all had the result that traders from all over the eastern 
(and western) Mediterranean had massive incentives to sail to the agorai of immobile 
(for operational reasons) Greek amphibious forces and navies.
177
 
 The number of ships needed to provision the continuous supply lines necessary in 
order to ensure the constant logistical security of stationary amphibious forces and navies 
was not enormous.
178
  The forty thousand men (the crews of two hundred triremes) 
present at Samos during the last six months of the blockade of that city in 440-439 (?) 
will have required 50,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or just over 800 (metric) tons of 
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 Two other factors may have encouraged traders to sail with grain supplies to overseas forces.  Firstly, 
two passages from Aristophanes (Eccl. 1027 (with Ussher [1973] ad loc.), Wealth 904) apparently indicate 
that emporoi were exempt from military service at Athens at the turn of the fifth century—perhaps in return 
for supplying Athenian forces?  Secondly, traders sailing to maritime poleis to exchange in their markets 
were liable to a range of indirect taxes:  import/export taxes, taxes on goods in transit, and harbor dues (see 
Vélissaropoulos [1980] 205-231).  Were all of these taxes and dues levied on traders sailing to the agorai 
of classical Greek amphibious forces and trireme fleets?  There is no way of achieving certainty on this 
question, but it may be held on general considerations that it is probably unlikely that these taxes and dues 
were levied in the camps and bases of amphibious and naval forces; this may have provided another (large) 
incentive to traders to sail to stationary amphibious and naval forces. 
 
178
 Cf. Erdkamp (1998) 56, 61-62, 83 on the shipping required to supply the needs of overseas Roman 
Republican forces; cf. also Bachrach (2002) 92 on the needs of the sixty thousand men of the first Crusade 
besieging Antioch:  “[t]he naval assets that were required to supply the Crusader camp, in addition to 




wheat equivalent of grain)
179
 per month:  the Athenian forces at Syracuse somewhere 
between 37,500 and 62,500 medimnoi of barley-meal (or between 600 and 1,100 tons of 
w.e. of grain)
180
 per month; the Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets in the Ionian War 
(assuming twenty thousand men on each side) 25,000 medimnoi of barley-meal (or just 
over 400 tons of w.e. of grain)
181
 each per month; the Athenians sailors and soldiers 
blockading Potidaea from the summer of 432 to the winter of 430/429 just over 21,500 
medimnoi of barley-meal (or just over 350 tons of w.e. of grain) per month;
182
 the 
Athenian force besieging Mytilene in 428/427 11,250 medimnoi of barley-meal (or just 
180 tons of w.e. of grain)
183
 per month.  Unfortunately, one is reduced to guessing—at 
best, ‘guesstimating’—the number of ships that would have needed to sail to the camps 
and bases of classical Greek amphibious forces and navies to meet their subsistence 
requirements, since there is very little information available on the carrying capacities of 
classical Greek trading vessels:  underwater archaeology has produced three shipwrecks 
intact enough to produce figures for carrying capacity; 25, 30, and 126 tons.
184
  The 
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 Really 824,100kg per month. 
 
180
 Really between 618.075kg and 1,103,125kg.  Between these figures because the forces of the Sicilian 
expedition amounted to somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 men. 
 
181
 Really 412,050kg. 
 
182
 Really 21,520 medimnoi and 355,107kg. 
 
183
 Really 185,422kg. 
 
184
 See Reed (2003) 18-19 and n.23 for references.  See Gibbins (2001) 283-288 for summary and 
discussion of our knowledge of classical Greek shipwrecks.  An average of 3,000 medimnoi/amphorae for 
the size of classical Greek trading vessels is often cited by scholars, citing Casson (1971) 171 n.23 who 
based this figure on IG XII, Suppl. 348 (a fourth century decree of Thasos regulating use of its harbor).  But 
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problem is complicated by the fact that none of these three wrecks was carrying grain, 
and also by the fact that it is unclear how much of the carrying capacity of trading vessels 
(which were not dedicated grain transports) was normally taken up with grain.
185
   
I will conclude this section, however, with some general considerations that 
suggest that the numbers of ships required to supply the agorai of classical Greek 
amphibious and naval forces need not have been great.  Firstly, if one adopts a figure of 
30 to 100 tons as a relatively safe range for the carrying capacity of dedicated grain-
carrying vessels in the classical Greek world, the number of ships needed to satisfy the 
energy requirements of immobile blockading forces and navies will have between 
somewhere between two and thirty.  Secondly, the fact that overseas forces were often—
perhaps, mostly—provisioned from areas relatively near to or in their theater of 
operations meant that traders may have been able to make several return trips a month to 
and from camps, thus reducing the number of ships needed to provision these forces.
186
  
Thirdly, ‘tramping’ traders coming to engage in exchanges with sailors and soldiers will 
have brought small amounts of grain, too, also lessening the number of dedicated grain-
carriers needed to sail to camps and operational bases.  Fourthly, and finally, Athenian 
overseas forces in the Aegean, at least, assumed that they could be provisioned 
                                                                                                                                                 
the text of the relevant part of this inscription is unsafe, and Casson’s interpretation is almost certainly 
incorrect:  see Hopkins (1978b) 41 n.13, (1983) 99 n.33. 
 
185
 See Gibbins (2001) 277. 
 
186
 See Thucy. 6.21.2 with chapter 1 section i:  Nicias’ speech implying that Athenian overseas forces on 
campaign in the Aegean could obtain their supplies from friendly territory within the Aegean.  See also 
chapter 1 section iva:  the Sicilian expedition being provisioned from nearby areas in Italy and Sicily.  Cf. 
again Rhodes and Osborne no.18 (cited at p.479 n.98 above):  neighboring poleis functioning as regular 




adequately by sea during the winter, as well as the summer:
187
 there will have been no 
peaks of supply needed during the summer months, then.  In sum, the number of 
specialized grain-carrying vessels will have been in single figures, or in low double 
figures. 
  
vi. Concluding remarks 
In Thucydides’ narrative of the Sicilian expedition, although the inability of the 
Athenians and Syracusans to pay their fighting forces is sometimes raised as a factor in 
the conduct of the war,
188
 the capacity of the Syracusans to provide supplies for their 
forces is always taken for granted in his narrative, and Thucydides mentions lack of 
provisions as a factor determining the Athenian conduct of operations only in exceptional 
circumstances:  once when the expedition’s triremes spent an unexpectedly long amount 
of time away from their base (waiting for Messana to be betrayed to them in the early 
winter of 415/414 (6.74.1-2)); and again in the last days of the final retreat.  But the 
problem of lack of provisions disappears from the narrative when the fleet returns to its 
winter base at Naxos, and even the lack of provisions on the expedition’s overland retreat 
from Syracuse was artificial:  the men had very little or no food only because the generals 
had sent to Catana to tell that polis to cease exporting food to the expedition.  Thucydides 
does raise on several occasions the problems that the Athenians had in safeguarding 
seaborne imports to the expedition, but, just as the capacity of coastal poleis to provision 
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 See again Thucy. 6.21.2 with chapter 1 section i; see also chapter 2 section iic. 
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the passing expedition is taken for granted in his narrative of the Sicilian campaign, the 
capacity of nearby friendly states to supply (through seaborne trade) the tens of thousands 
of men who made up the Sicilian expedition is also always taken for granted by 
Thucydides. 
Thucydides also simply assumed the capacity of the sometimes massive Athenian 
amphibious forces blockading rebellious poleis in the Aegean in the fifth century to 
provision themselves through seaborne grain supplies transported (and owned) by private 
traders.
189
  Even for the Ionian War, when Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets were paid 
less (and sometimes not paid at all), could not draw from the entire Aegean (and eastern 
Mediterranean) for their supplies, and could no longer guarantee complete security to the 
traders providing their grain, the provisioning of those fleets through seaborne (private) 
trade is still assumed by Thucydides, and also by Xenophon and Diodorus.  As this 
chapter has shown, the basis for these assumptions was sound:  the legal and 
administrative framework of classical Greek ‘military markets,’ as well as the conditions 
of distribution of grain in the classical Greek world, enabled classical Greek overseas 
forces (and classical Greek armies on the march to war zone) to provision themselves 
easily and sufficiently through markets.  This was the reason why, as the conclusion of 
chapter 5 demonstrated, that severe and sustained price increases in the agorai organized 
for classical Greek military forces were rare; the normal functioning of classical Greek 
economies made possible the normal functioning of the agorai organized for classical 
Greek military forces. 
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It may be objected here that some of the conclusions of this chapter are not so 
surprising:  as I have demonstrated, the demands on the resources of poleis at which 
classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious forces halted on their way to campaign 
theaters were not that great; and the subsistence requirements of even the greatest 
classical Greek overseas forces could be met by perhaps ten or twenty trading vessels a 
month.  But the conclusions of this chapter are important for two reasons.  Firstly, they 
confirm that the scholarly orthodoxy that prices for grain and other goods in the agorai 
provided to classical Greek military forces were regularly very high is without 
foundation.  Secondly, and more importantly, they show that markets in grain (and all of 
the institutional, legal, and built infrastructure these imply) could be assumed all over the 







Conclusion:  Classical Greek Armies and Navies and the Structure and 
Performance of Greek Economies in the Fifth Century B.C.E. 
 
 The scale and duration of classical Greek military campaigns were determined by 
the economic, institutional, and social structures of the classical Greek world.  The fact 
that, in the fifth century (especially), tens of thousands of Greek sailors and soldiers 
taking part in amphibious and naval operations could (and could be assumed to) depend 
(for months or years at a time) on markets (in which they bought food in true market 
exchanges) to acquire their provisions demonstrates that classical Greek economies were 
market economies (based on agriculture).  This is not to say that all economic 
transactions took place through the market,
1
 but that “[m]arket exchange was ubiquitous, 
and market prices moved together in ways typical of markets, albeit imperfectly co-
ordinated ones.”
2
  Markets in grain and other goods provided the economic framework in 
which classical Greek military forces operated.  Classical Greek states did not have to 
construct complex apparatuses to feed the thousands of men who constituted their 
amphibious, land, and naval forces
3
 (forces that (excepting Republican and imperial 
                                                 
1
 See Temin (2001) 172-173:  in other advanced agricultural market economies, substantial proportions of 
output were allocated by other means than market transactions.  Cf. esp. McMillan (2002) 6-7:  “[a] lot of 
transactions are excluded by this definition of a market.  Markets are never ubiquitous.  Even in the most 
market-orientated economy, a majority of transactions do not actually go through markets.  The reach of 
markets is delimited... Why then is it called a “market economy”, given that a majority of transactions, 
those inside households, firms, and government, are actually outside the market?  It is a market economy 
because even these nonmarket transactions take place within the context of markets.  The market 
transactions mold the economy overall.” 
  
2
 Temin (2001) 181. 
 
3
 Cf. van Wees (2007) 273:  “[f]or all the accounts and images of war in art and literature, for all the 
temples littered with dedications of booty and victory monuments, the impact of war on Greek society was 
rather limited.  The demands of war usually did not dictate the daily routine of citizens, or shape social and 
political structures, or dominate economic activity.  On the contrary, in archaic and classical Greece it was 




Rome) were not surpassed in size in Europe until the late fifteenth century and the rise of 
the large territorial state).
4
  The organizational system of classical Greek overseas 
military provisioning remained at all times the institution of the market (supplied by 
private traders transporting their own stocks of grain (and not engaging in ‘directed 
trade’)).  In addition, the practice of funding armies and navies on campaign by the sale 
of plunder, and the presuppositions underlying this practice, demonstrate that there were 
robust markets for goods other than grain in the classical Greek world (and very large 
volumes of monetary exchange in that world).  The picture of the fifth (and fourth) 
century Greek world that emerges from an analysis of the provisioning of classical Greek 
armies, navies, and amphibious forces, then, is one with robust commercial supply 
mechanisms for grain (and other foods), and high levels of liquidity and aggregate 
demand. 
 
 For two reasons, however, an analysis of the provisioning of classical Greek 
military forces cannot provide any direct information on the performance of classical 
Greek economies.  This is so for two reasons.  Firstly, the sources of the grain sold by 
traders to Greek military forces are indicated in ancient accounts of military conflicts 
very rarely, and then only in the vaguest of terms.  Thus, Thucydides mentions in passing 
that the Athenians in Sicily in 415-413 were being supplied with grain from Catana and 
Italy;
5
 Nicias’ second speech to the assembly before the departure of the Sicilian 
                                                 
4
 Cf., e.g., Dotson (1995) 223 for a survey of Italian fleet sizes in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
(paralleling classical Greek fleet sizes); and note esp. (ibid.) 222:  in 1295 “the Genoese put to sea the 
largest fleet ever launched by any Italian city:  165 galleys with 35,000 men.” 
 
5




expedition implies that Athenian overseas forces operating in the Aegean in the fifth 
century could assume supplies of grain from nearby friendly poleis;
6
 and Dionysius I, in 
his war against the Carthaginians in 396, apparently relied, too, on provisions from 
nearby friendly poleis while he was based at Egesta (Diod. 14.55.5).  We (almost) never 
certainly know, then, where classical Greek overseas forces (remaining immobile at 
operational bases) were supplied from. 
 Secondly, there are no indications in contemporary or later sources of the impact 
of classical Greek land and overseas forces’ demand for provisions on the ‘normal’ grain 
supply of Greek states.
7
  In other times and places in pre-industrial European history, the 
demand of military forces for grain (and other foods) sometimes led to massive 
dislocations in the normal grain trade and supply of communities, and thus to serious 
food shortages in those communities.
8
  In other times and place in pre-modern Europe, 
too, the presence of military forces sometimes led to substantial price rises in the areas in 
which they were operating.
9
  There is no mention of dislocations in the classical Greek 
                                                 
6
 See chapter 1 section i. 
 
7
 See only Thucy. 3.82.2:  in the Greek world of Thucydides’ time, “ὁ δὲ πόλεµος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοὺ 




 See, e.g., Housley (1999) 128-129:  “[s]o effective was the redirection of Sicilian grain towards the supply 
needs of Louis IX’s crusading army in Tunisia in the summer of 1270 that there were shortages not just in 
the north Italian cities but at Syracuse itself...”  See also Hale (1985) 181 on the same phenomenon in 
fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe. 
 
9
 See Garnsey (1988) 247-248 for price rises in cities associated with the presence of Roman (Republican 
and imperial) armies; Kaegi (1993) 46 for price rises associated with Roman armies in fourth century 
Antioch and in Anatolia in the late sixth century.  See also Hale (1985) 181-182 on this phenomenon in 
fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe.  Note here, too, that Greek cities in the Hellenistic and Roman 
periods sometimes intervened to fix prices for food at festivals, and on other occasions when temporary 
large aggregations of people could be expected (see Migeotte [1997] 39-43 for discussion (of the seven 
epigraphical texts spread over five centuries attesting this practice)):  the presence of temporary large 
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grain trade or rises in the price of grain related to the demand of classical Greek military 
forces.  But, given that we rely for our accounts of classical Greek land and naval warfare 
on literary representations of that warfare, this is not surprising:  we hear almost nothing 
of the effects of war on agriculture in the classical period, either, but difficulties in 
agricultural production caused by warfare are constantly mentioned in the much richer 
(extra-Athenian) epigraphical record of the Hellenistic period.
10
  Although we might 
expect to have mentioned in our literary sources disruptions to the grain supply of major 
states due to the demand of military forces for grain (and the fact that we do not does 
mean something), we should not expect to this be the case for the hundreds of smaller 
poleis dotted around the shores of the Aegean and western Mediterranean; that is to say, 
there is no way of knowing whether the more attractive markets provided by the camps 
and operational bases of classical Greek amphibious and naval forces
11
 drew grain away 
from—and thus led to subsistence difficulties in—small, insignificant ‘Normalpoleis’ in 
the fifth century.  The provisioning of classical Greek armies, navies, and amphibious 
                                                                                                                                                 
crowds of visitors, then, could be sometimes be expected in the Hellenistic and Roman Greek worlds to 
cause (temporary) price increases for food (cf. de Ligt [1993] 231-232; Chandezon [2000a] 91). 
 
10
 See Holleaux (1938) 99-101, Chandezon (2000b) for references and discussion.  But note Chandezon 
(2000b) 240 nn.60-61:  price rises (due to war) rarely (if ever) mentioned in inscriptions from the 
Hellenistic period (Moretti ([1977] 358) states that there are numerous inscriptions from (Aegean) islands 
describing situations in which imports became difficult because of the insecurity of the seas (because of 
war) or because of the necessity of provisioning armies directed merchants elsewhere—but none of the 
references Moretti cites supports (either of) these points). 
 
11




forces, then, cannot help us to say anything meaningful about the total (marketed) output 




Demonstrating, through an analysis of the provisioning of classical Greek military 
forces, the existence of a regular and substantial overseas trade in grain in the fifth 
century can, however, help us to say some things about the performance of classical 
Greek economies.  The existence of such a trade made possible increased specialization 
of labor and urbanization, and therefore the expansion of markets for other goods, and 
itself could only have been made possible by sizeable reductions in transactions costs for 
maritime commerce:
13
  it therefore provided the foundation for the kinds of economic 




I end by outlining one “line of investigation” that could provide important 
information on the performance of Greek economies in the fifth century.  Recent work 
has demonstrated how the huge increase in the scale of Greek amphibious and naval 
warfare seen in the fifth century was made possible by increasing state centralization and 
                                                 
12
 Cf. the evidence of sales of plunder for classical Greek economies:  this cannot provide a foundation for 
further studies of regional Greek economies; the figures we have for proceeds from sales of plunder only 
represent a base, and can tell us nothing about the total amount of demand and liquidity within a particular 
city or region (although they do provide evidence for high levels of liquidity and demand for goods in 
many areas of the Greek world, and especially in Asia Minor). 
 
13 Cf. Morris, Saller and Scheidel (2007) 10 on decreasing transactions costs. 
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the consequent concentrations of capital it permitted.
15
  Money became essential to 
overseas Greek war-making in the fifth century.
16
  But previous scholarship has missed 
the point that money only became essential for classical Greek amphibious and naval 
warfare because the growth of exchange economies in the Greek world enabled it to be 
so.  Firstly, increased trade (as the most important source of tax income for Greek states) 
produced increased revenues for Greek states, which they—or, more precisely, 
hegemonic powers such as the Athenians—could then concentrate to pay their forces.
17
  
Secondly, and more importantly, the introduction of military pay in the late sixth and fifth 
centuries did not encourage the creation of markets from nowhere (although it will have 
further encouraged commercialization of the Greek economy), but was itself dependent 
on the presence of markets in which it could be used.  Tracing—or attempting to trace—
the interrelationship between the development of market economies and the growth in the 
scale and duration of Greek warfare in the late sixth and fifth centuries seems to me to 
offer a promising way forward into the study of the performance of classical Greek 
economies. 
                                                 
15
 See Morris (2001) esp. 78-79, 91; and the groundbreaking work of van Wees (2004) 232-239.  It was the 
(much) smaller size of concentrations of capital available to Greek states in the fourth century that explains 
the lesser scale of overseas warfare in that century (and not any contraction in the size of markets):  see, 
e.g., van Wees (2004) 239. 
 
16
 See esp. Kallet-Marx (1993).  Cf., e.g., Krentz (2007) 179-180 on the huge costs of the overseas sieges 
undertaken by Athens in the fifth century. 
 
17
 Thucydides makes the point clearly in his Archaeology:  see, e.g., Gomme, HCT i.89, 108, 120; de 
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Appendix 1:  Thucydides’ Speeches as Historical Evidence 
 I first outline in this appendix my position on the general problem of the 
authenticity of Thucydides’ speeches.  I then show that the basis for the shared 
understandings in Nicias’ second speech to the assembly before the Sicilian expedition 
concerning the workings of normal Athenian amphibious expeditions (in the Aegean and 
the ‘near west’) was secure since most (if not all or nearly all) of the Athenian citizens 
listening to him had considerable experience and/or knowledge of such expeditions.  I 
end by discussing Thucydides’ method of bringing out judgments of speakers by 
(implicitly) comparing their arguments with the following narrative of events, and 
demonstrating that an analysis of the narrative subsequent to Nicias’ second speech to the 
assembly confirms my conclusion in chapter 1 section i that Nicias in that speech was 
asking for a superiority in triremes to protect shipments of provisions to the expedition in 
Sicily from states in the far west (and not from Athens). 
 
i. The problems of the authenticity of Thucydides’ speeches 
To get to the point, I find myself in complete agreement with Kallet-Marx (1993) 
on this question.
1
  With Kallet-Marx’s treatment of this question in mind, I want to 
emphasize here six considerations that I think are of particular importance in using 
Thucydides’ speeches as historical sources.   
Firstly, the speeches are not free inventions:  the arguments for this position were 
based on anachronistic assumptions about the plausibility of the historical and rhetorical 
                                                 
1
 (1993) 75-76 n.18 (or almost complete agreement:  see Pelling [2000] 275 n.10 on γνώµης at 1.22.1 





arguments of the speeches;
2
 and on the incorrect view that Thucydides inserted the 
speeches into his work so that he could have occasions to comment on the objective 
narrative surrounding them.
3
   
Secondly, Thucydides’ strikingly novel concern about the problems of accurately 
representing speeches,
4
 and his desire to keep as closely as possible to the gist of what 
was actually said (“... it is of basic importance that Thucydides should bring the speeches 
actually delivered into the question at all and suggest that they might be of concern to his 
readers”),
5
 show that he rendered the speeches as accurately as he could.   
Thirdly, that said, Thucydides does stress that, in contrast to his account of the 
ἔργα of the war, the speeches are his product and do not aim for the same level of 
accuracy as his account of the ἔργα.
6
 
Fourthly, if the responsions between speeches and events, and between speeches 
made at different times and places, sometimes seem very close in his work, we should 
remember that Thucydides chose to represent only those speeches that seemed to him the 
most important and useful in bringing out the themes and subjects he was interested in 
                                                 
2
 Gomme (1937) 156-189; Dover (1973) 23-27. 
 
3
 See Stahl (2003) 173-174 and section iii below. 
 
4
 See Pelling (2000) 114, 118; cf. Walbank (1985) 243-244. 
 
5
 Andrewes (1962) 65-66. 
 
6
 See Kallet-Marx (1993) 75-76 n.18; Pelling (2000) 118; Dover (1973) 21 n.1.  Greenwood ([2006] 64-66) 
has interesting observations on the difficulties of transcribing speeches completely and accurately even 






 similarly, Thucydides’ understanding of what were the crucial factors in any 
given situation guided him in his condensation, selection and arrangement of the 
arguments in his speeches.
8
   
Fifthly, Thucydides describes his method in composing the speeches at 1.22.1, but 
never indicates for any speech how much is “τὰ δέοντα,”
9
 and how much “τῆς ξυµπάσης 
γνώµης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων.”  “The vagueness of 1.22.1 is deliberate,” and suggests 
the “strong possibility... that he is providing an umbrella description which could cover a 
range of different procedures, and that he composed more freely at some times than at 
others.”
10
  In analysing the speeches of the debate on the Sicilian expedition, it is of basic 
importance that Thucydides would have had “a large number of reliable informants for an 
exchange all knew would be critical”;
11
 we should thus expect much of the total argument 
of the words truly spoken in the speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades under consideration 
here.   
                                                 
7
 Kagan (1975) 78; Pelling (2000) 118-119; Marincola (2001) 80-81.  See, e.g., 1.139.4, 6.15.1, 6.19.1 for 
explicit acknowledgements by Thucydides that he is not reporting all the speeches delivered in a debate 
before an (Athenian) assembly. 
 
8
 See esp. Pelling (2000) 119-120, Marincola (2001) 81-82; cf. Finley (1967) 6; Dover (1973) 23-24; 
Kagan (1975) 89; Greenwood (2006) 64; and see 2.13.9 for an unusually explicit statement of Thucydides’ 
criteria in deciding what to include in a speech (omitting from a representation of a speech of Pericles the 
conventional arguments he used to urge support for the war).  On the close correspondences between the 
speech of the Corinthians at the second meeting of the Peloponnesian League at Sparta in 432 (1.120-124) 
and Pericles’ speech before the Athenian assembly later in the same year urging the Athenians against any 
concession to the Peloponnesians (1.140-144) not necessarily meaning (at all) that these speeches were 
‘inventions’ of Thucydides, see Dover (1973) 25; Connor (1984) 49 n.58; and Hornblower, CT i.195-200. 
 
9
 On which see Macleod (1983) 68-69. 
 
10







Sixthly, and finally, those speeches for which we might expect Thucydides to 
have had fewer informants for,
12
 and thus to consist more of “τὰ δέοντα,” will be still 
useful, “for to be persuasive an orator [and an author representing an orator] had to move 




 ii. Nicias’ use of the ‘as you all know’ argument at 6.21-22 
To summarize and restate:  Nicias based his justification for the unusual amounts 
and types of παρασκευή he would go on to ask the assembly for at 6.22 on the 
understanding—made explicit at 6.21.2—that his audience in the assembly was 
thoroughly familiar with the nature of Athenian amphibious operations in the Aegean.  
Nicias was, in other words, employing a common rhetorical strategy in classical Greek 
oratory, the ‘as you all know’ type of argument.
14
  The syntax of his speech (naturally) 
supported and reinforced this strategy.  As Tompkins has pointed out,
15
 at 6.21 (and, in 
fact, throughout the speech), Nicias employed impersonal verbs (“... δεῖ... ξυµπλεῖν... 
ἐπιέναι”) and impersonal expressions employing abstract neuter adjectives and infinitives 
(“αἰσχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν ἢ ὕστερον ἐπιµεταπέµπεσθαι,” “ῥᾴδιον ἐλθεῖν”) that all 
“betray[ed] adherence to a priori concepts” and rested on “antecedent commitments”
16
—
                                                 
12
 See, e.g., Hornblower, CT iii.395-396, 404 on the speeches of Hermocrates and Athenagoras (6.33-40.1). 
 
13
 Davies (1993) 112; see also Pelling (2000) 37-43; but contrast Osborne (2000a) 6. 
 
14
 For a discussion of this type of argument, see Ober (1989) 149-150. 
 
15
 (1972) 191-193. 
 
16
 Tompkins (1972) 193. 
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on the nature of Athenian campaigns in the Aegean—that Nicias represented as shared by 
(himself and) his audience.  This brings up an important question concerning the use of 
Nicias’ speech as evidence for the provisioning of Athenian campaigns in the Aegean 
(and Sicily):  was there any basis for these shared commitments, for the ‘you all know 
how overseas expeditions in the Aegean are usually manned and provisioned’ argument, 
that formed the foundation of Nicias’ case for an exceptionally large παρασκευή for the 
Sicilian expedition?  Were the Athenians addressed by Nicias thoroughly familiar with 
conditions on Athenian campaigns in the Aegean? 
Ober writes of this ‘you all know’ rhetorical strategy,
17
 
The statement that everyone knew something could be used in an attempt to 
manipulate the audience.  Aristotle (Rhet. 1408a32-36) says that speechwriters 
used the tactic of saying everyone knows something to secure the agreement of 
even those who did not know it, because the latter would be ashamed at their 
ignorance of what was common knowledge. 
 
 So, for this type of argument to work, at least some of the speaker’s audience had 
to possess the knowledge assumed by the speaker to be ‘common knowledge.’  But in the 
case of Nicias’ audience, one can go further than that:  many, if not most, of those 
present—some thousands of citizens of all ages and socio-economic statuses (see esp. 
6.24.3)
18
—would have served on amphibious or naval operations in the Aegean or, at the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
17
 (1989) 149. 
 
18
 Thousands of citizens:  at 8.72.1, an oligarch envoy to the Athenians assembled at Samos is reported as 
stating that “what with their expeditions and employments abroad, the Athenians had never yet assembled 
to discuss a question important enough to bring five thousand of them together;” but this statement is not 
explicitly supported by Thucydides, and it is made by a speaker in a rhetorical context that requires the use 
of as low a figure as possible for past attendance figures at assemblies in order to support an argument (see 
Hornblower, CT iii.967 ad loc., and bibliography cited there).  Also, although the figure of five thousand 
cannot have been a gross distortion of the facts, for then it would have had no real persuasive force (see 
Andrewes, HCT v.183 ad loc.), it cannot be correct, either, since a quorum of six thousand was needed for 
an assembly dealing with questions involving individuals, and there must have been at least some of these 
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very least, would have learned of conditions on Athenian overseas campaigns from close 
family members, other relatives, and/or friends who would have taken part in such 
campaigns.
19
  Moreover, as Kallet has pointed out, the fact that Nicias employed this 
rhetorical strategy in the first place demonstrated that he thought that the assembled 
Athenians “collectively knew enough [about the conditions of overseas campaigns] to be 
expected to be impressed.”
20
  These considerations, taken together with the fact that 
Thucydides would have had many informants for this important speech and thus we 
should expect of much of the total argument of the words spoken by Nicias in this 
assembly,
21
 are important in that they add up to demonstrate that the foundation for the 
implicit and explicit understandings concerning the nature of overseas campaigns in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the period referred to (see again Hornblower, CT iii.967, Andrewes HCT v.183).  For the range of ages 
and statuses of the citizens present at the ‘Sicilian’ assemblies: see 6.24.3 with Dover, HCT iv.262-263, 
Hornblower, CT iii.361-363. 
 
19
 See Raaflaub (2007) 108:  “[i]ndeed, many of those who voted [at Athens] upon a specific proposal for 
military action were going to be among the soldiers fighting to realize it in the field.  Most of them had 
served in several campaigns on land or sea and thus were thoroughly familiar not only with the technical, 
logistic, and tactical issues, but also with the empire and thus with much of the “territory” in which such 
actions were going to take place.  Despite frequent criticism of the assembly’s incompetence, the Athenians 
must have brought to most decisions on military matters a level of personal experience matched by few 
modern societies.”  It should be noted here that, even in the quieter period (see 6.26) after the truce between 
the Athenians and Spartans in the summer of 423 (4.116-119) (leading eventually to the treaty of alliance 
between the two states in the winter of 422/1 (5.21-24)), the Athenians continued to dispatch amphibious 
and naval expeditions throughout the Aegean:  there were operations in the Chalcidide and Thrace from 
423 to 421 (see 4.129.2ff., 5.2ff., 5.32.1); in 418/7, there were operations in Thrace and the Argolid (see IG 
I
3
 370.1-23 with ML p.235) (note that no records for the expenditures of the treasurers of Athena have 
survived for the quadrennium 422/1-419/18 (Blamire [2001] 113)); in 417/16, there were again operations 
in Thrace (see IG I
3
 370.24-26), and Melos was reduced in an operation lasting from the summer of 416 to 
the winter of 416/5 (5.84-116).  See also chapter 2 section iii on the periploi sent around the Peloponnese in 
the years just before 415. Thus, there would have occasions even for the younger members of Nicias’ 
audience to have gained experience of conditions of campaigning in the Aegean, or at least to become 
familiar with these through report. 
 
20
 (2001) 44 n.81. 
 
21




Aegean (and the ‘near west’) that Nicias represented as shared with his audience was 
secure, since it lay upon a bedrock of experience and knowledge of amphibious and naval 
operations undertaken by the Athenian state in that part of the world.  Nicias’ speech, 
then, once properly analysed, represents valid and important evidence for how Athenian 
overseas campaigns in the Aegean were usually provisioned. 
 
 iii. The relationship between logoi and erga in Thucydides and the importance of 
naval superiority for the provisioning of the Sicilian expedition 
Stahl, in a discussion published originally in 1973, demonstrated that the old view 
of the relationship between speech and narrative in Thucydides, i.e., that Thucydides 
inserted speeches into his text to serve as opportunities to comment on the objective 
narrative around them, was wrong.
22
  Rather, the belated realization of the necessarily 
subjective character of narrative (i.e., the fact that any narrative implies interpretation) 
allowed us to reevaluate the relationship between speeches and course of events in 
Thucydides, and to realize that we could grasp Thucydides’ judgments of speakers and 
their proposals by examining the surrounding narrative:  “not elucidation of events by 
speeches, but, to put it pointedly, elucidation of speeches by the ensuing (or preceding) 
narrative of events now seems the appropriate method of reading Thucydides.”
23
 
                                                 
22
 Stahl (2003) 173-174. 
 
23
 Stahl (2003) 174.  Macleod, independently of Stahl, reached the same conclusion in an analysis ([1983] 
69-70) that I quote here in full:  “Thucydides is seeking not merely to record [the attempt by speakers to 
persuade an audience], but to show us how and why [the speakers in his narrative] succeeded or failed, to 
help us understand, and so also to judge, the speaker and his public.  This purpose we can achieve in two 
main ways: by sifting the arguments and by examining their relation to the narrative.  The speeches are so 
constructed that a careful reader can see into—or see through—the speaker’s reasoning; and the debate 
form, which confronts opposing arguments, is one of the chief means to this end.  There may also be a 
revealing relation between speeches which do not belong together in time; a particularly valuable point of 
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Stahl applied this method of analysis to the speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades 
during the debate in the second assembly before the departure of the Sicilian expedition 
in 415.  He demonstrated that it was exactly those factors that Nicias had emphasized in 
his second speech attempting to dissuade the Athenians from embarking on the 
expedition—cavalry, ships, money and grain supplies—that were to prove decisive in 
deciding the fate of the force sent to Sicily.
24
  Reading the narrative of the campaign that 
follows the speeches, and the emphasis Thucydides placed within it on the importance of 
cavalry, ships, money, and, vitally for the analysis here, provisions for the eventual 
outcome of the expedition, “... the reader quickly realizes that Thucydides himself favors 
the views of Nicias, whom the Athenians did not follow;”
25
 rather than heed the warnings 
of Nicias on the difficulties that a campaign in Sicily would inevitably encounter, 
however, the Athenians allowed themselves (in Thucydides’ presentation of events) to be 
seduced into the expedition by the specious arguments and distortions of Alcibiades,
26
 
                                                                                                                                                 
reference are those of Pericles, for Thucydides Athens’ best leader.  So too a complex pattern of verbal and 
conceptual echoes between speech and narrative helps him trace the path from proposal to event.  This 
relation of words to deeds is at the heart of Thucydides’ thinking; for the whole work is a passionate, 
though often gloomy, enquiry into the possibility of rational behaviour in politics and war.”  Thucydides 
had, in his introduction (1.21.2-1.22), alerted his audience to the fact that the speeches in his work would 
play a vital role—in combination with his description of the events that took place—in his account and 
interpretation of the war:  see Macleod (1983) 70, Pelling (2000) 114-115, 118. 
 
24
 (2003) 174-188. 
 
25
 Stahl (2003) 177.  In fact, Thucydides already presents Nicias in the introduction to his first speech to the 
assembly before the expedition as being correctly concerned that the Athenians were embarking on a great 
and dangerous undertaking on the specious pretext of aiding their allies, and that they were ignorant of the 
demands and dangers that their real goal, the conquest of the whole of Sicily, involved:  see 6.8.4 echoing 
the narrative at 6.6.1 (and Connor [1984] 162 n.12, Rood [1998] 162, Stahl [2003] 182).  The reader is thus 
“preconditioned” (see Kallet [2001] 36) by Thucydides’ introduction to this speech to be in sympathy with 
Nicias’ aim of warning the Athenians off the expedition. 
 
26 
On Alcibiades’ superficially attractive but fallacious and contradictory arguments advocating the 





 and their irrational hopes and desires for the possible gains 
ensuing from conquest.
28
   
Thucydides, then, used his narrative of the expedition to pass judgment on the 
arguments of Alcibiades and Nicias before the assembly (and the decision-making ability 
of their audience)—and more specifically, to endorse Nicias’ analysis (as against 
Alcibiades’) of the conditions facing the potential expedition to Sicily as correct:  “[t]he 
hard facts of money, horse, archers and grain supplies [and ships], as well as the stable 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2001) 37-42; and esp. Stahl (2003) 177 for Nicias being proved ‘right’ as against Alcibiades.  Historical 
distortions in Alcibiades’ speech to the assembly:  see Macleod (1983) 75, Bloedow (1990) 6-7, Dover, 
HCT iv.248 ad 6.16.6; Macleod (1983) 80, with Dover HCT iv.252-253, ad 6.17.7.  It was especially the 
unPericlean failure of Alcibiades to distinguish between private and public interests (Macleod [1983] 72, 
75, 86, Jordan [2000] 64-65, Kallet [2001] 35-42) and the Athenians’ failure as a whole to do so, that leads 
to the fateful decision to dispatch the expeditionary force:  see Jordan (2000) 65-66, Stahl (2003) 183, 190-
191.  But it should be noted that the fact that Nicias was also guilty of failing to distinguish his private 
concerns from the public interest also means that he has to share in the blame for the sending of the 
expedition: see Kallet (2001) 32-34 on Nicias’ mixing up of public and private interests; and see also 
Connor (1984) 163-164, 236-237; Ober (1998) 113; Rood (1998) 185-188.  In Nicias’ first speech to the 
assembly before the expedition, he had also engaged in distortion of events to dissuade the Athenians from 
going to Sicily:  see Dover, HCT iv.233 ad 6.10.5, HCT iv.236 ad 6.12.1.  That said, as noted above (see 
previous note), Thucydides introduces Nicias’ first speech in such a way as to show that it was correct to 
advise against the expedition, and it was correctly concerned that the Athenians were making the decision 
to go to Sicily for the wrong reasons; in addition, as Bloedow ([1990] 14) points out, Nicias’ use of the 
phrase “εἰ σωφρονοῦµεν” at 6.11.7 is paralleled in several other speeches (see, e.g., 3.44.1, 4.60.1) that are 
shown by subsequent narratives to be justified and intelligent analyses of particular situations. 
 
27
 See Stahl (2003) 177, 181-183; Liebeschutz (1968) 306 on 6.2-5:  Thucydides characterizes and 
underlines Athenian ignorance about Sicily by means of the ‘Sicilian Archaeology,’ and the deception at 
Egesta (see 6.6.2 and 6.8.2 with 6.46).  (Nicias’ suspicions at 6.22 that the Egestaeans are misleading the 
Athenians about the quantity of money they have available to support the Athenians in Sicily is borne out at 
6.46.2; again, his analysis of Sicilian affairs is proven correct by the later narrative.  See Stahl [2003] 178-
179:  “[a]nd by thus honoring Nicias, Thucydides implicitly exposes Alcibiades (and those who voted for 
his plan).”)  It is probable, though, that Thucydides exaggerated the extent of the Athenians’ ignorance of 
Sicily before the Sicilian expedition:  Buck (1988) 74; Greenwood (2006) 54; Missiou (2007) passim. 
 
28
 See esp. Stahl (2003) 183-184, 190-191; cf. also Liebeschutz (1968) 306 and n.134; Connor (1984) 159, 
168.  See also, e.g., Rood (1998) 152, Finley (1942) 217 n.25 on 6.1.1 echoing 4.65.4 where criticism of 
Athenian ‘grasping after more’ in Sicily is criticized.  See also Nicias in his first speech, 6.10.5, warning 
the Athenians not to give into the tendency to ‘grasp for more’ (6.10.5).  See also 6.31.6 for the Athenians 





constitution of major Sicilian cities, in the long run prove Nicias correct and his risk-
taking, war-mongering colleague-in-office wrong.”
29
  This endorsement of Nicias’ 
analysis can be traced clearly and precisely by comparing Thucydides’ presentation of the 
differing positions of Alcibiades and Nicias concerning the importance of ensuring naval 
superiority for the expedition with his description of the Athenians’ experiences once 
they had arrived in the theater of operations in the far west.  Alcibiades, addressing the 
assembly, had simply assumed that the Athenians would remain in control of the sea 
                                                 
29
 Stahl (2003) 191.  See also Marincola (2001) 90 summarizing Stahl’s analysis of the relationship 
between the speeches of Alcibiades and Nicias and the ensuing narrative:  “Stahl’s analysis of the speeches 
of Nicias and Alcibiades in Book VI in the light of the later Sicilian expedition argues that it was Nicias 
who correctly foresaw events, and the narrative plays up exactly those variables – Sicilian unity, money, 
cavalry [and ships and grain supplies] – that Nicias had foreseen as crucial.  In this way the narrative 
retrospectively gives judgement on the two participants, and, by extension, the Athenians who voted for the 
expedition.” 
 For Hunter (1973) the—in her view, exact—anticipation of erga by logoi in Thucydides’ history 
showed an artist who was not so much concerned with writing a historical account of events, but with 
constructing a work with “a veritable complexity of repetitive patterns—patterns not merely of human 
behaviour but type-characters, events, and even sequences of events” ([ibid.] 179); since these patterns 
constituted the cycles of history, Thucydides’ readers could learn to recognize these in the future.  Taking 
this view meant that Hunter had to argue that Thucydides had suppressed, exaggerated, and distorted 
historical data in order to maintain the exact relationship he (supposedly) sought between logoi and erga 
(cf. Ellis [1979], following the approach of Hunter, attempting to show how Thucydides in his Sicilian 
narrative consistently manipulated facts to maintain the relationship between the speeches of Nicias and 
Alcibiades and the ensuing narrative).  If Hunter were correct in taking this approach, it would have serious 
consequences for our view of the historical reliability of Thucydides’ work.  Hunter’s (and Ellis’) thesis, 
however, does not work for a number of reasons.  Firstly, it was based on a naïve and outdated view of 
historical ‘objectivity’:  see Marincola (2001) 100-101.  Secondly, it ignored the fact that Thucydides did 
worry about sources of information:  see Connor (1976-1977) 292 (and see [ibid.] 292-293 for an effective 
general refutation of Hunter’s work).  Finally, the relationship between logoi and erga is not as neatly exact 
as Hunter’s analysis requires.  To take the example of the Sicilian expedition, Thucydides’ narrative shows 
that “historical developments are anything but predictable, that is, steerable” (Stahl [2003] 200):  there were 
very many points during the campaign in Sicily when things might have gone differently and the ultimate 
result of the campaign might have changed:  see Stahl (2003) 216-219, Morris (2001) 71, Marincola (2001) 
10.  Also, to repeat from above (p.563 nn.7, 8), if the responsions between speeches and events, and 
between speeches made at different times and places, sometimes seem very close, we should remember that 
Thucydides chose to represent only those speeches that seemed to him the most important and useful in 
bringing out the themes and subjects he was interested in analysing; similarly, Thucydides’ understanding 
of what were the crucial factors in any given situation guided him in his condensation, selection and 
arrangement of the arguments in his speeches.  For the Sicilian expedition, see Rood (1998) 160 for how 
“Thucydides gives prominence to Nikias by his selective use of speeches”; and note that, of the speeches 
after Nicias’ first speech, Thucydides only chooses to include Alcibiades’ (see 6.15.1-2, and Kallet [2001] 
35).  Cf. Connor (1984) 162 n.11 on the possible reasons for Thucydides’ presentation of the debate 




during any fighting in Sicily, even against all the Siceliots combined (“ναυκράτορες γὰρ 
ἐσόµεθα καὶ ξυµπάντων Σικελιωτῶν”), and therefore that, even if the campaign did not 
go well, the expedition could return home safely (6.18.5).  Nicias, in contrast, had warned 
of the strength of Sicilian naval resources (6.20.4) and the need for the expedition to have 
an overwhelming superiority in triremes to counteract this and specifically “ἵνα καὶ τὰ 
ἐπιτήδεια ῥᾳον ἐσκοµιζώµεθα” (6.22).
30
  The subsequent narrative proves Nicias’ counsel 
to the assembled Athenians right.   
In the second summer of the campaign in 414, Nicias decided to fortify 
Plemmyrium, a headland overlooking the Great Harbour of Syracuse, since “if this were 
fortified, it seemed to him that the bringing in of supplies would be an easier matter,” 
“ῥᾴων αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο ἡ ἐσκοµιδὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔσεσθαι,” as basing the Athenian 
triremes there would make it easier to operate against the Syracusan fleet (7.4.4).  Soon, 
however, after some (avoidable) tactical errors in the same summer, Nicias wrote to 
Athens that the expedition had lost its superiority in numbers of triremes and that it was 
now struggling with the Syracusans for control of the sea (7.12.2-7.13.1).  Since the 
Athenians no longer had a “πολλῆς... περιουσίας νεῶν” (cf. 6.22:  Nicias had advised that 
the expedition “ναυσί τε καὶ πολὺ περιεῖναι”), if they were to relax their guard even a 
little, they would not have their supplies, which were even then being brought with 
difficulty brought past Syracuse and into their camp:  “τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐχ ἕξοµεν, παρὰ τὴν 
ἐκείνων πόλιν χαλεπῶς καὶ νῦν ἐσκοµιζόµενοι” (7.13.1).  Nicias’ letter home and other 
parts of Thucydides’ narrative of the expedition show that it was the necessity to protect 
supplies coming by sea from Italy (6.103.2, 7.14.3, cf. 7.25.1-2) and Sicily (Catana:  
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7.60.2) that meant that Athens had to have control of the sea.  In the following winter, 
however, the Athenian forts at Plemmyrium were taken by the Syracusan army (7.23-
7.24.2).  This was a serious blow to the Athenians since, having lost Plemmyrium, 
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι οὐδ’ οἱ ἔσπλοι ἀσφαλεῖς ἦσαν τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς τῶν ἐπιτηδείων 
(οἱ γὰρ Συρακόσιοι ναυσὶν αὐτόθι ἐφορµοῦντες ἐκώλυον καὶ διὰ µάχης ἤδη 
ἐγίγνοντο αἱ ἐσκοµιδαί)...   
 
the work of bringing in provisions through the entrance to the harbor 
could no longer be carried on with safety (since the Syracusans lying in wait 
there with triremes hindered this, and from now on the convoys could only make 
their entrance by fighting)... (7.24.3) 
 
The greater competitiveness of the Syracusans on the sea was confirmed just after the 
loss of Plemmyrium, when eleven ships from Syracuse destroyed most of a convoy of 
boats sailing from Italy with goods for the Athenians (“πλοῖα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γέµοντα 
χρηµάτων”) (7.25.1-2).    Eventually, the loss of Athenian superiority in trireme numbers 
and the growing naval ability of the Syracusans brought about a series of defeats at sea 
which led to the destruction of the expedition.
31
 
 The narrative of the expedition and especially the very close, almost exact, verbal 
echoes of Nicias’ advice to the Athenians at 6.22 found in Thucydides’ account of 
operations during the Sicilian campaign at (especially) 7.4.4, 7.13.1, and also 7.24.3—
note especially there the use of ἐσκοµιδὴ, a very rare word,
32
 recalling “ἐσκοµιζώµεθα” at 
6.22—bear out, then, Nicias’ analysis of the difficulties of provisioning the expedition in 
Sicily prior to its setting out and especially his emphasis on the importance of naval 
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 See chapter 1 section iva. 
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superiority for its successful provisioning.
33
  Crucially, in Thucydides’ narrative of the 
expedition, this (Athenian) naval superiority is linked with the security of logistical 
support from states near to or in the theater of operations (once that superiority was lost, 
the bringing in of supplies from areas near to the Athenian base of operations could no 
longer be guaranteed).  Thus, given the close relationship between the erga of the 
campaign and the logos of Nicias, the close connection in Thucydides’ narrative of the 
Sicilian expedition between the struggle at sea and the provisioning of the expedition 
from nearby states (along with the lack of any mention of provisioning from Athens in 
the narrative of the expedition) confirms the analysis in chapter 1 section i that, at 6.22, 
Nicias was asking for a superiority in triremes to guarantee the safety of the transport of 
provisions from states near to the Athenian base of operations, i.e. from states in Italy and 
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 Thucydides’ wish to demonstrate this means incidentally that he includes in his description of the Sicilian 
expedition the type of detail on provisioning that was usually omitted in the rest of his work as taken for 
granted by his audience in order to justify Nicias’ initial pessimism about the expedition and to demonstrate 
that the Athenians should have followed Nicias’ advice and not sailed to Sicily.  Cf. here the many more 
mentions of the convention of reception by poleis in Thucydides’ account of the Sicilian expedition:  
Thucydides includes these not only because the political/diplomatic situation in the far west was far more 
fluid than in the Aegean and the power of the Sicilian poleis and their distance from Athens meant that their 
reception of the expedition could not be taken for granted, but also to bear out Nicias’ contention in his 
second speech to the assembly that the Athenians, if they embarked upon the expedition, would be sailing 




Appendix 2:  The Number of Men on the Athenian Campaign in Sicily 
in 415-413 
 
Although Thucydides presents singularly detailed information on the size of the 
first armament that sailed from Athens to Sicily (6.43-6.44.1), and also provides (less 
detailed) information on its reinforcements, it is impossible to calculate with any 
precision the number of men who took part in the Athenian campaign in Sicily from 415-
413.  There are five main problems: 
1. Perhaps the most serious source of uncertainty in calculating the numbers of men 
who took part in the campaign is that we do not know how many men rowed the troop-
transports
1
 which are mentioned by Thucydides as constituting part of the first armament 
in 415, and which must have been the majority of the ships sailing under Demosthenes 
and Eurymedon in 413.
2
  Classical Athenian troop-transports were triremes that had been 
structurally modified in some way but could be reconverted into warships.
3
  But we are 
reduced to guessing as to what the structural modifications troop-transports underwent so 
as to be converted from triremes, and when it comes to estimating the number of sailors 
who were needed to row troop-transports.
4
  To accommodate the roughly 100 hoplites 
                                                 
1
 “στρατιώτιδες” at 6.43, but also referred to as ὁπλιταγωγοί by Thucydides (see, e.g., 8.25.1). 
 
2
 See now the recent summary of the problem at Hornblower, CT iii.1063-1065. 
 
3
 See Dover, HCT iv.309.  (This is Dover’s possibility (iii) for the meaning of στρατιώτις.  Recently, 
Wallinga ([1993] 174-177) has argued that triremes were regularly undermanned, and thus that Dover’s 
possibility (ii)—that a troop-carrier “was a normal trireme [i.e. with no structural modification] with a 
skeleton crew of sailors and a full complement of soldiers”—should be preferred (see Hornblower, CT 
iii.1063, 1064).  But Wallinga’s arguments that triremes were regularly undermanned do not stand up to 








that each transport must have carried,
5
 each troop-transport must have had (many?) fewer 




2. Thucydides provides many fewer numbers and details for the second major 
armament that sailed out under Demosthenes and Eurymedon in the summer of 413 as a 
reinforcement than he does for the first expedition in the summer of 415.
7
  He mentions 
that the force under Demosthenes and Eurymedon consisted of 73 triremes,
8
 about 5,000 
hoplites (of which 1,200 were Athenians “ἐκ καταλόγου” (7.20.2)), “not a few Barbarian 
and Greek javelin-men, slingers, and bowmen, and a sufficient amount of materiel and 
provisions” (7.42.1).
9
  There are several problems in attempting to calculate precisely the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
5
 A figure of roughly 100 hoplites per troop-transport makes the most sense of the figures Thucydides gives 
for the number of ships and hoplites sailing to Sicily in 415 and 413.  See van Wees (2004) 311-312 n.20; 
Hornblower, CT iii.1063-1065, and esp. the summary at 1065:  “[l]et us assume that fast triremes carried 10 
hoplite marines and were rowed by 170 sailors, and that troop-carriers carried 10 hoplite marines and were 
rowed by 60 sailors; and that some rowers were hoplites [N.B. this last step does not follow from the 
preceding discussion]...  If we adopt Casson’s more conservative 85 as the no. of hoplites carried on troop-
carriers, there is not room for 5,000 (40 x 85 = 3,400 on 40 troop-carriers + 100 epibatai on 10 fast triremes 
= 3,500) without yet more hoplite rowers.  It is not possible to be more precise than this.”  In practice, the 
number of hoplites carried by troop-transports must have varied according to the requirements and 
circumstances of an expedition:  see Krentz (2007) 149 Table 6.1. 
 
6
 In addition, it is not absolutely certain that the troop-transports were oared by dedicated rowers:  H. van 
Wees’ attractive suggestion (ap. Hornblower, CT iii.1064) “that the hoplites’ slave attendants acted as 
rowers on the transports” cannot be ruled out.  Also, note that Thucydides does not indicate if any of the 




 Cf. Hornblower, CT iii.619. 
 
8
 See Dover, HCT iv.419, Hornblower, CT iii.1062 for this number. 
 
9
 “... ἀκοντιστάς τε βαρβάρους καὶ Ἕλληνας οὐκ ὀλίγους καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ τοξότας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην 





number of men who constituted this second force.  Although Thucydides does not tell us 
that any of the 73 triremes were troop-carriers, most must have been, otherwise we 
cannot explain how the 5,000 hoplites were conveyed to Sicily;
10
 since Demosthenes and 
Eurymedon “brought as many troops as the original expedition, their 73 ships must have 
included troop-carrying space equivalent at least to 40 troop-carriers.”
11
  More precision 
than this is impossible, leading to the double problem that we have only a rough idea both 
of how many ships served as troop-transports in 413, as well as no real idea of how many 
men rowed these.  
Secondly, since Thucydides does not provide a precise figure for the numbers of 
light-armed troops on the second expedition, it is also impossible to calculate exactly the 
numbers of men who made up the light infantry component of the second force.  
Thucydides does mention that the second armament was joined (on its way to Sicily) by 
150 Iapygian (7.33.4), 300 Metapontine (7.33.5), and 300 Thurian javelin-men (7.35.1), 





 or for the light-armed troops recruited in the Aegean 
before the force had embarked from Athens.
14
 
                                                 
10
 See Hornblower, CT iii.1063. 
 
11
 Dover, HCT iv.309. 
 
12
 Although these seem to have matched the number of light-armed troops recruited by the Athenians from 
elsewhere:  this is the implication that follows from 7.60.4. 
 
13
 See 7.57.9 with Hornblower, CT iii.667 ad loc. 
 
14
 See 7.20.2:  in addition to preparing triremes and recruiting hoplites from the islands for the expedition, 
the Athenians collected light-armed troops from their other allied subjects (“... καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων 
ξυµµάχων τῶν ὑπηκόων, εἴ ποθέν τι εἶχον ἐπιτήδειον ἐς τὸν πόλεµον, ξυµπορίσαντες”).  See Dover (1965b) 
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 The expedition under Demosthenes and Eurymedon will also have been 
accompanied by vessels carrying supplies and materiel.
15
  Since the 413 expedition was 
smaller than the 415 expedition, there would have been fewer vessels of this type sailing 
in 413.  But Thucydides provides no indication as to their number; thus, to arrive at any 
estimate for them, we would be reduced to falling back on probabilistic assumptions 
based on the numbers he does provide for the ships carrying supplies and materiel for the 
expedition in 415. 
3. This leads to the third problem, that of estimating the numbers of slaves and non-
combatants following the expedition(s).
16
  In 415, the purely military/naval part of the 
force was followed by 30 grain-transporters (which also conveyed the bakers, 
stonemasons and carpenters for the expedition)
17
 and by one hundred ploia also 
requisitioned for the expedition.  In addition, Thucydides tells us that many other 
holkades and ploia followed the expedition voluntarily for the purposes of trade.  If it is 
difficult to calculate accurately the numbers of men on the officially requisitioned 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 ad “εἴ ποθέν τι εἶχον ἐπιτήδειον ἐς τὸν πόλεµον”:  “[d]espite the neuter gender, the reference can hardly 
be to anything except specialized categories of troops, e.g. archers and slingers.” 
 
15
 See above on “τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν” at 7.42.1, contra Hornblower, CT iii.619 ad 7.42.1 




 Cf. Hornblower, CT iii.1062. 
 
17








 Another source of uncertainty for the calculation of the numbers of men on the 
expedition is the numbers of slave attendants.
19
  It was usual practice for citizen hoplites 
to be accompanied on campaign by slave attendants,
20
 and the 1,500 Athenian hoplites on 
the 415 expedition and the 1,200 on the 413 expedition who qualified for military service 
as a member of the top three property classes will certainly have had slave attendants 
                                                 
18
 Green has attempted to estimate the number of men aboard these ships ([1970] 131 n.2) :  “[s]upplies, 
grain, tools, bakers, masons, and carpenters were carried aboard thirty merchant-vessels; the total 
complement of these ships, at the most conservative estimate, is unlikely to have been less than 1,500-
2,000 men.  There were also 100 smaller vessels (size not specified) requisitioned by the fleet, which may 
have accounted for a further 3,000 ±.  This is quite apart from the private traders and camp-followers.”  
Green, in fact, thinks that for non-combatants “a total figure of up to 20,000 is by no means impossible” 
([1970] 131).  But these figures, though based on reasonable assumptions, are all conjecture:  see 
Hornblower, next note and at n.16 above. 
 
19




 See Pritchett (1971) 49-51; van Wees (2004) 68-69; and 7.75.5 for the Sicilian expedition especially:  on 
account of the desertion of some slaves, and distrust of others, the hoplites and cavalrymen carried their 
own property “παρὰ τὸ εἰωθός,” “contrary to their usual custom” (Jowett).  Other literary evidence, in 
addition to that collected by Pritchett and van Wees, for the presence of slave attendants assumed in 
classical Greek armies:  Xen., Oec. 8.4; Polyaenus, Strateg. 2.3.10, 3.9.52.  See also van Wees (2004) 271-
272 n.23 for iconographical evidence for slave attendants accompanying Athenian hoplites on campaign; 
and Hornblower, CT iii.564 for inscriptional evidence for same.  The presence of slave attendants on 
military campaigns was a simple extension of the fact that well-off classical Greek citizens (see next note), 
when traveling, were always accompanied by a slave attending to their needs:  see Whitehead (1982) 120 
for this point (and, in addition to the evidence collected by Whitehead there, see also, e.g., Thucy. 4.118.6; 
Xen., Mem. 3.13.6; Theophr., Characters 21.5, 30.7).  (Gomme (HCT ii.275 ad 3.17.4), citing Thucydides’ 
description of the battle of Delium and Athenian operations at Pylos, disagreed with the position that every 
hoplite had a slave-attendant:  but, firstly, see already Pritchett [1971] 50 for Gomme’s mistake in not 
realizing that Thucydides does mention slave-attendants at Delium; secondly, Thucydides does tell us, 
contra Gomme, why the Athenian hoplites at Pylos did take up the “banausic work” of building a wall there 
(they were bored:  4.4.1); thirdly, Gomme did not take into account the rest of the vast amount of evidence 







 the 2,150 allied and 500 Argive hoplites on the first expedition and the 
3,800 hoplites from the islands (7.20.2) on the second, who also served as hoplites by 
reason of their property qualification, will almost certainly have had slaves with them, 
too.  It is much less certain, and likely improbable, however, that the seven hundred 
Athenian thetes on the first expedition (and the unknown number on the second) who 
served as hoplite marines had slaves to accompany them; and the 250 mercenary hoplites 
in 415 will probably not have been followed by personal servants, either.
22
  It is unlikely 
that any of the light-armed troops who took part in the operations in Sicily will have been 
accompanied by slave attendants, but, again, certainty is impossible on this point.  But the 
650 cavalry on the expedition will certainly have had slave attendants with them.
23
 
4. The “many” Sicels who came to Syracuse to join the operations against Syracuse 
in the summer of 414 (6.103.2) present a fourth problem:  Thucydides never gives a 
figure for the Sicels who joined the Athenians (perhaps because he had no way of 
ascertaining one), and we have no way of knowing how many Sicels “many Sicels” 
might have been.  Estimates have ranged from 1,000 to 10,000;
 24
 there is no way of 
                                                 
21
 See van Wees (2004) 56, citing Aristot., Pol. 1274a16-22, 1303a8-10:  the top three property classes in 
Athens included only the “rich” and the “notables.” 
 
22
 If the evidence of Xenophon’s Anabasis, describing conditions in a Greek mercenary army some fifteen 
years later, is any guide:  it appears that, amongst the Cyreans, only officers were followed by slave 
attendants (Tuplin [1998] 287-288; Lee [2007] 255-256).  
 
23
 See again 7.75.5.  Note, too, that an unknown number of the captured Hyccarans had been bought by 
members of the expedition (7.13.2):  this may explain the reference to the presence of slaves under the age 
of military service with the expedition before the final battle in the Great Harbor of 413 (see 7.60.3 with 
Dover, HCT iv.441). 
 
24




adjudicating between these figures, though it does seem unlikely that Thucydides would 




5. A final and serious problem confronting any attempt to determine precisely the 
numbers of men on the Athenian campaign in Sicily from 415-413 is the issue of 
casualties and desertions.
26
  The problem in calculating casualty figures stems from the 
facts that Thucydides only gives casualty figures selectively, and not after every 
engagement;
27
 that he rarely reports casualties among light-armed troops;
28
 and that his 
figures appear to be rough estimates, rather than any sort of official counts.
29
  In other 
words, Thucydides’ narrative of the expedition does not present a consciously full 
accounting of the numbers of casualties suffered by the Athenians and their allies in 
Sicily.  It is clear, however, from his description of the operations in Sicily that the losses 
                                                 
25
 There must also have been hoplite reinforcements from Naxos, Catana, and Etruria with the expedition, 




 Cf. Hornblower, CT iii.1065. 
 
27
 Rubincam (1991) 181, 190-191, and esp. 186-187:  there are “considerable fluctuations in the casualty 
information reported by Thucydides for different kinds of troops; and there are signs that these may well be 
due as much to the historian’s own judgment of the relative significance of different details for the 
understanding of a battle or of the whole war, as to the chance of his access to different sorts of 
information.  For in a considerable number of cases his statement of casualties contributes significantly to 
the particular picture his narrative paints of the engagement in question.” 
 
28
 Rubincam (1991) 187-189. 
 
29





suffered by the Athenians in the first year of the campaign were minimal,
30
 but that, 
especially after the stationing of the fleet at Plemmyrion in the summer of 414, casualties 
must have been numerous and continuous in the second year of the campaign.  
Thucydides does mention that the crews stationed at Plemmyrion suffered serious losses 
at the hands of the Syracusan cavalry stationed at Olympieion (7.4.6; cf. 7.13.2), but 
provides no numbers.  Similarly, Thucydides tells us that the expedition lost a great many 
men (killed and taken prisoner) when the Syracusans captured the forts at Plemmyrion 
(7.24.2), and that a great many of the Athenians and allies were killed in the night battle 
on Epipolae (7.45.2) (both in the summer of 413), but provides no casualty figures for 
either engagement.
31
  Thucydides does give fuller and more precise information on the 
losses suffered by the Athenians at sea in the summer of 413:  three triremes were lost 
defending against the Syracusan attack on Plemmyrion (7.23.4); one or two of the 
Athenian triremes were sunk in the first battle after the reconstruction of the Syracusan 
                                                 
30
 Before the change of the Athenians’ naval base to Plemmyrion in the summer of 414, the mentioned 
casualties are:  “some light-armed” (“τῶν ψιλῶν τινὰς”) scattered in search of plunder who were killed by 
Syracusan cavalry (the first ominous mention of this crucial Syracusan strategic advantage in operation) 
(summer 415) (6.52.2); 50 (Athenian and allied) dead in the battle of the Anapus (beginning of winter 
415/414) (6.71.1); some few Athenians and Argives killed in the capture of the first Syracusan counterwall 
(summer 414) (6.100.2); Lamachus and 5 or 6 men (summer of 414) (6.101.6).  Some few Athenians and 
allies must have been killed in the other limited operations undertaken by the forces of the expedition 
during its first year in Sicily (see esp. 6.101.5-6:  other casualties certain, but only those of Lamachus and 




 Diodorus gives a figure of 2,500 men lost in the attack on Epipolae (13.11.5), but figures in Diodorus for 
the sizes of military forces and casualties are schematic and unreliable, and should not be trusted:  see 
Meiggs (1972) 447-452, 457-458; Hornblower (1987) 203; cf. esp. Bigwood (1983) 351 and n.50 on 
Diodorus’ “[s]chematic figures [in his account of the battle of Cunaxa]... inspir[ing] little confidence.”  The 
only casualty figure Thucydides provides (for operations on land in the second year of the expedition) is 70 
horse and a few hoplites, lost in a defensive operation against a Syracusan attack on the Athenian lines 
(7.51.2) (confirming the Syracusan superiority on land noted at 7.51.1).  Again, there must have been other 
infantry engagements after the relocation of the Athenian naval base to Plemmyrion—the Athenians 




triremes (7.38.1); seven triremes were sunk and most of the men on-board them taken 
prisoner and others killed in the battle after Ariston’s ruse (7.41.4); 18 triremes were 
taken by the Syracusans and all their men killed in a battle soon after the lunar eclipse 
(7.53.3).  (This last notice alerts us to another source of uncertainty:  it is usually unclear 
in Thucydides how many, if any, men escape after the sinking of a trireme.)  In sum, we 
can state that the Athenians suffered major casualties in the final year of the war, but we 
will be reduced to the roughest of estimates in calculating these. 
 The expedition also lost many men to desertion, especially again in the final year 
of the war, when the Athenians had lost their clear superiority on land and sea, and an 
unsuccessful outcome for the expedition became increasingly certain:  already by the late 
summer of 414, Nicias was describing desertion as a serious problem for the expedition 
(see esp. 7.13.2).  We may imagine that the process accelerated as the situation of the 
expedition deteriorated, and especially when malaria began to be a serious problem in the 
camp as the summer of 413 progressed (7.47.2; cf. 7.50.3, 7.75.3).  But we have no way 





 It is, then, impossible to derive from Thucydides’ narrative of the Sicilian 
expedition (or any other narrative thereof) a precise (or even closely approximate) figure 
for the number of combatants and non-combatants on the Sicilian campaign at any point 
during its operations.  This is not meant in any way as an attack on Thucydides’ integrity 
as a historian.  Thucydides was generally careful and conservative in his use of numbers:  
                                                 
32




he clearly took pains to establish their accuracy;
33
 indicated to his audience the level of 
confidence they should have in the exactness of particular figures;
34
 and, generally, “did 
not... indulge in the kind of wild and absurd inflation of numbers that so besmirched the 
reputation of some other ancient historians...”
35
  But there were major limits, given the 
state of communications technology and the limited aims of public archives in the fifth 
century Greek world, to the amounts of accurate numerical information Thucydides could 
gather.
36
  In addition, Thucydides could presume in his audience knowledge of the basic 
conditions of war:  thus he did not have to specify, for example, how many sailors usually 
rowed classical Athenian troop-transports, or if light-armed troops were usually 
accompanied by slave attendants or not.  Moreover, Thucydides’ narrative of the events 
in Sicily was not written to serve as a primary source for the Sicilian expedition:  it was 
constructed, rather, as an interpretation of a recent and controversial series of events of 
                                                 
33
 See, e.g., Rubincam (1979) 80, 82. 
 
34
 See Rubincam (1979) 78-82, 84 for Thucydides using qualifiers to indicate doubts about the precision or 
certainty of particular figures.  See Rubincam (1991) 184-185 for an interesting illustration of this:  “only 
17% of troop numbers are qualified [in Thucydides], as against 57% of the casualty figures, even though 
the troop numbers are larger on average, and larger figures are as a rule more highly qualified.  I would 
take this to mean that Thucydides and/or his informants (we cannot usually be sure who introduced the 
qualification felt less certainty regarding casualty figures).”  Precise numbers of troops going out to fight 
will have been easier to discover than casualty figures (Rubincam [1991] 184).  See also Rubincam (2001) 
85:  Thucydides does not qualify all his measures of distance; those he does not qualify are between fixed 
points within Attica, or immediately adjacent areas, or in the Amphipolis area—i.e., in areas with which 
Thucydides was thoroughly familiar. 
 
35
 Rubincam (1991) 190.  See also Hornblower (1987) 203:  “Thucydides’ sobriety in giving troop and fleet 
totals does not establish his accuracy.  But he must be given his rightful place at the head of an honourable 
tradition which avoided inflated figures.” 
 
36






  Those numbers that were included in Thucydides’ account of 
the Sicilian expedition all served the rhetorical purpose of furthering his interpretation of 
the events of the expedition.  This is not to say that Thucydides misrepresented or 
invented numerical information, but that his presentation of numbers should not be 
judged by anachronistic norms taken from modern research or discursive practices.
38
 
 If, then, Thucydides could not gather precise information on the numbers of all of 
the various contingents of the expedition, and may sometimes not have included 
numerical information which he did have access to, we can still accept the figures that 
Thucydides does give us for troops, cavalry, triremes, and transports.  And we can use 
these figures to come up with the order of magnitude we should be thinking of for the 
numbers of men on the expedition.  The numbers are enormously and impressively large.  
The first force that sailed to the far west in 415 had 5,100 hoplites, of which 2,200 were 
Athenian, 1,500 from the hoplite register, and 700 thetes who were with the force as 
marines for the ships; 2,150 were from Athenian subject poleis, 500 from Argos and there 
were 250 Mantinean and other mercenaries.  Completing the infantry forces of the 
expedition, there were 480 archers (80 of whom were from Crete), 700 slingers from 
Rhodes, and 120 light-armed exiles from Megara.  There was also one horse-transport 
carrying 30 horses:  these would have been accompanied by their cavalrymen.  All 
together, then, the land force that sailed to Sicily in 415 comprised 6,430 effectives. 
                                                 
37
 See introduction section iv for these points. 
 
38




 The naval component of the expedition was made up of 134 triremes, of which 
100 were Athenian vessels—60 fast triremes and 40 troop-transports—and the remainder 
from Chios and the other allies, and 2 pentekonters.  The 94 triremes that were not troop-
transports would have been manned by, in addition to 10 hoplites and 4 archers (already 
counted), 170 rowers, 10 deck hands, and 6 officers:
39
  some 17,500 men in total (17,484 
exactly).  The two pentekonters would have rowed by 50 men.  The one horse-transport 
would have been oared by 60 rowers.
40
  Leaving aside the men who crewed the troop-
transports, the purely naval component of the force would therefore have amounted to 
somewhere around 17,650 men.  The expedition leaving Athens in the summer of 415 
comprised, then, at a minimum, approximately 24,100 effectives.  These were joined, by 
the early summer of 414, by 650 cavalry in all (i.e. both Athenian and allied) (6.98.1; cf. 
6.94.4).  Three pentekonters arrived from Etruria in the summer of 414 (6.103.2), adding 
                                                 
39
 See Hornblower, CT iii.1063 for the 34 allied triremes being warships, and not troop transports.  See 
Morrison (1984) 55 for two hundred men (as broken down in the text above) being the usual crew of a 
trireme in the classical period.  Wallinga ([1993] 169-185) argued that Athenian triremes were regularly 
undermanned “at the moment of mobilization” ([ibid.] 178), but this view has been thoroughly refuted by 
Gabrielsen (1994) 249 n.11.  In addition to Gabrielsen’s objections to Wallinga, note also, firstly, that 
Wallinga ([1993] 170-171) has no convincing arguments against the evidence of the many calculations of 
trireme crews’ pay for future or proposed campaigns found in classical sources that all proceed on the basis 
that trireme crews numbered 200 men; secondly, that his treatment of the crew numbers at the battle of 
Sybota ([1993] 173) suffers from the misconception that Corcyra and Corinth were ordinary poleis (see 
esp. 1.33.2 on Corcyra being the second greatest naval power in Greece after Athens), and misses the point 
that it took the Corinthians two years to prepare a fleet for the campaign which culminated in the battle of 
Sybota (1.31.1); and, thirdly, that 6.50.2 and Xen., Hell. 1.5.20 do not show that “even in the Athenian 
navy undermanning was habitual” ([1993] 174), but that desertion from fleets on campaign occurred in 
certain circumstances (cf. Xen., Hell. 5.1.24, [Dem.] 50.32, 38 for evidence for desertion apparently being 
common in the fourth century).  See also [Dem.] 50.7 (unnoted by Wallinga):  Apollodorus boasts that he 
was the first trierarch to man his ship before embarkation for some operations in the north Aegean—
implying that all trierarchs could be expected to do so eventually; and [Dem.] 51.5-6:  another trierarch in 
the mid fourth century assuming that all triremes setting on a campaign will eventually be manned. 
 
40
 See Morrison et al. (2000) 156 citing IG II
2
 1628.154-5, 161-2, 470, 475, 480 (and cf. Morrison et al. 




another roughly 240 men.
41
  Thus, at some time before the end of summer 414 (i.e., 
before the start of the serious losses in manpower suffered by the expedition due to 
fighting and desertion), the expedition numbered at least 25,000 men.  
There will have been roughly 4,000 slave attendants (at a conservative estimate) 
accompanying the expedition’s hoplites, and certainly 650 slaves accompanying the 
cavalrymen.  The number of rowers oaring the troop-transports can only be guessed at, 
but one could adopt 60 as a minimum estimate.  Each transport and the two pentekonters 
will have had officers and deck hands, too.  In addition to the men crewing the fast 
triremes and rowing the pentekonters, we could therefore add 3,000 men (almost 
certainly a minimum figure) oaring the transports and making up the crews of the 
pentekonters for the expedition.  The men in the vessels requisitioned for the transport of 
the supplies and materiel of the expedition and in the vessels sailing voluntarily for the 
sake of trade may have amounted to at least 5,000 men.
 42
  Moreover, one plausible guess 
estimates the number of Sicels who joined the operations against Syracuse in the summer 
of 414 (6.88.4, 6.103.2) at 10,000;
43
 again, being (very) conservative, we could add, say, 
5,000 for our estimates.  Adopting a series of purposefully low and cautious estimates, 
then, the expedition will have numbered between 25,000 and 42,500 men before Nicias 
took the decision to transfer the expedition’s naval station to Plemmyrion; more likely, 
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 See Morrison et al. (2000) 56 (citing Hdt. 7.184.3). 
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we should be thinking of somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 men.
44
  After the 
transfer of the fleet to Plemmyrion, even the roughest of estimates become difficult, since 
the rates of the expedition’s casualties and desertion amongst its crews become much 
heavier, and there are the problems indicated above with calculating the numbers of men 
who came to Sicily as part of Demosthenes’ and Eurymedon’s expedition in 413;
45
 it 
seems very unlikely, however, that losses were such that the numbers of combatants and 
non-combatants in the Athenian and allied forces ever dipped below 30,000 men. 
One final point.  Thucydides does state, in his highly emotional description of the 
retreat of the remnants of the expedition after the final defeat of the fleet in the Great 
Harbor of Syracuse, that “in the entire throng no fewer than 40,000 men were on the 
march together,” “µυριάδες γὰρ τοῦ ξύµπαντος ὄχλου οὐκ ἐλάσσους τεσσάρων ἅµα 
ἐπορεύοντο” (7.75.5).  This figure, however, should not be taken as indicative of the 
numbers of men who constituted the expedition at this point.  As discussed, Thucydides 
was generally very careful and cautious in his numbers.  On rare occasions, however, he 
did ‘tragically’ use exaggeratedly large numbers to evoke strong emotion; but this use of 
huge, ‘conventional’ figures is limited to three highly rhetorical contexts in which 
precision was impossible.
46
  At 7.75.5, there is no way that Thucydides could have 
                                                 
44
 Though see p.579 n.23:  some of the slaves who were with the expedition in 413 were not of military age. 
 
45
 But note that, in addition to these reinforcements, Eurymedon sailed out from Athens during the winter 
of 414/413 with 10 triremes (7.16.2), and left 9 behind (7.31.3)—that is, 1,800 men.  Given the problems 
indicated above, however, even these precise data do not help us to formulate an estimate for the numbers 
of Athenian and allied forces in the winter of 414/413 or summer of 413. 
  
46
 See Rubincam (1979) 85-86 with n.36:  in addition to 7.75.5, the other two occasions are 2.98.3 (a figure 
given in the context of the huge resources possessed by the barbarian kingdom of Sitalces):  the huge army 
that invaded Macedonia under Sitalces is said to have amounted to no less than 150,000 men (“λέγεται οὐκ 
ἔλασσον πεντεκαίδεκα µυριάδων γενέσθαι”: note “λέγεται”—the number of men under Sitalces’ is not 
endorsed by Thucydides); and 7.27.5:  the “more than 20,000 slaves” that fled from Athens to Deceleia 
  
588 
known how many men were fleeing the Athenian camp; this, together with the strongly 
emotional context in which the figure is given, requires that the figure of 40,000 should 
not be taken as representing a ‘true minimum.’
47
  That is, the figure of ‘more than 
40,000’ should be taken as indicating a general idea that great numbers of men were 
fleeing the Athenian camp, and the precise idea that the final demise of the Sicilian 
expedition constituted a tragedy for the Athenian state, and not as an estimate or the basis 
for an estimate of the number of combatants and non-combatants on the Sicilian 
expedition who had survived the fighting until this point.
48
 
                                                                                                                                                 
after the Spartans fortified it.  On this latter passage, see Rubincam (1979) 85:  “[b]ut given the context in 
which the figure stands, as one of the details supporting the general statement that the occupation of 
Dekeleia “hurt the Athenians very much, and because of the destruction of property and loss of manpower 
that it caused, was one of the chief reasons for the decline of Athenian power”, it seems most likely that 
Thucydides said “more than 20,000” rather than “about 20,000” not because he had reason to believe this 
figure was the lowest conceivable (i.e., that it was a true minimum), but because he wanted to emphasize 
how large the figure was.”  Hanson’s ([1992]) attempts to ‘save’ the figure of around 20,000 as a reliable 
estimate for the number of Athenian slaves who deserted are unconvincing and proceed from 
methodologically incorrect assumptions. 
 
47
 See Rubincam (1979) 85-86:  “[t]here are other passages where a considerable element of uncertainty 
probably existed for Thucydides or his informants, but the strongly hyperbolic context in which the figures 
are cited... makes it likely that the primary reason for the qualification was emphasis... [W]hen [Th.] asserts 
that the crowd that streamed out of the Athenian camp near Syracuse for the final hopeless retreat by land 
numbered “not less than 40,000” (VII.75.5), I cannot believe that this is anything more than the roughest of 
estimates.  If, as seems probable, the group enumerated included not only fighting troops, but hangers-on 
and slaves, it would be surprising if even Nikias knew how many they were.  Why, then, a comparative 
rather than an approximating qualifier?  The context here is highly rhetorical, the whole chapter devoted to 
the description of the retreat being written so as to evoke strong emotion, in the style of ‘tragic history’.  
And the figure is cited to justify the statement that the retreat resembled a procession of refugees fleeing 
from a captured city, “... and a large [city] at that”.  This hyperbolic tone in the passage suggests that 
Thucydides wrote “more than 40,000” instead of “about 40,000” chiefly from a desire to emphasize the 
magnitude of the figure.  That it is no true minimum is confirmed by its largeness, both by Thucydides’ 
standards and by those of modern scholars:  it is the second largest number applied by Thucydides to a 
group of people, and one of only four numbers from 20,000 up; and many modern scholars have felt that 
even if 40,000 were taken as an absolute figure, or an outside maximum, it is probably still too high.” 
 
48
 As, e.g., Dover (HCT iv.452) does.  See also Hornblower, who devotes an appendix “to establish whether 
that figure [of more than 40,000] can be true” (CT iii.1061-1066) (though Hornblower concludes that 
Thucydides “did exaggerate a bit,” citing H. van Wees (who thinks the figure of 40,000 “just possibly 




Appendix 3:  The Daily Grain Requirements of Classical Greek Sailors 
and Soldiers 
 
i. Classical and Hellenistic ideas of the daily grain requirements of adult males 
 It appears to have been a commonly accepted notion in the classical and 
Hellenistic Greek worlds that one Attic choinix (= 1.094 liters)
1
 of wheat was a proper 
and sufficient allowance for the daily grain consumption of sailors and sailors.  
Herodotus used this amount to calculate the total grain requirements of the men in 
Xerxes’ army and navy:  “εὑρίσκω γὰρ συµβαλλόµενος, εἰ χοίνικα πυρῶν ἕκαστος τῆς 
ἡµέρης ἐλαµβάνε, καὶ µηδὲν πλέον,” “for I find reckoning that each man received a 
choinix of wheat, and nothing more...” (7.187.2); the fact that Herodotus used this figure 
to make his calculation of Persian military requirements in grain in 481 strongly implies 
that such an amount was considered usual (and sufficient) for the daily subsistence of 
sailors and soldiers in the classical period.
2
  The same implication can be drawn for the 
Hellenistic period from two inscriptions from Crete and Amorgos.  In a treaty between 
Attalus I and Malla made ca. 200,
3
 it was stipulated that, on the arrival at Malla of 
auxiliary soldiers sent by Attalus, the Mallians would provide for the maintenance of the 
men, giving one Aiginetan drachma to each man (and two to their officers) and one Attic 
choinix (of wheat) (Face A, ll.20-24):  “Ὅταν δὲ παραγένωνται πρὸς Μαλλαίους, 
                                                 
1
 Moreno (2007) 325. 
 
2
 Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 52, 55.  Or, to put it another way, this amount of wheat was considered a 
sufficient contribution to a diet meeting the energy requirements of an adult male in the classical period:  
on energy requirements, see section ii below. 
 
3





τ[ρ]ε[φ]έτωσαν τὴν συνµαχίαν αὐτοί, παρέχ[ο]ντες τῆς ἡµερᾶς ἑκάστωι ἀνδρὶ δραχµὰν 
αἰγιναῖαν, τῶν δ’ ἡγεµόνων ἑκαστωι δραχµὰς δύο καὶ κατὰ σῶµα χοίνικα ἀττ[ικ]ην...”
4
  
(Although the type of grain is not specified in the treaty, since wheat was by far the most 
commonly consumed grain in the Greek world ca. 200, we should take it that wheat is the 
grain referred to here.)
5
  An inscription recording the arrangements for a public meal at 
Aegiale in the second century states that, in addition to pork (for the ephebes) and wine, 
one choinix of wheat was to be distributed to all male residents of the polis (and one half 
choinix to boys):  “... σιτοµετρείτωσαν δ[ὲ οἱ] ἐπιµεληταὶ ὠνησαµένοι σῖτον πύρινον ἀπὸ 
τοῦ ἀργυρίου διδόν[τ]ες τῇ προτεραίᾳ τοῖς τε πολίταις τοὶς ἐπιδηµοῦσιν καὶ παροίκοις καὶ 
ξένοις τοῖς παρεπιδηµοῦσιν τῶν µὲν ἄνδρων ἑκάστῳ χοίνικα τῶν δε παίδων ἥµισυ 
χοίνικος” (IG XII.7.515.70-4).  Although Foxhall and Forbes thought that this inscription 
could not offer evidence for the usual daily consumption of wheat by Greek adult males 
because the wheat was dispensed “under such special, ceremonial circumstances,”
6
 “the 
fact... remains that the ration given to each man under the regulations governing the 
festival is the precise equivalent of the daily military ration attested by... other sources; 
thus, the regulations recorded by this inscription strongly imply that a choinix of wheat 
for each man was an appropriate ration for one day.”
7
 
                                                 
4
 The treaty also stipulated that the Mallians were to continue to distribute the ration of one Attic choinix a 




 Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 52; Markle (1985) 294.  On wheat as the predominant grain in the Hellenistic 
Greek world, see Gallo (1983) 462 n.15 (with earlier references there). 
 
6
 (1982) 53. 
 
7
 Markle (1985) 294.  For one choinix of grain as an appropriate allowance for the daily grain consumption 
of an adult Greek male, cf. also Herakleides Lembos, FHG 3.169 fr. 5 (ap. Atheneaus 3.98E):  reporting 
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 It also appears to have been commonly accepted in classical and Hellenistic 
Greece that two choinikes of ἄλφιτα were the (nutritional) equivalent of one choinix of 
wheat.
8
  The strongest evidence for this equivalency comes from the accounts of the 
temple of Apollo on Delos for 282 (IG XI.2.158A.37-50).  For the first seven months of 
their service in this year, two τεχνῖται employed by the temple received 1.5 choinikes of 
wheat per day, in addition to two obols per day “εἰς ὀψώνιον.”
9
  In the last three months of 
the year, when wheat prices on Delos had risen significantly,
10
 cheaper ἄλφιτα was 
substituted for the wheat at the rate of 3 choinikes per day.
11
  Although these rations do 
not provide evidence for Greek thinking on the standard daily grain consumption of adult 
males—since they were meant to provide for the two craftsmen’s households, too
12
—
                                                                                                                                                 
that Alexarchus, brother of Cassander, called the choinix “the daily-feeder,” “τὴν χοίνικα ἡµεροτροφίδα.”  
Although no interpretation of this phrase can admit of complete certainty, it is likely, given the date (see n.5 
above), that Alexarchus was referring to a choinix of wheat (see Figueira [1984] 91).  The Pythagorean 
precept “µηδ’ ἐπὶ χοίνικα καθίσαι,” reported in later sources, may not be referring to a daily ration of grain 
(Foxhall and Forbes [1982] 51-52 n.34) and it is unclear in any case whether it is referring to a choinix of 
wheat, barley, or barley-meal ((ibid.), Roebuck [1945] 161 n.88). 
 
8
 See Jardé (1925) 128-135 for the original argument for this position (though see Roebuck [1945] 159 for 
Jardé establishing daily grain consumption at too high a level on the basis of IG XI.2.158A.37-50 (and see 
further n.12 below)). 
 
9
 Actually 45 choinikes of wheat and 10 drachmas “εἰς ὀψώνιον” per month. 
 
10
 I do not enter here into the controversy on the reason for this price rise:  see Oliver (2007) 241-247 for a 
recent summary and reasonable treatment of the controversy. 
 
11
 Actually 90 choinikes of ἄλφιτα.  Reger’s discussion ([1993] 304-317) of the relative prices of wheat and 
barley-flour on Hellenistic Delos is not helpful in ascertaining the relative cheapness of ἄλφιτα on the 
island in 282 since it is based on an incorrect conversion of (whole) barley (“κριθαί”) prices into barley-
flour (“ἄλφιτα”) prices:  see Sosin (2002) 138. 
 
12
 This can be stated for two reasons:  firstly, both 1.5 choinikes of wheat and 3 choinikes of barley-meal 
are 50% greater than the standard amounts for daily grain consumptions for adult males recorded elsewhere 
in literary and epigraphical sources; secondly, “the 2 obols per day εἰς ὀψώνιον is too much for other food, 
such as oil, wine, fruit and vegetables, for one person” (Markle [1985] 295). 
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they do demonstrate that it was thought on Delos in 282 that two volumetric units of 
ἄλφιτα were the equivalent of one volumetric unit of wheat.  That two (Attic) choinikes 
of ἄλφιτα per day were considered sufficient (over a continuous period of time) to cover 
the daily grain requirements of adult male soldiers (and were thus the equivalent of one 
choinix of wheat) can be seen from the terms of the armistice between the Athenians and 
the Spartans in 425 after the Spartiate force on Sphacteria had been cut off from the 
mainland:  the Athenians permitted the Spartans on the mainland to send the Spartiates 
blockaded on Sphacteria (a fixed amount of) two Attic choinikes of ἄλφιτα (already 
kneaded) per day, as well as two kotylai (= 0.547 liters) of wine and a piece of meat per 
day.
13
  Around 200, an inscription from Mykonos records that a cook, in return for his 
work butchering and cooking two pigs for a public sacrifice, was paid by the archons in 
charge of the sacrifice “ὀσφὺν καὶ κωλῆν τῆς ὑὸς τῆς ἑτέρας, ἀλφίτω[ν] δύο χοίνικας, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
13
 Thucy. 4.16.1:  the Spartiates were to receive “δύο χοίνικας ἑκάστῳ Ἀττικὰς ἀλφίτων καὶ δύο κοτύλας 
οἴνου καὶ κρέας...”  Roebuck ([1945] 160) suggests that the rations of two choinikes of ἄλφιτα and two 
kotylai of wine received by the Spartiates on Sphacteria could have been a ration deliberately designed to 
humiliate them (and thus might not offer evidence for usual daily food consumption rates).  This view is 
based, however, on inferences about daily consumption rates drawn from evidence for Spartiate 
contributions to their syssitia; but these contributions can tell us nothing about daily Spartiate consumption 
rates (see n.20 below).  The Helots accompanying the Spartiates on Sphacteria were to receive half their 
rations (Thucy. 4.16.1): i.e., they were to receive a grain ration of one choinix of barley-meal a day (not 
barley, as Moreno [2007] 32 n.184 has it).  This does not mean that one choinix of ἄλφιτα was considered 
sufficient to cover the daily energy requirements of an adult male Helot, but reflects Helots’ lower status as 
compared to Spartiates (contra Foxhall and Forbes [1982] 55)—and therefore does not tell us how much 
grain Helots normally consumed per day in civilian life on their farms.  Thucy. 4.16.1 has been cited along 
with Athenaeus 6.272B by Figueira ([1984] 91) and Moreno ([2007] 31 n.184) as evidence that slaves 
normally received one choinix (of barley-meal) per day.  But the statement at Athenaeus 6.272B that the 
Corinthians had so many slaves that the Pythian priestess called them “pint-measurers” “χοινικοµέτρας” 
“merely informs us that the choenix was the unit normally used for measuring out grain for slaves; it is not 
specifically stated how many choenikes or with what product slaves were fed” (Foxhall and Forbes [1982] 
51); for the measuring out of grain for distribution as particularly associated with slaves, see Theophr., 
Characters 9.4.  (Note finally here that Hornblower (CT ii.169-170) states ad 4.16.1 that “a single 
choinix—here, the helot ration—is the... daily ration of corn assumed by Hdt. at vii.187.2.”  But it is not the 




οἴνου τρεῖς κοτύλ[α]ς,” “the loins and ham of one pig, two choinikes of barley-meal, three 
kotylai of wine” (SIG
3
 1024.14-16).  While the loins and ham were clearly special 
rewards, the payments of ἄλφιτα and wine can be taken, in the absence of any 
disbursement of money to the cook, as the payment of a day’s food requirements,
14
 and 
thus back up the evidence of Thucy. 4.16.1 that two choinikes of barley-meal were 
considered sufficient allowance for the daily grain consumption of an adult male in 
classical and Hellenistic Greece. 
 This figure also receives support from a passage in Herodotus discussing Spartan 
customs and institutions.  Herodotus states that if the Spartan kings  
µὴ ἐλθοῦσι δὲ τοῖσι βασιλεῦσι ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον ἀποπέµπεσθαί σφι ἐς τὰ οἰκία 
ἀλφίτων τε δύο χοίνικας ἑκατέρῳ καὶ οἴνου κοτύλην, παρεοῦσι δὲ διπλήσια πάντα 
δίδοσθαί·  τὠυτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς ἰδιωτέων κληθέντας ἐπὶ δεῖπνον τιµᾶσθαι. 
 
do not come to the messes, two choinikes of barley-meal and a kotyle of wine are 
sent to each of them at their houses, but when they come they shall receive a 
double share of everything; and the same honor shall be theirs when they are 




The kings, then, received two choinikes of barley-meal and a kotyle of wine when they 
dined at home, and twice these rations—and twice more than the other Spartiates 
present—when they dined at the public mess (i.e., the Spartiates at the messes received a 
daily ration of two choinikes of barley-meal and a kotyle of wine).
16
  Hodkinson thought 
                                                 
14
 Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 54 (contra Markle [1985] 295). 
 
15
 This is an adaptation of the Loeb translation. 
 
16
 The second portion was to allow the King to honor whomsoever he might choose:  see Xen., Lac. Pol. 
15.4.  Hodkinson ([2000] 194), following Macan, notes that “the word διπλήσια [at 6.57.3] describes the 
relationship between the kings’ rations and those of other citizens, not that between the kings’ rations at the 
mess and at home.”  But Hodkinson is forced to note (ibid.) that “Herodotus’ text, however, clearly intends 
some contrast between home and mess”; it is hard to see what that contrast could be if it were not between 
the portion of two choinikes of barley-meal and a kotyle of wine received at home, and the double portion 
of these foods received at the mess.  Hodkinson ([2000] 194-195] attempts to argue, leaning on Herodotus’ 
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that Herodotus was using Lakonian rather than Attic measures here,
17
 but there is good 
reason to think that Herodotus is, in fact, using Attic measures in this passage.  Firstly, 
Attic(-Euboic) measures are assumed as the ‘default’ measures throughout the rest of 
Herodotus’ work:  when he converts the Persian artaba into Greek measures for his 
audience, he uses the Attic medimnos and choinix (1.192.1); similarly, when he converts 
Babylonian talents into Greek talents, he uses the (Attic)-Euboic standard (3.95.1).
18
  
Secondly, slightly earlier in his description of the perquisites of the Spartan kings, 
Herodotus notes that they receive at each new moon and each seventh day of the first part 
of the month, a full-grown victim for Apollo’s temple, a medimnos of barley-meal and a 
‘Laconian quart’ of wine (“καὶ οἴνου τετάρτην Λακωνικήν”) (6.57.2):  the fact that 
Herodotus specifies that the Laconian measure only here in his account of the kings’ 
perquisites implies strongly that he is using other (i.e. Attic) measures in the rest of his 
description (why would he specify a Laconian measure for the wine and not for the 
barley-meal here otherwise?).
19
  Thirdly, Herodotus cannot be referring to two Laconian 
choinikes of ἄλφιτα as the normal daily ration of grain distributed at the Spartan syssitia, 
                                                                                                                                                 
use of the word “πάντα” at 6.57.3, that the contrast is between the limited range of foodstuffs the king 
would receive at home (barley-meal and wine only) and the full range of foodstuffs they would receive in 
the mess.  But this interpretation provides no satisfactory explanation for the contrast between home and 
mess rations denoted by “διπλήσια,” and forces Hodkinson into unconvincing and incorrect argumentation 
for the amounts of food normally consumed by Spartiates in their syssitia (see p.599 n.35 below), and 
therefore should be rejected. 
 
17
 (2000) 194. 
 
18
 And see again 7.187.2:  there is no reason to think that Herodotus is using any other measure here than 
the Attic.  Therefore Hodkinson’s statement that the view that Herodotus was using Attic measures “does 
violence to Herodotus’ text in implying that he translated Lakonian measures into Attic, but neglected to 
inform his readers” ([2000] 194) is incorrect. 
 
19




because that would add up to a total of 60 Laconian choinikes a month, more than (we 
know from other evidence) each Spartiate actually contributed to the syssitia (and we 
never hear of any public contribution to the Spartan messes).
20
  At 6.57.3, then, 
Herodotus narrates that the Spartan kings received two choinikes of ἄλφιτα when they 
stayed at home, and that all Spartiates (except the kings) received the same measure of 
ἄλφιτα at the public messes.
21
 
 Finally, a passage from Xenophon’s Anabasis may also offer evidence that two 
choinikes of ἄλφιτα were a usual and sufficient allowance for the daily grain needs of 
soldiers (and so could be considered the nutritional equivalent of one choinix of wheat).  
At Anab. 1.5.6, Xenophon, describing the desperate situation of the Greeks when their 
grain ran out during the march between Corsote and Charmande, states that it was not 
possible to buy grain anywhere else than in the Lydian agora, 
                                                 
20
 Each Spartiate contributed one Laconian medimnos (=48 choinikes) a month to their syssition:  see Plut., 
Lyc. 12.2 and Dicaearchus, FHG 2.242, fr. 23 (ap. Athenaeus 4.141C) with Figueira (1984) 88-89, 
Hodkinson (2000) 191-192.  It should be noted here that Spartiate contributions to their syssitia cannot be 
used to reconstruct their daily or monthly food consumption since there is no indication in any ancient 
source that the Spartiates’ consumption in the messes matched their contributions and it is probable that 
some of the food contributed went to feed non-Spartiates:  see Garnsey (1989b) 91 n.8 for this point. (It 
should be noted here, in addition, that Foxhall and Forbes’ discussion of the caloric values of the Spartiate 
contributions to the syssitia ([1982] 58-59) is invalid because of their failure to realize that Plutarch’s 
account of the common mess dues used Laconian (and not Attic) measures (see Figueira [1984] 92 n.11, 
Hodkinson [2000] 206 n.9, 206-207 n.12).) 
 
21
 See also p.599 n.35 below for refutation of Hodkinson’s arguments that Herodotus was using Laconian 
measures at 6.57.3.  Hodkinson also argues that Herodotus cannot be using two Attic choinikes at 6.57.3 
because they do not convert into Laconian measures neatly; but there is no reason why this would present a 
problem for Herodotus’ audience.   Hodkinson also argues that the circumstances on Sphacteria do not 
present corroboration for the view that Hdt. 6.57.3 offers evidence for a daily mess ration of two Attic 
choinikes, since the rations for the Spartiates on Sphacteria were to cover their daily consumption and the 
rations for the Spartiates were only to cover their evening meals:  but we do not know how much a 
Spartiate ate outside the syssitia (Foxhall and Forbes [1982] 58) and the communal meal is presented in all 
ancient sources to be (by far) the most important meal of the day.  Finally, it should be noted here that 
Moreno cites Hdt. 7.187 with Hdt. 6.57 and Thucy. 4.16 for the statement that “[t]wo choinikes of barley 
were perceived as the nutritional equivalent of one choinix of wheat” ([2007] 32 n.184).  But both Hdt. 




τὴν καπίθην ἀλεύρων ἢ ἀλφίτων τεττάρων σίγλων.  ὁ σίγλος δύναται ἕπτα 
ὀβολοὺς καὶ ἡµιωβέλιον Ἀττικούς· ἡ δὲ καπίθη δύο χοίνικας Ἀττικὰς ἐχώρει. 
 
at the price of four sigloi for a kapithē of wheat-flour or barley-meal.  The siglos 
is worth seven and one-half Attic obols, and the kapithē had the capacity of two 
Attic choinikes. 
 
The interesting thing about Xenophon’s description of the prices found in the Lydian 
agora for this discussion is that the kapithē is converted in other Greek texts into Greek 
measures at the rate of either half a choinix or one (Attic) choinix,
22
 and appears to have 
been in reality a dry measure of just less than a liter in capacity (or just under an Attic 
choinix).
23
  Why did Xenophon write, then, that the kapithē contained two Attic 
choinikes?  It seems to me that there are two possible answers to this question.  Firstly, 
the kapithē in the Lydian agora may have contained, as usual, just less than an Attic 
choinix but Xenophon, influenced by the fact that he and the rest of the Greeks normally 
bought and consumed two Attic choinikes of barley-meal (and wheat-flour)
24
 per day, 
may have recalled incorrectly that the kapithē contained two Attic choinikes.
25
  Secondly, 
the kapithē in the Lydian agora may really have contained two Attic choinikes of barley-
                                                 
22
 See Tuplin (2004) 172 for references. 
 
23
 Bivar (1985) 632-634. 
 
24
 It should be noted that the equivalence found at Anab. 1.5.6 between wheat-flour and barley-meal tells us 
nothing about the normal relationship between wheat and barley-meal in the Greek world because wheat 
was always sold/distributed in the form of grain and not flour in the Greek world.  It is not surprising, 
however, that two choinikes of wheat-flour could be considered a daily grain allowance similar to two 
choinikes of barley-meal, given the close relationship between wheat and barley in weight per volume and 
the fact that wheat-flour weighs less by volume than wheat: see Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 78. 
 
25
 For the idea, cf. already Tuplin (2004) 172 n.58:  “[p]erhaps Xenophon absorbed the drachmae-per-
choinix and translated back into sigloi-per-kapithe, getting relatively familiar sigloi roughly right but 
misremembering the size of a kapithe – a confusion possibly assisted by disagreement about how many 




meal (or wheat-flour) because the traders in the agora may have adjusted its capacity to 
meet the usual purchasing (and consumption) practices of the Greeks.  Under either 
hypothesis (and no other seems possible to me), two Attic choinikes of ἄλφιτα per day 
again seems to be considered a normal consumption rate of grain for classical Greek 
soldiers. 
 There is, then, relatively speaking, quite a lot of contemporary ancient evidence to 
support the idea that classical and Hellenistic Greeks thought that one choinix of wheat or 
two choinikes of ἄλφιτα were sufficient to cover the daily grain requirements of adult 
males, and especially sailors and soldiers.  Almost all discussions of the daily grain 
consumption of adult Greek males now reject this equivalency, however, on the basis of 
the results of some grinding and milling experiments carried out by Lin Foxhall.
26
  In 
order to attempt to define the contribution made by grain to ancient Greek and Roman 
diets, and in the absence of any data from antiquity for the weight per volume of ἄλφιτα, 
Foxhall produced her own figure for the weight per liter of ἄλφιτα by some milling 
experiments with a small sample of English two-rowed, hulled barley.
27
  Although 
Foxhall noted many reasons why any result from these experiments should be treated 
with caution,
28
 the figure she produced—0.643kg of barley-meal per liter—was still used 
                                                 
26
 Jasny ([1942] 752 n.11) and Roebuck ([1945] 159-160) had already rejected the 1 : 2 wheat : barley-meal 
equivalency on the grounds that wheat has a nutritive value of roughly 35 percent more than barley by 
volume, and thus the ratio of 1 : 2 could not be valid as it did not accurately reflect the difference in 
nutritive value between wheat and barley:  but, again, the question is one of barley-meal, and not barley, 
and therefore the 1 : 2 equivalency cannot be rejected on these grounds. 
 
27
 Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 75-78. 
 
28
 (Ibid.) 77-78:  “[t]here are, however, some severe difficulties involved [in these experiments], and I am 
not fully convinced of the validity of th[e] figure produced [by them].  First, my sample of barley meal was 
made from English, not Greek, barley.  Second, we do not know precisely which methods were used to 
remove the lemma and palea [from hulled barley grains] in antiquity.  Third, we do not know the extraction 
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throughout her and Forbes’ treatment of ancient grain consumption.
29
  On the basis of 
this figure, a figure for weight per volume of wheat (from modern Messenia) of 0.772 kg 
per liter,
30
 and the fact that the caloric value of wheat and barley is roughly the same, 
Foxhall and Forbes calculated that one liter of wheat would only have provided 440 more 
calories than one liter of ἄλφιτα:
31
  they concluded from this that “[i]t is likely, then, that 
one choenix of wheat per man per day was the more or less standard Greek allowance, 
especially for army rations, though whether this is true of its possible corollary, two 
choenikes of alphita is more doubtful.”
32
   
After Foxhall and Forbes’ article—or, more precisely, after Foxhall’s calculation 
of the weight per volume of barley-meal—it has become standard to deny any 
                                                                                                                                                 
rate of ancient alphita, i.e. what percentage of the original weight of grain is left after grinding and 
winnowing or sifting... It is likely that the extraction rate of ancient alphita fell within the 60-70% range, 
but it is by no means certain, and again much further experimentation is needed.” 
 
29
 (Ibid.) 44:  “[u]nfortunately, we have carried out only one set of experiments with small samples, and the 
results are thus statistically dubious; but since these are the only weight/volume figures available for barley 
ground on a simple mill, they will have to suffice for the present.”  Before continuing, I should say here 
that Foxhall and Forbes’ article was ground-breaking both in its collection and treatment of the literary and 
epigraphical evidence for ancient Greek and Roman grain consumption, and in its attempts to compare this 
evidence with skeletal data (but see pp.610-611 n.79 below) and FAO/WHO information on human caloric 
requirements, and, although new data have emerged since they published their article (see section ii below), 
still remains the starting point for any research on this topic. 
 
30




 (Ibid.) 53-54. 
 
32
 (Ibid.) 55; cf. (ibid.) 56 n.49.  Although they attempted to cast doubt on the literary and epigraphical 
evidence for a standard daily grain allowance of two choinikes of ἄλφιτα per man per day ((ibid.) 54-55), it 




equivalency between one choinix of wheat and two choinikes of ἄλφιτα,
33
 and to use one 
choinix of wheat or barley-meal in calculating the daily grain requirements of classical 
Greek populations.
34
  It has also become standard for scholars to use the figure Foxhall 
produced for the weight per volume of ἄλφιτα of 0.643kg per liter to calculate the grain 
requirements of adult Greek males
35
 (even for those few scholars still using two choinikes 
of ἄλφιτα as their figure for the daily grain consumption of classical Greek 
populations).
36
  But, in addition to the problems cited by Foxhall and Forbes in using the 
                                                 
33
 Although Foxhall and Forbes nowhere in their article actually ever explicitly rejected the 1 : 2 
equivalency between wheat and barley-meal.  See, e.g., Gallo (1983) 453 (expliciting following Foxhall 
and Forbes, and consequently rejecting the 1 : 2 equivalency between wheat and barley (sic)); Garnsey 
(1989b) 38:  “[u]ntil 1982, when Foxhall and Forbes published their article... it was generally accepted that 
the ‘standard ration’, at least in the Greek world, was 1 choenix of unmilled wheat per day, or double this 
volume of barley meal.”  See also Markle (1985) 278-279 using Foxhall and Forbes’ calculations to reject 
the 1 : 2 equivalency between wheat and barley-meal, and to compute a figure of 1.2 choinikes of barley-
meal as a sufficient daily ration for an adult male. 
 
34
 See, e.g., van Wees (2001) 48 (and n.20) citing Foxhall and Forbes in using one choinix of “grain” (the 
context shows van Wees is thinking of barley-meal) to calculate the caloric requirements of the inhabitants 
of zeugite farms in classical Attica (and cf. [2001] 47 and n.11 for using Foxhall and Forbes’ figures to 
calculate the grain-producing requirements for membership of Athenian property classes); Lee (2007) 8 and 
n.33, 214 and nn.46, 48 explicitly citing Foxhall and Forbes for the statement that a choinix of wheat or 
barley-meal was the standard daily ration for the Cyreans, and esp. (2007) 38 and n.142 citing Foxhall and 
Forbes in using a figure of one choinix of barley-meal to calculate how many days’ rations the xenia given 
to the Cyreans by Sinope and Heraclea would have made for 8,000 men.  See also Krentz (2007) 154 taking 
one choinix of barley-meal (“or (less often) wheat”) to be a standard ration for classical Greek soldiers; 
Lendle (1995) 373 taking one choinix of barley-meal to be the standard daily ration.  See also Lazenby 
(1994) 16 and n.143 citing Foxhall and Forbes on figures for rations for classical Greek military forces and 
their caloric equivalents. 
 
35
 Arguing incorrectly from Hdt. 6.57.3 (see n.16 above), and using Foxhall and Forbes’ estimates of the 
weight per volume of ἄλφιτα, Hodkinson ([2000] 195-196) postulates daily mess rations for Spartiates of 1 
Laconian choinix (1.55 liters) of ἄλφιτα (it should be noted that his postulated daily mess ration of 1 kotyle 
of wine has serious problems:  see Lipka [2002] 151 n.27).  Hodkinson ([2000] 194) similarly uses Foxhall 
and Forbes’ calculations to argue that Hdt. 6.57.3 does not offer evidence for a daily ration in the Spartiate 
syssitia of two Attic choinikes of ἄλφιτα on the grounds that this would provide an unrealistically high 
number of calories.  See also Figueira (1985) 93 n.15 using Foxhall and Forbes’ figures to calculate the 
wheat equivalent of ἄλφιτα (and see also p.601 n.42, p.617 n.100 below); and Reger (1993) 325 n.80 using 
Foxhall and Forbes’ figure for weight per volume of ἄλφιτα to calculate the monthly demand for grain of 




 Whitby (1998) 15; Gabrielli (1995) 119 (with appendix 4 section ii). 
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figure for ἄλφιτα produced by Foxhall’s milling experiments, there is a problem in their 
calculations that renders invalid their figure for the weight per volume of barley-meal.  
For her experiments, Foxhall states that she started with a sample of one liter of “very 
clean” English autumn-sown wheat (triticum vulgare) with a net weight of 782.2g per 
liter, and with a sample of English two rowed, hulled barley, “fodder quality, reaped by 
combine harvester, not cleaned, numerous hull and rachis fragments included,” with a net 
weight of 587.0g per liter.
37
  But in her presentation of her milling results, Foxhall lists a 
figure for her (“whole, hulled grain”) barley sample (“before grinding”) of 750g per liter:  
it was the grinding, winnowing, and sifting of this sample that produced the weight per 
volume of barley-meal of 0.643kg/liter.
38
  (Foxhall gives no indication as to why she uses 
this different figure; my best guess is that it refers to the weight per volume of her 
original sample of barley after it had been cleaned and the “numerous hull and rachis 
fragments” removed.)  This figure—750g per liter—for weight per volume of hulled 
barley grains is not possible, however.  The normal weight per volume ratio between 
wheat and barley (made ready for sale or distribution, i.e. “cleaned”), as found in all other 
times and places, is roughly 6 : 5
39
 or 5 : 4.
40
  But the barley sample used by Foxhall 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
37






 This ratio between wheat and barley is attested for classical Attica (Stroud [1998] 54), Roman Egypt 
(Rathbone [1983] 270 (and see (ibid.) for this ratio found in other times and places in pre-modern and 
modern Europe)), and the modern United States of America (see again Stroud [1998] 54). 
 
40
 The latter ratio is attested for modern Messenia (see van Wersch [1972] 185:  a figure of 772g/liter for 




weighing 750g per liter does not fit this ratio either with her own sample of wheat—
which only weighed 32.2g more per liter—or with the weight per volume of any sample 
of wheat known from antiquity (or modernity).
41
  Secondly, as Figueira has pointed out, a 
weight of 750g/liter for barley is heavier than USDA #1 barley (c. 606g/liter) and heavier 
than the upper range for weight per volume of barley allowed in modern grain storage 
handbooks.
42
  At some point in her experiment or calculations, then, Foxhall made an 
error that led her to use a figure for the weight per volume for her barley sample that was 
invalid—and since her figure for the weight per volume of ἄλφιτα was derived from this 
invalid figure, her figure for the weight per volume of barley-meal must be considered 
invalid, too.   
Foxhall’s calculations, then, offer no grounds to reject the weight of the classical 
and Hellenistic literary and epigraphical evidence attesting that both one choinix of wheat 
and two choinikes of ἄλφιτα could be considered proper and sufficient for an adult Greek 
male’s daily consumption of grain; and all the calculations of Foxhall and Forbes—and 
subsequent scholars—of the grain requirements of classical Greek adult male populations 
made on the basis of Foxhall’s figure of 0.643kg/liter for the weight per volume of 
ἄλφιτα must be rejected. 
                                                 
41
 Since for a sample of wheat to cohere with Foxhall’s figures for barley, it would have to have a weight 
per volume of 900g/liter or 937.5g/liter.  These weights per volume would be above any known for 
antiquity (see, e.g., Foxhall and Forbes [1982] 43 on the figures from Pliny, HN 18.66; Rathbone [1983] 
270 on weights per volume for wheat from Roman Egypt) or known to me from modern agriculture:  the 
National Association of British and Irish Millers (the U.K. trade association for flour millers), for example, 
quotes a figure for weight per volume of wheat of 750g/liter (I am grateful to Dr. Sam Millar, Head of 
Cereals & Milling Department, Campden & Chorleywood Food Research Association, for sending me this 
information (in an e-mail of 3/15/2007)). 
 
42
 (1985) 93 n.15.  Curiously, however, having pointed this out, Figueira then proceeds to use Foxhall’s 




ii.  Was one choinix of wheat per day sufficient to cover the energy requirements 
of classical Greek sailors and soldiers? 
 Since the publication of Foxhall and Forbes’ article in 1982, new data on the 
weight per volume of wheat and barley in classical Greece have emerged from a recently 
discovered inscription recording an Athenian law of 374/3 B.C. establishing a tax on 
grain from the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros.
43
  The law prescribed that the 
contractors of the tax, once they had transported the tax grain to the Aiakeion (in the 
Athenian agora),
44
 weigh out the wheat at the weight of a talent for 5/6 of a medimnos 
and the barley at the weight of talent per medimnos.
45
  An initial objective of this 
appendix was to use this equivalency to come up with a figure of weight per volume for 
barley-flour, but there are no data (from any geographical region or historical period) 
presently available on the weight ratio between a given volume of barley-flour and the 
given volume of barley it was produced from.
46
  In this section of the appendix, therefore, 
I will attempt to use the (normative) figure for the weight per volume of wheat the 
Athenian grain-tax law gives us
47
 in order to calculate whether one choinix of wheat—
                                                 
43
 Stroud (1998) is the editio princeps.  The inscription is now Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no.26. 
 
44
 Stroud (1998) 54. 
 
45
 Rhodes and Osborne 26.21-25. 
 
46 I have searched through ancient literary and epigraphical texts, secondary literature on ancient grain 
production and consumption, secondary literature on the metrology of pre-modern Europe, work and 
research on modern production and milling of barley, and have asked archaeobotanists about this question, 
but all to no avail. 
 
47
 Stroud (1998] 55) evinces caution in taking the weight/volume ratios recorded in the grain-tax law as 
standard figures either for Athens or for Greece in general; the point is well taken, but the point I would 
emphasize here is that this a weight per volume ratio for wheat prescribed by the polis of Athens for an 
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given that, as I have demonstrated in the previous section, this was considered in the 
Greek world the nutritional equivalent of two choinikes of barley-meal—would have 
provided a sufficient amount of calories to provide for the energy requirements of an 
average classical Greek sailor or soldier.
48
  Before proceeding, I should state that I am 
aware of the limitations of the results proceeding from the calculations I undertake in the 
rest of this section.  All of the key variables underlying the following calculations (the 
weight/volume conversion for wheat, the caloric value of ancient wheat,
49
 the height, 
weight, age, and physical activity levels of the average Greek sailor or soldier) allow of 
greater or lesser amounts of imprecision.  But the range of uncertainty will not be so large 
that “the parameters of the possible” on this question will not be able to be established;
50
 
that is, despite the imprecision of the calculations, I hope to demonstrate that they will 
still show that it is possible to establish whether one choinix of wheat provided a 
                                                                                                                                                 




 Note that von Reden ([2007] 403 and n.96) has already made use of Rhodes and Osborne 26 to calculate 
the daily and annual grain consumption of average classical Greek soldiers, and that Rosivach ([2000] 32 
and n.6) and Moreno ([2007] 32) have already made use of the inscription to calculate the annual grain 
consumption of Athenian adult males.  None of these scholars, however, have attempted to calculate 
whether the amount of wheat contained in a choinix as implied by Rhodes and Osborne 26.21-25 would 
have provided a sufficient amount of calories for a classical Greek adult male, and, furthermore, there is an 
error in Rosivach’s and von Reden’s calculations (see n.54 just below). 
 
49
 Cf. the gloomy remarks of Devroey on attempting to ascertain the caloric value of rations in the 
Carolingian period ([1987] 88):  “[q]uantitative research creates problems for the study of history of the 
early middle ages.  By calculating cereal yields and calorific values of rations on the basis of uncertain 
metric data there is a danger of substituting tenuous knowledge for ignorance.  The resulting illusion of 
reality may be no more than the reflection of our own hopes, anxieties and prejudices.” 
 
50




(roughly) sufficient amount of calories to meet the energy requirements of classical 
Greek sailors and soldiers. 
 The first source of uncertainty concerns the weight of an Attic talent.  In general, 
classical Greek measures cannot be expected to have been as precise or consistent as 
modern measures are.
51
  With this consideration in mind, although there is some doubt on 
the precise weight of an Attic talent,
52
 I will use here, following Moreno,
53
 the Attic 
market weight of 27.47kg for a talent.
54
  Proceeding on the basis of the weight/volume 
ratios provided by the grain-tax law, this gives us a figure of 0.687kg. (actually 
0.68675kg) per Attic choinix of wheat. 
 Estimating the caloric content of this weight of wheat is fraught with difficulties.  
Firstly, it is not possible to ascertain the cultivar of wheat grown on the islands of 
Lemnos, Imbros, or Skyros.
55
  Secondly, “[f]ood composition depends on a large number 
of factors:  climate, soil, variety, transport, storage, and preparation.”
56
  Because of these 
                                                 
51
 See Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 43. 
 
52
 See the discussion at Stroud (1998) 55. 
 
53
 (2007) 325. 
 
54
 Rosivach and von Reden (see n.48 above) mistakenly Attic coin weights in converting the weight/volume 
ratio found in Rhodes and Osborne 26 into metric weight equivalents of Attic volumetric units of wheat. 
 
55
 See Dalby (2003) 348-349 for a brief summary of the different cultivars of wheat grown in the Greek 
world.  Sallares ([1991] 324, 326) states that bread wheat was unknown in classical Greece, but it has been 
found in archeological excavations of Protogeometric and Geometric Greek sites, and the scant 
archeobotanical data from archaic and classical Greek sites suggests that it was cultivated in these periods, 
too:  Megaloudi (2006) 77-79, 81 with Tables 5.12, 13, 14. 
 
56
 Sika et al. (1995) 62; and see the differences noted in that article in caloric and nutrient content for grains 
by national region, country, and continent ([1995] 64-67).  Cf. Greenfield and Southgate (2003) 19:  
“[f]oods, being biological materials, exhibit variations in composition; therefore a database cannot 
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factors, modern food composition databases will only have a limited predictive accuracy 
for any single sample of wheat
57
 (although it should be noted that uncooked grains have a 
low water content and therefore are less variable in composition than other foods).
58
  
Thirdly, we do not know the typical extraction rates for wheat in classical Greece, i.e. 
how much of the original grain was left after milling, winnowing, and sifting.
59
  We may 
assume, however, for classical Greek sailors and soldiers using simple hand-held mills, 
that the usual extraction rate was (very) high.  With all of these problems in mind, I will 
use the figures of 343 kcal. per 100g. dry measure edible portion of whole grain or meal 
soft wheat (triticum aestivum), and 364 kcal. per 100g. dry measure edible portion of soft 
wheat flour of an extraction rate of 80-89 per cent (both drawn from FAO/USDA food 
composition data for the Near East)
60
 to calculate the (possible) caloric value of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
accurately predict the composition of any given single sample of food.”  The problem was seen by Foxhall 
and Forbes ([1982] 46). 
 
57
 Southgate (1993) 268-269.  The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the producers of food 
composition databases have not always indicated precisely the sources of their data and variations therein, 




 (Ibid.) 269. 
 
59
 Cf. Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 78, Clark and Haswell (1970) 53-54. 
 
60
 FAO/USDA (1982) (this study would have been unavailable to Foxhall and Forbes):  I chose the figure 
for triticum aestivum on the basis of the works cited at n.55; see also Megaloudi (2006) 35.  FAO/USDA 
(1982) also lists a figure of 367 kcal per 100g. dry measure edible portion of soft wheat flour of an 
extraction rate of 72 per cent.  Foxhall and Forbes used the figure of 334 kcal. per 100g for “medium” 
wheat of 100 per cent extraction (noted, however, as applicable to extraction rates of 94 to 100 per cent) 
from FAO/Chatfield (1949) Table 2, Item 1.  But, firstly, see next note on extraction rates for wheat and 
other grains; secondly, Chatfield’s study is now out of date, because of changes and improvements in 
analytical methodologies and documentation procedures (see FAO, [n.d.]); thirdly, and related to the 
second point, the values found in her study for the caloric value of wheat are consistently lower than those 
found in more recent publications (cf., e.g., Sika et al. [1995] 67 Table 5; USDA, Agricultural Research 
Service [2005]).  Of more recent FAO food composition data, I chose the data from the Near East since it 
clearly indicated caloric values for different extraction rates of indigenous wheat (from a region more 
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normal daily allowance of wheat for classical Greek sailors and soldiers.  Assuming an 
extraction rate of 90 per cent for the one Attic choinix of wheat,
61
 it would have been 
milled down to 0.618kg
62
 and had a caloric content of 2120 kcal; assuming an extraction 
rate of 80 per cent, it would have been milled down to 0.545kg.
63




 Comparative evidence suggests that cereals will have made up between 60 and 75 
per cent of an average classical Greek adult male’s caloric needs:  this is a guess, but an 
informed guess.
65
  It has sometimes been suggested that the diet of classical Greek 
soldiers may have included more cereals than the normal ‘civilian’ diet,
66
 but there is no 
reason to think this:  in friendly or neutral territory, military forces acquired their 
provisions from markets similar in scale and structure to those used by civilian 
                                                                                                                                                 
closely comparable to the Mediterranean and Black Sea region than other sources of FAO research data 
(Africa, Asia, Latin America) on food composition more recent than FAO/Chatfield [1949]). 
 
61
 See Clark and Haswell (1970) 53-54:  consumption of grain at extraction rates above 90 per cent 
unknown in contemporary third-world countries; they therefore assume a roughly 10 per cent loss in weight 
in milling “in the hands of a cultivator who has to exercise strict economy” ([1970] 54).  Foxhall and 
Forbes ([1982] 46 n.14) reject Clark and Haswell’s assumption, but without providing a reason. 
 
62
 Actually 0.618075kg.  From this point on, I will round figures for convenience. 
 
63
 Actually 0.5494kg. 
 
64
 Note that wheat flour does not lose any calories in the process of being made into bread (Foxhall and 
Forbes [1982] 80; Garnsey [1989a] 90 n.18). 
 
65
 See esp. Garnsey (1989a) 31; cf. von Reden (2007) 390. 
 
66
 Garnsey (1989b) 39, von Reden (2007) 403.  Garnsey was generalizing here about ancient military forces 
and fails to note that classical Greek military forces acquired their provisions through different means than 




populations and therefore had access to a ‘normal’ range of foodstuffs; in enemy 
territory, foraging may, in fact, have provided opportunities for a more variable diet than 
usually consumed.  Extrapolating from the 60 to 75 per cent estimates, then, one choinix 
of wheat at an extraction rate of 90 per cent would have been part of a diet providing 
between 2826 and 3533kcal, and one choinix of wheat at an extraction rate of 80 per cent 
part of a diet providing between 2668 and 3335 kcal. 
 How do these figures compare to the energy requirements of classical Greek 
sailors and soldiers?
67
  Energy requirement is defined as “the amount of food energy 
needed to balance energy expenditure in order to maintain body size, body composition 
and a level of necessary and desirable physical activity consistent with long-term good 
                                                 
67 Military historians of other periods in pre-industrial European history have attempted to calculate both 
the energy requirements of sailors and soldiers and the caloric content of known figures for military diets.  
Engels ([1978] 123-126) used a figure of 3600 kcal per man per day for the caloric requirements of 
Alexander the Great’s army and a daily ration of 3.9 lbs. of grain (to make 3.5 lbs. of bread).  But Engels’ 
figure of 3600 kcal. per day was the U.S. Army RDA for a 19-year-old soldier of 175.2cm height—
Alexander’s (and classical Greek) soldiers will have been both shorter and older, and therefore would have 
needed fewer calories (Roth [1999] 7, 12).  Secondly, Engels overestimated the amount of grain required 
per man per day because he misunderstood the bread-making process (Foxhall and Forbes [1982] 80) and 
because he mistakenly counted only grain consumption in his calculations of the food needed to meet daily 
energy requirements (Roth [1999] 47-48).  All estimates which have been made by scholars for the caloric 
requirements of Roman, medieval, and early modern European sailors and soldiers and the energy values of 
their diets are all more or less (sometimes methodogically) loose estimates, based on uncertain calculations, 
and offer no useful concrete comparative evidence (see the survey in Bachrach [2002] 97-100; Bachrach 
[2002] 86 uses a figure for grain consumption for the forces of the First Crusade besieging Antioch of 
“approximately one kilogram of milled wheat for each person per day” but this would produce a 
contribution for wheat alone of upwards of 3600 calories to the diets of the besieging forces and thus an 
implausibly high total caloric content for their diet of somewhere between 4800 and 6000 calories).  There 
are, at first sight, promising data in four medieval figures for the daily diets of galley crews and crusading 
forces (see Pryor [2006a] 10-12); but since the grain component of each of these diets consisted of ship’s 
biscuit, and we do not know the volume or weight of grain needed to make a given weight of biscuit ((ibid.) 
14-15), we cannot estimate the caloric content of these diets (Lane, in a ground-breaking article, used 
modern unshortened water crackers to estimate the caloric content of biscuit ([1966] 264 n.2), but this 
amounts to no more than a guess).  On the whole subject, see already Garnsey (1989b) 36, and esp. 38:  
“[i]n short, it is difficult to be enthusiastic about medieval and early modern sources on food consumption.”  
But comparative evidence does offer two insights.  Firstly, a survey of the scholarly literature on the rations 
of pre-modern European military forces demonstrates “the dominance of grain as the staple of the soldier’s 
diet in the pre-modern West” (Bachrach [2002] 100).  Secondly, the wheat ration of the Roman Republican 







  Human energy requirements are determined by a number of variables:  gender; 
weight; age; and level of physical activity.
69
  We can state with certainty that Classical 
Greek sailors and soldiers were male (!).  What of the other variables? 
 An adult male’s BMR, and therefore the bulk of his energy requirements, is 
determined by his body weight.
70
  We have no data for the weights of classical Greek 
adult males, but there are skeletal data providing an indication of the average stature of 





                                                 
68
 FAO/WHO/UNU (2004) 5.  Cf. Morley (2007b) 598:  “[i]n its simplest form subsistence may be equated 
with the calories necessary for the survival of an average person.” 
 
69
 FAO/WHO/UNU (2004) 7:  adult males need energy for basal metabolism (representing 45 to 70 per 
cent of daily total energy expenditure (and which “is determined mainly by the individual’s age... body 
size, and body composition”); metabolic response to food (which “increases total energy expenditure by 
about 10 percent of the BMR [basal metabolic rate] over a 24-hour period in individuals eating a mixed 
diet”); and physical activity (this “is the most variable and, after BMR, the second largest component of 
daily energy expenditure”). 
 
70
 (Ibid.) 8, 35-36.  BMR [basal metabolic rate]:  “[t]he minimal rate of energy expenditure compatible with 
life.  It is measured in the supine position under standard conditions of rest, fasting, immobility, 
thermoneutrality and mental relaxation” (FAO/WHO/UNU [2004] 9). 
 
71
 A number of notes regarding these figures.  The numbers in this table represent averages calculated in 
each case by the reporting authors; only Bisel (1990) and Ma (2008) report individual heights.  Also, none 
of these figures, with the exception of those in Breitinger (1937), would have been available to Foxhall and 
Forbes.  Finally, von Reden ([2007] 388 Table 14.1) has also summarized average heights for classical 
Greek skeletons, but there are several problems with her table.  Firstly, she missed Bisel and Angel (1985), 
a publication that supersedes the Angel articles from 1971 and 1972 which she cites (see next note).  
Secondly, she reports a figure for classical Acanthos of an average of 169.2cm for male skeletons without 
providing a reference for this figure.  Thirdly, she states that “sample size is given in cases in which n < 50” 
but does not note sample size for the figures from Metapontum and for the skeletons from the grave of the 
Messenians where the sample sizes are < 50.  Fourthly, she does not include a figure for the Spartiates 






  170.5cm (n=52) 
Metapontum
73
 166.6cm (n=20) (std. 6.1) 
Spartiates
74
 170.0cm (n=13) 
Messenians
75
 171.3cm (n=4) 
Thebans (?)
76
 179cm (n=2) 
 
The mean of these figures is 169.79cm; the standard deviation of 2.13cm implies that 
170cm should serve as a reasonable approximation of average heights.
77
  A total of 
                                                 
72
 Bisel and Angel (1985) 203 Table 4:  the classical period is periodized there as 650-300 B.C., and the 
skeletons are listed as coming from “various sites in Greece.”  This study can be taken from Angel’s 
comment at (1985) 197 on the Mycenaean skeletons he reports in this article as superseding his previous 
publications of skeletal data from the classical period.  Kron ([2005] 72 n.22) notes regarding this article 
that Angel employed the (commonly used) Trotter and Gleser method (for extrapolating stature from long 
bones) which “arguably gives very slightly exaggerated results compared to the more conservation Olivier 
method.”  But note also that Kron himself uses results gained by using the Trotter and Gleser method since 
it is generally “considered accurate” ([2005] 79-80). 
 
73
 Henneberg and Henneberg (1998) 520.  Note that the average height of males in the table above is 
uncorrected for age; the average corrected for age by Henneberg and Henneberg is given as 165.6cm (std. 
6.0).  Henneberg and Henneberg used the Trotter and Gleser method to reconstruct stature from the skeletal 
remains they examined (ibid.). 
 
74
 Breitinger (1937) 203.  These skeletons are the remains of the Spartiate dead from King Pausanias’ 
Athenian expedition of 403:  see Xen., Hell. 2.4.33.  Three notes on this figure:  firstly, Breitinger reports 
an average of 170cm, with the three tallest individuals being 178, 181, 185cm, respectively, and the 
smallest being 160cm; secondly, Breitinger does not indicate the methods he used to reconstruct the 
statures of the Spartiates; thirdly, these results may have been skewed upwards by attempts to 
accommodate them to the National Socialist ideological position that classical Spartiates were part of the 
same ‘Northern race’ as Germans (see [1937] 203). 
 
75
 Bisel (1990) 159 Table 7.  The skeletons in question were Messenian, not Athenian (contra von Reden 
[2007] 388 Table 14.1). 
 
76
 Ma (2008) 76:  these two skeletons were among the dead buried in the tomb underneath the Lion of 
Chaironeia commemorating the battle of Chaironeia in 338. 
 
77
 It should be noted here that Henneberg and Henneberg’s sample of twenty skeletons had a standard 
deviation of 6.1, showing quite a variation between samples.  In contrast, the variation found between the 
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ninety-one heights for classical Greek males is clearly a very small sample set to be 
working from; that said, the sample is not skewed by any subjective bias (representing 
simply the classical Greek skeletal heights that have been published) and is drawn from 
all over the classical Greek world.  From the figure established here for an average height 
for classical Greek adult males, one can reconstruct an average body weight for classical 
Greek males by using an exponential equation developed by Henneberg, Hugg, and 
Townsend precisely for this purpose:  W(eight) = 2.05.exp[0.0208.h(eight)].
78
  Using the 
figure established for the mean height of classical Greek males (169.79cm), this equation 




                                                                                                                                                 
different sets of data calculated here is much lower:  this may be because the combining of the four sets of 
already averaged figures has hidden “skews” in the data. 
 
78
 Henneberg et al. (1989).  See Henneberg and Henneberg (1998) 520 for a useful summary of the method:  
“[b]ody weight can be reconstructed from numerous bone dimensions combined into multiple regression 
equations.  Such an approach seems to be impractical in the case of our poorly preserved and often 
fragmentary material.  Moreover, robustness of the skeleton only partially reflects body weight since the 
degree of fatness may fluctuate over short periods of time, as may the level of hydration of the body.  Since 
the relationship between human body height and weight seems to be uniform over the wide range of 
individual ages and across populations, we have decided to reconstruct weight from body height.  This 
approach obviously cannot provide for fluctuating levels of fatness or hydration.  It can only indicate an 
average “normal” body weight.  The relationship between body height and weight is exponential:  
weight=2.05 exp[0.0208 height].” 
 
79
 I am grateful to Maura Halpenny for her help with the calculations of average classical Greek male body 
heights and weights in this appendix.  Foxhall and Forbes ([1982] 47-48) adopted an estimate of 62kg. for 
the average body weight of the “ancient Greek (or Roman) male.”  Remarking correctly that it was 
extremely difficult to determine even approximately average body weights for ancient Greek or Roman 
males (in 1982:  see p.608 n.71 above), because of the lack of attention paid to skeletal remains in classical 
archaeology, they arrived at this figure in two steps.  Firstly, they cited Angel (1945) 284-285 for a mean 
height for the ancient Attic male of 162.2cm (while noting that the results were not statistically significant 
because of the small sample size (61 males)).  Secondly, in order “to add flesh to these very bare bones” 
([1982] 47), they supplemented Angel’s figure with data for the average heights and weights of Cretan 
males in the 1940s and on Greek soldiers and university students in the 1960s ([1982] 47-48 n.22).  But 
there is a serious methodological error underlying these calculations.  Human height is determined by 
health and nutrition and, as such, is a highly sensitive indicator of the biological well-being of a population 
(see Kron [2005] 69-71 for a survey of recent research in anthropometry): average heights will therefore 
vary by region and time period to reflect changes in, e.g., the economic, demographic, and epidemiological 
environments; average statures have been known to increase in some historical populations by as much as 
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 Thirdly, age.  Classical Greek adult males of the requisite property were liable to 
conscription for hoplite (and cavalry) service between the ages of 18 and 60,
80
 although 
call-ups for active service on campaign for citizens at the upper end of this age range may 
have been limited in most poleis to extraordinary circumstances.
81
  Citizens were 
conscripted for hoplite service by tribal unit and age-group so that the burden of military 
service could be distributed equitably among those liable to conscription.
82
  Although it 
was something of a topos that mercenary forces were fitter and more able for military 
service than citizen armies made up of hoplites of a range of ages,
83
 there are numerous 
references in Xenophon’s Anabasis, by far the fullest and detailed account we possess of 
the ‘lived experience’ of a classical Greek mercenary force on campaign,
84
 to younger 
                                                                                                                                                 
5cm over a single generation (Niskanen [2006]).  Average heights (and weights) from modern Greece 
therefore cannot be used to reconstruct average heights and weights from classical (or ancient) Greece.  
Angel’s figure of 162.2cm cannot be used for the same reason, since it is an average calculated from 
skeletal material scattered chronologically over a time span of roughly 4500 years (from the Neolithic to 
the medieval periods) ([1945] 330, 362-363 Table 8). 
 
80
 See, generally, van Wees (2004) 46; and Bugh (1988) 52-55 for cavalry service (in Athens). 
 
81
 See van Wees (2004) 242:  older age limit (in normal circumstances) for active service in Athens (which 
may have been caused exceptionally by the need for a substantial ‘home guard’ to defend the 
extraordinarily long fortification walls (and borders) of Athens).  But see also Thucy. 1.105.3-6, 4.44.4 for 
the “older men” at Corinth not taking part in land campaigns in normal circumstances.  See, however, 
Hanson (2000) 89-95 for examples of older (in their forties and fifties) hoplites at Athens and elsewhere. 
 
82
 The system is best attested, as usual, at Athens:  see Hamel (1998) 24-28, Christ (2001) (at some point 
before 352, the method of conscription was changed from call-up by tribe to call-up by age-group).  For 
evidence of organization (and presumably conscription) of other polis armies by tribal affiliation, see 
Hanson (2000) 122-123, Krentz (2007) 148. 
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 See Xen., Hell. 6.1.5 with Hanson (2000) 89-90. 
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and older mercenaries marching and fighting in the army recruited by Cyrus.
85
  There is 
no precise information on the recruitment to polis armies of light-armed troops in the 
classical Greek world, both because the presence of these forces in classical Greek armies 
was generally ignored by contemporary historians and because there does not seem to 
have been any organized conscription of these forces:  that said, Thucydides’ descriptions 
of general levies shows that light-armed troops turned out in large numbers for 
campaigns and thus were probably representative of the (property) classes from which 
they came.
86
  Classical Greek navies were recruited through a mixture of citizen levies 
and the hiring of mercenaries (and the slaves of both of these groups):
87
  there is no 
reason to think that the ages of the men rowing classical Greek triremes were skewed in 
any one direction.  In sum, although the age profile of classical Greek armies and navies 
cannot be determined precisely, it can be said with some certainty that their composition 
was broadly representative of the adult male populations of their organizing poleis and 
the classical Greek world as a whole. 
Finally, levels of physical activity.  These would have varied according to type 
and stage of campaign.  The total energy expenditure (TEE)
88
 of, e.g., naval forces 
anchored at operating bases or on days during voyages spent in port or at anchorage, of 
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 See Lee (2007) 74-76 for references and discussion. 
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 See van Wees (2004) 62-65. 
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 See (ibid.) 209, 211-212, 218. 
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 Defined at FAO/WHO/UNU (2004) 9 as “[t]he energy spent, on average, in a 24-hour period by an 
individual or a group of individuals.  By definition, it reflects the average amount of energy spent in a 




amphibious and land forces engaged in the blockades of enemy poleis, or of land forces 
on rest days during marches, would obviously have been much lower than that of naval 
forces sailing from one base to another (or engaged in battle), or of infantry forces on 
marching days.  For the physical activity level (PAL)
89
 of the first group of activities 
indicated here, I will adopt a PAL value consistent with a moderately active daily 
lifestyle:  1.75 x BMR;
90
 for the second group of activities, I will adopt a PAL value 
consistent with a vigorously active daily lifestyle:  2.05 x BMR.
91
  The typical rhythms of 
classical Greek land, naval, and amphibious campaigns will have meant that the number 
of days spent by military forces engaged in the first type of activities described here 
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 Defined at (ibid.) 9 as “TEE for 24 hours expressed as a multiple of BMR, and calculated as TEE/BMR 
for 24 hours.  In adult men... BMR times PAL is equal to TEE or the total energy requirement.” 
 
90
 (Ibid.) 37-39 for a discussion and classification of physical activity levels. 
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 It should be noted here that these categories of physical activity levels “indicate the physical activity 
most often performed by most individuals in the population, over a period of time” and that “[e]nergy 
requirements of such populations will change with the energy demands of their cyclical lifestyles” ((ibid.) 
38).  Obviously, on days of land and naval combat, the PAL and therefore TEE of armies and trireme crews 
would have been much higher, but such days were obviously rare.  
 
92
 See chapters 1, 2, and 3 for the normal rhythm of campaigns:  typical (Athenian) amphibious campaigns 
in the fifth (and fourth) centuries were marked by some days or weeks of sail, followed by (at most) a few 
days’ fighting, and then months or years of blockade (during which any fighting was (at most) 
intermittent); for classical navies, days spent at operating bases, or at ports and anchorages during voyages, 
far outweighed days rowing and fighting; finally, most land campaigns were marked by (at most) a few 
days’ marching followed by the establishment of camps at frequent intervals so as to enables armies to 




Combining these data, the daily average energy requirements of classical Greek 
sailors and soldiers can be estimated, using FAO research data,
93
 to have been between 
3050 and 3200 kcal for men aged 18 to 29.9 years with a moderately active lifestyle, and 
between 3600 and 3750 kcal for men aged 18 to 29.9 years with a vigorously active 
lifestyle; between 2950 and 3050 kcal for men aged 30 to 59.9 years with a moderately 
active lifestyle, and between 3450 and 3550 kcal for men aged 30 to 59.9 years with a 
vigorously active lifestyle.  Comparing these figures to the estimates of average daily 
energy requirements to the energy values calculated above for daily classical Greek 
military diets in which one choinix of wheat provided the bulk of carbohydrates,
 94
 it can 
be seen that a diet (of 3533 kcal) in which one choinix of wheat milled at an extraction 
rate of 90 per cent provided 60 per cent of the calories—both assumptions with a high 
degree of probability—would have covered the TEE of both moderately and vigorously 
active classical Greek men aged 30 to 59.9 years, and the TEE of moderately active 
Greek men aged 18 to 29.9 years.  Such a diet would result in a deficiency of somewhere 
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 FAO/WHO/UNU (2004) 41 Table 5.4, 42 Table 5.5.  This research was obviously unavailable to Foxhall 
and Forbes: note that the 2004 FAO estimates of energy requirements are lower than the 1973 FAO 
estimates available to them; cf. Garnsey (1989b) 38 for the point that expert estimates of caloric 
requirements have gradually decreased over time.  I should note here also that my reasons for presenting 
these data are the same as Foxhall and Forbes ([1982] 50):  “[i]t must be stressed, however, that it is not 
possible to use calorific or other nutritional requirements to reconstruct ancient diets.  Calorific 
requirements merely provide a set of independent parameters, useful for determining the limits of human 
food consumption, and thus useful as ‹yardsticks› against which modern hypotheses about ancient food 
consumption can be measured.  That is to say, they can show whether our estimates of, e.g., ancient grain 
consumption are within the bounds of physiological possibility (or even likelihood), but they cannot by 
themselves provide an answer to the question ‹how much?›.” 
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 It should be emphasized again that these calculations led to estimates of average consumption.  When 
military forces received their monthly pay installments or bonuses and were operating in areas with markets 
where food was available in abundance, they may have consumed more food than required (cf. chapter 7 
section iv above).  In other cases, when sailors or soldiers were paid irregularly or not at all, or found 
themselves cut off from any means of acquiring provisions as a result of the movements of enemy forces, 
they may have consumed less food than required to meet their energy needs.  But, in general, the 




between 67 and 217 kcal for a vigorously active classical Greek male aged 18 to 29.9 
years, and therefore not so much as to result in serious physiological or behavioral 
penalties over time—especially considering that, for classical Greek sailors and soldiers, 
periods of vigorous activity would be interspersed among periods of moderate activity.  
In sum, one choinix of wheat could have formed—and probably did form—part of a diet 
providing a sufficient amount of calories to provide for the energy requirements of an 
average classical Greek sailor or soldier. 
Finally, there is the question of the energy requirements of the slave attendants of 
hoplites and those slaves who rowed Athenian and classical Greek triremes.  There is no 
reliable ancient evidence for the normal daily grain consumption of slaves in the classical 
Greek world.
95
  There is also no evidence for the heights (and therefore) weights of 
slaves.  Any remarks on the typical ages of slave-attendants will be no more than guesses. 
We can make the following probabilistic assumptions, however.  The lives of slave 
attendants on campaign will necessarily have been more onerous than those of their 
hoplite owners.  Slave rowers will have had the same caloric requirements as the free 
rowers of classical Greek triremes.  Slaves were valuable property and owners would 
have been usually concerned to make sure that they were not undernourished.
96
 Slaves 
would not usually have been free to select their own diets.  Owners would generally wish 
to meet the energy requirements of their slave in the cheapest way possible—i.e., by 
feeding them with grain.  In light of these considerations, it is highly probable that the 
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 See again p.592 n.13. 
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energy requirements of slave attendants and slave rowers were (in the first case) higher 
and (in the second) equal to their owners’, that these requirements were met by their 
owners, and that they were met predominantly by grain.
97
  It seems best, then, to think 
that the daily grain consumption of slaves on land and naval campaigns was at least equal 
to that of their owners. 
 
iii. The measurement of classical Greek sailors and soldiers’ consumption of 
λφιτα in wheat equivalent 
 So far, then, I have established that in classical and Hellenistic Greece one choinix 
of wheat was considered the nutritional equivalent of two choinikes of ἄλφιτα; and that 
one choinix of wheat could have constituted part of a diet sufficient to meet the daily 
energy requirements of an average classical Greek sailor or soldier.  We may conclude, 
following on from these two premises, that two choinikes of ἄλφιτα could also have 
constituted part of a daily diet sufficient to provide for the energy needs of an average 
classical Greek adult male (sailor or soldier).  But, although there is now available a 
normative classical Greek figure (keeping in mind Stroud’s reservations) for the weight 
of one choinix of wheat (0.687kg.), we do not possess any (reliable) figures for the 
weight of a similar volume of ἄλφιτα.  This presents a problem:  since classical Greek 
sailors and soldiers most often consumed barley-meal rather than wheat,
98
 any calculation 
of the grain consumption and purchases of classical Greek military forces will necessarily 
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have to be in volumetric units of unknown weight (of barley-meal).  While such a 
procedure will still allow for comparison with figures for the grain consumption and 
purchases recorded for other classical Greek populations, it will not allow for any cross-
cultural comparisons across time.  Therefore, this dissertation will express figures for the 
consumption of ἄλφιτα of Greek military forces both in Greek volumetric units, and in 
kilograms of wheat equivalent (reflecting the fact that, in the classical Greek world just as 
in other pre-industrial European societies, grain was the single greatest component of 
both output and consumption).
99
  Since two choinikes of ἄλφιτα were considered the 
nutritional equivalent of one choinix of wheat, the wheat equivalent of two choinikes of 
ἄλφιτα can be easily calculated:  it will be 0.687kg. (=the weight of one choinix of 
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 For the use of wheat equivalent to generate cross-cultural and cross-temporal comparisons, see Clark and 
Haswell (1970) 55ff.; Figueira (1984) 91-92; Hopkins (2002) 198.  See Figueira’s definition of a kilogram 
of wheat equivalent ([1984] 92):  this “is equivalent to either the amount of nutrition derived from a 
kilogram of wheat or to the value of other foodstuffs expressed in terms of wheat by price.” 
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 Figueira calculated an equivalency for ἄλφιτα and wheat of 1 medimnos of ἄλφιτα = 0.72 medimnos of 
wheat ([1984] 92-93 and nn.14-15).  To arrive at this figure, Figueira first noted that barley was valued in 
the modern Mediterranean at 65 per cent of the value of wheat, and that this figure was approximated in the 
few surviving ancient data available to us.  To get from this figure to the relationship between the value of 
barley-meal and wheat, he used Foxhall’s figure for weight per volume of barley-meal, even after noting 
that the figure for the barley from which she produced her barley-meal was implausibly high (see p.601 
above).  Figueira then substituted (arbitrarily) for Foxhall’s figure of c. 750g/liter a weight per volume for 
barley of 583g/liter and then, using the relationship between this figure and Foxhall’s figure for barley-
meal of 643g/liter (the latter is 1.103 times greater than the former), multiplied 65 (the value of barley as 
compared to wheat in percentage terms he had already noted) by 1.103 to reach a figure of 72 per cent for 
the price relationship between barley-meal and wheat.  Since Foxhall’s figure for weight per volume of 
barley-meal is invalid, the second and third steps of Figueira’s calculations are also invalid, and therefore 




iv. Concluding remarks; suggestions for further research 
 In presenting the results of sections ii and iii of this appendix, I am aware of the 
limitations of the data underlying these results and the consequent possible objections to 
them.  As already noted, all of the key variables underlying the calculations in this 
appendix are uncertain:  accordingly, the figures found here are not meant to project a 
false sense of precision or certainty, but only to represent the bands of probability within 
which we should be moving on the spectrum of possible grain consumption rates and 
energy requirements for classical Greek military forces.  But, again, these bands can be 
(very roughly) established.  In addition, this appendix represents an improvement on the 
pioneering article of Foxhall and Forbes, the study now conventionally cited by scholars 
both on the caloric values of grains and grain-products and the energy requirements of 
populations in the classical Greek world, in that it has indicated errors in their 
calculations of the weight per volume of barley-meal and in their use of skeletal data, and 
has also incorporated data unavailable to them on the weight per volume of wheat in 
classical Greece, the heights of classical Greek males, and human energy requirements.  
In sum, the goal here has been to push as hard as possible against the limits of our 
knowledge, while indicating precisely the nature of those limits, and to establish a 
framework for further study.
101
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 Cf. the remarks of Foxhall and Forbes ([1982] 75), which serve as a useful methodological guide in this 
respect:  “[p]erhaps this study will best serve as a cautionary tale for researchers using grain consumption 
as one of the bases for constructing models of population size and/or structure, agricultural production, 
grain trade and other fundamental issues in classical social and economic history.  In order to estimate 
ancient grain consumption from the available ration figures and to use these data without merely repeating 
or enlarging upon past mistakes, one must continually re-evaluate and make explicit our underlying 
assumptions and understand the full range of variables involved.  Only then can one incorporate estimates 




 I end with some suggestions as to how the results of this appendix could be 
improved upon and how they could (should) become obsolete in the (near) future.  While 
some of the variables in the calculations undertaken here will never be known precisely, 
such as, e.g., the age profile of classical Greek military forces, there are some areas of 
research where further precision is and will be possible: 
 1.  The question of how much a given volume of barley-flour weighed in 
comparison to the weight of the given volume of barley it was made from in the classical 
Greek world could be determined within a range of probability by enlisting the services 
of a specialist miller stone milling barley with traditional techniques.
102
  There are still in 
Greece bakers using roughly milled, hulled barley to bake the traditional biscuit called 
‘dako’ on Crete and ‘paximadi’ in Greece.  The practical expertise of the millers 
producing the barley-meal for this biscuit could be used to ascertain the relationship 
between the volume/weight ratios of barley and barley-meal.  The process would be 
fraught with difficulties (how to decide what cultivars of barley, type of grinding stone, 
or extraction rates to use?  How does the processing of barley before and for milling 
differ today from antiquity?  How much should the barley-flour be tamped down before 
measuring its volume?)
103
 but it would still “get us further” in establishing possible 
parameters for this question (which are currently unavailable).
104
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 See already Foxhall, reporting the results of her milling experiments ([1982] 77):  “[m]ore 
experimentation with various methods of processing hulled barley is clearly very necessary.”  To my 
knowledge, no study focusing on classical antiquity has carried out any further experiments on the 
processing of hulled barley. 
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 See Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 78 for the last question. 
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 My thinking on this subject was greatly helped by the contributors to a thread of discussion on the 
subject of ‘barley and barley-flour weights/densities’ on the Archaeobotany listserv 
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 2.  The greater attention now paid (finally) to botanical remains during the 
excavation of classical sites in the Greek world will aid in ascertaining the cultivars of 
barley grown in the classical period.
105
  This, in turn, could aid in the attainment of 
greater precision in the choice of cultivars for the types of experiments just described and 
thus in greater precision in the results of such experiments. 
 3.  There are many skeletal remains from the classical period which remain 
unpublished—for example:  the remains of the Spartiate dead from King Pausanias’ 
invasion of Attica in 403 still await final publication; the skeletal remains from the mass 
grave found near Thespiae in the nineteenth century A.D., which may be the Thespian 
dead from the Battle of Delium in 424, have never been published;
106
 and not only have 
the two hundred and fifty-four skeletons found during the excavations of the Lion of 
Chaironeia in 1879 never been fully published, but their current exact location is 
uncertain.
107
  In addition, new skeletal remains from the classical Greek world are being 
discovered constantly:
108
  most exciting in this regard are the (possibly) hundreds of 
skeletons of soldiers from the classical period recently found in Himera that have been 
                                                                                                                                                 
(archaeobotany@jiscmail.co.uk) in March and April 2007 (I am again grateful to John (Mac) Marston for 
forwarding my question on the weight and density of barley as compared to barley-flour to the 
Archaeobotany listserv, and to Seth Pevnick for putting me in touch with John).  In particular, I learned a 
lot from the comments in this thread of Sabine Beckmann, Nic Dolby, Delwen Samuel, and Anaya Sarpaki. 
 
105
 See now Megaloudi (2006). 
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 For description of and bibliography on this burial, see, e.g., Pritchett (1985) 132-133. 
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 Ma (2008) 76. 
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 See, e.g., Baziotopoulou-Valavani (2002) 190:  89 adult male and female skeletons discovered in a mass 
burial in the Kerameikos; (ibid.) 199:  report of a discovery of one hundred and twenty skeletons of adult 




reported to have an average height of 175cm.
109
  The publication of some or all of these 
remains will obviously bring greater precision and more statistical significance to our 
calculations of the average heights (and weights) of classical Greek sailors and soldiers. 
 4. Finally, stable isotope analysis has, as of now, hardly been applied to skeletal 
remains from the classical period:  it can be expected that a much more precise idea of 
the role of cereals in the diet of classical Greek adult males will become possible in the 
coming years and decades as more stable isotope analysis of human remains from the 
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 Valsecchi (2008) (I thank Graham Claytor for alerting me to this article). 
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 See, e.g., Buikstra and Lagia (2009) esp. 17-19 for discussion of the possibilities and the data already 




Appendix 4:  The Provisioning of the Ten Thousand on the March to 
Cunaxa 
  
i. The usual means of provisioning of the Ten Thousand on the march to Cunaxa 
As noted in chapter 4 section ii, the Ten Thousand on the march to Cunaxa did 
not usually acquire their provisions from the Lydian agora located in the non-Greek part 
of Cyrus’ army.  Rather, the army on the move to Cunaxa provisioned itself in the 
settlements which it passed during its march.
1
  For most of the march, this meant 
purchasing from markets provided by cities along its route.
2
  This can be shown to be true 
                                                 
1
 Again, the key text here is Anab. 1.5.9:  Xenophon, describing the character of Cyrus’ march, states that 
“τὸ δὲ σύµπαν δῆλος ἦν Κῦρος ὡς σπεύδων πᾶσαν τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ οὐ διατρίβων ὅπου µὴ ἐπισιτισµοῦ ἕνεκα ἤ 
τινος ἄλλου ἀναγκαίου ἐκαθέζετο,” “[i]n general, it was clear that Cyrus was in haste throughout the whole 
journey and was making no delays, except where he halted to procure provisions or for some other 




 Krasilnikoff (1993), now sometimes cited as the standard work on the pay of the Ten Thousand (Descat 
[1995a] 101, Roy [2004] 265 n.2, 269), argues that the Cyreans usually obtained their food by purchase 
from cities and villages throughout the course of the march to Cunaxa.  He cites ([1993] 84) 1.2.18, 1.2.24, 
1.5.6, 1.5.10 in support of this view (without further argumentation for why we should or can extrapolate 
from the few mentions of provisioning on the march to Cunaxa to the army’s normal provisioning 
practices) but only the last passage refers to the purchase of supplies at a city (at 1.2.24, Xenophon notes 
that the tavern-keepers (“οἱ τὰ καπηλεῖα ἔχοντες”) remained at Tarsus after the rest of its inhabitants had 
fled:  while it is possible that the Greeks may have bought some provisions from these tavern keepers, it 
cannot have been significant; at least Menon’s soldiers could have lived off the plunder they took in the 
city (1.2.20); and, at 1.3.14, when the troops were still at Tarsus, the assumed place of purchase of 
provisions is the Lydian market in the non-Greek part of the army (although this is meant as a deliberately 
absurd proposal (see p.260 n.13 above)).  Krasilnikoff ([1993] 84-86) also cites 1.3.9 and 1.3.11 together 
with 5.6.19-23 and 7.1.7 in support of the view that the Cyreans provisioned themselves from purchases in 
cities before the battle of Cunaxa, but the first two passages do not refer to the purchase of provisions, and, 
while the latter two do, the arrangements made with (prospective) employers at Cotyora and Byzantium 
cannot tell us anything by themselves (i.e. without further argument) about the arrangements for pay and 
provisioning under Cyrus.  Also, Krasilnikoff rejects Griffith’s arguments that Cyrus supplied his soldiers 
with rations in kind ([1993] 83-84) without addressing or refuting the latter’s arguments properly.  In sum, 
Krasilnikoff’s arguments for his position that the Greeks on their march to Cunaxa usually obtained their 
food by purchase from the settlements on their way provide no firm basis at all for that position.  In 
addition, Krasilnikoff’s analysis of the pay and provisioning of the Ten Thousand is marred by several 
errors of fact.  1.3.21 offers no information on the “normal” amounts of pay for the Cyreans (contra [1993] 
82).  The agreement Cyrus struck with the mercenaries at Thapsacus (1.4.13) was significantly different 
from the agreements struck with Seuthes and the Spartans (for neither of which is 7.3.12 the correct 





from three considerations.  Firstly, the provisioning of the mercenaries under Cyrus is 
taken for granted in Xenophon’s narrative, mentioned only when it took place under 
exceptional circumstances or by methods that might be considered unusual (this is 
unsurprising, given that the Anabasis can be characterized primarily as a classical 
military historical narrative written by a classical Greek military man):
3
  there are 
(including the three references to the Lydian agora) only eight explicit references to 
provisioning (or potential sources of provisions) in his description of the six months from 
the beginning of the march in Sardis to the battle of Cunaxa (1.2.18, 1.3.11, 1.3.14, 
1.4.19, 1.5.4, 1.5.6, 1.5.9, 1.5.10) and all refer to exceptional circumstances.  In the rest 
of the Anabasis, the provisioning of the mercenaries is assumed in the narrative in two 
circumstances only:  firstly, when the mercenaries were explicitly guaranteed availability 
of supplies in an agreement with a state agent or employer and this source of supplies was 
explicitly described before a part of a march (or a campaign) (as in the cases of 
Tissaphernes (2.3.26-27) and Seuthes (7.3.10)), provisioning is not mentioned at all or 
only in unusual circumstances (or when it serves to clarify the narrative) in the 
subsequent narrative of the march or campaign.   Secondly, the provisioning of the march 
is assumed (and thus only mentioned exceptionally) in those months when the Cyreans 
were moving within a world of friendly Greek poleis and were purchasing their 
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 Formally, the Anabasis is an unusual text, not easily categorized in one genre or another, combining, as it 
does, elements of travel literature, biography, and ethnography (see, e.g., Dillery [1998] 9-15).  That said, it 
is “obviously not a systematic ‘travel’ account; large distances are covered which attract no description of 
places or events at all, and the primary purposes of the account are not topographical or concerned with 
conveying a sense of place about the eastern world” (Tuplin [1991] 44-45).  In sum, although 
autobiographical justification does play a role in the formation of the narrative (especially in the 
descriptions of the army’s dealings with the Greek cities it passes by and halts at during its katabasis) (see, 
e.g., Erbse [1966], Tuplin [1991] 45), the Anabasis can be characterized primarily as an account of a 
military campaign written by a military man who had a particular interest in the themes of military 




provisions at markets provided by friendly (Greek) poleis or foraging for them from 
hostile non-Greek territory.
4
 Otherwise, when the mercenaries were moving through 
strange, hostile and non-Greek territory without a state agent or employer who could 
guarantee access to provisions, the provisioning of the Cyreans was always precarious 




The march from Sardis to Cunaxa took place mainly within a world of friendly 
cities:  the rhythm of the march in Asia Minor was from city to city and, after Asia 
Minor, the march stopped and was received at the cities of Issus, Myriandrus, Thapsacus, 
Charmande, and Pylae.  In addition, if under Cyrus, provisioning arrangements are taken 
for granted in the narrative, as they are under Tissaphernes and Seuthes, there is one 
significant difference between Xenophon’s account of provisioning under Cyrus, on the 
one hand, and of Tissaphernes and Seuthes, on the other.  The methods by which the 
mercenaries were to get their provisions under the latter leaders were proposed explicitly 
in (Xenophon’s text of the) speeches made by those leaders, and were explicitly accepted 
by the Cyreans.  It is only once these speeches are made, and the proposals in them 
regarding supplies are accepted by the men, that there is no need to mention the sources 
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 See chapter 3 section iiia. 
 
5
 Thus, in the three days from the battle of Cunaxa to the mercenaries’ temporary truce with the King 
(2.1.1-2.3.26-27), there are fifteen explicit mentions of provisions and the act of provisioning, compared to 
eight for the previous six months.  On the narrative of the march from the Zapatas (after the murder of the 
generals and the break with Tissaphernes) to Trapezus (3.1.1-4.8.21), see Nussbaum (1967) 148:  the 
narrative of this part of the march is “completely dominated by the external physical emergency in which 
the Army finds itself – the immediate need to procure subsistence and to ward off an active enemy and in 
general overcome every physical danger and obstacle...”  Cf. Woronoff ([1987] 13) on Xenophon’s 
descriptions of the villages the army comes across during this part of the march:  “si Xénophon s’attarde 




of the men’s supplies in the subsequent narrative.  In contrast, the methods of the men’s 
provisioning under Cyrus are never described explicitly by Xenophon, who, in regard to 
the logistics of the army under the pretender, concentrates only on the problems and 
discussions surrounding the receipt of µισθός from Cyrus.
6
  It appears certain, then, that 
purchase at markets in cities was the assumed means of acquiring provisions for the 
mercenaries on their march to Cunaxa; i.e., when the march stopped at cities before 
Cunaxa, it provisioned itself in markets in those cities or provided by those cities.
7
  This 
conclusion gains support from the one (offhand) mention of purchasing in a market 
provided by a city during the march to Cunaxa, at Charmande (1.5.10, cf. 1.5.11-12).  
Here, the purchasing of food is described by Xenophon because of the unusual means of 
transport necessary to get to the market in the city (the soldiers used skins filled with hay 
and then sewn up to cross the Euphrates); the unusual (for classical Greeks) food 
purchased there (wine made from dates and bread from millet); and because Clearchus 
was nearly killed on his way back from inspecting the agora (1.5.11-12).  That is to say, 
the purchase of food in the market at Charmande is mentioned by Xenophon because of 
the unusual circumstances under which the purchasing took place and because of the 
unusual products bought in the market; but the means of acquisition—purchasing in a 
market—is not presented as unusual.   
Secondly, as noted in chapter 4 section ii, in Xenophon’s description of the 
famine that afflicted the Greeks in the desert between Corsote and Pylae once their grain 
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 See pp.627-628 and n.11 below. 
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 This is certain, at least, for that part of the march after the army had left Cyrus’ sphere of control; for the 
march from Sardis until the border of Lycaonia, there is the (slight) possibility that provisioning from 




had given out (1.5.6), he states that:  “... καὶ πρίασθαι οὐκ ἦν εἰ µὴ ἐν τῇ Λυδίᾳ ἀγορᾷ ἐν 
τῷ Κύρου βαρβαρικῷ...”, “and it was not possible to buy anywhere except in the Lydian 
market in the barbarian part of Cyrus’ army.”  The necessary implication from this 
statement is that it was normal during (at least this part of) the march for the Cyreans to 
buy provisions elsewhere than in the Lydian agora:
8
  i.e., that the Cyreans normally 
bought their provisions in the cities they passed. 
Thirdly, the argument that the mercenaries on the march to Cunaxa were 
obtaining their food supplies primarily through purchases from markets provided by 
cities also gains confirmation from a point raised by Marinovic.
9
  All the real or potential 
employers (but one)
10
 of the Ten Thousand, Greek and non-Greek, paid or proposed a 
sum of money for their hire, to be paid per month; this sum is termed µισθός.  
(Tissaphernes was (ostensibly) leading the Greeks home, not employing them.)  When 
Xenophon speaks of Cyrus,
11
 Timasion (5.6.23), Thorax (5.6.26), Anaxibius (7.1.7), and 
                                                 
8
 Note that Xenophon states that “there was nowhere else to buy...,” not “there was nowhere else to get 
food.”  Contrast 6.2.4:  Lycon the Achaean demanding σιτηρέσιον from the Heracleots to buy provisions for 
the mercenaries’ journey from Heraclea since the xenia provided by the Heracleots were not sufficient and 
there was no other place (no indigenous settlement to plunder) from which the mercenaries could provision 
themselves (see chapter 3 section iii for full discussion of this passage). 
 
9
 (1988) 161. 
 
10
 The exception is Coeratadas (7.1.33ff.).  Unable to provide µισθός to the soldiers, he had to promise them 
food and drink till they reached the Delta of Thrace, at which point they could live off plunder.  The 
striking and important part, for the argument here, of Coeratadas’ proposal, is that, in the absence of pay, he 
had to propose to the soldiers alternative arrangements to obtain food and drink; such alternative 
arrangements are proposed only here and in the agreement with Seuthes. 
 
11
 E.g., 1.2.11-12:  at Caÿstru-pedion, Cyrus owed the mercenaries more than three month’s µισθός and 
paid them four; 1.3.9:  Cyrus had been the mercenaries’ µισθοδότης; 1.3.21: Cyrus promising a fifty per 
cent rise in µισθός; 1.4.13:  at Thapsacus, Cyrus promised the Greeks µισθὸν ἐντελῆ until they reached 
Ionia again; 2.5.22:  Tissaphernes saying that the mercenary force was led by Cyrus from the coast διὰ 
µισθοδοσίαν πιστεύων; 6.4.8:  most of the soldiers had entered the service of Cyrus ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν 
µισθοφοράν.  (Xenophon uses µισθός and µισθοφορά interchangeably:  see here, 5.6.19 (µισθὸν) and 5.6.23 
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Thibron (7.6.1), Xenophon mentions no other form of payment other than µισθός as being 
disbursed or promised.   
In contrast, as Marinovic points out, Seuthes came to a different agreement with 
the men:  having promised µισθός to them, he added that they were to take their food and 
drink from the country (and that any booty taken was to be given to him to sell, in order 
to provide the soldiers’ µισθός (7.3.10)).  Seuthes had to make this arrangement for the 
food and drink of the men, since they would be operating in hostile territory (see, e.g., 
7.3.13, 7.6.25-31), away from any friendly cities or communities, and thus would not able 
to use their pay to purchase provisions.  The fact that Seuthes had to specify 
arrangements for provisioning, in addition to his promise of µισθός, marks his agreement 
with the mercenaries out as exceptional, according to Marinovic.
12
  This is not quite true.  
When the men were deciding at Perinthus which leader they should serve under, Seuthes 
or Aristarchus, Xenophon presented the latter’s offer as follows (7.3.3):  “... Aristarchus 
directs us to force our way to the Chersonese... and if we... get to the Chersonese, he says 
that... you will not be cheated any more but will receive pay, and that he will not shut his 
eyes any more, as he does now, to your being in want of provisions.”
13
  But the reason for 
specifying the provisions in this case was different:  it was not because there would be no 
                                                                                                                                                 
(µισθοφορὰν), and 6.1.16 (µισθοφορὰν), 7.1.3 (µισθοφορὰν) and 7.1.7 (µισθὸν); in each of these two cases, 
µισθός and µισθοφορά refer to the same promised payment.) 
 
12
 (1988) 161.  Cf. 7.7.33-34, where any forces hired by Seuthes for a potential campaign in Thrace (against 
the remnants of the Ten Thousand if they refused to leave Thrace) would have to receive both provisions 
and µισθός from Seuthes. 
 
13
 “... οὗτος δὲ αὑτὸς κελεύει εἰς Χερρόνησον... πορεύεσθαι· ἢν... ἐκεῖσε ἔλθωµεν... οὔτε ἐξαπατήσεσθαι ἔτι 




opportunity to purchase provisions in the Chersonese but because Aristarchus, prior to his 
offer, had been staying in Perinthus while the mercenaries were struggling to obtain 
provisions outside the city and had not done anything to alleviate their supply situation.  
He had to address this failure to help the mercenaries in any offer he might make to them, 
in order to make it more acceptable to them.  His offer might also have reflected the fact 
that any service for the mercenaries in the Chersonese would have been in the middle of 
winter, and therefore he may have to make special arrangements to ensure that there 
would be no shortage of provisions for the soldiers there.
14
 
In contrast to the agreement with Seuthes, in the agreements with Timasion, 
Thorax, and Anaxibius (5.6.23, 5.6.26, 7.1.7), µισθός was demanded or promised with the 
explicit expectation that it would be used for the purchase of provisions in a market 
provided by or in a city (although the market is not mentioned in the text, or is only 
mentioned later (in the case of Timasion and Thorax)), in accordance with normal 
classical Greek historiographical practice.  At 7.6.1, where, if we remember that the army 
Thibron was recruiting would have been expected to provision itself according to Greek 
norms (there is nothing in Xenophon’s account in the Hellenica of the campaigns of 
Thibron to suggest otherwise), we can assume that the µισθός promised there was (partly) 
                                                 
14 Cf. chapter 3 section iiia, chapter 7 section iii on on shortage of provisions in mid-winter at Trapezus and 
Perinthus in the winters of 401/400 and 400/399 respectively.  But see 7.1.13:  at Byzantium, after 
Anaxibius had shut the men out from the city, he told the generals and lochagoi to get provisions for the 
army from the Thracian villages in the vicinity of the city, where there were much barley and wheat and 
other supplies; and having taken these, to proceed to the Chersonese, where Cyniscus, a Spartan general, 
would pay them (“µισθοδοτήσει”) (7.1.13).  Here is another example of promised service under a Greek 
commander for µισθός only, this time in the Chersonese.   Later (7.2.15), when the mercenaries were at 
Perinthus, Xenophon did not want the army to go to the Chersonese and find itself shut up “καὶ τὸ 
στράτευµα ἐν πολλῇ σπάνει πάντων γενέσθαι ἔνθα πείθεσθαι µὲν ἀνάγκη τῷ ἐκεῖ ἁρµοστῇ, τῶν δ’ 
ἐπιτηδείων οὐδὲν ἔµελλεν ἕξειν τὸ στράτευµα,” “and in sore need of everything in a place where it would be 
necessary to obey the resident governor and where the army would not obtain anything in the way of 
provisions.”  But this was after Anaxibius had been replaced as admiral by Polus and Aristarchus had 




for the purchase of provisions.  Therefore, when Xenophon mentions, repeatedly, 
agreements between Cyrus and the mercenaries that specify amounts of µισθός and the 
lengths of time during which µισθός was to be paid, but no further arrangements for 
provisioning, as Seuthes had to do, and in the light of the previous arguments in this 
section, it seems certain that the soldiers, during their service under Cyrus, were expected 
to use the µισθός they received from him to buy provisions, as they were in their 
agreements with their later Greek employers.
15
 
All that said, there is the slight possibility that, as long as the army marched 
through Cyrus’ sphere of control in Asia Minor, it may have been provisioned from 
satrapal stores.  There is evidence for the presence of sizeable reserves of tax grain 
available to satrap in Asia Minor in the fourth century;
16
 and there is a chance that 
Xenophon may have felt his readers sufficiently familiar with Persian institutions to take 
for granted in his narrative the distribution of provisions by Cyrus to the army during the 
march in Asia Minor until the border of Lycaonia.
17
  There almost certainly would have 
been satrapal reserves of grain at Cyrus’ capital of Sardis and at Celaenae, where the 
                                                 
15
 Griffith ([1935] 266-267) gives no evidence or reasoning for his statement that the mercenaries’ contract 
with Seuthes was the same as the one they had with Cyrus (other than that shown at chapter 6 section ix 
and n.23 below to be false); neither does Loomis for his statement ([1998] 48 n.68) that Seuthes’ agreement 
with the Greeks promised “less regular provision” of rations in kind than the agreement with Cyrus did.  I 
hope to have provided in these pages the analysis, argumentation and background needed (lacking in 
Krasilnikoff’s account (see above n.2)) in order to utilize 5.6.19-23 and 7.1.7 to reconstruct details of the 
pay and provisioning arrangements of the Greeks on their way to Cunaxa. 
 
16
 See Briant (1994) esp. 71-72 (cf. Briant [1986] 37, 47-48 n.23). 
 
17
 See Briant (1987) 4-5 for classical Greek literary audiences being relatively familiar with Persian 




march paused for thirty days and which was a center of satrapal administration,
18
 and 
probably there would have been also at Ceramon Agora (1.2.10), where, because of its 
situation on the Royal Road, there would have been imperial stores of provisions 
stockpiled.
19
  (Ceramon Agora was, however, the only point at which Cyrus joined the 
Royal Road, before leaving it again to march to Iconium
20
 (though Cyrus could have 
ordered communities on the route of the march to prepare provisions for the (ostensible) 
purpose of the march against Phrygia)).  There is therefore a possibility that the men may 
have been provisioned from satrapal reserves of grain during this part of the march.
21
  
That said, the fact that Xenophon was operating within the mental framework of the polis 
and saw the world through the template provided by that framework
22
 means that it is 
most likely that, when he took for granted the provisioning of the men on the march 
through Asia Minor, he assumed that his audience would take it that the men provisioned 
themselves in Asia Minor (primarily) from markets provided by the cities they passed.  In 
addition, the fact that Xenophon can indicate explicitly when Cyrus had provided for the 
                                                 
18
 See Briant (2002) 625, 705 and 1.2.8-9:  the city contained both a satrapal palace and a paradeisos 
belonging to Cyrus. 
 
19
 Though whether the staging-posts along Royal Roads could provision large armies is a matter of some 
doubt (Tuplin [2004] 173), set up, as they were, mainly for individual travelers and messengers (Briant 
[2002] 364-368; Debord [1995] 90; Kuhrt [1995] 244); see, however, ps.-Arist., Oec. 2.2.38a, 1353a25-28 
with Briant (2002) 364-365, 452-453 for the possibility of storehouses on the Royal Road being able to 
feed passing armies in Alexander’s time. 
 
20
 Debord (1995) 95. 
 
21
 For other possible evidence of Persian use of satrapal/imperial stores in Asia Minor in the fourth century:  
see Dem. 23.155, Diod. 15.3.3, Polyaenus, Strateg. 7.33.2. 
 
22





food supply of the Greeks (see below on 1.10.18) and that he does not so during his 
description of the march in Asia Minor also implies that the primary means of 
provisioning for the Greeks until Lycaonia was purchase from cities.
23
 
On those parts of the march outside urbanized regions, such as between 
Myriandrus and Thapsacus, and between Thapsacus and Charmande, requisitioning from 
villages became the primary means of provisioning.  The army had to provision in the 
villages they encamped in at the Chalus river because it was the last settlement before 
five days of marching through unpopulated (and infertile country);
24
 and in the villages 
                                                 
23
 Griffith believed that the Ten Thousand received both rations in kind (at the start of each month of their 
service) and µισθός (at the end of each month of service) from Cyrus: (1935) 265-267, 295-296.  Roy, in an 
important article on the mercenaries of Cyrus, agreed with Griffith’s conclusions on the rates of pay the 
Ten Thousand received ([1967] 309) and their provisioning arrangements ([1967] 311) (although he 
subsequently changed his position ([2004] 269) to agree with Krasilnikoff [1993]); Griffith is also followed 
by Seibt ([1977] 175), Dillery ([1995] 67); and Loomis ([1998] 47-48).  But Griffith’s analysis of the 
linked problems of the pay and the provisioning of the Cyreans was both an illustration of and based on his 
general thesis on the nature of pay given to mercenaries in the fifth and fourth centuries, which I have 
shown above to be incorrect (see chapter 6 section ix).  In addition, Griffith took 1.4.19, 1.5.9, and 1.10.18 
as evidence that Cyrus provided rations in kind to the mercenaries in addition to µισθός.  But the 
provisioning in the villages mentioned at 1.4.19 offers no evidence for the usual provisioning of the 
Cyreans throughout the course of the march, since they requisitioned food in these villages solely because 
they were the only settlements in this part of the march (see next note); 1.5.9 says nothing of Cyrus 
providing rations in kind (and see also pp.263-264 n.22 on the use of ἐπισιτίζοµαι and its derivatives at 
1.4.19 and 1.5.9); and although at 1.10.18 Xenophon tells us that Cyrus provided 400 wagons laden with 
stores of wheat-flour and wine, these were never used and were an exceptional measure taken solely for the 
provisioning of the mercenaries in the days before the final battle with the King:  see sections ii, iii below.  
One should also note here that the Greeks had been paid µισθός at Tarsus and that there is explicit evidence 
that the Greeks were purchasing food from markets on (at least) the latter part of the march (1.5.6, 1.5.10), 
the money for which must have come from the µισθός paid out by Cyrus earlier; this is a major problem for 
his presentation that Griffith does not address (see Marinovic [1988] 160 for this point).  In addition, it is 
very unlikely that the mercenaries had access to imperial stores of grain at any point after they had crossed 
into Lycaonia (since they did not travel on the Royal Road):  see pp.263-264 n.22.  Finally, it should be 
noted that Griffith’s incorrect dual payment schema also means that all of his arguments and conclusions 
on the rates of pay given to mercenaries in this period, including that of the Cyreans, are invalid ([1935] 
294-297), since, following the logic of his argument, he had to add a payment of σῖτος—for which there is 
no evidence—to those rates we find for µισθός in Thucydides and Xenophon:  the rates of pay he posits are 
thus too high (by the amount of the imaginary σῖτος payment he posits).  Loomis (1998) 48 and n.68, 
following Griffith’s logic, adds a payment for σῖτος of two obols to the four the mercenaries received as 
µισθός from Cyrus; Griffith’s figures are unclear, but it appears he saw a µισθός payment of five obols, 
with the σῖτος bringing up a total of seven or eight obols (see Loomis [1998] 48 n.67). 
 
24
 At 1.4.9, Xenophon tells us that the army encamped (“ἐσκήνουν”) in some villages at the Chalus river 
belonging to Parysatis, the mother of Cyrus.  It seems certain, on the basis that the stop here resembled 
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 rivers because, during their march along this part 
of the middle Euphrates, these were the only settlements in this non-urbanized and desert 
region, and thus the only places that offered it opportunities to provision.
27
 
The Greeks obtained food through foraging or pillaging only infrequently.  The 
fact that the mercenaries only passed through hostile territory on a couple of occasions 
                                                                                                                                                 
those made later in the march to and from Mesopotamia—made at a settlement with provisions and a water 
supply during and before a march through desert (and unpopulated) territory—that Cyrus halted in these 
villages for the sake of provisioning his troops.  The journey between Myriandrus and Thapsacus was a 
march through a “polis-free zone” (Lee [2007] 38) of twelve days and 350 kilometers (see Gabrielli [1995] 
118 for a summary of the marching rates and distances traveled per day during the march from Myriandrus 
to Cunaxa) (furthermore, although the Amiq plain west of the Chalus is fertile (Lendle [1995] 38), the 
“country eastwards from the River Chalus/Afrin is for the most part arid and stony downland broken by 
steep and rough limestone ridges” (Farrell [1961] 154)).  The stop at the Chalus river, then, provided the 
only opportunity in nine days of rapid marching to reprovision; Xenophon probably did not specify that the 
troops provisioned in the villages of Parysatis, because it could be taken for granted that Cyrus’ troops 
would be able to requisition food from villages belonging to his mother. 
 
25
 See 1.4.19:  at the end of a nine-day march from Thapsacus, the army halted for three days at the Araxes 




 From the Araxes, the army marched five days to the deserted city of Corsote, on the Mascas river, where 
again the soldiers stayed for three days and provisioned themselves (again Xenophon uses the verb 
“ἐπεσιτίσαντο”) (1.5.4).  Xenophon describes Corsote as a “πόλις ἐρήµη, µεγάλη.”  This phrase was taken 
by earlier editors and translators to mean a large city in the desert (see, e.g., Brownson’s translation in the 
Loeb (“in the desert... a large city”), Walpole [1963] 69, Mather and Hewitt [1938] 269).  But, on the basis 
of the parallels at 3.4.7 (the once inhabited Larisa described as a deserted (ἐρήµη) city) and 3.4.10 (a 
deserted (ἔρηµον) stronghold by the formerly inhabited city of Mespila), Corsote should be taken to be a 
deserted city:  see, e.g., Masqueray (2000) 66, Manfredi (1986) 27, Joannès (1995) 176, Lendle (1995) 46, 
Tuplin (1999) 353.  It in unclear in what type of settlement(s) the soldiers obtained their food at Corsote; in 
the absence of a city, and given the similarity in details to the halt at the Araxes, and other rivers and 
groups of villages later (see 2.5.1, and cf. 2.3.14-17, 3.4.31, 4.7.18), it would seem that the Cyreans 
provisioned in villages here; certainty is impossible, however. 
 
27
 See Joannès (1995) 174-176, Tuplin (1999) 353.  The use of the verb “ἐπεσιτίσαντο” at 1.4.19 and 1.5.4 
tells us nothing by itself about the institutional means used by the soldiers to provision themselves in these 
villages (see again pp.263-264 n.22).  Krasilnikoff ([1993] 85) and Trundle ([2004] 88) assume that the 
Greeks bought their provisions in the villages at the Araxes river.  The fact, however, that the act of 
provisioning is mentioned at all at the Araxes and Mascas rivers—1.4.19 is the first explicit mention of an 
act of provisioning in the Anabasis—marks the acts of provisioning in the villages there as exceptional on 
the march to Cunaxa, and makes it very unlikely that the mode of provisioning in these villages was 
purchase.  On the other hand, there is nothing to indicate that the army took these villages to be hostile:  it 





greatly limited the role played by these methods in the provisioning of the march to 
Cunaxa.  Passing into Lycaonia, Cyrus, in accordance with convention, gave the country 
over to the Greeks to plunder on the grounds that it was hostile territory (“ὡς πολεµίαν 
οὖσαν”) (1.2.19).  Xenophon’s description of the provisioning arrangements of the army 
at Tarsus implies strongly that at least some of the mercenaries stole provisions in that 
city or its surrounds.
28
  It is almost certain that the Greeks were able to collect food for 
themselves when Cyrus cut down the paradeisos of Belesys (which contained “all the 
products of the seasons” (“ἔχων πάντα ὅσα ὧραι φύουσι”)) and burned down his palace, 
both of which were located at the sources of the Dardas River (1.4.10).
29
  Xenophon does 
not state in any of these three cases that food had been stolen as part of pillaging 
operations:  but gathering food through foraging or pillaging is only mentioned in the 
Anabasis when the mercenaries were without a leader and/or outside urbanized regions, 
and so it can be assumed in each of these instances. 
The army also foraged as it marched down the Euphrates.
30
  On the march from 
the Araxes to the Mascas, the army hunted the wild animals and birds found in the 
country (1.5.1-3).
31
  The bustards that were caught were eaten as a “delicious” 
                                                 
28
 See p.261 n.17 above. 
 
29
 Lee (2007) 23. 
 
30
 Cf. Lee (2007) 222-223 on their foraging for meat. 
 
31
 They had also probably made an attempt earlier (at the Chalus river) to supplement their diet with fish 
and doves but were prevented from doing so by the Syrian inhabitants on religious grounds:  see 1.4.19 and 




supplement to the soldiers’ grain-based diet (1.5.3).
32
  The day after the battle of Cunaxa, 
when the Greeks discussed with Ariaeus, the commander of Cyrus’ barbarian troops, how 
they should return to Ionia (2.2.10-12), he was of the opinion that they should return by a 
route different from that which they had taken to get to Cunaxa:  “[f]or even on our way 
hither we were not able to get anything from the country during the last seventeen stages; 
and where there was anything, we consumed it entirely on our way through” (2.2.11).
33
  
Ariaeus’ statement is supported by Xenophon’s narrative:  the army can be calculated to 
have been, seventeen σταθµοί before the meeting of the Persian with the Greek 
commanders, in the midst of the march to Corsote to Charmande(/Pylae);
34
 in the course 
of this march, Xenophon tells us, there was no fodder or any growing thing of any kind 
(1.5.5); and from Pylae, the Persians had adopted a “scorched earth” strategy, burning up 
“καὶ χιλὸν καὶ εἲ τι ἄλλο χρήσιµον ἦν,” “fodder and everything else that was of any use” 
(1.6.1).  One can infer from the implicit contrast in Ariaeus’ statement with the rest of the 
march before the ordeal from Corsote to Charmande(/Pylae) that
 
the army, including the 
Greeks, had been able to forage for provisions ἐκ τῆς χώρας it passed through previously.  
This foraging, however, was limited in scope for two main reasons.  Firstly, it took place 
in infertile and unpopulated territory.  Secondly, the speed of the march from the Levant 
                                                 
32
 Cf. 1.5.6 with p.258 n.7 above:  on the most barren part of the entire march—from Corsote to Pylae—the 




 “ἑπτακαίδεκα γὰρ σταθµῶν τῶν ἐγγυτάτω οὐδὲ δεῦρο ἰόντες ἐκ τῆς χώρας οὐδὲν εἴχοµεν λαµβάνειν· 
ἔνθα δέ τι ἦν, ἡµεῖς διαπορευόµενοι κατεδαπανήσαµεν.”  (Diod. 14.25.8 is a summary of 2.2.11 and thus 
offers no information additional to that passage.) 
 
34




to the battle at Cunaxa—some twenty-five to thirty-five kilometers a day,
35
 a rate of 
march near (or at) the performance maximum of Greek (or other pre-industrial) 
armies
36
—would have prevented the army from gathering any very large amount of food 
through foraging, even if there had been any, since gathering large supplies of food 
through foraging was a process that took significant amounts of time and would have 
slowed down the march considerably.
37
  In sum, then, on the march to Cunaxa, foraging 
was an occasional source of food to enliven otherwise monotonous grain-based meals,
 38
 
i.e., it functioned, as the Lydian agora did, merely as a supplementary source of 
provisions to those acquired in cities or villages.
39
 
                                                 
35
 See the table at Gabrielli (1995) 118-119 summarizing the distances traveled in the march to Cunaxa and 
the time taken to cover those distances. 
 
36
 See Krentz (2007) 161. 
 
37
 Roth (1999) 294; Harari (2000) 306. 
 
38
 Thus Lee ([2007] 23) is incorrect to list purchase from towns, the Lydian agora, and foraging as the 
major sources of provisions for the Greeks without indicating the relative insignificance of the latter two 
compared to the first.  Foraging would have been a major source of fodder, however:  see 1.6.1 quoted in 
the text above; 1.5.5:  many of the baggage-animals died on the brutal march between Corsote and 
Charmande because of the lack of fodder in the desert; 1.5.7:  Cyrus making the stages through the desert 
very long, when he wanted to reach fresh fodder; 1.9.27:  fodder gathered by Cyrus’ servants, and shared 
out when scarce (implying that its collection was usually a matter of individual responsibility).  Cf. 2.4.11:  




 We have almost no evidence for the means by which the non-Greek part of Cyrus’ army was provisioned 
throughout the march to Cunaxa.  The Lydian agora was in the barbarian part of the army (see again 
1.2.17-18, 1.3.14, 1.5.6) but this traveling market will not have played any major role in the provisioning of 
the non-Greek part of the army for the reasons outlined at chapter 4 section ii.  Ariaeus, in speaking of the 
strategic situation that faced the non-Greeks in the army that survived the battle of Cunaxa and the Greek 
mercenaries, uses the first-person plural in addressing the Greeks and speaking of the army’s provisioning 
in the seventeen days before the battle and of his plan for the joint forces’ sources of provisions in the 
upcoming march home (2.2.11-12, and see above p.634).  This suggests that Greeks and non-Greeks in 
Cyrus’ army provisioned themselves on the march before Cunaxa by the same means though, frustratingly, 
in the negotiations and descriptions concerning provisioning that follow Ariaeus’ speech, Xenophon only 
tells us of the Greeks’ negotiations with the Persians and of how the Greeks provisioned themselves (2.3.4, 
2.3.13, 2.3.21ff.); this is despite the fact the Greeks and the force under Ariaeus continued to encamp near 
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ii. The 400 wagons provided by Cyrus for the Greeks:  Previous Views 
When the Greeks returned to their camp after the battle of Cunaxa, 
καταλαµβάνουσι δὲ τῶν τε ἄλλων χρηµάτων τὰ πλεῖστα διηρπασµένα καὶ εἴ τι 
σιτίον ἢ ποτὸν ἦν, καὶ τὰς ἁµάξας µεστὰς ἀλεύρων καὶ οἴνου, ἃς παρεσκευάστο 
Κῦρος, ἵνα εἴ ποτε σφόδρα τὸ στράτευµα λάβοι ἔνδεια, διαδιδοίη τοῖς Ἕλλησιν--
ἦσαν δ’ αὗται τετρακόσιοι, ὡς ἐλέγοντο, ἅµαξαι--καὶ  ταύτας τότε οἱ σὺν 
βασιλεῖ διήρπασαν. 
 
[t]hey found most of their property pillaged, in particular whatever there was to 
eat or drink, and as for the wagons loaded with wheat-flour and wine which 
Cyrus had provided in order that, if ever serious need should overtake the army, 
he might have supplies to distribute among the Greeks (and there were four 
hundred of these wagons, it was said), these also the King and his men had now 
pillaged. (1.10.18) 
 
The role of these wagons in the provisioning of the Greek mercenaries hired by 
Cyrus has been the source of much controversy.  Some scholars have denied that these 
wagons existed at all,
40
 basing this view primarily on the fact that Xenophon used the 
phrase “ὡς ἐλέγοντο” in reporting the number of the wagons provided by Cyrus.  But 
Xenophon states in his own voice that Cyrus provided the wagons—therefore they must 
have existed—and the citation “ὡς ἐλέγοντο,” far from expressing doubt as to the 
existence of the wagons (as has been thought by previous scholars), is, in fact, used by 
Xenophon to authorize the extremely large figure given for their number.
41
  Griffith took 
                                                                                                                                                 
each other for twenty days after the agreement with Tissaphernes (2.4.1) before Ariaeus’ force started to 
encamp with Tissaphernes (2.4.9).  Thus, although there are some indications that non-Greek forces of 
Cyrus provisioned themselves using the same methods as his Greek mercenaries, certainty (or even 
probability) on this question is impossible. 
 
40
 Roy (1967) 311 n.93; Krasilnikoff (1993) 83-84; Lendle (1995) 90; Lee (2007) 134, 215.  Roy ([1967] 
311 n.93) is cited by each of the last three scholars for their position, but Roy has recently changed his view 
and now believes that the wagons did, in fact, exist:  see (2004) 277 and n.27, following Gabrielli (1995) 
with reservations (see pp.644-645 n.67 below for these). 
 
41
 See Gray (2003) 116 (with n.29 citing 1.10.18 as an example):  “[t]he major function of citations [in 
Xenophon] is to validate content that the the reader might find too great to be believed.  The writer engages 
with the reader to authorize... excessively large or small numbers...”  Cf. Gray (2003) 123.  See also Gray 
(2003) 117:  “The citations [in Xenophon’s Anabasis and Hellenica]... authorize... details in a larger story 
that the narrator tells in his own voice... [Xenophon] does not use citations where his knowledge falls short, 
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the presence of the four hundred wagons in the camp of the Greeks after the battle of 
Cunaxa as evidence supporting the view that the mercenaries were provisioned through 
their march to Babylonia primarily through rations in kind provided by Cyrus, and Descat 
took the wagons as evidence that the mercenaries were provisioned from imperial stores 
of grain after Thapsacus.
42
  But, as I have demonstrated, the wheat-flour and wine on the 
wagons were cited by Griffith and Descat in support of hypothetical schemas of 
payments to the Cyreans that are baseless and the presence of the wagons in Cyrus’ camp 
after Cunaxa offers no evidence in itself for the usual provisioning of the march.
43
  
Gabrielli has also recently argued that the wagons did exist and that they 
provisioned the mercenaries on the march (starting from Myriandros or Issos); and his 
position has been cited in a recent major review of work on the Anabasis as one of the 
standard works on the provisioning of the mercenaries till Cunaxa.
44
  But Gabrielli’s 
paper on the wagons is full of methodological errors, false assumptions, and 
contradictions, and his conclusions should not be accepted: 
                                                                                                                                                 
or because he disbelieves the report, or for any other straight research reason.”  Cf. Gabrielli (1995) 116:  
““[l]a construction de ce passage [i.e. 1.10.18] me semble claire, c’est bien sur le nombre exact de chariots 
que porte le doute et non pas sur leur existence.  De plus si on peut comprendre que Xénophon n’ait pas 
compté les chariots, il est impossible qu’il n’ait pu les voir.” 
 
42
 See Griffith (1935) 266 (followed by Dillery [1995] 67, Loomis [1998] 47-48, esp. 48 n.65); Descat 
(1995a) 104 (stating the wagons accompanied the army from Thapsacus onwards). 
 
43
 See chapter 6 section ix and p.629 n.15, p.631 n.24 above on the problems with Griffith’s account; and 
pp.263-264 n.22 for refutation of Descat’s account of the pay and provisioning of the Cyreans. 
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1. The first part of Gabrielli’s paper is an attempt to produce “une estimation 
relativement précise des forces dont disposait Cyrus.”
45
  His argument runs as follows:  
there were less than four hours between the time Cyrus’ army learned of the approach of 
the King’s army and the time it was lined up ready for battle; Cyrus’ army was marching 
in single column when it learned of the approach of the King’s army; Clausewitz stated 
that a division of 8,000 men (“y compris son artillerie et autre véhicules”) takes up the 
space of one hour’s march; since the tail of the column of Cyrus’ army caught up with its 
head within four hours, the army cannot have been more than 30,000 men in total (i.e., it 
must have been less than 4 (hours) x 8,000 men = 32,000 men).  On the basis of these 
calculations, Gabrielli accepts Tarn’s figure of 28,000 men for the size of Cyrus’ army. 
There are serious problems with every step of this calculation.
46
  That less than 
four hours elapsed between the approach of the King’s army and the formation of Cyrus’ 
army for battle is Gabrielli’s guess, and nothing more.  Xenophon provides only the 
roughest of time indicators for the events of the day of the battle of Cunaxa.  It was about 
“full market time” (“ἀµφὶ ἀγορὰν πλήθουσαν”) when Pategyas came with the news that 
the King was approaching with a large army in formation for battle (1.8.1); it was already 
the afternoon (“ἡνίκα δὲ δείλη ἐγίγνετο”) when a cloud of rising dust—which the Greeks 
realized was caused by the King’s army—appeared in the plain.  Gabrielli arbitrarily 
assigns the times of 9 a.m. and 1 p.m. (he does not explicitly state the latter time but it 
follows from the four hour figure he gives) to each of the time indicators given by 
                                                 
45
 (1995) 112; see (1995) 112-114 for the argument criticized here. 
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Xenophon, but these times are arbitrarily assigned and admit of no certainty.
47
  In 
addition, as Tuplin points out,
48
 Gabrielli fails to realize that “some parts of the army 
were still forming when battle had almost started [1.8.14]; [and] deilē marks the point 
when the dust cloud appeared, still a long way from the fighting.”  Thus, a precise figure 
for the time that elapsed between the news of the coming of the King’s army and the time 
of the battle is impossible to obtain, but Gabrielli’s figure of less than four hours is 
certainly too low because of the points raised by Tuplin.  One of the two figures 
underlying Gabrielli’s calculation of the size of Cyrus’ army has no basis, then. 
Secondly, Gabrielli uses some passages from the Cyropaedia to argue that Cyrus’ 
army must have been marching in single file on the day of the battle.  But the part of the 
Cyropaedia from which Gabrielli cites his evidence for this conclusion is presenting a 
fully elaborated description of what would constitute the organization of an ideal short 
march by a classical Greek army, and cannot be used to reconstruct the practices of a 
mainly non-Greek army.
49
  Furthermore, the passages Gabrielli cites from the 
Cyropaedia do not offer evidence for an army marching in single file.
50
  In any case, it is 
clear from Xenophon’s account that Cyrus’ army was not marching in single file before 
                                                 
47
 The times he gives are arbitrary despite the ancient references he gives and discusses for the time of 
“ἀµφὶ ἀγορὰν πλήθουσαν.”  None of these references provide any precise guidance as to what time “full 
market time” represents on the 24 hour clock (or provide any guidance as to Xenophon’s use of the term) 
so that the 9 a.m. time is still simply Gabrielli’s guess. 
 
48
 (1999) 344-345. 
 
49
 See the discussion of the use of the Cyropaedia as a source for classical Greek military organization at 
chapter 3 section iva. 
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the news of the King reached it:  on the day of the battle, Cyrus proceeded more 
carelessly (than previous days) with only a small body of troops in front of him (“καὶ 
ὀλίγους ἐν τάξει ἔχων πρὸ αὑτοῦ”), and most of the army was marching in disorder (“τὸ 
δὲ πολὺ αὐτῷ ἀνατεταραγµένον ἐπορευέτο”) (1.7.20).  Since Cyrus’ army was not 
marching in single file, there are therefore no grounds for Gabrielli’s calculation. 
Finally, even if there were (and there are not) grounds for Gabrielli’s calculation, 
one cannot use Clausewitz’s figures for the marching rates of an early nineteenth-century 
C.E. Prussian army to reconstruct those of a mixed Greek and non-Greek army at the turn 
of the fifth century B.C.E.:  the presence of an artillery train in Clausewitz’s division 
would have added greatly to the total size of the train of the division of the army and 
increased correspondingly the space it occupied (making it longer and more unwieldy 
than a column of 8,000 men of an ancient army marching in single column).
51
  In sum, 
neither of the figures in Gabrielli’s calculation of the numbers of combatants in Cyrus’ 
army stand up, nor does the rationale underlying his calculation, and therefore the 
number of 28,000 men he estimates for the size of Cyrus’ army must be rejected out of 
hand. 
2.  Establishing that there is no basis for the estimate of 28,000 (for the number of 
combatants in Cyrus’ army) arrived at in the first half of Gabrielli’s paper is crucial for 
the analysis of Gabrielli’s discussion of the four hundred wagons provided by Cyrus, 
since the goal of his discussion of the wagons is to provide indirect confirmation of the 
                                                 
51
 See Gabrielli (1995) 113 n.10:  this problem with using Clausewitz’s figure had already been seen by 
Delbrück.  Gabrielli attempts to get around this problems by stating the presence in the column of Cyrus’ 
army of chariots and draft animals would have occupied a space equivalent to that of the artillery train 
accompanying Clausewitz’s division, but i. there is no way of ascertaining this; and ii. Clausewitz’s 






  To confirm his (baseless) estimate for the size of Cyrus’ army, Gabrielli 
simply assumes without argumentation that the wagons accompanied Cyrus’ march for 
the duration of his march through the desert
53
 (and that Cyrus distributed rations in kind 
to the Greeks throughout this part of the march),
54
 and then plays a series of games with 
numbers to support the figure of 28,000—a figure, I emphasize again, that has no 
foundation.  In order to defend his estimate,
55
 Gabrielli has to commit a series of serious 
methodological errors and engage in a number of misinterpretations of Xenophon’s 
account of Cyrus’ march. 
3.  Firstly, Gabrielli use the evidence of Cyr. 6.1.54 (where Xenophon states that 
the normal load of one yoke was twenty-five talents) to infer that each of the four 
hundred wagons could carry 900 kilograms of grain.
56
  The equivalency 25 talents = 900 
kg. means that Gabrielli is using the Aeginetan rather than the Attic(-Euboeic) standard in 
calculating the capacity of the wagons.  There is no reason to suppose that Xenophon—
                                                 
52
 See Gabrielli (1994) 114:  the estimate of 28,000 “a l’avantage de nour fournir la base de raisonnement 
nécessaire à une réflexion sur la logistique de l’éxpedition.”  See also Tuplin (1999) 344:  “[Gabrielli] starts 
with a direct argument for a modest estimate of the number of combatants.  He then offers an indirect 
confirmation that [this] relatively modest estimate[.] [is correct].  (Gabrielli does not quite state what he is 
doing in the second part of his paper in these terms.  But frankly the calculations he performs there are not 
of much real significance unless this is at least part of their purpose.)” 
 
53
 (1995) 116 (though see p.647 n.77, 648 n.78 below:  Gabrielli arguing (incorrectly) that they must have 
accompanied the march since Myriandros or Issos). 
 
54
 Or rather he cites a passage that offers no evidence for the statement that Cyrus distributed rations in kind 
([1995] 117:  Gabrielli cites 1.6.21 here, but this reference does not exist; I presume from the translated 
passage he cites that he is referring here to 1.9.27-28, which, again, offers no support for his statement.) 
 
55
 And to counter the arguments of Roy (1967) 311 n.93, on which see pp.646-647 below. 
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an Athenian—had the Aeginetan standard in mind in the passage cited from the 
Cyropaedia rather than the Attic standard
57
 (which would have given a figure of 660-690 
kg,
58
 much less suitable for Gabrielli’s (ultimate) arguments) (cf. Anab. 1.5.6).  Also, the 
four hundred wagons will have been requisitioned from civilian owners and therefore will 
have been of different sizes and capacities; thus, in calculating the total capacity of the 
wagons, one cannot proceed as if each wagon was of a standard(ized) size and capacity.
59
  
Finally, since some of the four hundred wagons were carrying wine, we have no idea how 
many carried grain, and therefore any inferences drawn from calculations based on the 
grain-carrying capacity of all the wagons must lose all validity.  Gabrielli’s figure of 
900kg per wagon will not stand, then. 
4.  Gabrielli uses barley-flour (ἄλφιτα) rather than wheat-flour (ἄλευρα)—the 
grain product explicitly mentioned in 1.10.18—to calculate how many daily rations the 
supposed 900 kg. would have produced.  He offers no sensible reason for doing this,
60
 
and there is none, since wheat-flour and barley-flour are not substances of uniform 
density.
61
  Using the figure of 2 choinikes of alphita per day given to the Spartiates held 
                                                 
57
 Cf. Tuplin (1999) 345. 
 
58
 See appendix 3 section i. 
 
59
 Cf. Mitchell (1976) 122-123 n.100 for this point. 
 
60
 His reasoning for using barley-meal rather than wheat-flour goes as follows ([1995] 119):  “[b]ien sûr la 
même valeur calorique peut être apportée, et pour une poids plus faible, par une quantité moindre de farine 
de blé, mais en choissisant la ration la plus pondéreuse nous conservons une marge qui nous permet 
d’évaluer au plus juste les capacités de ces chariots.”  This makes no sense. 
 
61
 See appendix 3 section i.  Tuplin ([1999] 345) states that it might be better to use a figure of nearer 1 kg 
per day as a daily ration in calculating the grain-carrying capacity of the wagons.  He cites, from the 
Persian side, the evidence of the Persepolis fortification tablets, but these refer to rations of barley; from the 
Greek side, he cites Hdt. 7.187, where Herodotus uses 1 choinix of wheat per day to calculate the grain 
  
643 
prisoner on Sphacteria (Thucy. 4.16.1), and the incorrect calculations of Foxhall and 
Forbes (2 choinikes of barley-flour = 1.4 kg.),
62
 the figure for daily rations per wagon he 
produces (640)
63
 is far too low for the supposed 900 kg. on the wagons.  All this ends up 
meaning that the figure he produces for the number of daily rations provided by each of 
the four hundred wagons is absolutely meaningless. 
5.  On the basis of the (meaningless) figure of 640 rations of grain per day per 
wagon, Gabrielli calculates that the Greeks by themselves would have needed only 
twenty wagons per day; therefore he concludes that it is doubtful that the wagons were 
provided for the Greeks only, rather that “il est plus vraisemblable de considérer qu’ils 
sont destinés à l’armée tout entière.”
64
  But Xenophon states explicitly at 1.10.18 that the 
wine and wheat-flour on the wagons were meant (solely) for the Greeks.  There is no 
reason not to accept Xenophon’s report on their intended function. 
 6.  Assuming that the wagons were already accompanying the march by the time 
of the army’s halt at the Araxes, Gabrielli states that the wagons carried less than thirteen 
days’ provisions, since the army suffered a shortage of grain on the march from Corsote 
to Pylae, but must have carried more than five, since the army suffered no shortage of 
                                                                                                                                                 
needs of Xerxes’ army.  But it is wheat-flour, and not barley or wheat, which is being carried on the 
wagons, and therefore the evidence of the fortification tablets and Herodotus’ figure of one choinix a day 
are not pertinent here. 
 
62
 See again appendix 3.  Note, however, that Foxhall and Forbes’ figure for weight per volume of ἄλφιτα 
is 0.643kg/liter ([1982] 44, 76) and so Gabrielli should have been using a figure of 1.286kg in his 
calculations, yet another error invalidating his conclusions. 
 
63
 His calculations should produce a figure of 642:  Tuplin (1999) 345. 
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food on the five day march from the Araxes to Corsote.  Assuming that the wagons 
carried no wine on the march from Corsote to Pylae, Gabrielli calculates (on the basis of 
the incorrect figures for the carrying capacity of the wagons and the daily rations of the 
soldiers discussed above) that the four hundred wagons could have carried at least ten 
days of grain for an army of 28,000 combatants.
65
  Since this figure of ten days is 
consistent (on Gabrielli’s reckoning) with the evidence of the availability of grain on the 
march through the desert, it serves as confirmation that the calculation of the number of 
combatants in Cyrus’ army in the first half of the paper is correct.  
 But, again, there are major problems with each step of this final part of Gabrielli’s 
argument for the estimate of the size of Cyrus’ army.  Firstly, there were not thirteen 
straight days of marching between Corsote and Pylae, but more probably eleven or 
twelve, since the soldiers halted at the city of Charmande, a day’s march before Pylae.
66
  
Secondly, the inference Gabrielli makes from the differing conditions on the two desert 
marches relies on the assumption that the wagons were the only source of supplies on 
these marches, and that the men did not carry any supplies requisitioned in the villages on 
the Araxes and Mascas Rivers.  But it is certain from usual classical Greek military 
practice and the vocabulary used at 1.4.19 and 1.5.4 that the soldiers took some (probably 
three) days’ provisions with them from these villages for the march,
67
 so that the wagons 
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 See p.264 n.23. 
 
67
 Three days’ worth of provisions a standard amount for a Greek army setting out on a march:  see chapter 
3 section i.  ἐπισιτίζοµαι at 1.4.19 and 1.5.4 meaning (primarily) to provision for the upcoming march:  see 
again chapter 3 section ii.  See also 1.10.18:  it was not only the four hundred wagons that were pillaged, 
but the Greeks also found all of their property plundered, and “in particular whatever there was to eat and 
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(hypothetically) would not have had to carry provisions for every day of the march either 
between the Araxes and the Mascas rivers, or between Corsote and Charmande.  If the 
Greeks (at least) each took three days’ of provisions for the march—the standard 
amount—and the march from Corsote to Charmande was only twelve days, then the 
wagons (again, hypothetically) should have needed to cover only nine days, which, 
following Gabrielli’s calculations, they should have been able to do; thus, following the 
logic of Gabrielli’s arguments, there should have been no scarcity of grain in the desert 
between Corsote and Charmande/Pylae. 
Thirdly, in order to support his argument here, Gabrielli has to advance the 
supposition that the wine Xenophon speaks of at 1.10.18 was only loaded on to the 
wagons after Pylae “lorsque les problèmes de ravitaillement furent moins aigus.”
68
  But 
the only reason to suppose this is to support the faulty calculations already made:  there is 
no reason to think the wine and grain were loaded on to the wagons at different times; 
and nothing in Xenophon’s statement about the wagons suggests that we should do so. 
7.  Also, Gabrielli’s (incorrect) calculation that the four hundred wagons could 
have covered the grain needs of the Greek and non-Greek forces of Cyrus does not 
                                                                                                                                                 
drink.”  The Greeks, then, each had individual supplies of food and drink for the march after Pylae.  Roy 
expresses the reservation concerning Gabrielli’s argument that the four hundred wagons really existed that 
“Gabrielli does not explain why a large stock of supplies had not been distributed while the army crossed 
terrain where food was scarce and then faced a decisive battle” ([2004] 277).  It is true that Gabrielli does 
not explain why the wheat-flour and wine was not distributed by Cyrus, but the fact that the Greeks still 
had food and drink explains why Cyrus had not had to distribute the wheat-flour and wine from the four 
hundred wagons by the time of the battle (and thus there is no reason to doubt the existence of the wagons). 
 
68
 (1995) 120:  Gabrielli states that the wine must only have loaded after Corsote, but he must mean Pylae 
here, since he states earlier on the same page that his calculations are proceeding on the assumption that the 




answer the problem of how the non-combatants on the march were provisioned.
69
  
Gabrielli estimates the number of non-combatants in Cyrus’ army as “certainement au 
moins aussi nombreux que les combattants.”
70
  This is certainly incorrect for the Greek 
part of the army:  Lee has shown that relatively few of the Greeks had slave attendants 
(before Cunaxa, at least);
71
 and the evidence Gabrielli cites for slaves accompanying 
Cyrus on the march is based on evidence for slave attendants in Greek armies.
72
  
Nevertheless, there will have been some slave-attendants in both parts of the army, and 
the failure to include their provisioning needs undermines the internal logic of Gabrielli’s 
argument.  Following his figures for the slave attendants in Cyrus’ army and the rations 
carried on the wagons, the grain needs of the Greeks and the slaves would have 
represented almost exactly ten days’ provisions, i.e. the total amount he claims were 
carried on the wagons, and thus there would not have been enough grain on the wagons 
for the army (of Greeks and non-Greeks) as a whole.  This is yet one more error that 
render Gabrielli’s whole analysis of the function of the four hundred wagons provided by 
Cyrus absolutely nugatory. 
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 Gabrielli ([1995] 120) states that the four hundred wagons would have provided at least ten days’ rations 
for the 28,000 combatants of the army, “sans compter la foule des non-combatants et les chevaux.”  Having 




 (1995) 115. 
 
71
 (2007) 256-259. 
 
72
 (1995) 115.  In addition, Gabrielli cites the Cyropaedia as evidence for the usual organization of Persian 
armies in his discussion of the number of non-combatants and draught animals in Cyrus’ army:  but, again, 
the Cyropaedia should be understood as Xenophon’s paradigmatic account of the military organization and 




8.  Finally, Gabrielli never satisfactorily answers Roy’s objection to the presence 
of the wagons on the desert marches on the ground that the pace of these marches was too 
high for wagons heavily laden with wheat-flour and wine.
73
  Gabrielli himself cites 
statistics that heavily laden wagons traveled roughly 2.5 km./hr. and up to 3.7 km./hr. 
when carrying a light load.  Even the quicker time he cites—which would be infeasible 
for a wagon carrying (supposedly) 900kg. of grain (or wine)
74
—would be barely 
sufficient to cover the 35 km. per day covered between the Araxes and Pylae, taking into 
account the fact that the army would have needed time before each day’s march to eat, 
decamp, and tend to the animals and after each day’s march to bivouac, tend to the 
animals, and eat—and that the vanguard of the army would have had to stop marching for 
the day some hours ahead of the rest of the army in order to allow the army to camp 
together each night.
75
  Some wagons did make the march between Corsote and 
Charmande/Pylae,
76
 but it appears that they were few in number and were not heavily 
laden, since all of them could be lifted “high and dry” out of mud by the Persian nobles 
accompanying the march (1.5.7-8) (these wagons probably formed Cyrus’ personal 
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 (1967) 311 n.93. 
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 Gabrielli ([1995] 117) states, without argumentation, that a load of 900 kg. for a wagon “est peu” but this 
is simply incorrect:  see, e.g., Burford (1960) 4-5, 9; and, for comparative evidence, see also, e.g., Erdkamp 
(1998) 73 n.93. 
 
75
 See Maurice (1930) 229; Pryor (2006a) 6-7, 9. 
 
76
 The oxen pulling these wagons were almost certainly operating above normal performance maxima:  




retinue).  Four hundred wagons heavily laden with wheat-flour and wine could have not 





 Gabrielli’s hypothesis that the four hundred wagons mentioned at 1.10.18 
accompanied Cyrus’ march through the desert and that they functioned to provision the 
entire army through that march has absolutely no foundation, then
78
—and it is surprising 
that an article so full of basic errors, baseless assumptions, and faulty methodology could 
ever have been cited as the standard article on the wagons.  Other scholars accepting the 
existence of the wagons have also assumed that the wagons were present with the army 
as it marched through the desert along the left bank of the Euphrates.  To explain the 
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 Note also that part of the reason that Gabrielli thinks that the wagons joined the march at Myriandros or 
Issos is that, before these cities, the wagons “auraient ralenti l’armée inutilement” ([1995] 120).  But, even 
apart from the fact that the average speeds of the march were higher after Myriandros and Issos (and the 
rest-periods shorter), the same reasoning should have applied to exclude the wagons from the march after 
these cities (since the provisioning opportunities offered by the settlements on the march to Babylonia 
would mean that the presence of the wagons on the march would have been similarly useless). 
 
78
 Gabrielli posits that the wagons probably only accompanied the march from Myriandros or Issos, and 
were “probablement la réponse au problème logistique que posait la traversée du désert à Cyrus” ([1995] 
120).  He gives two explanations for this view.  Firstly, he cites Marinovic’s point that there is no mention 
of provisions during the march from over the territory controlled by Cyrus; but there is no mention of 
provisions at any point until the Araxes, and provisioning is mentioned on the march even after this point 
only in exceptional circumstances.  (Also, Gabrielli adds that “[s]ur cette première partie du trajet [i.e. in 
Asia Minor] la question du transport des vivres ne se pose donc pas.”  But, since Cyrus was received by 
every city he passed, and had the opportunity to requisition at every group of villages he halted at, after 
leaving Asia Minor, he had effectively the same control over the lands he passed through from Cilicia to 
Cunaxa as he had in the lands he officially controlled, in terms of provisioning, at least.  Following 
Gabrielli’s logic, therefore, there was no reason why the question of the transport of provisions should have 
been posed on the march from Cilicia to Cunaxa.)  Secondly, Gabrielli states that the presence of wagons 
would have slowed the march “inutilement” before Myriandros or Issos:  but see previous note.  And two 
external factors make it most improbable that Cyrus added the four hundred wagons loaded with wheat-
flour and wine at Myriandros or Issos.  Firstly, to get from Myriandros to the Euphrates, the army had to 
cross Mount Amanus, most likely by means of the Beilan pass (Manfredi [1986] 96-97).  Even if this pass 
is not especially rugged (see Lee [2007] 22 contra Farrell [1961] 154), its ascent still entailed a rise of 740 
meters over only eight or nine kilometers of marching (Manfredi [1986] 99-100), a difficult task for 
wagons weighed down with hundreds of kilograms of grain and wine, but one easily foreseen and thus 
avoidable.  Secondly, the march from Myriandrus to the Chalus river was not through desert:  the Amiq 
plain west of the Chalus is fertile (see p.648 n.78 above).  Thus, there was no desert crossing (causing 




dearth of grain described by Xenophon at 1.5.6, some of these scholars have resorted to 
thinking that Cyrus miscalculated the amount of supplies needed for the march from 
Corsote to Charmande.
79
  But this assumes that Cyrus was distributing rations in kind 
throughout the march—an assumption I have shown earlier to be false—and is 
inconsistent with Xenophon’s description of the famine, which makes no mention of a 
failure of Cyrus to distribute rations, but implies, rather, that the men were suffering 
famine because they had had no opportunity to buy grain.  Other scholars accepting the 
existence of the wagons confess that they have no idea why the grain was not distributed 
on the march between Corsote and Charmande.
80
 
 But it is mere assumption that the wagons laden with wheat-flour and grain 
accompanied the march before Pylae—and the fact that there is no mention of 
distribution of wheat-flour when there was a dearth of grain in the army on the march 
between Corsote and Charmande is a definite proof that they were not present on this part 
of the march:  it would have made no sense for Cyrus to hold back grain from the soldiers 
when they had no other means of acquiring it (and were reduced to eating meat).
81
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 See, e.g., Kelsey and Zenos (1895) 18, 228; Mather and Hewitt (1938) 269. 
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 See Anderson (1970) 52; Harthen (2001) 128. 
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 See Roy (1967) 311 n.93.  Roy (ibid.) also argued against the existence of the wagons on the grounds 
that 2.2.11 shows that there were no opportunities for the army to reprovision after Charmande and thus no 
opportunity to acquire four hundred cartloads of food after Charmande.  Ariaeus at 2.2.11 states during his 
meeting with the Greek generals and lochagoi that there had been no provisions—or hardly any (whatever 
there was had been taken by the army)—in the last seventeen march-days to take “ἐκ τῆς χώρας” (see 
p.634 above for discussion of this passage).  The start of the seventeen march-days can be calculated to 
have been in the middle of the march between Corsote and Charmande (see above p.264 n.23).  But the 
mercenaries bought provisions at Charmande, i.e. after the start of the seventeen march days referred to by 
Ariaeus.  Thus, when Ariaeus stated that there were no opportunities to provision “ἐκ τῆς χώρας” in the 
seventeen march days previous to his meeting with the Greeks, he meant that there were no opportunities 
for the army to provision from foraging, and not there were absolutely no opportunities for the army to 
provision itself.  2.2.11 therefore does not rule out provisioning by the army after Charmande (i.e., at Pylae) 
by means other than foraging. 
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Moreover, Xenophon’s description at 1.10.18 of the wagons’ function—that they had 
been provided by Cyrus in case serious need (of grain) should ever overtake the army—
does not make sense if these wagons had been used previously to provision the 
mercenaries.
82
  In sum, we can state with certainty that the wagons were not used to 
provision the Greeks at any point before they are mentioned by Xenophon at 1.10.18. 
 
iii.  The 400 wagons provided by Cyrus:  a measure taken to provide logistical 
security and tactical flexibility for the army before Cunaxa 
In the preceding section, then, the following was established:  there is no evidence 
that the four hundred wagons mentioned by Xenophon at 1.10.18 accompanied any part 
of the march other than that from Pylae to the day of the battle; moreover, because of the 
dearth of grain in the army between Corsote and Charmande narrated at 1.5.6, and the 
implication of 1.10.18 that wagons had not been used previously to feed the Greeks, one 
can state with certainty that the wagons were not present at any point before Pylae.
83
  
(This coheres with the discussion in section i, which demonstrated that the Greeks 
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 Cf. Tuplin (1999) 345:  Xenophon’s description of the wagons “is rather peculiar if they were actually 
the ones which had fed them for at least half of the hard stages after Corsote.” 
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 This conclusion also gains support from an analysis of the relative marching rates of the army from 
Sardis to Cunaxa.  On the march through Babylonia from Pylae, the average number of parasangs covered a 
day dropped to four (roughly twenty kilometers a day) (1.7.1), the slowest rate on the march, and the fourth 
day of marching from Pylae only covered three parasangs (though this is probably to be explained by the 
difficulty of marching through the narrow passage between the Euphrates and a huge ditch dug by the King 
(see 1.7.14 with Anderson [1974] 100)).  This is in direct contrast to the march between the Araxes and 
Pylae, when the march covered an average of seven parasangs a day; even earlier in the march, the average 
speed was somewhere between five and six parasangs a day, with occasional bursts of seven (1.4.1), eight 
(1.2.6), and ten parasangs a day (1.2.11) (cf. the table of marching speeds compiled by Gabrielli ([1995] 
118)).  The decrease in marching rates after Pylae would be consistent with the addition of four hundred 




acquired their supplies from the settlements which they passed during the march to 
Cunaxa:  because they could provision in the settlements they passed, there was no need 
for the army to be accompanied by a supply train on the march to Babylonia.)
84
  
Secondly, the wheat-flour and wine on the wagons did not have to be distributed before 
the battle because there was still food and drink in the army, the property of individual 
soldiers.  Finally, there is no reason to doubt Xenophon’s statement that the wagons had 
been provided by Cyrus as a source of supplies in case of an emergency (only).
85
 
Why did Cyrus prepare wagons loaded with wheat-flour and wine at Pylae (and 
not previously), then?   The answer to this question lies in a consideration of the strategic 
situation faced by Cyrus at Pylae.  Cyrus was expecting battle with the King soon after he 
left Pylae.  At 1.7.18, Xenophon tells us that, four days’ march out of the city, the 
pretender gave Silanus three thousand darics for correctly forecasting, eleven days 
earlier, that there would not be a battle within ten days:  Cyrus had expected that the King 
would fight within ten days or not at all.
86
  As Lendle has pointed out,
87
 although there is 
no mention in the text of the number of days taken up by the army’s halts at Charmande 
and Pylae, Silanus’ prophecy—and thus Cyrus’ expectation that battle with his brother 
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 Cf. chapter 3 sections ii, iii above:  substantial supply-trains unnecessary for classical Greek armies when 
marching through friendly territory since they acquired supplies on these marches from markets provided 
by friendly poleis. 
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 I should add here, too, the point that, since it is impossible to ascertain the total carrying capacity of the 




 Note that Cyrus thought that the King would fight within ten ἡµέραι and not ten σταθµοί. 
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was imminent—should be dated to the stay at Pylae, directly before the invasion of 




But, after the army had departed from Pylae, there were no (or few) opportunities 
to forage for provisions
89
 and (seemingly) no settlements to acquire new sources of 
supplies from
90
—and, in any case, tactical considerations (the expected approach of 
Artaxerxes’ army) meant that the soldiers could not be allowed to spread out in order to 
forage, or to leave the march in order to purchase or requisition food from any 
settlements they passed.  Therefore, in the time between the departure of the army from 
Pylae and the battle, Cyrus could not rely on any new means of acquiring provisions for 
the mercenaries to supplement the supplies they had each taken from Pylae for the 
upcoming march.
91
  Given this strategic situation, the wagons full of provisions will have 
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 (Ibid.):  it is very unlikely that, following the indications of time given in the narrative, that the prophecy 
was given on the sixth day of the march between Corsote and Pylae, somewhere in the middle of the desert.  
It is much more likely, instead, that the army spent around six or seven days at Pylae, and that Xenophon 
did not describe the army’s halt at the city because little unusual or of consequence happened there.  Note 




 See p.634 above on the implication of Ariaeus’ statement at 2.2.11.  Cyrus probably expected, too, that 
the King’s force would employ a “scorched earth” strategy as, in fact, they did (1.6.1).  In addition, the 
expected presence of the King’s (vast) forces nearby meant that Cyrus would have been expecting to 
compete for whatever supplies there were in the area of operations with another (vast) army. 
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 There is no mention of any settlements in Xenophon’s account of the five days of marching from Pylae.  
See also 2.2.12-13:  the first villages in Babylonia were a long day’s march away from the halt the army 
departed from on the day of the battle. 
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 I should add here that there is no reason to doubt that Pylae had the resources both to provision the army 
for the coming marches and to fill four hundred wagons with wheat-flour and wine.  The area around Pylae 
was fertile (see Joannès [1995] 175; cf. Lee [2007] 25, Lendle [2005] 50) and one of the few places in 
Mesopotamia where viticulture is possible (Joannès [1995] 179 with Tuplin [1999] 346).  Also:  Cyrus 
almost certainly commandeered at Pylae the provisions loaded on the four hundred wagons.  But the 
requisitioning of these provisions does not tell us about the usual provisioning of the march up to this point 
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had two linked functions.  Firstly, they would have acted as a “safety net” for the 
Greeks,
92
 which the mercenaries could have relied upon if a greater amount of time than 
Cyrus expected elapsed between the departure from Pylae and the battle (because of a 
later (than expected) arrival of the King’s forces or if the armies’ maneuvering for 
position before battle took up a large amount of time)
93
 and the mercenaries’ supplies ran 
out (as a result).
94
  Secondly, the four hundred wagons “increased the tactical flexibility” 
of Cyrus’ army.
95
  The grain and wine carried on the wagons gave Cyrus considerable 
maneuvering room before the imminent battle:  any decisions he might make on whither 
and when to march could be made now for tactical rather than supply considerations.
96
  
Whereas the necessity for speed earlier on the march had discouraged the preparation of a 
substantial supply-train to accompany the army—and the facts that the army was able to 
acquire provisions from the settlements it passed during the march, and, in the absence of 
                                                                                                                                                 




 See Harari (2000) 319 for this point. 
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 See chapter 3 section ivb for two examples of classical Greek armies having to send home for supply-




 Cf. 1.10.18 (Cyrus provided the wagons in case “serious need should overtake the army”) to Harari 
(2000) 319 (the “safety net” of a supply-train “enabled armies to live off the land without fear that a sudden 
supply crisis would bring immediate starvation”). 
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 Erdkamp (1998) 22. 
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 See again Harari (2000) 319:  “[t]rains were also of great importance during military crises, for instance 
when a battle was imminent, because they enabled armies to maneuver freely at least for a few days, 
unimpeded by supply considerations.”  The straits to which the army had been reduced on the march from 
Corsote to Charmande doubtlessly reinforced, in any consideration, the advantages of having a supply-train 




enemy forces earlier in the march, was not constrained by any tactical considerations in 
its provisioning, had meant that such a supply-train was previously unnecessary
97
—the 
strategic situation confronting Cyrus at Pylae, and especially the freedom of action which 
the presence of the wagons in the army would give in that situation, now compelled the 
preparation of a sizeable supply-train at that city. 
 In conclusion, this explanation of the function of the four hundred wagons 
provided by Cyrus for the Greeks (but never used by them)—that the wagons were added 
at Pylae to give the army both logistical security and tactical flexibility—has the 
following advantages.  Firstly, it is consistent with Xenophon’s statement at 1.10.18 that 
Cyrus’ intention in providing the wagons was to have supplies distributed to the Greeks 
in case of serious need in the army.  Secondly, it coheres with his treatment of 
provisioning throughout the anabasis to Cunaxa.  Thirdly, it matches with the ecological 
and topographical ‘facts on the ground.’  Finally, and crucially, it gives us a convincing 
strategic rationale for the addition of the wagons to the army, something lacking from all 
previous treatments of the four hundred wagons provided by Cyrus. 
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 Cf. Haldon (2006b) 149:  “[i]n friendly territory, and whenever provisions could be garnered readily, 
[armies] would have replenished supplies much more frequently in order to avoid having to take along 








I briefly examine here some arrangements made for the pay and provisioning of 
military forces in the Hellenistic period.  I do this for two reasons:  firstly, I wish to 
examine a claim that conditions on campaign affected the rates of pay given to Boeotian 
cavalry in the early third century; if this claim is correct, it would mark an important 
difference between classical and early Hellenistic practice, and could throw some doubt 
on the conclusions reached above in chapter 5.  Secondly, I want to draw attention to 
some differences between the ways in which classical and Hellenistic military employers 
paid their soldiers; I aim, in highlighting these, to both support and confirm some of the 
conclusions reached above in chapter 7 concerning the workings of military markets in 
the classical period. 
 
ii. SEG 28.461 and the sharing of military expenses between allies in the classical 
and Hellenistic periods  
I will begin by looking at an inscribed agreement between the Boeotian poleis of 
Orchomenus and Chaeronea,1 datable to the mid 280s,2 regarding cavalry service in the 
Boeotian koinon army.  At some unknown time prior to the erection of the inscription 
                                                 
1 SEG 28.461.  See Étienne and Roesch (1978) for the text of the inscription with a translation and 
commentary. 
 




(which is the Orchomenian copy of the agreement between the two cities),3 the one 
cavalry squadron (ίλα) of the Chaeroneans had been integrated into the cavalry force of 
the Orchomenians, where it had joined with the three Orchomenian squadrons to form a 
single contingent available for the requirements of the federal Boeotian army.4  The 
object of the agreement was to ensure that the burden of koinon cavalry service would be 
shared equitably between the two cities.  Thus, an order of departure for military service, 
both within and outside Boeotia, for the four squadrons was established; and in the event 
of a call for service by the koinon army when each squadron had already served for the 
year and each had spent equal time on campaign, provision was made for the drawing of 
lots by the Orchomenian hipparch, who was to be in charge of the contingent as a whole, 
to see which squadron would serve (ll.23-26).  To monitor and enforce the fair 
distribution of service, an account was to be established by the two cities in which 
campaigns within Boeotia and outside Boeotia were to be recorded separately, for as 
much time as the cavalry received ἐφόδια (ll.26-29).  A second document, inscribed later 
by a different hand,5 below the agreement on the same stone, is that account:  the first 
half recording the lengths of service within Boeotia survives, but unfortunately the 
account of service outside Boeotia is missing, apart from its heading and a part of a name 
of an Orchomenian squadron leader (ilarch).  
                                                 
3 Étienne and Roesch (1978) 359. 
 
4 (Ibid.) 366. 
 




It is to the provision for the setting up of this account of the lengths of service 
undertaken by the cavalry squadrons that I want to turn to now.  The Greek is as follows:  
τιθέσθη δὲ τὰς στροτει- / ίας τάς τε ἐν τῆ Βοιωτίη κὴ τὰς ἐ- / χθόνδε τᾶς Βοιωτίας 
χωρὶς ἑκατέ- / [ρ]ας ἇς κα τὰ ἐφόδια λάβωνθι.  Étienne and Roesch translate as follows:  
“que l’on compte séparément les campagnes en Béotie et les campagnes hors de Béotie, 
pour tout le temps où les cavaliers auront touché leurs indemnités de route.”6  In a recent 
brief discussion of the evidence of the agreement between Orchomenus and Chaeronea 
for the military organization of the Boeotian League, part of an interesting paper on the 
coinages and economies of Greek federal states in the classical and Hellenistic periods, 
Mackil and van Alfen took this clause to  
make... it clear that the cavalrymen who served in the koinon army were required 
to keep track of the time they served, because they were to receive pay from the 
district itself (that is, from the combined treasuries of the member poleis), at 
different rates for service within Boiotia than for service outside the region.7 
 
The assumption underlying this interpretation of the provision establishing the account is 
that conditions on campaign will determine the rates of pay given to the cavalry forces of 
both cities.  The question is whether there is anything in the clause ordering the setting up 
of the account that justifies such an assumption. 
 This part of Mackil and van Alfen’s paper is based on work in Mackil’s 2003 
dissertation on the agreement between the Orchomenians and the Chaeroneans.  There 
she translated lines 26-29 of the inscription as follows:  “Let them keep track of the time 
they serve inside Boiotia and outside it separately, for which they have accepted traveling 
                                                 
6 (1978) 362. 
 




expenses.”8  This led to the following conclusion (more or less the same as above, except 
that this earlier version includes a “presumably”) regarding the setting up of the account: 
[The cavalry] are to keep track for themselves of the time they served, because 
they are evidently to be paid for it, by the district itself, and presumably at 
different rates depending on whether they served inside Boiotia or outside the 
region.9 
 
The problem with this conclusion is that it relies on an error in Mackil’s original 
translation.  Mackil takes the subject of the infinitive τιθέσθη to be the men serving in the 
cavalry squadrons.  The subject of τιθέσθη is, however, more ‘generalized,’ as the ‘on’ of 
Étienne and Roesch’s translation conveys successfully: there is no particular person or 
persons in mind as the subject; the idea is that an account is to be set up by public 
order—that it is to be taken care of by the poleis in question.10  That the account is to 
made by the poleis of the agreement, and not the members of the cavalry squadrons, is 
proved by the presence of the account below and on the same stone as the public 
inscription ordering its establishment.  The account was a matter of concern for the 
Orchomenians and Chaeroneans as a whole, then, rather than the members of the cavalry 
squadrons who were to undertake the military service:  the agreement was for the poleis 
                                                 
8 (2003) 493. 
 
9 (2003) 335. 
 
10 Compare the translation at Mackil and van Alfen (2006) 223 n.69:  “[l]et an account be recorded 
separately for campaigns in Boiotia and outside of Boiotia, for which they have taken their travel 
allowances.”  Although this translation is correct, the incorrect inference from Mackil’s original translation 




to keep account of the lengths of the campaigns served by their respective cavalry 
squadrons.11 
 But if there is no basis for Mackil and van Alfen’s assertion that the cavalrymen 
were to keep track themselves of the time they served on campaign because they were to 
be paid at different rates for service in and outside Boeotia,12 the question still remains 
why the cities of Orchomenus and Chaeronea should have been concerned to record the 
lengths of service undertaken by their cavalry for the Boeotian koinon inside and outside 
Boeotia separately, “for as much time as the cavalry received ἐφόδια [ἑκατέ- / [ρ]ας ἇς 
κα τὰ ἐφόδια λάβωνθι],” i.e. why the cities were concerned to differentiate between the 
pay arrangements for military service in and outside Boeotia.   The answer to this 
question lies in placing this account within the context of the conventions governing 
military aid to allies in the Greek world in the classical and (much better attested in this 
respect) Hellenistic periods, and, particularly, of some of the provisions of a treaty made 
by the Boeotians with the Aetolians and Phocians some five or fifteen years before the 
agreement between the Orchomenians and Chaeroneans. 
Especially in the Hellenistic period, it was common in military alliances between 
Greek states to specify how, if one of the parties to the alliance was called to the help of 
another, how any expeditionary force sent by that party to the call for help was to be 
maintained while fulfilling its reciprocal military obligations to the party requesting its 
                                                 
11 In fact, a moment’s reflection will make it clear that this must have been so.  Letting the individual 
members of the cavalry squadrons report the lengths of service for which they were due pay would have led 
to an unacceptably high number of opportunities for those individuals to defraud their respective poleis. 
 
12 There is also no reason to think that the cavalrymen were to receive pay from “the combined treasuries of 
the member poleis [i.e. Orchomenus and Chaeronea]” (Mackil and van Alfen [2006] 223:  see p.657 




aid:  i.e., provision was made for how the expenses of any potential campaign(s) were to 
be shared between the state/s requesting help and the state/s summoned to help.13  There 
were three basic arrangements.14  In some agreements, the expenses of the expeditionary 
force were borne exclusively by the state or ruler summoning military aid.  In others, the 
expense of paying and maintaining any summoned force were shared:  they were to be 
incurred by the state/ruler that was dispatching the force for the duration of the journey to 
the requesting ally, after which the requesting state/ruler paid for the summoned force for 
as long as it employed that force; or, more often, the summoned force received its pay for 
the first thirty days following its arrival at its ally state/ruler from the state/ruler that had 
sent it, after which, again, the requesting state/ruler paid for the force as long as it 
employed the force.15  These basic arrangements could receive slight modifications in 
specific agreements between states:  for instance, in a treaty between the Aetolians and 
Acarnanians in 263-262, it was agreed that the pay for the first thirty days of service 
would be given by the state from which the soldiers were coming, without any 
specification as to at which time this thirty day period would begin;16 after the thirty days, 
the expense of maintaining the force was to be met by the people that requested it, as 
usual (IG IX 12, 3 (Schmitt [1969], no.483), ll.20-28). 
                                                 
13 See Garlan (1977) 150-158. 
 
14 See (ibid.) 155-157 for examples. 
 
15 For a treaty of this type, see chapter 5 section iv on Thucy. 5.47.6. 
 
16 The date of departure to the neighboring state was probably understood as the start date of this period:  




Another slightly different take on the basic customary arrangements is found in an 
agreement of either 301 or 292/1 made by the Boeotians with the Aetolians and the 
Phocians (Schmitt [1969], no.462).17  In the event of one of these states being attacked by 
a third party, the Boeotians and the Aetolians agreed to help the attacked ally (frag. a, 
ll.14-15).  The details governing the pay arrangements for the forces providing the 
reciprocal military aid are found on fragment b of the inscription, at ll.3-13:  “] ων ἐφόδια 
[--- παρ’ (?) Αἰτω]λῶν Βοιωτοὺς [--- ὅσον δ’ ἂν χρόν]ον δέωνται, χρῆσ[θαι τᾶι 
συµµάχιαι (?) --- Αἰτωλοὶ παρὰ Βοιωτ]ῶν ἢ Βοιωτοὶ παρ’ Αἰτω6[λῶν ---]τι ἀφῶσιν 
Αἰτωλοὶ Βοιω[τοὺς--- ἢ (?) Βοιωτοὶ] Αἰτωλούς· διδόναι δὲ ὅτι6 --- ἐπ]ε6ιδὰν 
προαν[α]λώσωσιν Βοι[ωτοὶ --- ἀπο]δοῦναι τοὺς Βουλάρχους ἐντ--- ειν καὶ ἐν τῶι 
ἐπιστήσοντι συ6[νεδρίωι (?) ---ο]υ6.  κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἂν Αἰτ[ωλοὶ --- 
προαναλώσω]σιν, [ἀ]ποδ[ο]ῦναι τὰ6[ς ἀρχὰς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ---”  Although the state of the 
stone makes its impossible to restore with certainty those parts of the inscription that are 
missing, the general meaning of the agreement and some of the clauses on pay can be 
grasped quite easily.18  There is a clause mentioning ἐφόδια—most probably regarding its 
payment—followed (at ll.5ff.) by a clause agreeing that each of the states, the Boeotians 
and the Aetolians, if they had requested military aid, could keep the force sent to them by 
their ally for as long as they had need of it (ll.5-6:  [--- ὅσον δ’ ἂν χρόν]ον δέωνται, 
χρῆσ[θαι τᾶι συµµάχιαι (?) --- Αἰτωλοὶ παρὰ Βοιωτ]ῶν ἢ Βοιωτοὶ παρ’ Αἰτω6[λῶν ---
                                                 
17 The Phocians, however, are not mentioned in the clauses detailing the requirements of reciprocal military 
aid and the provisions made for its execution. 
 




]τι).19  The service in aid of the requesting state was to cease only when that state 
dismissed the summoned military force to its home state (ll.7-8:  ἀφῶσιν Αἰτωλοὶ 
Βοιω[τοὺς--- ἢ (?) Βοιωτοὶ] Αἰτωλούς).  Finally, at ll.9ff., there is a mention of 
advances—which are almost certainly of the ἐφόδια mentioned above—that were to be 
made by the summoned state and that were to reimbursed by the magistrates of the 
summoning state within a certain period of time.  As to why and in what circumstances 
these advances were to be paid, Flacelière, having placed this treaty within the context of 
the other types of agreements described above on the distribution of military expenses 
between allies, was able to provide a convincing explanation:  
Ici les frais d’entretien des troupes de secours devaient être entièrement à la 
charge du pays secouru,– car, s’ils avaient incombé pendant les trente premiers 
jours au pays qui envoyait le secours, aucun avance n’aurait été nécessaire.  
Comme il y avait une impossibilité matérielle à ce que le pays secouru pût payer 
ces frais dès le début, c’est-à-dire dès le moment où les troupes de secours se 
mettaient en marche, les dépenses faites par ces troupes de secours se devaient 
être provisoirement couvertes par leur pays d’origine, à charge pour le pays 
secouru de les rembourser ensuite.20 
 
It is in the context of the clauses on advances in the Boeotian treaty with the 
Aetolians that we ought to place the provision in the agreement between the 
Orchomenians and the Chaeroneans for the setting up of the account of the lengths of 
military service in and outside Boeotia.  The treaty with the Aetolians was made either in 
301 or 292/1—complete certainty is impossible on this point21—and was still in force in 
279, during the invasion of central Greece by the Gauls:  thus it was in force at the time 
                                                 
19 The restoration is, of course, not certain, but is highly probable:  Flacelière ([1930] 78) compares Thucy. 
5.47.6:  “ἢν δὲ πλέονα βούλωνται χρόνον τῇ στρατιᾷ χρῆσθαι...” 
 
20 (1930) 80.  Cf. Garlan (1977) 158. 
 




of the agreement between the Orchomenians and Chaeroneans.22  As I have argued 
above, the account of the duration of campaigns for which the cavalry of these two poleis 
received ἐφόδια was the concern of the poleis:  it was the poleis that wished to record the 
lengths of service undertaken by their cavalry squadrons.  Placing their agreement within 
the context of the Boeotian League’s treaty with the Aetolian League, one can see that the 
account of the duration of the campaigns would have served two requirements for 
Orchomenus and Chaeronea:  it would not only allow for the equitable distribution of 
cavalry service between the four squadrons of the combined cavalry force of the two 
cities, but it would also allow for calculation and equitable distribution of the military 
expenses for which the cities were liable—the ἐφόδια for service within Boeotia, for 
internal Boeotian League policing duties—and calculation of the expenses for which the 
cities were initially liable, but for which they would later be reimbursed—the ἐφόδια for 
service outside Boeotia, in aid of an allied state, most probably the Aetolian League, for 
which they were to advance sums of money that would later be repaid to them. 
 I realize that this interpretation of the clause cannot admit of complete certainty 
but I believe that it is cogent for three reasons.  Firstly, it places the actions of the 
Orchomenians and Chaeroneans within the framework of long recognized conventions 
governing foreign military expeditions in the Greek world:  it is an explanation, therefore, 
that fits within known polis financial and military practices in this period.  Even if the 
campaigns outside Boeotia were not in aid of the Aetolians, there may have been other 
                                                 
22 Roesch (1979) 250-251.  Roesch (ibid.) notes that the fact that the treaty between the Boeotians and 
Aetolians was in force at the time of the agreement between Orchomenus and Chaeronea “pourrait donner 
une indication sur les opérations effectueés hors de Béotie peu après 287,” i.e. on the operations outside 
Boeotia listed in the account below the agreement.  (Roesch does not use this point, however, to clarify the 




unattested treaties made by the Boeotians with similar provisions on pay.  But, and this is 
the second point in favor of my interpretation, my linking of this clause with the treaty of 
the Aetolians gives an appropriate historical context for the poleis’ actions:  the unsettled 
conditions in central Greece during this period.  Thirdly, this interpretation places the 
military pay given by the Orchomenians and Chaeroneans back into a context of public 
finance and expenditure.  Given that there is no evidence prior to this date for states in the 
Greek world linking military pay to conditions on campaign—that, in contrast, all the 
evidence points to pay being determined by the current financial resources of military 
employers and/or by competition among military employers for soldiers and sailors—and 
that there is nothing in this inscription or in contemporary evidence from Boeotia to 
suggest that the Boeotian League or the poleis of Orchomenus and Chaeronea were 
anomalous in this respect, it is almost certain that the clause in the agreement between 
these two cities providing for the establishment of an account listing the duration of the 
cities’ cavalry squadrons’ service within and outside Boeotia should be interpreted as a 
measure to monitor and control public spending, and more particularly to ascertain what 
the two poleis were owed for their cavalry squadrons’ service outside Boeotia.23 
                                                 
23 In fact, the clause “ἑκατέ - [ρ]ας ἇς κα τὰ ἐφόδια λάβωνθι” is redundant if interpreted as part of an 
attempt by the two poleis to keep track of their spending on cavalry pay because of their payment of 
different rates of “ἐφόδια” for military service in and outside Boeotia.  On this interpretation, the account to 
be set up would have included the lengths of the different cavalry squadrons’ service, and thus monitored 
and enforced the part of the agreement between the two cities attempting to ensure equal lengths of service 
for the four cavalry squadrons, but the clause on “τὰ ἐφόδια” would have served no purpose.  If the two 
cities were paying different rates to their cavalry depending on whether they served within or outside 
Boeotia, this would have been generally known and thus presumed in any agreement between the two 
cities, and there would have been no reason to mention it as part of the establishment of an account in any 
agreement, especially since its mention would not have made any material difference to the Orchomenians 
or Chaeroneans:  this pay would have been distributed before and during the squadrons’ service, and the  
two poleis, on this hypothetical explanation, would not have expected any recompense for the sums they 
had distributed.  Interpreting the clause in question differently, it could be argued the inclusion in the 
agreement of a clause ordering the setting up of an account of the campaigns for which the cavalry received 
pay implies that there were campaigns for which the cavalry squadrons did not receive “ἐφόδια,” and that 
the clause on pay was meant to keep track of the campaigns for which the cities had to distribute pay, in 
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 iii. Some notes on the payment of Hellenistic military forces and the markets 
provided to them by their employers 
In the Hellenistic period, the distinction between pay (µισθός) and subsistence 
rations (σιτηρέσιον), which had been inchoate in the middle of the fourth century, 
hardened into established practice.  From the third century on, Hellenistic soldiers 
generally received two payments in return for service:  pay (proper) in coin—the term 
ὀψώνιον for the most part replacing the classical µισθός to denote this payment, although 
the latter was still used frequently in literary authors; and a payment of rations in kind—
variously called σῖτος, σιτοµετρία, σιταρχία, σιτηρέσιον, µέτρηµα—the value of part or 
all of which could be converted into and paid in coin (which type of payment the term 
σιτώνιον always referred to).24  Again, these were the terms generally utilized to denote 
the two types of payments, but there could be differences in usage by region and period:  
the treaty made between the Aetolians and Acarnanians referred to above (IG IX 12, 3 
(Schmitt [1969], no.483, ll.35-37), for example, used σιταρχία, it seems, to refer to both 
payments combined; and, in Ptolemaic Egypt, σιταρχία meant pay (proper), as opposed 
to σιτοµετρία, rations in kind.25  The term ἐφόδια, however, is only attested in the 
agreement between the Orchomenians and the Chaeroneans, and in the treaty between the 
                                                                                                                                                 
order that the financial burden of cavalry service might be distributed equally between the two cities.  This 
might have been so, but this interpretation would still not explain why a distinction was made for 
campaigns within and outside Boeotia. 
 
24 See Launey (1949-50) 724-780, and esp. 735 for a summary of his findings; cf. Ducrey (1970) 653-655, 
Burrer (2008) 75. 
 
25 Launey (1949-50) 758-759, 765; cf. (ibid.) 733, Burrer (2008) 86 n.16 for other examples of σιταρχία 




Boeotians, Aetolians and Phocians, to refer to a payment to military forces.  Thus, there 
is uncertainty as to what it means in the agreement between the Orchomenians and the 
Chaeroneans:  pay (=ὀψώνια), or the rations granted to the cavalry squadrons, or a 
payment including both of their allowances.26  In the absence of any mention of another 
type of payment here, or in the agreement with the Aetolians—though, given the 
fragmentary state of this inscription, the argument from silence is not so strong here—it 
would be seem to be the last:  a single payment combining both pay proper and a 
subsistence allowance.27 
 If ἐφόδια does mean in these two inscriptions a single payment combining both 
pay proper and a subsistence allowance, it is still true that Hellenistic soldiers, in contrast 
to those serving in classical military forces, usually received two types of payments:  
namely, one for pay proper, and one to cover basic food expenses (the latter sometimes 
distributed in kind, sometimes in coin).  In another contrast with usual practices in the 
classical period, Hellenistic soldiers were sometimes offered markets by their employers 
in which basic foods, e.g. grain, oil, and wine, were sold to them at fixed prices that were 
lower than those prevailing on markets in the areas in question.  The evidence for this 
practice comes from Pergamum, Egypt (especially), Athens, and Carthage.  In an 
                                                 
26 Étienne and Roesch (1978) 372.  Cf. Flacelière (1930) 77 on the meaning of ἐφοδία in the agreement with 
the Aetolians:  “[j]e crois qu’ici il faut entendre par ἐφοδία les frais de route et d’entretien payés à des 
troupes en campagne;” and Schmitt (1969) 98:  “ἐφοδία wohl = ὀψώνια...”  Garlan is almost certainly 
wrong to take ἐφοδία in the agreement with the Aetolians as exclusively referring to “frais de route” ([1977] 
158). 
 
27 The fact that the term ἐφόδια is used for payments to military forces only in the agreement between the 
Orchomenians and Chaeroneans and in the Boeotian treaty with the Aetolians tends to favor the 
interpretation that the payments for service outside Boeotia mentioned in the cavalry agreement were made 




agreement between Eumenes I and the previously revolted mercenaries of his garrisons in 
Philetaeria and Attaleia,28 the conditions of future service for the mercenaries were 
regulated; included in the agreement was a clause on the sale of provisions by the King to 
the mercenaries (ll.3-4):  “σίτου τιµὴν ἀποτίνειν τοῦ µεδίµνου δραχµὰς τέσσ[αρ]ας, οἴνου 
τοῦ µετρητοῦ δραχµὰς τέσσαρας.”29  In the absence of any price data for grain (or wine) 
in Pergamum in the third century, one cannot state certainly that the price of four 
drachmas for a medimnos of grain was lower than prevailing market prices at Pergamum 
but, given that these clauses represent the demands of the mercenaries, it would seem 
very likely that this was the case.30  A decree of 210 in praise of the Athenian general for 
the countryside at Eleusis seems to refer to the acquisition by the general of a stock of 
grain that he resold to the soldiers of the garrison at Eleusis at low prices.31  The fact that 
the general received special praise for this action and the grain was not provided by the 
state implies that soldiers in Athenian garrisons did not usually have the right or 
opportunity to buy provisions at lower than market prices (the phrasing of the inscription 
                                                 
28 OGIS 266, Schmitt (1969) no.481.  The inscription is undated but Eumenes I reigned from 263 to 241. 
 
29 This clause has sometimes been interpreted—taking Eumenes as the subject of ἀποτίνειν—as fixing the 
rate of conversion of the mercenaries’ rations in kind into payments in coin (see Launey [1949-50] 738, 
Bagnall and Derow [2004], no.23).  As Chaniotis ([2005] 87) points out, however, “[t]he clauses represent 
the demands of the mercenaries and, therefore, reflect their main concerns...” and thus the mercenaries 
should be taken as the subject of the infinitive:  see also Launey (1949-50) 739-741. 
 
30 Launey ([1949-50] 738-741) think that the prices for wheat and wine in this inscription represent fixed 
low prices (cf. Chaniotis [2005] 87), since the prices are substantially lower than the only other prices for 
grain and wine we possess for the third century, i.e. those from Delos:  but the data from Delos can tell us 
nothing about prevailing market conditions at Pergamum and are therefore irrelevant to this question.  
Demands of the mercenaries:  see Chaniotis in the last note. 
 
31 See IG II2 1304, ll.31-33 (“ἐπεµελήθη δὲ καὶ τῆς τῶν ὀ[ψωνίων δ]ιαδόσεως, σῖτόν τε παρατιθέµενος ἐξ 




also implies that the soldiers of the garrison were to buy their provisions from their 
ὀψωνίον).  The right of soldiers to buy grain and other basic foods from the state 
authorities at lower than market prices was, however, common in Ptolemaic Egypt, where 
it carried the general name of ἀγορά in documents.32  The contrast with the classical 
period is instructive.  There is only one instance attested in the literary and epigraphic 
sources for the classical period of a military employer providing food to a force at fixed 
low prices.33  The argument from (almost) silence is not quite conclusive, since there is 
so much more documentary evidence for the conditions of service for soldiers in the 
Hellenistic period than there is for the fifth and fourth centuries, but the contrast is 
striking, nonetheless.  The establishment and continued duration34 of this practice in the 
Hellenistic period at Pergamum and Egypt was made possible by the reserves of tax grain 
(and other foods) available to the monarchs of these kingdoms and the generally greater 
resources of these kingdoms compared to classical city-states (as well their rulers’ greater 
power to mobilize those resources):  the virtual absence of fixed (low) prices in military 
markets in the classical period, conversely, must be a result of the fact that almost no 
classical Greek state, due to the absence of direct taxation in kind in the classical period, 
had similar reserves of grain or other foods to draw upon for distribution to soldiers.35 
                                                 
32 See Launey (1949-50) 766-767, 770-771, 779. 
 
33 Plut., Mor. 193E:  see chapter seven section iv for discussion. 
 
34 As opposed to its one mention for a specific campaign in the classical period (see last note). 
 
35 Taxation:  see chapter 2 section iic and chapter 3 section ivb.  See also p.189 n.229 for discussion of the 
one military employer in the classical period (Alexander of Pherae) who did offer food at low prices to 





It should also be noted that the practice of providing grain and other foods at fixed 
low prices is attested in the Hellenistic period within the controlled environment of 
garrisons, i.e. in circumstances in which it was possible to plan and organize the transport 
and distribution of grain and other foods to a fixed (and limited) amount of men at a fixed 
location.  The fact that we do not have evidence of this practice for military expeditions 
abroad can be ascribed to the rarity of major military expeditions (by Egyptian forces, at 
any rate), and the extraordinary logistical requirements of these expeditions, that went far 
beyond the routine duties and recording practices of the Ptolemaic military 
administration, and thus our surviving evidence.  We do not know, then, if the system of 
fixed prices for grain and other basic foods was maintained for the soldiers of Hellenistic 
kings on their campaigns abroad (and, if so, how well such a system might have worked). 
 We also hear of basic foods being offered to mercenaries at low prices by the 
Carthaginians in the middle of the third century, but in a much different context.  In the 
aftermath of the First Punic War (in 240), on the return to Africa of the mercenaries who 
had fought for the Carthaginians against the Romans in Sicily, a mutiny was stirring 
among these mercenaries because of the Carthaginians’ failure to hand over arrears of 
pay owed to them (Polyb. 1.66-67, esp. 1.66.3, 11, 1.67.2):  the Carthaginians could not 
pay these arrears because of the exhaustion of their resources brought about by the war 
with the Romans (Polyb. 1.66.5, 1.67.1).  Furious with the Carthaginians’ failure to pay 
them, and by the Carthaginians’ attempts to beg off part of the pay owed, the mercenaries 
marched to Tunis, only twenty or so kilometers, a day’s march, away from Carthage 
(Polyb. 1.67.13).  Terrified by the mass of mercenaries encamped so near their city, “[the 
Carthaginians] went to every length in their eagerness to pacify [the mercenaries’] anger; 
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they sent them supplies of provisions in rich abundance, to be purchased exactly on their 
own terms, and at their own price [i.e. at the price the mercenaries fixed],”36 and also sent 
them representatives from their gerousia promising to do, in so far as they could, 
whatever the mercenaries asked for (Polyb. 1.68.5).  Encouraged by the evident fear of 
the Carthaginians, and by the Carthaginians’ eventual concession on the issue of the 
owed ὀψώνιον, and to their demands that the Carthaginians pay them the value of their 
horses that had been killed by the Romans (Polyb. 1.68.8), the mercenaries pressed for 
more:  “that they ought to receive the value of the rations of grain due to them from a 
long time previous, reckoned at the highest price reached during the war.”37  The crux of 
the mercenaries’ claim was that they were owed σιτοµετρία by the Carthaginians; they 
were now demanding, rather than the payment in kind of the rations owed in kind, the 
cash value of their ration allowance—but at the highest price reached by grain during the 
war.38  In short, as Polybius comments (1.68.10), they were inventing all sorts of 
outrageous claims.  The Carthaginians promised to do all they could and the matter went 
to arbitration (Polyb. 1.68.11). 
 We can infer two very interesting implications from the mercenaries’ demands 
and the Carthaginians’ fearful actions in reply.  Firstly, the fixing of food prices by 
                                                 
36 Polyb. 1.68.4-5:  “σπουδάζοντες ἐξιλάσασθαι τὴν ὀργὴν αὐτῶν·  καὶ τάς τε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀγορὰς 
ἐκπέµποντες δαψιλεῖς ἐπώλουν, καθὼς ἐκεῖνοι βούλοιντο καὶ τάττοιεν τὰς τιµάς...” 
 
37 Polyb. 1.68.9:  “τῆς προσοφειλοµένης σιτοµετρίας ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου τὴν µεγίστην γεγονυῖαν ἐν τῷ 
πολέµῳ τιµὴν ἔφασκον αὑτοὺς δεῖν κοµίζεσθαι.”  Interestingly, it seems that, in contrast to Greek practice, 
the Carthaginians could have been distributing rations in kind as part of total pay already in the late fifth 
century:  see Diod. 13.88.2 (when the Carthaginian army encamped before Agrigentum in 406 was 
suffering from lack of food, the Campanian and other mercenaries in the army demanded from Himilcar, 
the Carthaginian commander, “τὰς σιτοµετρίας τὰς προτεταγµένας”). 
 




soldiers in the market offered to them, and the conversion of the payments of owed 
σιτοµετρία into coin, were obviously exceptional occurrences, considered outrageous by 
Polybius, and permitted here only because of the terror of the Carthaginians.  Secondly, 
and more importantly, the claim of the mercenaries regarding σιτοµετρία gives us our 
only explicit evidence for price changes in the camp of a military force on campaign in 
the Mediterranean in the classical and Hellenistic periods, in what we may consider 
normal circumstances.39  There is no evidence, however, for the cause of these price 
increases, and we should not assign, without reflection, the reason for the price rises to 
disruptions in the production and distribution of grain caused by the First Punic War:  
prices for grain ordinarily fluctuated over the course of the year, and the mercenaries may 
simply be referring to the (relatively) high prices reached by grain in the months before 
the harvest.40 
  Finally, in the cases of the mercenaries employed by Eumenes I and the 
Carthaginians, and the soldiers serving under the Ptolemies, we have only been dealing 
with the rations or ration-allowances of soldiers, and not their total pay:  in addition to 
their rations—either in coin (implied by the granting of ἀγοραί) or in kind—the 
mercenaries, as I have noted above, also received ὀψώνιον.  That is to say, the level of 
these soldiers’ total remuneration was only partially determined by the fixed prices they 
found in the markets provided to them.41  Moreover, by paying rations in kind or by 
                                                 
39 I.e., outside those instances discussed in chapter 4. 
 
40 See chapter 7 section iii, and cf. Griffith (1935) 289:  “... the fluctuations in commodity prices, due 
perhaps to the state of war as well as to the ordinary causes.” 
 
41 In the case of the Athenian evidence cited above, where the inscription implies that the soldiers bought 
their provisions from their ὀψωνίον, we have no reason to think, albeit in the absence of any evidence either 
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setting fixed prices at which soldiers could buy their provisions, Hellenistic military 
employers divorced the levels of payments of ration-allowances to their soldiers from 
prevailing market prices.42  Payments to soldiers for ration-allowances to be spent in the 
markets specially organized for them must have borne over time only a very limited 
relation to the prices of basic foods in ‘normal’ markets in surrounding areas, and 
therefore the amounts of these payments can tell us nothing specific about the prices 
found simultaneously in ‘normal’ markets in Pergamum, Egypt or Carthage—except for 
the obvious point that prices must have been generally higher in these ‘normal’ markets 
(since the soldiers were getting fixed low prices).  The decision to provide soldiers the 
benefit of ἀγοραί with fixed prices for their basic subsistence foods does tell us one very 
important thing about the functioning of ‘normal’ markets in Pergamum, Egypt, and 
Carthage, however:  there were flexible prices for basic foods in these ‘normal’ markets 
                                                                                                                                                 
way, to think that market prices for grain or other foods determined the amount of pay distributed by the 
state to Athenians serving in garrisons, although it can be concluded that the praise for the general of the 
countryside at Eleusis’ actions implies very strongly that the men serving in the garrisons usually bought 
their food at current market prices. 
 
42 The disconnect between ration-allowances and market prices is illustrated brilliantly in a treaty between 
Attalus I and Malla made ca. 200 (see Ducrey and van Effenterre [1969] 281-282 for the inscribed text of 
the treaty and (ibid.) 288 for its date).  The treaty stipulates that Attalus is to send men to the Mallians if 
they have need of military aid (ll.9-17); and that Attalus will provide for these men their means of 
transport, their pay (“τὰ ὀψώνια”), and what is necessary for their voyage to Malla (ll.17-19).  On their 
arrival at Malla, the Mallians will provide for the maintenance of the men, giving one Aiginetan drachma to 
each man (and two to their officers) and one Attic choinix (of grain) (ll.20-24), “ἐαν µὴ ἐν πολεµίαι ὦσιν, 
οὖ ἔσται σῖτον λανβάνειν,” “unless they are in an enemy territory where it will be possible to take grain” 
(ll.24-26).  Thus, the ration of one Attic choinix of grain per man per day will be still due to each man in an 
enemy territory where they will be no grain available to forage; but, if there is grain to be taken in the 
enemy territory, the Mallians will be released from their obligation to provision the men (see Garlan [1977] 
152-153 n.5 for the correct interpretation of this clause, contra Ducrey and van Effenterre [1969] 298, 
Ducrey [1970] 658-659).  Ration-allowances of grain acquired through foraging were obviously not 




(since the measure of setting fixed prices in markets for these foods must have been 




                                                 
43 In the case of the Carthaginian mercenaries, the Carthaginians’ concession of letting the mercenaries set 
their own fixed prices not only protected the latter from fluctuations in price, but also functioned primarily 
as a Carthaginian gift (since the mercenaries would have had the opportunity (and the incentive) to set 
prices as low as possible, and therefore save money).  The provision of food at fixed low prices also 
protected military employers from potential discontent in their armies and disruption of military activity 
arising from high food prices and consequent subsistence crises (the provision of rations in kind would 




Appendix 6:  Thucydides 8.58.5-6 and Rates of Pay for 
Peloponnesian Sailors in the First Years of the Ionian War 
  
i. Introduction 
I demonstrated in chapter 6 that the “full drachma” (per man per day) was the rate 
of pay expected by the men of the Peloponnesian fleet during the summer of 412 and the 
winter of 412/11 (see 8.29.1, 8.45.6, 8.50.3), the first year of the Ionian War.
1
  Having 
done this, I want here to discuss how much money the men of the Peloponnesian fleet at 
Miletus in the summer of 411 (i.e. those men who were angry that they were not 
receiving their pay in full or regularly from Tissaphernes (8.78, 8.83.2-3)) expected to 
receive as their ‘full pay.’  If one were to follow the current scholarly consensus, the 
answer to the question of what the rate of pay of the Peloponnesian fleet in the summer of 
411 was would lie in the proper interpretation of a clause in the treaty made by the 
Spartans and Persians towards the end of the winter of 412/11 (8.58.5):  
τροφὴν δὲ ταῖς ναυσὶ ταῖς νῦν παρούσαις Τισσαφέρνη παρέχειν κατὰ τὰ 
ξυγκείµενα µέχρι ἂν αἱ νῆες αἱ βασιλέως ἔλθωσιν. 
  
Tissaphernes shall provide pay for the ships now present, according to 
the agreement, until the arrival of the King’s ships. 
 
Almost every scholar who has written on this treaty has taken the phrase “κατὰ 
τὰ ξυγκειµένα” at 8.58.5 to be referring to an agreement on a rate of pay made between 
Tissaphernes and the Spartans prior to the treaty—an agreement that this clause reaffirms 
as valid.
2
  Although the scholars who have interpreted “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” as referring 
                                                 
1
 8.29.1, in fact, strongly implies that such a rate had been established in the years before 412 as usual for 
naval service:  see again chapter 5 section iv.  All textual references in this appendix will be to Thucydides 
unless otherwise indicated. 
 
2
 See Classen (1875-1882) viii.93, 140, Tucker (1892) 218, Kirchhoff (1895) 141, Meyer (1955) 89, Lewis 
(1977) 124 (but see 104 n.84), Rood (1998) 265 n.50, Cawkwell (2005) 150 (and cf. p.678 n.13 below on 
Lévy [1983] 236) for a rate of pay agreed by Tissaphernes and the Spartans prior to the treaty; see 
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to an agreed rate of pay have done so within the framework of a debate on the aims and 
the proper interpretation of this treaty (and its relationship to the two earlier agreements 
between Tissaphernes and the Spartans in the summer of 412 and earlier in the winter of 
412/411), and not within the context of a discussion of the rate of pay for the 
Peloponnesian fleet in the summer of 411, the conventional interpretation that “κατὰ τὰ 
ξυγκειµένα” refers to an earlier established rate of pay has had the necessary consequence 
that these scholars have had to point to an earlier agreement specifying a rate of pay, a 
rate of pay that, on the customary view of 8.58.5, is reaffirmed as valid by this clause.  
And since we hear of no later agreement on pay between the Spartans and the Persians 
between this treaty (made toward the end of the winter of 412/11) and the expression of 
discontent over their pay by the Peloponnesian sailors at 8.78, the rates of pay proposed 
by scholars as solutions to the proper significance of “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” at 8.58.5 
should be taken as representing what they have believed to be the rates of pay expected 
by the Peloponnesian sailors at Miletus in the summer of 411.  
Several different prior agreements have been advanced as providing the rate of 
pay supposedly implied by “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα.”  Lewis believed that the reference to 
“κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” left “us with no choice but to believe that the reference is to 29.2 
[since there was no other reference between this passage and 8.58.5 to an agreed rate of 
pay in Thucydides’ narrative], but this may not be right.”
3
  This solution to the problem 
                                                                                                                                                 
Andrewes, HCT v.142 (cf. HCT v.70, 80, 102, 143) (followed by Kallet [2001] 266) and Hornblower, CT 
iii.929 for the view that 8.58.5 refers to a rate of pay agreed by the Spartans and Tissaphernes, and 




 (1977) 104 n.84; cf. 124 n.105.  Lewis, as part of his discussion of this problem, demonstrated [(1977) 
124] that the three obol per day rate we find agreed between the Persians and the Spartans in 407 (Xen., 
Hell. 1.5.5) was a product of negotiations between these two parties in the winter of 408/7 (Xen., Hell. 
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of 8.58.5 and “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” was the common one in earlier literature on the 
subject:
4
  on this view, the rate agreed at 8.29.2 between Tissaphernes and the 
Peloponnesians in the early winter of 412/11—thirty talents per month for fifty-five 
ships, or a sum slightly over three obols per day per man
5
—was the rate at issue at 8.58.5. 
Meyer had 8.58.5 referring back to 8.45 and Tissaphernes’ unilateral reduction 
there, on Alcibiades’ urging, of the Peloponnesians’ pay from one drachma to three 
obols, though he acknowledged that this suggestion was not capable of proof.
6
  
Cawkwell, on the other hand, criticizing Thucydides for the incompleteness of the 
information he provided in Book 8 on the subject of pay for the Peloponnesian sailors, 
took “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” to be referring to Tissaphernes’ promise, in the winter of 
413/2, to provide τροφή for any Peloponnesian triremes that came to Asia to campaign 
against the Athenians (8.5.5), i.e. to a rate of pay that was agreed then (but not reported in 
Thucydides’ narrative) for the crews of these triremes.
7
  (Although Cawkwell did not 
                                                                                                                                                 
1.4.2-3), so that that figure is of no help in deciding what any new agreed rate of pay was in the winter of 
412/11.  Cf. Andrewes, HCT v.142; Krentz (1989) 125, 136. 
 
4
 Classen ([1885] VIII.93 ad 8.29.2) believed that the phrase referred “ohne Zweifel” to 8.29.2; cf. (1885) 
VIII.140 ad 8.58.5.  See also Tucker and Kirchhoff (see n.2 for exact citations) for “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” 
taken to be referring back to 8.29.2.  See also pp.677-678 for Hornblower (CT iii.929) taking 8.58.5 as 
referring to the rate of pay agreed at 8.29. 
 
5
 See Hornblower, CT iii.836-838 for the various solutions proposed for the question of what the rate of pay 
agreed on at 8.29.2 actually was. 
 
6
 See n.2 for citation. 
 
7
 See n.2 for citation.  Cawkwell (ibid.) states that “and in the formal treaty there is no more than a clause to 
the effect that Tissaphernes ‘should provide pay for the ships currently present in accordance with what 
had been agreed’ [emphasis in the original] (8.58.4) (sic).  The reference must be to the original agreement 
at Sparta.”  But Cawkwell never demonstrates why the reference must be to the original agreement at 
Sparta (rather than, to follow the logic of the rate of pay argument, the agreement reached at 8.29.2 
between Tissaphernes and the Spartans).  Cawkwell’s interpretation of 8.58.5 as referring back to 8.5.5 is 
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specify, the rate of pay promised by Tissaphernes at 8.5.5 was almost certainly one 
drachma per man per day.)
8
   
Andrewes interpreted “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” to imply that a rate of pay for the 
Peloponnesians—that, according to Andrewes, had been left to be decided by the King at 
8.29.1
9
 (and still not had been at 8.45.6)—had been settled by him in the meantime, but 
Thucydides had omitted, for some reason or another, this information from his 
narrative.
10
  In the absence of any mention of a rate of pay in the treaty, and the supposed 
ruling from the King on the rate of pay for the Peloponnesian sailors, Andrewes, offering 
the rate agreed between the King and the Spartans in 408/7 tentatively as a parallel, 
suggested that the rate referred to at 8.58.5 may have been three obols a day.
11
  
Hornblower took the agreement to be most likely referring to 8.29, “which specifically 
                                                                                                                                                 
also odd, since he states (ibid.) that neither at 8.5.5 nor at 8.29.1 were Tissaphernes’ promises to provide 
the pay of the Peloponnesians “put into any sort of formal agreement.” 
 
8
 See again Lewis (1977) 88 n.29 (and Lévy [1983] 223 n.18). 
 
9
 8.29.1:  “τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγιγνοµένου χειµῶνος, ἐπειδὴ τὴν Ἴασον κατεστήσατο ὁ Τισσαφέρνης ἐς φυλακήν, 
παρῆλθεν ἐς τὴν Μίλητον, καὶ µηνός µὲν τροφήν, ὥσπερ ὑπέστη ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίµονι, ἐς δραχµὴν Ἀττικὴν 
ἑκάστῳ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ διέδωκε, τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐβούλετο τριώβολον διδόναι, ἕως ἂν βασιλέα 
ἐπέρηται· ἢν δὲ κελεύῃ, ἔφη δώσειν ἐντελῆ τὴν δραχµήν”; “[d]uring the following winter [412/11], after he 
had placed Iasus in charge of a garrison, Tissaphernes came to Miletus, where he distributed to all the ships 
a month’s pay, as he had promised at Lacedaemon to do, to the amount of an Attic drachma a day for each 
man; for the future, however, he proposed to give only three obols until he should ask the King; if the King 
should so order, he would give the full drachma.” 
 
10
 HCT v.142:  “”at 29.1, 45.6, the king had not yet ruled on the rate of pay; by now he has done so, but the 
fact is not yet noted in its place by Thucydides.”  Cf. HCT v.70, 102.  Citing Andrewes, Kallet comments 
on 8.58.5-6 ([2001] 266):  “[w]hich agreement is mentioned in the treaty is unclear, but it implies that the 
King had fixed a rate of pay, and that he would provide the pay to be disbursed by Tissaphernes.”  Rood 
(see n.2 above for citation) also does not specify what “fixed rate of pay” he thinks Thucy. 8.58.5 refers to. 
 
11
 Offered only tentatively since Andrewes was aware (see pp.675-676 n.3 above) that the rate of pay 




mentioned the need for the King’s approval.”
12
  He continued:  “[i]f, as seems likely, the 
King had indeed given approval at some point, Th. has not told us this (so Andrewes)... 
The reference [to “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα”] will be twofold:  (1) to the level of pay 
envisaged at 29.1 (a drachma a day), as (2) approved by the King at some unknown 
subsequent moment.”  Thus, Hornblower, in assuming that 8.58.5 was referring to a prior 
agreement on a rate of pay later approved by the King, and offering an interpretation of 
8.58.5 based on this assumption, had to adopt Andrewes’ rather desperate solution of 
assuming Thucydides’ failure to note an important point in the agreements on and 
machinations concerning the pay given by the Persians to the Peloponnesians in the 
course of the historian’s description of the early years of the Ionian war,
13
 in a narrative 




There are, then, problems for each of these previously proposed solutions to the 
proper interpretation of 8.58.5, problems that are, in fairness, acknowledged by most of 
the scholars advancing them:  admitted uncertainty regarding the validity of the proposed 
interpretations, or the resort to unsatisfactory assumptions, or both.  In the rest of this 
appendix, I will argue that the uncertainty as to what “τὰ ξυγκειµένα” at 8.58.5 refer to, 
                                                 
12
 See p.676 n.4 for the citation for this and the following quote. 
 
13
 Cf. Lévy’s treatment of this clause [(1983) 236]:  he supposed that “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείµενα” must be 
referring to “modalités de financement” such as a rate of pay, or the number of men to be paid by 
Tissaphernes; on that basis, since these modalities had already ignited various conflicts prior to the treaty 
(though most of the conflicts he cites (at [1983] 236 n.122) are, in fact, subsequent to the treaty), “on ne 
sait à quelles conventions précises fait allusion le texte” ([1983] 236).  See also section iv below on Lévy’s 
treatment of 8.58.5. 
 
14




and the despairing assumptions regarding Thucydidean vagueness or incompleteness this 
uncertainty has given rise to, have come about not because of the lack of clarity or 
fullness of Thucydides’ narrative, but because the scholars working on this passage have 
been looking for the wrong sort of earlier agreement.  All of the works discussed so far 
have assumed without discussion or argument that “τὰ ξυγκειµένα” of 8.58.5 refer to an 
earlier agreement between Tissaphernes (approved by the King or not) and the Spartans 
on a rate of pay for the sailors of the Peloponnesian triremes.  But, as I hope to 
demonstrate below, there are no grounds for this assumption (or for the linked 
assumption that 8.58.5 is referring to an agreed rate of pay now approved by the King).  
And after considering 8.58.5 and the phrase “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” first within the context 
of the three agreements made between the Spartans and the Persians in 412 and 411, and 
then within the context of the whole of the section treating pay in the third treaty between 
the Spartans and the Persians, and the events leading up to that treaty, I will posit another 
explanation of 8.58.5, one that does not require uncertain reference to some earlier 
mentioned rate of pay, or the assumption of Thucydidean failure of any kind.  Having 
done this, I will then be in a position to state what the rate of pay expected by the 











There is a striking consistency in the content of the three treaties agreed between 
the Spartans and Persians in the years between 412 and 411.
16
  They consist of largely 
similar clauses, although these clauses tend to become more precise, and more formal, 
over the course of the three treaties.
17
  The first treaty, concluded between Tissaphernes 
and Chalcideus (8.17.4), recognizes the right of the King to both the territory and cities 
he holds and those his ancestors held, and contains an undertaking by the Spartans to act 
in concert with the Persians to stop the Athenians collecting tribute (or anything else) 
from the cities now recognized as belonging to the King (8.18.1); agrees on joint 
prosecution of the war and against making a separate peace with the Athenians (8.18.2); 
and engages each of the parties to consider any who revolt from the other party as 
enemies (8.18.3).  As commentators on this first treaty have pointed out, the advantage of 
this last clause lay wholly with the Persians:  one of the two motives
18
 lying behind 
Tissaphernes’ initial request for ships from the Spartans was a desire to gain their help in 
                                                 
15
 Although the first two agreements between Tissaphernes and Spartans were not treaties formally ratified 
by the authorities at Sparta and the King, the third being the only agreement holding this status (see 
Andrewes, HCT v.40, 143, and esp. 90 ad 8.43.4; Lévy [1983] 226-227; Cawkwell [2005] 149-150; 
Hornblower, CT iii.928), Thucydides described and referred to them as treaties (see Lévy [1983] 228), and 
since it is also the modern scholarly convention to refer to them as such, I will do so, too. 
 
16
 See Lévy (1983) 222. 
 
17
 See Andrewes, HCT v.143, Lévy (1983) 224 and n.36. 
 
18
 8.5.5:  see there also for the other, and primary, motive lying behind Tissaphernes’ approach to the 
Spartans: the King’s demand for tribute from the Greek cities in the area under Tissaphernes’ control, 
tribute which the Persians had not been able to collect because of the Athenian control of these cities.  The 
issue of the collection of tribute in the cities under the King’s control is one of the first issues to be 




the capturing of Amorges, a Persian in Caria who had rebelled from the King, and whom 
the King had ordered Tissaphernes to capture dead or alive (8.5.5);
19
 in contrast, the 
Spartans at this time were not in danger of any immediate defections from their alliance, 
and thus had nothing to gain from this clause.
20
  Accordingly, after the capture of 
Amorges (8.28.1-3), the clause does not reappear in the two later treaties.
21
 
The second treaty makes some slight alterations to the first two clauses of the first 
treaty,
 22
 but also includes a new clause on pay to reflect the now substantial presence of 
the Peloponnesian fleet off the coast of Asia Minor.  The explicit statement of the first 
treaty about the extent of the King’s territorial possessions is replaced in the second with 
a mutual non-aggression agreement barring each party from attacking the other’s 
territory; but the definition of what constitutes the King’s territory in this clause is 
effectively the same as that of the first treaty (8.37.2).
23
  This non-aggression pact is 
backed up by a positive undertaking by each party that they will intervene to stop any of 
                                                 
19
 Lewis (1977) 91; Andrewes, HCT v.41-42; Lévy (1983) 232. 
 
20
 See Lewis (1977) 91 on the Persian undertaking to assist the Spartans in the event of a revolt of one of 
their allies:  “... it is hard to see who is in mind, and no doubt this is simply a courteous balancing-clause.”  
Cf. Lévy (1983) 232:  this clause is founded on “une fausse réciprocité” since “le camp lacédémonien n’est 
alors menacé d’aucune défection.” 
 
21
 See Andrewes, HCT v.42, Lévy (1983) 233.  Although the language of this clause specifying a promise 
not to support revolts from the other party does disappear from the second and the third treaties, the thrust 




 Lewis (1977) 93:  “[m]uch of the difference between the [first and second] treaties is a matter of nuance.” 
 
23
 The first treaty recognizes the King’s possession of “Ὁπόσην χώραν καὶ πόλεις βασιλεὺς ἔχει καὶ οἱ 
πατέρες οἱ βασιλέως εἶχον” (8.18.1), the second his possession of “Ὁπόση χώρα καὶ πόλεις βασιλέως εἰσὶ 




their allies or subjects attacking the other party (8.37.5).
24
  The clause in the first treaty 
engaging the Spartans’ assistance in preventing the Athenians collecting tribute from 
cities belonging to the King is replaced by a clause barring the Spartans or any of their 
allies exacting tribute from cities belonging to the King (8.37.2).  8.37.4, a clause 
enjoining the Spartans and the Persians to wage war together, and to make peace with the 
Athenians together is “more succinct than 18.2, but not in substance different.”
25
 
There are two clauses in the second treaty that do not appear in the first.  8.37.3 
recognizes any later agreements necessitating changes to the second treaty as valid.
26
  
That this provision did not appear in the first treaty is readily explicable given that that 
agreement was “concerned entirely with Tissaphernes’ immediate needs” and should be 
regarded as “no more than a preliminary working arrangement between the forces on the 
spot.”
27
  Also, importantly, the second treaty includes a clause on pay for the first time:  
the King will meet the expenses of any forces summoned by him and operating in his 
territory (8.37.4).  That a clause on pay had not appeared in the first treaty is also readily 
explicable.  The first treaty had not included a clause providing for Persian maintenance 
of Peloponnesian sailors because there were not, at that point in time, any Peloponnesian 
                                                 
24
 For this interpretation of 8.37.5, see Lévy (1983) 233 and n.102, Hornblower, CT iii.856-857 (contra 
Andrewes, HCT v.80-81). 
 
25
 Andrewes, HCT v.80; cf. Lévy (1983) 235. 
 
26
 A common clause in Greek treaties allowing for unforeseen circumstances or later negotiations (see 
Andrewes, HCT v.80 ad loc.):  there is no reason (despite Andrewes’ (ibid.) mention of rates of pay in his 
note on this clause:  see below pp.693-694) to think that this clause “pourrait s’appliquer aussi au 
financement de l’expédition,” contra Lévy (1983) 235. 
 
27
 See Andrewes, HCT v.80.  This provision does not appear in the third treaty, either:  see below p.685 




ships present off the coast of Asia Minor for the Persians to provide pay to.
28
  By the time 
of the second treaty, however, Peloponnesian and allied ships were operating in force off 
the coast of Asia Minor, and cooperating with Tissaphernes (see 8.25.2, 8.28-29, 8.35.1-
2), and thus a provision for the financing of their fleet was now inserted into the 
agreement between the Spartans and the Persians.
29
 
The third treaty begins again with a clause recognizing the extent of the King’s 
empire, now again, as in the first treaty, in the form of an explicit statement: his territorial 
possessions are now expressly limited to Asia (8.58.2):  this limitation was most probably 
in response to Lichas’ objections that the second treaty, which recognized the King’s 
territory as that which he or his forefathers had held, allowed the King to claim authority 
over Greek lands as far as Boeotia (8.43.3).
30
  The grandiloquent second clause of the 
treaty that “concerning his own country the King shall determine as he pleases [καὶ περὶ 
τῆς χώρας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βούλεται]” (8.58.2) probably expresses 
                                                 
28
 See Andrewes, HCT v.40; see also Hornblower, CT iii.801, 855:  as Hornblower points out, Kallet 
([2001] 256 (cf. 251)) is therefore incorrect in seeing the omission in the first treaty of a provision for 
Persian payments to the Peloponnesian fleet as evidence of Spartan financial “amateurishness.” 
 
29
 Lévy describes 8.37.4 as a “formule habile qui lie les deux volets de l’accord:  reconnaissance des droits 
du Roi et financement de l’expédition” ([1983] 235).  In other words, Lévy assumes that a clause assigning 
responsibility for the payment of the Peloponnesian ships was not, on its own, significant enough to 
warrant inclusion in the second treaty:  its inclusion has to be explained by its “formule habile” linking the 
Peloponnesian receipt of pay to Spartan acknowledgement of the rights of the King.  But, as I have just 
noted, the changes in the military situation between the time of the first and the second treaties provide 
more than sufficient explanation for the inclusion of a clause assigning responsibility for pay in the second 
treaty (cf. Hornblower, CT iii.856).  See also p.694 n.64 below for further discussion of this point. 
 
30
 See Lewis (1977) 104-105. As Andrewes points out (HCT v.140), however, the phrasing of this clause 
(“χώραν τὴν βασιλέως, ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστι, βασιλέως εἶναι”) “allows that there is still territory in Europe 
which he may regard as his.”  Cf. Hornblower, CT iii.928; Lévy (1983) 230.  See also Cawkwell (2005) 
149:  this clause of the third treaty could also be seen as an improvement for the Persians in that “‘whatever 
territory and cities the King holds or the King’s fathers held’ might be questioned on the ground that 
Darius’ father, Artaxerxes I, had ceded control of the Greek cities of Asia, and his grandfather, Xerxes, had 




the King’s uncontested claim to tribute from the territory he claims as his.
31
  The third 
and fourth clauses, 8.58.3-4, a mutual non-aggression pact and positive undertakings on 
each side to prevent any of their allies or subjects attacking the other side, are slightly 
modified versions of 8.37.2 and 5:
32
 the slight changes were almost certainly in response 
to the fears of Tissaphernes (attested at 8.57.1) that the Peloponnesian trireme crews 
might be thinking of plundering Persian territory to obtain money.
33
  There are then two 
clauses on pay, 8.58.5-6, again, as in the second treaty, apportioning responsibility for the 
payment of the Peloponnesian ships:  the responsibility for this will shift to the Spartans 
and their allies when the King’s ships (i.e. a Phoenician fleet of one hundred and forty-
seven ships which was being equipped by Tissaphernes for use in the Aegean) arrive.
34
  
The treaty ends with clauses in which the Spartans and Persians agree to wage war 




The basic issues agreed between the Spartans and the Persians remain the same 
over the course of the three treaties, then—the extent of the King’s territory, his right to 
                                                 
31
 See Lévy (1983) 234, Hornblower, CT iii.928.  See also Andrewes, HCT v.140-141 for discussion of this 
clause, and esp. HCT v.140:  “it should be self-evident that the king may do as he will with his own, and 
some reason has to be found why this should be secured explicitly in the treaty; a likely answer is that in 
the course of the negotiations some possible limitation on his powers had been discussed.” 
 
32
 Cf. Andrewes, HCT v.141, Lévy (1983) 233 and n.102. 
 
33
 Note in this respect that 8.58.4, unlike 8.37.2 and 8.37.5, enjoins the Spartans and their allies, and the 
King, to prevent individuals from their respective forces from harming the other’s territories. 
 
34
 See 8.46.1, 5, 8.59 and Hornblower, CT iii.1004-1005 (ad 8.87). 
 
35




tribute, the mutual non-aggression pact and the promise to act against any party 
contravening the non-aggression pact, the joint prosecution of the war and the agreement 
to end it together, (and once the Peloponnesians have arrived in the theater of operations) 
the clauses assigning responsibility for the pay of the Peloponnesian ships
36
—although as 
the agreements develop from the “working arrangement” that is the first treaty to the fully 
‘worked up’ third treaty (a document that appears to represent a striving for finality in the 
arrangements between the Spartans and Persians),
37
 the introductions to the agreements 
are increasingly more official,
38
 the language of the agreements become more precise, the 
individual provisions of the treaties become more formal and appropriate for a 
conventional Greek treaty,
39
 and the clauses on military action and pay more “concrete” 
to reflect changes in the circumstances of the war (the arrival of a substantial 
Peloponnesian naval presence in the eastern Aegean; the imminent arrival of the King’s 
ships).
40
  These are all intelligible developments.
41
  Thus, the content of each clause of 
                                                 
36
 As noted above (pp.680-681 and n.21), although the language of 8.18.3 disappears from the later treaties, 
the basic import of that clause is still present in the mutual non-aggression clauses of the text of the second 
and third treaties. 
 
37
 See Andrewes, HCT v.143.  This effort for finality, together with the fact that the final treaty appears to 
view the end of the war with the Athenians as near (or at least foreseeable) and the more “concrete” 
(Andrewes, (ibid.)) nature of its clauses on military action, probably explains the omission of any clause in 
the final treaty recognizing any later agreements necessitating changes to it as valid (cf. 8.37.3). 
 
38
 See Andrewes (ibid.) on the prescript to the third treaty:  “[t]he inclusion of other Persians besides 
Tissaphernes, the elaboration of the preamble, the date given in both Persian and Spartan terms, all suggest 
a more resolute attempt to draft a document for formal ratification.” 
 
39
 Cf. Andrewes, HCT v.80 (ad 8.37.2, 3), and 82 (on the second treaty generally):  “[t]his is, at least in its 
language, much more like a regular treaty between independent partners.  18.1 and 3, with their 
concentration on the interests of Persia, are replaced by provisions which are formally reciprocal, except on 






each treaty makes sense on its own terms, but the slightly altered and new clauses of the 
second and third treaties also make sense as easily discernible modified versions of 
clauses in the first and second treaties, respectively.  To conclude this section, then, the 
point I wish to make is that, given the nature and content of the three treaties between the 
Spartans and Persians, there is no need to go outside the text of these agreements in order 
to locate the earlier clauses of which the provisions of the second and third treaties are 
slightly modified versions.   
 
iii. 8.58.5 within its immediate context 
8.58.5 forms part of a discrete section of the third treaty treating the pay of the 
Peloponnesian fleet: 
τροφὴν δὲ ταῖς ναυσὶ ταῖς νῦν παρούσαις Τισσαφέρνη παρέχειν κατὰ τὰ 
ξυγκείµενα µέχρι ἂν αἱ νῆες αἱ βασιλέως ἔλθωσιν· (6) Λακεδαιµονίους δὲ καὶ 
τοὺς ξυµµάχους, ἐπὴν αἱ βασιλέως νῆες ἀφίκωνται, τὰς ἑαυτῶν ναῦς, ἢν 
βούλωνται, τρέφειν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι.  ἢν δὲ παρὰ Τισσαφέρνους λαµβάνειν 
ἐθέλωσι τὴν τροφήν, Τισσαφέρνη παρέχειν, Λακεδαιµονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς 
ξυµµάχους τελευτῶντος τοῦ πολέµου τὰ χρήµατα Τισσαφέρνει ἀποδοῦναι ὁπόσα 
ἂν λάβωσιν. 
 
Tissaphernes shall provide pay for the ships now present, according to 
the agreement, until the arrival of the King’s ships; (6) but after the arrival of the 
King’s vessels the Lacedaemonians and their allies may pay their own ships if 
they wish it.  If, however, they choose to receive pay from Tissaphernes, 
Tissaphernes shall furnish it; and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall repay 
him at the end of the war such moneys as they shall have received.
42
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
41
 Cf. Cawkwell (2005) 149. 
 
42
 I take “τὰς ἑαυτῶν ναῦς, ἢν βούλωνται, τρέφειν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι” as allowing the Spartans the choice of 
whether they want to maintain their fleet or not, with Hornblower, CT iii.930 ad loc. contra, e.g., 
Andrewes, HCT v.142 ad loc. (the latter interpreted this clause as assigning responsibility to the Spartans 
and their allies to pay their men on the arrival of the King’s ships).  In either case, the clause will be still be 
concerned with the question of which party will be maintaining the Spartan fleet and thus the controversy 





8.58.5-6 is a section of the treaty that has a consistent thrust and an internal 
coherence:  these clauses are wholly concerned with responsibility for payment, and not 
with rates of pay; to be more precise, the clauses on pay here detail whose responsibility 
it will be in the future (i.e. from the time of the treaty onwards) to provide pay for the 
Peloponnesian ships, and in which circumstances.  Thus, at 8.58.5, the payment of the 
Peloponnesian ships in the immediate future is the subject under consideration:  τροφή for 
the ships present off the coast of Asia Minor, according to the previous agreement (“κατὰ 
τὰ ξυγκειµένα”), is to be provided by Tissaphernes until the King’s ships come.  8.58.6 
then follows without any change in topic from 8.58.5:  in the first clause of 8.58.6 
following 8.58.5, it is agreed that, in the event of the King’s ships arriving—i.e., when 
the strategic circumstances of the war in the eastern Aegean will have changed on 
account of the King’s ships’ arrival there—the responsibility for funding the pay of the 
Peloponnesian triremes will fall upon the Spartans and their allies;
43
 the obligation to 
provide pay to the Peloponnesian sailors will longer be Tissaphernes’, who has the 
responsibility to provide pay only until the moment of the King’s ships arrival in the 
Aegean. 
Thus if one considers 8.58.5 in its immediate context, one sees that its reference 
to an earlier agreement (“τὰ ξυγκειµένα”) forms an integral part of a section of the third 
treaty detailing who was to pay, from the time of that treaty onwards, the Peloponnesian 
ships which were then operating off the coast of Asia Minor.  There is therefore no 
                                                 
43
 In the event of the King’s ships arriving, the Spartans and their allies can, if they wish (see previous 
note), as the treaty states, receive the money for pay for their ships from Tissaphernes, but it is agreed that 
they will have to pay back this money at the end of the war; it is, therefore, wholly accurate to say that the 
responsibility for paying the Peloponnesian ships will shift from Tissaphernes to the Spartans and their 




reason to take “τὰ ξυγκειµένα” at 8.58 as referring to an earlier agreement setting a rate 
of pay, and every reason to take it as referring to an earlier agreement that stated that 
Tissaphernes was to provide pay for the Peloponnesian ships.  And, in fact, an earlier 
agreement can be found in Thucydides’ narrative with just such a provision.  As noted in 
section ii above, there is a clause in the second treaty between Tissaphernes and the 
Spartans detailing which party was to be responsible for the pay of any military force of 
the Peloponnesians operating in the King’s country (in which Asia Minor is included):
44
  
“the expense of all forces in the King’s country, sent for by the King, shall be borne by 
the King.”
45
  The obligation of the King to maintain the Peloponnesian ships in Asia 
Minor is thereby explicitly established by this clause.  8.58.5, then, with its reference to 
Persian payments to the ships “now present” refers to those Peloponnesian ships 
summoned by the Persians and operating in Persian territory (in which Asia Minor is 
included by the agreements), and the prior agreement referred to at 8.58.5 (“τὰ 
ξυγκειµένα”) is the clause on pay agreed on by the two parties in the second treaty at 
8.37.4, detailing the responsibility of the Persians for the pay of Peloponnesian crews 
operating in the King’s territory (i.e. Asia Minor and its surrounding waters).  That the 
King is specified as the provider of pay at 8.37.4, whereas Tissaphernes is at 8.58.5, does 
not present a problem for this view:  despite the language of 8.37.4, it was Tissaphernes 
who provided pay for the Peloponnesian force in the period between the second and third 
                                                 
44
 See 8.37.2 and Andrewes, HCT v.80. 
 
45







 the reference to the King as provider of pay at 8.37.4 should therefore be 
understood loosely, and taken as denoting a general Persian responsibility to maintain the 
Peloponnesian ships that had come to fight on the Persian side.
47
  The section on pay in 
the third treaty (8.58.5-6) was included, then, in order to modify the clause on pay in the 
second treaty (8.37.4), to allow for a change in the provider of pay to the Peloponnesian 
ships, on the arrival of the Phoenician ships.
48
  Put simply, to place 8.58.5 back into the 
wider context of the three treaties as a whole, the clauses of 8.58.5-6 are, just as the rest 
of the clauses in the third treaty between the Spartans and the Persians, a slightly 
modified version of a similar clause in the second treaty between those two parties:
49
  “τὰ 
ξυγκειµένα” of 8.58.5 do not refer, then, to an earlier agreement between Tissaphernes 
and the Spartans establishing a rate of pay for the men of the Peloponnesian fleet, but to 
                                                 
46
 See 8.45.2, 8.45.6 (with Andrewes, HCT v.142, Kallet [2001] 266 n.119), 8.50.3, 8.57.1-2.  In addition, 
note that Tissaphernes was paying the Peloponnesians before the second treaty (see 8.29.1-2) and after the 
third (see 8.78, 8.80.1, 8.83-84, 8.87, 8.99). 
 
47
 At the risk of circularity, that 8.37.4 should be understood in this way is confirmed by 8.58.5-6, and the 
explicit statement there that the Peloponnesian ships were to be paid by Tissaphernes “according to the 
agreement” until the King’s ships should arrive, and the implication therefrom that he had been doing so 
since the prior agreement on pay, i.e., 8.37.4. 
 
48
 It also, as pointed out by Lewis ([1977] 106 n.95; cf. Andrewes, HCT v.80 ad 8.37.4, µεταπεµψαµένου 
βασιλέως), modified the earlier clause on pay, in that the final treaty withdrew the theoretical possibility 
left by the second treaty (37.4) that the King may send for more Peloponnesian ships. 
 
49
 It should be noted that it is only in the case of 8.58.5 that Andrewes thinks one of the treaties is “referring 
outside itself” (“to ξυγκείµενα which must have been negotiated earlier and separately”) (HCT v.143); and 
that Lévy, in an examination of the use of the terms ξυνθῆκαι and ξυγκείµενα to describe the three treaties, 
goes outside the context of the three treaties to explain the meaning of these terms only to explain the use 
of ξυγκείµενα at 8.58.5:  see (1983) 228 n.68.  It should also be noted in respect of this question that 
Thucydides uses the terms ξυνθῆκαι and ξυγκείµενα in book 8 to denote only the three treaties between the 
Spartans and the Persians (Lévy [1983] 228), and no other agreement between them (such as those reached 




an earlier agreement at 8.37.4 assigning responsibility for the pay of the Peloponnesian 




iv. The inclusion of clauses apportioning responsibility for pay in the second and 
third treaties; and the reason why rates of pay were not included in these treaties 
The clauses of 8.58.5-6, then, represent a series of linked provisions outlining 
how the expenses of the joint Peloponnesian-Persian campaign against the Athenians 
were to be shared between the requesting (Persian) and summoned (Peloponnesian) states 
from the time of the third treaty onwards.  They are a comprehensible development on a 
similar clause in the second treaty between the Spartans and the Persians.  Thus, there is 
no need for the assumption that there is an allusion to an agreement on a rate of pay in the 
words “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” at 8.58.5.  So why have so many scholars assumed that 
these words must be referring to a previously agreed rate of pay?  The beginning of an 
answer to this question emerges from an examination of Edmond Lévy’s treatment of the 
clauses on pay in the second and third treaties. 




Jusque-là [the arrival of the royal fleet] Tissapherne entretiendra la flotte 
actuellement présente selon les dispositions convenues (κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείµενα).  Il 
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 Krüger ([1858-61] II.2.137) in his comments on 8.58.5 and, in particular, on “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα,” 
already noted that this phrase referred back to the second treaty:  “[n]ach dem mit Theramenes 
geschlossenen Vertrage.  (Ds.)  Wohl nur allgemein mit Bezug auf 8.37.3 [sic]:  τὴν δαπάνην βασιλέα 
παρέχειν.”  But, as I have shown (see n.2 above), Krüger is in a minority of one on this question and his 
interpretation of 8.58.5-6 has had no influence on subsequent readings of this clause and the formation of 
the scholarly consensus on the proper interpretation of 8.58.5, so that a full argumentation for the view that 
8.58.5 is referring back to 8.37.4 is still called for here. 
 
51




paraît difficile de voir dans cette dernière expression une simple allusion au fait 
que la chose avait déjà été décidée, ne serait-ce que dans le deuxième accord.  Il 
faut plutôt supposer qu’on s’était mis d’accord sur les modalités de financement 
(solde journalière, nombre d’hommes à payer, etc.), modalités qui avaient déjà 
suscité de nombreux conflits.  S’il en est bien ainsi, on ne sait à quelles 




Lévy, then, rejected the view that “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” could refer to 8.37.4
53
 on 
the grounds that such a reference would be too obvious (“une simple allusion”); the 
implication must be—and I think it is safe to say this without misrepresenting Lévy’s 
intentions here—that Lévy thought that if the phrase “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” referred 
simply to a clause delimiting responsibility for payment of the Peloponnesian ships, it 
would be otiose—the phrase needed (“il faut plutôt supposer”) to refer to something else 
to be of enough importance to warrant inclusion in the third treaty.   
 But certain developments in the relationship between Tissaphernes and the 
Spartans in the time between the second and third treaties had the consequence that a 
clause in the third treaty apportioning responsibility for the pay of the Peloponnesian fleet 
was in no way redundant.  In the period between the making of the second and third 
treaties, the issue of who was to pay for the Peloponnesian fleet was a live one.  The 
eleven Spartan ξύµβουλοι who had been sent out
54
 to act as advisers to Astyochus (the 
Spartan commander of the Peloponnesian fleet) had, on meeting with Tissaphernes at 
Cnidos to discuss the terms of the first two treaties with the Persian (8.43.2), rejected the 
terms of those treaties, and renounced any claim to receive pay from Tissaphernes 
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 (1983) 236. 
 
53










  Having refused to observe the terms of the first two treaties, and thus 
broken with Tissaphernes—who had left the conference with the Spartans in a rage 
without having settled anything (8.43.4)—the Spartans had then attempted to provide pay 
for the Peloponnesian fleet from the resources of their allies (and without asking 
Tissaphernes for money).
56
  Although the Peloponnesians were able to levy thirty-two 
talents from the Rhodians (8.44.4), and still presumably had some money remaining from 
the sack of Iasus (8.36.1), their attempt to self-finance the fleet’s pay was a failure; within 
a couple of months, there was no longer any money for the pay of the men of the fleet 
(8.57.1).
57
  It was, in fact, precisely this lack of pay that caused Tissaphernes to approach 
the Spartans again towards the end of the winter of 412/411.  Afraid that their lack of 
money might force the Peloponnesians to fight a possibly unsuccessful naval battle 
against the Athenians, or to desert their ships—in either case destroying the balance 
between the two warring sides that he was striving for (see esp. 8.46.5)—or that it might 
force them to plunder his territory in search of money (8.57.1), Tissaphernes supplied the 
Peloponnesians with pay and concluded a third treaty with them (8.57.2). 
With these events in mind, one can see why the clause on pay in the second treaty 
assigning responsibility for payment for the Peloponnesian ships to Tissaphernes was 
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 Lichas, one of the Spartan ξύµβουλοι, rejecting the territorial provisions of the first two treaties “urged 
that another and better treaty be concluded; at any rate, the Spartans would not abide by this, nor did they 
need [Tissaphernes’] pay at all upon such terms” (“ἑτέρας οὖν ἐκέλευε βελτίους σπένδεσθαι, ἢταύταις γε οὐ 
χρήσεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῆς τροφῆς ἐπὶ τούτοις δεῖσθαι οὐδέν”) (8.43.4). 
 
56
 See 8.44.1:  the Spartans “thought that they would be able by themselves to maintain their fleet, on the 
basis of the existing alliance, without asking Tissaphernes for money (“... ἡγούµενοι αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ τῆς 
ὑπαρχούσης ξυµµαχίας δυνατοὶ ἔσεσθαι, Τισσαφέρνη µὴ αἰτοῦντες χρήµατα, τρέφειν τὰς ναῦς”). 
 
57




reaffirmed in the third treaty, and why it was necessary that it be reaffirmed.  The break 
in relations with Tissaphernes between the second and third treaties, the refusal to 
observe the terms of the first two treaties, and the Peloponnesian attempt at self-financing 
in the months before the conclusion of the third treaty, taken together, had the result that 
Persian responsibility for paying the Peloponnesian fleet could not be taken for granted in 
any new treaty between the Spartans and the Persians and that any prior undertaking by 
Tissaphernes to pay the Peloponnesians had to be reconfirmed.  The phrase “κατὰ τὰ 




 Lévy, as noted above,
59
 also thought that 8.37.4 did not “do enough” in itself to 
merit inclusion in the second treaty.  This sense, that the clause on pay at 8.37.4 is in 
some way lacking, is present, too, in other treatments by scholars who believe that “τὰ 
ξυγκειµένα” at 8.58.5 refer to a rate of pay.  Thus, Kallet states of the clause on pay in the 
second treaty that “a rate of pay is conspicuously absent” from it.
60
  Although there is no 
mention of a rate of pay at 8.37.4, Andrewes found a reference to a rate of pay at 8.37.3, 
and that clause’s allowance for later negotiations and unforeseen circumstances,
61
 
although there was no explicit reason or positive evidence for this interpretation of 8.37.3 
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 Lévy was also incorrect in citing Xen., Hell. 1.5.5 in relation to the question of the meaning of “κατὰ τὰ 
ξυγκείµενα” at 8.58.5 ([1983] 236 n.122) (see above pp.675-676 n.3). 
 
59
 See p.683 n.29. 
 
60
 (2001) 257. 
 
61
 See Andrewes, HCT v.80 ad locc.  See also HCT v.82:  “[t]he king’s obligations to maintain the 




(based, as it was, on the assumption that 8.58.5 is a back reference to an agreement 
settling a rate of pay).  Lewis commented of 8.37.4 that “hard figures are avoided” in it—
the implication being that the omission of a rate of pay here was worthy of note.
62
  The 
assumption underlying all of these criticisms of 8.37.4 is, then, that any clause in a treaty 
assigning responsibility for the payment of military forces ought to include a rate of 
pay:
63
  as 8.37.4 does not, this has to be commented on or explained away.  Although, as 
I have demonstrated, the clause on pay at 8.37.4 makes sense on its own terms and does 
not have to be explained away,
64
 I raise this point again because it is precisely the same 
assumption that also underlies these scholars’ and the consensus interpretation of the 
phrase “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” at 8.58.5:  that a clause on pay in any treaty should refer to 
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 (1977) 94:  see also n.93 there suggesting an explanation for the lack of “hard figures”:  “[i]f the 
Peloponnesians or Hermocrates wanted to put them in, they were doubtless put off with the reminder that 
the King’s will was still not known on this point.” 
 
63
 Cf. Cawkwell (2005) 150:  the omission of any reference to a rate of pay at 8.37.4 one of the reasons why 
“Thucydides must be found deficient in omitting” the matter of pay. 
 
64
 See pp.682-683 above:  the military context in which the second treaty was concluded—i.e. the presence 
of the Peloponnesian triremes off the coast of Asia Minor and the joint operations of Tissaphernes and the 
Peloponnesians—differed from the first.  In addition, there was also, in the period just before the 
conclusion of the second treaty, the feeling among the Peloponnesians—despite the fact that their µισθός 
was being paid sufficiently at this time and that the war was well-provided for in general (8.36.1)—that the 
first treaty was “lacking” (“ἐνδεεῖς”), and not so much to their own interest as Tissaphernes’ (8.36.2), and so 
a new treaty was needed with the Persian.  Thus, in order to reflect the changed military context and 
Spartan dissatisfaction with the first treaty, the provisions of this second treaty were framed to make them, 
in contrast to the first treaty, “formally reciprocal” (Andrewes, HCT v.82), and 8.37.4 and its provision for 
Persian payment of the Peloponnesian ships was included in the second treaty.  (Kallet ([2001] 256) writes 
that the Spartans saw the first treaty as wanting because it did not include any provision for pay—in 
opposition to Andrewes who thought “ἐνδεεῖς” to be “a question of... politics” (HCT v.79).  But the second 
treaty improved the Spartan position both financially and politically:  one should not see this in ‘either... or’ 
terms.  That said, 8.37.4 is, as Hornblower states ad loc. (CT iii.856), “the main respect in which, from the 




a rate of pay, and therefore that the clause in the third treaty assigning responsibility for 
the pay of the Peloponnesian ships should specify a rate of pay.
65
 
But the assumption that either of the clauses in the second and third treaties 
between the Spartans and the Persians ought to have specified the rates of pay to be 
distributed to the Peloponnesian ships ignores the fact that rates of pay for the 
Peloponnesian ships had already been agreed or set before these treaties, and thus did not 
need to be mentioned in them.
66
  At the beginning of the winter of 412/11, an agreement 
was reached between Tissaphernes and the Spartans whereby the Tissaphernes distributed 
a month’s pay at an Attic drachma a day per man and promised for the future to pay at a 
rate of a little over three obols per day per man (and that he would give a drachma again 
if the King so ordered) (8.29.1-2):
67
  this agreement was still in force when the second 
treaty between the Persians and the Spartans was concluded in the same winter (at some 
point before the solstice of 412 recorded at 8.39.1); the rate of pay for the Peloponnesian 
ships was not a matter of controversy and therefore there was no reason to include it in 
that treaty.  At some undeterminable point in the same winter, after the second treaty but 
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 Although evidence for this belief does not emerge explicitly in treatments of 8.58.5—though it lurks 
there silently in the unspoken assumptions underlying those treatments—it can be seen in the comments on 
8.37.4 noted just above, and from the fact that 8.58.5 has not attracted the same criticism or comments as 
8.37.4—because of the assumption that it includes a reference to a rate of pay. 
 
66
 Note also that while provisions in classical and Hellenistic treaties detailing how the expenses of any 
potential campaign(s) were to be shared among summoning and summoned states very often did specify 
rates of pay for the military force summoned to provide military aid to its treaty partner (see examples in 
Garlan (1977) 150-158, esp., e.g., 5.47.6 (cf. chapter 5 section iv)), they sometimes did not (cf., e.g., ML 42 
(although fragmentary, it appears that no rate of pay is mentioned here); SEG 28.461 (with discussion at 
appendix 5 section ii); Garlan [1977] 154 n.1). 
 
67




before the third treaty,
68
 Tissaphernes (on Alcibiades’s advice) unilaterally cut the pay of 
the Peloponnesian sailors to three obols per man per day (8.45.2); this rate was agreed 
with the trierarchs and generals of the Peloponnesian fleet (except the Syracusans) 
(8.45.3), although, in the aftermath of the reduction, Alcibiades promised that the 
Peloponnesians would get their full drachma (rather than three obols) per day again when 
money arrived from the King (8.45.6).  That a drachma per day was thought of as their 
proper and full pay by the Peloponnesians can be seen by the Peloponnesians’ claims for 
it later in the same winter (8.50.2).  Again, then, the rate of pay for the Peloponnesian 
triremes had been the subject of updated agreements and detailed announcements before 
the third treaty:  the rate of one drachma per day was acknowledged by both sides; it was 
Tissaphernes’ failure to pay this rate that was the cause of dispute and controversy 
between the two sides and not the rate itself; again, therefore, there was no need to 
include a rate of pay in the third treaty.
69
  Again, there is no need to search for a rate of 
pay at 8.37.4 or 8.58.5:
 
 therefore the assumption underlying the scholarly consensus on 
the phrase “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκειµένα” at 8.58.5 has no basis and should be rejected.
 70
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 See chapter 6 section iv for discussion of this point, and for the rest of the paragraph. 
 
69
 The Spartan advisors’ renunciation of financial aid from Tissaphernes took place at some point after 
8.50.2 and the Peloponnesian claims for their full drachma:  see 8.50.2 with 8.41.1 together with 8.52 and 
8.43.2.  But the question of the Peloponnesian trireme crews’ rate of pay did not feature in the Spartan 
advisors’ disputes with Tissaphernes, or as a reason for their brief break with him:  regarding pay, the sole 
issue at hand in their dispute with the satrap was the question of who would provide it for the 
Peloponnesian triremes.  There was, then, no change in or controversy regarding the Peloponnesians’ 
expected rate of pay between 8.50.2 and the time of the third treaty. 
 
70
 And with this assumption gone, nor is there a basis any longer for the linked assumption that 8.58.5 
refers to a previously agreed rate of pay that had been approved by the King prior to the treaty.  To 
demonstrate this fully will require extensive quotation of the main adherents to this view.  Andrewes, in his 
commentary (HCT v.142) ad Τισσαφέρνη παρέχειν, stated:  “[Tissaphernes] is naturally the agent, but the 
text does not make it clear whether or not the money was the king’s.  The money brought to Sparta or 
promised there at 5.5-6.2 was presumably the satraps’ own, and at 45.6 Tissaphernes was still paying out of 




If one no longer looks through the distorting lenses of the assumption that 8.58.5-
6 is referring to a prior agreement between Tissaphernes and the Spartans on a rate of 
pay, but instead considers 8.58.5 within its proper context, then Thucydides’ presentation 
of all issues regarding the pay of the Peloponnesian trireme crews in book 8 become 
clear, complete and comprehensible.  Since 8.58.5 does not refer to any agreement on a 
rate of pay, but simply apportions responsibility for payment of the Peloponnesian ships 
present in the theater of operations to Tissaphernes, and there is no other indication of a 
change in the rate of pay offered to the Peloponnesians after the machinations described 
at 8.45.2 and 8.45.6, we can take it therefore that there was no change in the rate of pay, 
or rather the expected rate of pay, between the events described at 8.29.1, 8.45.6, and 
8.50.3, when Thucydides used the term µισθὸς ἐντελής (or variations thereof) to refer to a 
rate of pay of one drachma per man per day that the Peloponnesian sailors expected to be 
disbursed to them, and those described at 8.78 and 8.83.2-3, when the Peloponnesians 
were complaining that they were not receiving their µισθὸς ἐντελής from Tissaphernes:  
                                                                                                                                                 
and it is likely enough that the king had now taken over the expense.”  Following on from this, in his 
comments ([1981] 142) ad κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείµενα, Andrewes continued (as noted above:  see p.677):  “at 
29.1, 45.6, the king had not yet ruled on the rate of pay; by now he has done so, but the fact is not yet noted 
in its place by Thucydides.”  Lewis ([1977] 104) thought along the same lines as Andrewes:  “[t]he 
question of the rate of pay had been referred to the King (29.1); it has now evidently been settled (58.5), 
though we are not told on what terms.”  Hornblower’s interpretation of 8.58.5 and “κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείµενα” is 
also dependent on the idea of the King’s subsequent approval of a rate pay agreed previously by 
Tissaphernes with the Spartans (see pp.677-678 above).  But, as I have shown, there is also no reason to 
assume that 8.58.5-6 is evidence for the King’s approval of a previous agreement on a rate of pay for the 
Peloponnesian sailors; this assumption is based on the baseless assumption that 8.58.5 refers to a prior 
agreement between Tissaphernes and the Spartans on a rate of pay; there is also no reason to assume, nor 
any evidence, that the King gave his approval to a rate of pay agreed by Tissaphernes with the 
Peloponnesian fleet prior to the third treaty.  In addition, contra Andrewes, it is nowhere explicitly stated at 
8.58.5-6 that the money to be disbursed by Tissaphernes will come from the King (see Kallet [2001] 266); 
this is simply assumption.  These arguments hold even if one does accept Lewis’ arguments ([1977] 104) 




i.e. the “full pay” referred to as not being paid at 8.78 and 8.83.2-3 still meant the “full 
drachma” of 8.29.1 and 8.45.6.  The Peloponnesian sailors were still, then, in the summer 
of 411, expecting a rate of pay of one drachma per day per man, but were receiving less:  
they were almost certainly receiving only three obols per day at this time (see 8.45.2, 6) 
(and that irregularly).  Despite their complaints and their unwillingness to serve for less 
than the expected rate of a drachma a day, it seems that the men serving in the 
Peloponnesian fleet had, in the absence of the Athenians’ capability to pay any more than 
three obols, soon to become accustomed to such a rate from the Persians in the early 
years of the Ionian War; this at least is what is implied by the agreement reached in the 
winter of 408/7 by the Spartans and the King that the latter should pay only three obols 
per day per man to the Peloponnesians (see Xen., Hell. 1.5.5 with pp.675-676 n.3 
above).
71
  But one should note that, even in 407, the Spartans could still propose a rate of 
pay of one drachma per man per day to Cyrus, who had recently come down to the coast 
to take charge of Persian affairs in Asia Minor, for the sailors of the Peloponnesian fleet 
in the Aegean (Xen., Hell. 1.5.4).  The expectation of one drachma per man per day, no 
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 Consider also the fact that the desertion from the Athenian fleet on the eventual rise in pay of the 
Peloponnesian fleet to four from three obols is presented as a (potential) new development in the war:  see 
chapter 5 section iii. 
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Appendix 7:  Figures for Proceeds from the Sale of Plunder in the Fifth 




Source Victor Date  From Sum 







Greeks/Plataeans 479 Persians 
(Plataea) 








415 Hyccara 120 T (Th), 
100 T (D) 
Thucy. 6.95 Argos 414 Thyreatis 25 T 







Catane 300 minae 
Xen., H.G. 
3.4.24 




Agesilaos 394 Asia Minor 1,000 T 
Diod. 15.14.4 Dionysios 384 Agylle  500 T 
Dem. 20.77 Chabrias 376 Spartans 110 T 
Diod. 15.47.7 Iphicrates
5




                                                 
1
 Pritchett’s table of specific figures for booty ([1971] 75-76) contains several inaccuracies and some sums 
of money that were raised from exactions and raids on temples rather than from the proceeds of sales of 
plunder.  T=talents. 
 
2
 This poem is an inscription on a tripod stating that Gelo, Hiero, Polyzalus, and Thrasybulus dedicated 
four tripods at Delphi out of fifty talents and a hundred litres of gold, being a tithe of the tithe of their 
victory over the Carthaginians.   Multiplying by one hundred to get the total amount of the booty, one 
arrives at the sum of six thousand and four hundred talents. 
 
3
 On the proposal of Cleocritus the Corinthian, the Plataeans were awarded for the prize for valour, and 
eighty talents of the spoils were accordingly set aside for them, with which money they, as Plutarch tells us, 
“rebuilt the sanctuary of Athena, set up the shrine and decorated the temple with frescoes which have 
remained in perfect condition to this day.” 
 
4
 See pp.109-110 n.240 for the date. 
 
5
 Timotheus is wrongly included by Diodorus. 
 
6
 Diodorus writes that Timotheus (see previous note) and Iphicrates captured nine Syracusan triremes 
attempting to provide aid to the Spartans at Corcyra and sold their crews for more than sixty talents.  
Xenophon (Hell. 6.2.35-36), however, writes that the captured Syracusan crews were ransomed (and does 
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FGrH 328 F 
162, 
Theopompus  
FGrH 115 F 
292 
Philip  340 Merchant ships 
to Athens under 
the protection of 
Chares 
700 T 





                                                                                                                                                 
not provide a figure for the proceeds of their ransom).  The brief account of the episode at Polyaenus, 
Strateg. 3.9.55 mentions neither sale nor ransom of captives. 
 
7
 See pp.497-498 n.168 for discussion of this figure. 
 
8
 Diodoros states that the 440 talents were the proceeds of the sale of the thirty thousand captives taken in 
the capture of the city.  Cleitarchus mentions the same figure, but applies it to the total wealth found in the 
city (Athenaeus, 4.148D-F; FGrH 137 F 1). 
 
